Ms Bubbles Inc v. Rue 21, Inc. et alNOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION for Partial Summary JudgmentC.D. Cal.November 17, 2016R O BI N S K A PL A N L LP A T T O R N E Y S A T L A W LO S A N G E L E S 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 61245757.1 RUE21’S NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT David Martinez, Bar No. 193183 DMartinez@robinskaplan.com Jill S. Casselman, Bar No. 266085 JCasselman@robinskaplan.com ROBINS KAPLAN LLP 2049 Century Park East, Suite 3400 Los Angeles, CA 90067‐3208 Telephone: (310) 552‐0130 Facsimile: (310) 229‐5800 Attorneys for Defendant rue21, Inc. UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA MS. BUBBLES, INC., a California corporation, Plaintiff, v. RUE 21, INC., a Delaware corporation; MJCK CORPORATION, a California corporation dba NOBILITY; and DOES 1‐10, inclusive, Defendants. Case No. CV 15‐09301 AB (KLSx) [Assigned to the Honorable André Birotte Jr.] DEFENDANT RUE21, INC.’S NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT Date: December 19, 2016 Time: 10:00 a.m. Courtroom: 4 [Memorandum of Points and Authorities; Separate Statement of Uncontroverted Facts and Conclusions of Law; [Proposed] Order; Declarations of Gretchen Stryker and David Martinez filed concurrently herewith] TO PLAINTIFF AND ITS ATTORNEYS OF RECORD: PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that on December 19, 2016 at 10:00 a.m., or as soon thereafter as the Motion may be heard at the United States District Court, located at 312 N. Spring Street, Courtroom 4, Los Angeles, CA 90012, Defendant rue21, Inc. (“rue21”) will and hereby does move this Court, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56, for an order granting Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on Plaintiff Ms. Bubbles, Inc.’s claim to statutory damages and attorneys’ fees. Case 2:15-cv-09301-AB-KS Document 88 Filed 11/17/16 Page 1 of 2 Page ID #:1427 R O BI N S K A PL A N L LP A T T O R N E Y S A T L A W LO S A N G E L E S 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 61245757.1 ‐ 2 ‐ RUE21’S NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT The Motion is made on the ground that Plaintiff failed to register for copyright registration prior to commencement of the alleged infringement, and is consequently barred from recovering either statutory damages or attorneys’ fees under 17 U.S.C. § 412. This Motion is based upon this Notice of Motion, the Memorandum of Points and Authorities, the Declarations of Gretchen Stryker and David Martinez, the Separate Statement of Uncontroverted Facts and Conclusions of Law, the exhibits filed concurrently herewith, the [Proposed] Order filed concurrently herewith, the Court’s file on this matter, and upon such and further evidence and argument as may be presented prior to or at the time of the hearing on this Motion. RULE 7‐3 CERTIFICATION This motion is made following the conference of counsel pursuant to L.R. 7‐ 3 which took place on July 7, 2016 and August 17‐18, 2016. The parties were unable to resolve the issues raised in this Motion. DATED: November 17, 2016 ROBINS KAPLAN LLP By: /s/ David Martinez _ David Martinez Attorneys for Defendant rue21, Inc. Case 2:15-cv-09301-AB-KS Document 88 Filed 11/17/16 Page 2 of 2 Page ID #:1428 R O BI N S K A PL A N L LP A T T O R N E Y S A T L A W LO S A N G E L E S 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 61245758.1 MEMORANDUM OF P&A IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT David Martinez, Bar No. 193183 DMartinez@robinskaplan.com Jill S. Casselman, Bar No. 266085 JCasselman@robinskaplan.com ROBINS KAPLAN LLP 2049 Century Park East, Suite 3400 Los Angeles, CA 90067‐3208 Telephone: (310) 552‐0130 Facsimile: (310) 229‐5800 Attorneys for Defendant rue21, Inc. UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA MS. BUBBLES, INC., a California corporation, Plaintiff, v. RUE 21, INC., a Delaware corporation; MJCK CORPORATION, a California corporation dba NOBILITY; and DOES 1‐10, inclusive, Defendants. Case No. CV 15‐09301 AB (KLSx) [Assigned to the Honorable André Birotte Jr.] DEFENDANT RUE21, INC.’S MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT Date: December 19, 2016 Time: 10:00 a.m. Courtroom: 4 [Notice of Motion and Motion for Partial Summary Judgment; Separate Statement of Uncontroverted Facts and Conclusions of Law; [Proposed] Order; Declarations of Gretchen Stryker and David Martinez filed concurrently herewith] Defendant rue21, Inc. (“rue21”) hereby respectfully submits its Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of its Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on Ms. Bubbles, Inc.’s (“Plaintiff”) claim for statutory damages and attorney’s fees, as follows: Case 2:15-cv-09301-AB-KS Document 88-1 Filed 11/17/16 Page 1 of 14 Page ID #:1429 R O BI N S K A PL A N L LP A T T O R N E Y S A T L A W LO S A N G E L E S 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 61245758.1 i MEMORANDUM OF P&A IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT Table of Contents Page I. INTRODUCTION .............................................................................................. 1 II. STATEMENT OF FACTS .................................................................................... 2 III. LEGAL STANDARD ........................................................................................... 2 IV. AS A MATTER OF LAW, PLAINTIFF IS NOT ENTITLED TO RECOVER STATUTORY DAMAGES OR ATTORNEY’S FEES ................................................ 3 V. CONCLUSION .................................................................................................. 9 Case 2:15-cv-09301-AB-KS Document 88-1 Filed 11/17/16 Page 2 of 14 Page ID #:1430 R O BI N S K A PL A N L LP A T T O R N E Y S A T L A W LO S A N G E L E S 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 61245758.1 ‐ ii ‐ MEMORANDUM OF P&A IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT Table of Authorities Page(s) Cases Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242 (1986) ............................................................................................. 3 Bouchat v. Bon‐Ton Dep’t Stores, Inc., 506 F.3d 315 (4th Cir. 2007) ............................................................................ 7, 8 Business Trends Analysts, Inc. v. Freedonia Group, Inc., 887 F.2d 399 (2d Cir.1989) ................................................................................... 4 Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986) ............................................................................................. 3 Derek Andrew, Inc. v. Poof Apparel Corp., 528 F.3d 696 (9th Cir. 2008) ........................................................................ 4, 5, 6 Dyer v. Napier, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11855 (D.Ariz. March 16, 2006) ......................................... 6 Ez‐Tixz, Inc. v. Hit‐Tix, Inc., 919 F. Supp. 728 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) ......................................................................... 5 Gerig v. Krause Publications, Inc., 58 F. Supp. 2d 1261 (D. Kan. 1999) ...................................................................... 5 Gloster v. Relios, Inc., 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 43995 (E.D. Pa. June 28, 2006) ....................................... 6, 8 In re Oracle Corp. Sec. Litig., 627 F.3d 376 (9th Cir. 2010) ................................................................................ 3 Johnson v. Jones, 149 F.3d 494 (6th Cir. 1998) ................................................................................ 5 Johnson v. Univ. of Virginia, 606 F. Supp. 321 (W.D. Va. 1985) ........................................................................ 5 Livingston v. Art. com, Inc., 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 95519 (N.D. Cal. July 11, 2014) .......................... 5 Case 2:15-cv-09301-AB-KS Document 88-1 Filed 11/17/16 Page 3 of 14 Page ID #:1431 R O BI N S K A PL A N L LP A T T O R N E Y S A T L A W LO S A N G E L E S 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 61245758.1 ‐ iii ‐ MEMORANDUM OF P&A IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (1986) ............................................................................................. 3 Morgan v. Hawthorne Homes, Inc., 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 59210 (W.D. Pa. June 2, 2011) ................................... 6, 7, 8 Parfums Givenchy, Inc. v. C & C Beauty Sales, Inc., 832 F. Supp. 1378 (C.D. Cal. 1993) ............................................................... 4, 5, 6 Polar Bear Prods., Inc. v. Timex Corp., 384 F.3d 700 (9th Cir. 2004) ................................................................................ 4 Robert R. Jones Associates, Inc. v. Nino Homes, 858 F.2d 274 (6th Cir.1988) ................................................................................. 4 Singh v. Famous Overseas, Inc., 680 F.Supp. 533 (E.D.N.Y. 1988) .......................................................................... 5 Statutes 15 U.S.C § 504(c)(1) .................................................................................................. 7 17 U.S.C. § 106 .......................................................................................................... 3 17 U.S.C. § 412 ................................................................................... 1, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9 17 U.S.C. § 412(2) ............................................................................................. 4, 5, 8 17 U.S.C. § 501 .......................................................................................................... 3 17 U.S.C. § 504 ....................................................................................... 3, 4, 6, 7, 8, 9 17 U.S.C. § 504(a) ...................................................................................................... 4 17 U.S.C. § 504(b) ..................................................................................................... 4 17 U.S.C. § 504(c) ...................................................................................................... 4 17 U.S.C. § 505 .......................................................................................................... 4 Rules Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a) ................................................................................................... 3 Case 2:15-cv-09301-AB-KS Document 88-1 Filed 11/17/16 Page 4 of 14 Page ID #:1432 R O BI N S K A PL A N L LP A T T O R N E Y S A T L A W LO S A N G E L E S 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 61245758.1 ‐ iv ‐ MEMORANDUM OF P&A IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT Other Authorities H.R. Rep. No. 1476, reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. .................................................. 8 Case 2:15-cv-09301-AB-KS Document 88-1 Filed 11/17/16 Page 5 of 14 Page ID #:1433 R O BI N S K A PL A N L LP A T T O R N E Y S A T L A W LO S A N G E L E S 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 61245758.1 ‐ 1 ‐ MEMORANDUM OF P&A IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES I. INTRODUCTION Plaintiff alleges in this action that rue21 has infringed its alleged copyright over its “Great Architect” fabric design.1 This motion raises an axiomatic, black‐letter principle of copyright law – a plaintiff who fails to register for copyright registration prior to the commencement of the alleged infringement is precluded from recovering statutory damages and/or attorney’s fees. 17 U.S.C. § 412. Here, as shown below, Plaintiff did not register its copyright until April 7, 2015. Yet the alleged infringement commenced weeks earlier ‐ no later than February 12, 2015 ‐ when rue21 emailed its vendor MJCK a reproduction (“Accused Design”) of the Subject Design without authorization, and certainly no later than February 18, 2015 when rue21 issued purchase orders to MJCK for several thousand garments bearing the Accused Design.2 Indeed, case law universally holds that infringement “commences” for purposes of determining eligibility for statutory damages and attorney’s fees upon the first act of infringement, even where there are subsequent acts of infringement of the same copyright. Further, while Section 412 provides a safe harbor where the Plaintiff registers a published work within three months of publication, Plaintiff cannot avail itself of the Section 412 safe harbor because it published the Subject Design on March 31, 2014, over a year before it registered it on April 7, 2015. As such, the Court should grant summary adjudication on 1 Hereinafter “Great Architect” or “Subject Design”. 2 rue21 disputes Plaintiff’s claims of direct and derivative copyright infringement, as the Subject Design is comprised entirely of stock, unprotectable elements which existed in the public domain long before Plaintiff’s registration, and is therefore not subject to copyright protection. This motion, however, exclusively addresses Plaintiff’s improper prayer for statutory damages and attorney’s fees. Case 2:15-cv-09301-AB-KS Document 88-1 Filed 11/17/16 Page 6 of 14 Page ID #:1434 R O BI N S K A PL A N L LP A T T O R N E Y S A T L A W LO S A N G E L E S 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 61245758.1 ‐ 2 ‐ MEMORANDUM OF P&A IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT Plaintiffs’ prayer for statutory damages and attorney’s fees. II. STATEMENT OF FACTS rue21 is a national retailer of clothing apparel with outlets across the United States.3 Plaintiff asserts direct and derivative copyright infringement, claiming that rue21 infringed Plaintiff’s alleged copyright in the Subject Design.4 Plaintiff alleges that rue21 “infringed Plaintiff’s copyrights by copying the Subject Design, and by producing, distributing, and selling fabric and/or garments incorporating the Subject Design without Plaintiff’s consent or permission,” and that it “knowingly induced, participated, and aided and abetted in, and profited from, the copying and/or subsequent selling of garments and/or fabrics featuring the Subject Design.” SSF ¶ 3. Plaintiff registered its alleged copyright in the Subject Design with the USCO on April 7, 2015. SSF ¶ 4. As per its Certificate of Registration, Plaintiff first published the Subject Design on March 31, 2014. SSF ¶ 5. On February 12, 2015, rue21 emailed its vendor, Defendant MJCK Corporation (“MJCK”), attaching a copy of the Subject Design, and asked MJCK to reproduce the Accused Design on several thousand tank tops. SSF ¶ 6. On February 18, 2015, rue21 issued two purchase orders for tank tops bearing the Accused Design to MJCK. SSF ¶ 7. III. LEGAL STANDARD Summary judgment is appropriate when there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). The party moving for summary judgment has the initial burden of 3 See Declaration of Gretchen Stryker, (“Stryker Decl.”) ¶ 2. 4 United States Copyright Office (“USCO”) Registration Number VAu 1‐958‐351. See Separate Statement of Undisputed Material Facts (“SSF”), ¶¶ 1‐2. Case 2:15-cv-09301-AB-KS Document 88-1 Filed 11/17/16 Page 7 of 14 Page ID #:1435 R O BI N S K A PL A N L LP A T T O R N E Y S A T L A W LO S A N G E L E S 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 61245758.1 ‐ 3 ‐ MEMORANDUM OF P&A IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT identifying the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247‐48 (1986); In re Oracle Corp. Sec. Litig., 627 F.3d 376, 387 (9th Cir. 2010). Where, as here, the moving party meets its burden, the non‐moving party must identify facts showing that a genuine issue for trial exists. In re Oracle Corp. Sec. Litig., 627 F.3d at 387 (citing Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 324 (1986)). The non‐moving party may not rely on the pleadings but must come forward with evidence from which a fact finder could reasonably render a verdict in its favor. Id. (citing Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252). “The nonmoving party must show more than the mere existence of a scintilla of evidence” or “some ‘metaphysical doubt’ as to the material facts at issue.” Id. (quoting Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986)). IV. AS A MATTER OF LAW, PLAINTIFF IS NOT ENTITLED TO RECOVER STATUTORY DAMAGES OR ATTORNEY’S FEES The owner of a copyright is afforded the exclusive right to reproduce, distribute, display or perform the protected work, or to make derivative works, and to authorize others to do the same. 17 U.S.C. § 106. Copyright infringement occurs when a defendant impinges upon one of these exclusive rights without the copyright owner’s permission, i.e., by reproducing, distributing, displaying or performing the protective work, making derivative works, or authorizing others to do any of these acts. 17 U.S.C. § 501 (“Anyone who violates any of the exclusive rights of the copyright owner . . . is an infringer of the copyright or right of the author, as the case may be.”) Pursuant to the Copyright Act, a copyright owner in a civil infringement lawsuit may elect one of two types of damages: (1) actual damages and “any additional profits of the infringer” or (2) statutory damages. 17 U.S.C. § 504(a)‐(c). Case 2:15-cv-09301-AB-KS Document 88-1 Filed 11/17/16 Page 8 of 14 Page ID #:1436 R O BI N S K A PL A N L LP A T T O R N E Y S A T L A W LO S A N G E L E S 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 61245758.1 ‐ 4 ‐ MEMORANDUM OF P&A IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT The court may also award “a reasonable attorney’s fee to the prevailing party.” 17 U.S.C. § 505. The Copyright Act, however, makes clear that copyright registration is a prerequisite to recovery of statutory damages and/or attorney’s fees. Specifically, 17 U.S.C. § 412 provides in pertinent part: In any action under this title, . . . no award of statutory damages or of attorney’s fees, as provided by sections 504 and 505, shall be made for— (1) any infringement of copyright in an unpublished work commenced before the effective date of its registration; or (2) any infringement of copyright commenced after first publication of the work and before the effective date of its registration, unless such registration is made within three months after the first publication of the work. Id. Section 412(2) thus bars a copyright owner from recovering statutory damages or attorney’s fees for copyright infringement of a published work if: (1) the copyright was registered more than three months after the work was first published, and (2) the infringing activity commenced after the date of first publication and before the effective date of registration of the work. See Derek Andrew, Inc. v. Poof Apparel Corp., 528 F.3d 696, 701 (9th Cir. 2008); Parfums Givenchy, Inc. v. C & C Beauty Sales, Inc., 832 F. Supp. 1378, 1393 (C.D. Cal. 1993).5 Moreover, as the Ninth Circuit has explained, Section 412 “leaves no room for discretion,” mandating that attorney’s fees and statutory damages are barred where the infringement “commences” after publication but before registration, and the plaintiff does not register within three months of publication. Derek Andrew, Inc., 528 F.3d at 701 (emphasis added), citing Polar Bear Prods., Inc. v. Timex Corp., 384 F.3d 700, 707 n.5 (9th Cir. 2004).6 5 Citing, e.g., Business Trends Analysts, Inc. v. Freedonia Group, Inc., 887 F.2d 399, 403–04 (2d Cir.1989); Robert R. Jones Associates, Inc. v. Nino Homes, 858 F.2d 274, 281 (6th Cir.1988). 6 See also Gerig v. Krause Publications, Inc., 58 F. Supp. 2d 1261, 1268 (D. Kan. 1999) (Section 412 “leaves no room for discretion, mandating that no attorney’s Case 2:15-cv-09301-AB-KS Document 88-1 Filed 11/17/16 Page 9 of 14 Page ID #:1437 R O BI N S K A PL A N L LP A T T O R N E Y S A T L A W LO S A N G E L E S 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 61245758.1 ‐ 5 ‐ MEMORANDUM OF P&A IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT Further, “[e]very court to consider the issue has held that infringement ‘commences’ for the purposes of § 412 when the first act in a series of acts constituting continuing infringement occurs.” Derek Andrew, Inc., 528 F.3d at 701 (emphasis added); Parfums Givenchy, Inc., 832 F. Supp. at 1393 (“the first act of infringement in a series of ongoing separate infringements ‘commence[s]’ one continuing ‘infringement’ under Section 412(2).”); Ez‐Tixz, Inc. v. Hit‐Tix, Inc., 919 F. Supp. 728, 736 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (“The alleged acts of infringement that occurred after the copyright was registered do not constitute new acts of infringement but a continuation of the infringement that ‘commenced’ prior to registration.”); Singh v. Famous Overseas, Inc., 680 F.Supp. 533, 535–36 (E.D.N.Y. 1988) (holding that infringement does not “commence” with each new act in an ongoing infringement, because “it would be peculiar if not inaccurate to use the word ‘commenced’ to describe a single act”).7 Indeed, Courts have consistently rejected attempts by plaintiffs to parse an ongoing pattern of infringing conduct into pre‐and post‐registration events, and routinely find a “continuing infringement,” where “the pre‐ and post‐registration infringement is part of one continuing pattern of conduct.” See, e.g.,Livingston v. Art.com, Inc., 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 95519,*24‐28 (N.D. Cal. July 11, 2014) (finding continuing infringement as to chain of events amongst several defendants, including infringement by one defendant by way of improper licensing agreement prior to registration and sales and purchases by other defendants after registration) (emphasis added); Parfums Givenchy, Inc., 832 F. Supp. at 1393 fees or statutory damages be awarded so long as the infringement commenced before registration of the copyright.”), citing Johnson v. Jones, 149 F.3d 494, 505 (6th Cir. 1998). 7 See also Johnson v. Univ. of Virginia, 606 F. Supp. 321, 325 (W.D. Va. 1985) (holding that infringement does not “commence” with each new act in an ongoing infringement because “ascribing such a meaning to the term “commenced” would totally emasculate § 412.”); Johnson, 149 F.3d at 506 (“Every court to consider this question has come to the same conclusion; namely, that infringement ‘commences’ for the purposes of § 412 when the first act in a series of acts constituting continuing infringement occurs.”). Case 2:15-cv-09301-AB-KS Document 88-1 Filed 11/17/16 Page 10 of 14 Page ID #:1438 R O BI N S K A PL A N L LP A T T O R N E Y S A T L A W LO S A N G E L E S 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 61245758.1 ‐ 6 ‐ MEMORANDUM OF P&A IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT (finding continuing course of infringement which “commenced” with the initial act of copying; subsequent importations and sales did not commence separate acts of infringement); Morgan v. Hawthorne Homes, Inc., 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 59210, *9 (W.D. Pa. June 2, 2011) (inquiry is “whether Defendants’ alleged acts of post‐ registration infringement were a continuation of its initial pre‐registration infringement.”). Thus, where there is a continuing pattern of conduct, the single infringement rule applies although the defendant violates separate provisions of the Copyright Act, or sells different products that violate the same copyright. See, e.g., Parfums Givenchy, Inc., 832 F. Supp. at 1393 (rejecting argument a new infringement occurred “each time the defendant infringed a separate provision of the Copyright Act.”); Dyer v. Napier, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11855, at *8‐10 (D.Ariz. March 16, 2006)(finding continuing infringement where the defendant infringed by “creating” an infringing sculpture before registration and then “selling” the sculpture after registration; post‐registration customizing of sculpture by changing its size, surface texture and adding features did not commence a new infringement); Gloster v. Relios, Inc., 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 43995, at *4 (E.D. Pa. June 28, 2006) (holding that creating and selling new jewelry designs after plaintiff’s copyright registration did not commence a new infringement even though the defendant sold different accused jewelry items); Derek Andrew, Inc., 528 F.3d at 701 (statutory damages claim barred where infringement through sale of certain garments commenced before registration, even though infringement continued after registration through sale of different garments) (emphasis added). Indeed, Courts have found continuing infringement under Section 412 where one defendant infringes before the registration, and separate defendants infringe after registration. Thus, in Bouchat v. Bon‐Ton Dep’t Stores, Inc., 506 F.3d 315, 331 (4th Cir. 2007), the plaintiff sued the Baltimore Ravens alleging that its Case 2:15-cv-09301-AB-KS Document 88-1 Filed 11/17/16 Page 11 of 14 Page ID #:1439 R O BI N S K A PL A N L LP A T T O R N E Y S A T L A W LO S A N G E L E S 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 61245758.1 ‐ 7 ‐ MEMORANDUM OF P&A IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT logo infringed the plaintiff’s copyright. The Ravens announced the allegedly infringing logo in June, 1996, and the plaintiff registered in July, 1996. The Court found that the Ravens’ subsequent infringement, including its licensing and sales, was part one infringement for purpose of Section 412. The plaintiff later sued manufacturers and retailers that used, made or sold the logo. The Court rejected the plaintiff’s claim to fees and statutory damages under Section 412 as to these defendants as well, reasoning that their alleged infringement was rooted in the Ravens’ pre‐registration announcement of the logo. Id., at 324‐326; 329‐331. Similarly, in Morgan v. Hawthorne Homes, Inc., supra, the Court found a continuing course of infringement where one defendant infringed by “making copies” of architectural plans before registration, and other defendants infringed by making derivative works of the plans and building houses after registration. It reasoned that “[e]ach act of infringement stems from the initial acquisition and copying of Morgan’s drawings by Hawthorne Homes, and their later use by the subsidiaries of Hanna Holdings.” Morgan, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 59210, *10. The Court thus concluded that “[t]here is no legally significant difference between the pre‐registration conduct and the post‐registration conduct (if at all) that would suggest that the alleged infringement was anything but an ongoing series of infringements that commenced in 2001.” Id. Further, under the continuing infringement rule, “the fact that the liability of the various [defendants] is grounded in contributory or vicarious infringement makes no difference.” Id. The continuing infringement rule under Section 412 is also rooted in the remedial statutory framework underlying Section 504 of the Copyright Act, which provides that an eligible plaintiff may only recover a single “award of statutory damages for all infringements involved in the action…” See 15 U.S.C 504(c)(1) (emphasis added); cf. Bouchat v. Bon‐Ton Dep’t Stores, Inc., 506 F.3d at 331 (“Because a statutory damages award covers ‘all infringements involved in the Case 2:15-cv-09301-AB-KS Document 88-1 Filed 11/17/16 Page 12 of 14 Page ID #:1440 R O BI N S K A PL A N L LP A T T O R N E Y S A T L A W LO S A N G E L E S 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 61245758.1 ‐ 8 ‐ MEMORANDUM OF P&A IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT action ... for which’ infringers are liable, id. it is appropriate to treat the earliest date of infringement by any participant in a line of related copyright violations as the date of commencement.”); Morgan, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 59210, *11 (same). The Legislative History of Section 504 is in accord: The House Report explains that “[a] single infringer of a single work is liable for a single amount . . ., no matter how many acts of infringement are involved in the action and regardless of whether the acts were separate, isolated, or occurred in a related series.” Gloster, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 43995, *7 (citing H.R. Rep. No. 1476 at 162, reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5659, 5778). These well‐settled principles similarly require summary adjudication under Section 412 of Plaintiff’s claims for attorney’s fees and statutory damages in this case. First, Plaintiff cannot avail itself of the Section 412 safe harbor because it published the Subject Design on March 31, 2014, over a year before it registered it on April 7, 2015. See 17 USC 412(2) (safe harbor for work published at time of infringement where registration is made within three months after the first publication of the work); cf. SSF ¶¶ 4‐5. Second, the alleged infringement “commenced” under Section 412 months before Plaintiff’s registration. Plaintiff did not register the Subject Design until April 7, 2015, even though it first published it on March 31, 2014. See SSF, ¶¶ 4‐5. On February 12, 2015, almost two months prior to Plaintiff’s registration, rue21 reproduced the Accused Design and distributed it to MJCK. SSF ¶ 6. rue21 purchased, and MJCK sold, allegedly infringing tank tops bearing the Accused Design via purchase orders dated February 18, 2015, also well before Plaintiff’s copyright registration. SSF ¶ 7.8 Assuming arguendo that Plaintiff’s copyright in the Subject Design is valid, 8 Further, the accused garments arrived at rue21’s distribution centers on or about March 24, 2015, and rue21 offered for sale and sold accused garments commencing on March 26, 2015. Case 2:15-cv-09301-AB-KS Document 88-1 Filed 11/17/16 Page 13 of 14 Page ID #:1441 R O BI N S K A PL A N L LP A T T O R N E Y S A T L A W LO S A N G E L E S 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 61245758.1 ‐ 9 ‐ MEMORANDUM OF P&A IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT rue21’s copying and distribution of the Accused Design on February 12, 2015, constitute “the first act in a series of acts constituting continuing infringement.” The incontrovertible evidence establishes that the alleged infringement allegedly “commenced” for purposes of Section 412 prior to Plaintiff’s copyright registration. In short, pursuant to Sections 412 and 504 and the wealth of authority cited above, Plaintiff’s claim for statutory damages and attorney’s fees is barred. Accordingly, rue21 is entitled to an Order granting partial summary judgment in its favor. V. CONCLUSION rue21 respectfully requests that the Court grant this motion for partial summary judgment in its entirety. DATED: November 17, 2016 ROBINS KAPLAN LLP By: /s/ David Martinez _ David Martinez Attorneys for Defendant rue21, Inc. Case 2:15-cv-09301-AB-KS Document 88-1 Filed 11/17/16 Page 14 of 14 Page ID #:1442 R O BI N S K A PL A N L LP A T T O R N E Y S A T L A W LO S A N G E L E S 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 61246126.1 STATEMENT OF UNCONTROVERTED FACTS AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW David Martinez, Bar No. 193183 DMartinez@robinskaplan.com Jill S. Casselman, Bar No. 266085 JCasselman@robinskaplan.com ROBINS KAPLAN LLP 2049 Century Park East, Suite 3400 Los Angeles, CA 90067‐3208 Telephone: (310) 552‐0130 Facsimile: (310) 229‐5800 Attorneys for Defendant rue21, Inc. UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA MS. BUBBLES, INC., a California corporation, Plaintiff, v. RUE 21, INC., a Delaware corporation; MJCK CORPORATION, a California corporation dba NOBILITY; and DOES 1‐10, inclusive, Defendants. Case No. CV 15‐09301 AB (KLSx) [Assigned to the Honorable André Birotte Jr.] DEFENDANT RUE21, INC.’S SEPARATE STATEMENT OF UNCONTROVERTED FACTS AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT Date: December 19, 2016 Time: 10:00 a.m. Courtroom: 4 [Notice of Motion and Motion for Partial Summary Judgment; Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment; [Proposed] Order; Declarations of Gretchen Stryker and David Martinez filed concurrently herewith] Pursuant to Local Rule 56‐1, Defendant rue21, Inc. (“rue21”) respectfully submits the following Statement of Uncontroverted Facts and Conclusions of Law in support of rue21’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on Plaintiff Ms. Bubbles, Inc.’s (“Plaintiff’s”) claim for statutory damages and attorneys’ fees, as follows: Case 2:15-cv-09301-AB-KS Document 88-2 Filed 11/17/16 Page 1 of 10 Page ID #:1443 R O BI N S K A PL A N L LP A T T O R N E Y S A T L A W LO S A N G E L E S 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 61246126.1 ‐ 2 ‐ STATEMENT OF UNCONTROVERTED FACTS AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW UNCONTROVERTED FACTS UNCONTROVERTED FACT EVIDENCE 1. Plaintiff asserts direct and derivative copyright infringement claims, alleging that rue21 infringed Plaintiff’s alleged copyright over Great Architect. Complaint. 2. Plaintiff claims that rue21 infringed Plaintiff’s alleged copyright in a design referred to as “Design 6627/Great Architect”, United States Copyright Office (“USCO”) Registration Number VAu 1‐958‐ 351 (hereafter, the “Great Architect” or the “Subject Design”). Complaint. 3. Specifically, Plaintiff alleges that rue21 “infringed Plaintiff’s copyrights by copying the Subject Design, and by producing, distributing, and selling fabric and/or garments incorporating the Subject Design without Plaintiff’s consent or permission,” and that it “knowingly induced, participated, and aided and abetted in, and profited from, the copying and/or subsequent selling of garments and/or fabrics featuring the Subject Design”. Complaint, ¶¶ 17, 25. 4. Plaintiff registered its alleged copyright in the Subject Design with the USCO on April 7, 2015. Exh. A to Declaration of David Martinez (“Martinez Decl.”) (Certificate of Registration for VAu 1‐958‐351) 5. As per its Certificate of Registration, Plaintiff first published the Subject Design on March 31, 2014. Exh. A to Martinez Decl. Case 2:15-cv-09301-AB-KS Document 88-2 Filed 11/17/16 Page 2 of 10 Page ID #:1444 R O BI N S K A PL A N L LP A T T O R N E Y S A T L A W LO S A N G E L E S 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 61246126.1 ‐ 3 ‐ STATEMENT OF UNCONTROVERTED FACTS AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW UNCONTROVERTED FACT EVIDENCE 6. On February 12, 2015, rue21 emailed its vendor, Defendant MJCK Corporation (“MJCK”), attaching a copy of the Subject Design, and asked MJCK to reproduce the Accused Design on several thousand tank tops. Exh. C to Martinez Decl. (February 12, 2015 Email from Michelle Kilian to Johnny Choi and attachments thereto); Decl. of Gretchen Stryker, ¶¶ 3‐4. 7. On February 18, 2015, rue21 issued two purchase orders for tank tops bearing the Accused Design to MJCK. Exh. D to Martinez Decl. (rue21 Purchase Orders dated 2/18/15. See line item 2, Vendor Style N1612101); See also Stryker Decl., ¶¶ 5‐6. Case 2:15-cv-09301-AB-KS Document 88-2 Filed 11/17/16 Page 3 of 10 Page ID #:1445 R O BI N S K A PL A N L LP A T T O R N E Y S A T L A W LO S A N G E L E S 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 61246126.1 ‐ 4 ‐ STATEMENT OF UNCONTROVERTED FACTS AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW CONCLUSIONS OF LAW CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AUTHORITY 1. Summary judgment is appropriate when there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). 2. The party moving for summary judgment has the initial burden of identifying the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247‐48 (1986); In re Oracle Corp. Sec. Litig., 627 F.3d 376, 387 (9th Cir. 2010). 3. Where, as here, the moving party meets its burden, the non‐moving party must identify facts showing that a genuine issue for trial exists. In re Oracle Corp. Sec. Litig., 627 F.3d at 387 (citing Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 324 (1986)). 4. The non‐moving party may not rely on the pleadings but must come forward with evidence – affidavits, depositions, answers to interrogatories, or admissions – from which a fact finder could reasonably render a verdict in its favor. Id. (citing Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252). 5. “The nonmoving party must show more than the mere existence of a scintilla of evidence” or “some ‘metaphysical doubt’ as to the material facts at issue.” Id. (quoting Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986)). 6. The owner of a copyright is afforded the exclusive right to reproduce, distribute, display or perform the protected work, or to make derivative works, and to authorize others to do the same. 17 U.S.C. § 106. Case 2:15-cv-09301-AB-KS Document 88-2 Filed 11/17/16 Page 4 of 10 Page ID #:1446 R O BI N S K A PL A N L LP A T T O R N E Y S A T L A W LO S A N G E L E S 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 61246126.1 ‐ 5 ‐ STATEMENT OF UNCONTROVERTED FACTS AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AUTHORITY 7. Copyright infringement occurs when a defendant impinges upon one of the exclusive rights enumerated by 17 U.S.C. § 106 without the copyright owner’s permission, i.e., by reproducing, distributing, displaying or performing the protective work, making derivative works, or authorizing others to do any of these acts. 17 U.S.C.A. § 501 (“Anyone who violates any of the exclusive rights of the copyright owner . . . is an infringer of the copyright or right of the author, as the case may be.”). 8. Pursuant to the Copyright Act, a copyright owner in a civil infringement lawsuit may elect one of two types of damages: (1) actual damages and "any additional profits of the infringer" or (2) statutory damages. 17 U.S.C. § 504(a)‐(c). 9. The Act, however, makes clear that copyright registration is a prerequisite to recovery of statutory damages and attorney fees. 17 U.S.C. § 412. 10. Section 412(2) thus bars a copyright owner from recovering statutory damages or attorney's fees for copyright infringement of a published work if: (1) the copyright was registered more than three months after the work was first published, and (2) the infringing activity commenced after the date of first publication and before the effective date of registration of the work. See Derek Andrew, Inc. v. Poof Apparel Corp., 528 F.3d 696, 701 (9th Cir. 2008); Parfums Givenchy, Inc. v. C & C Beauty Sales, Inc., 832 F. Supp. 1378, 1393 (C.D. Cal. 1993), citing, e.g., Business Trends Analysts, Inc. v. Freedonia Group, Inc., 887 F.2d 399, 403–04 (2d Cir.1989); Robert R. Jones Associates, Inc. v. Nino Homes, 858 F.2d 274, 281 (6th Cir.1988). Case 2:15-cv-09301-AB-KS Document 88-2 Filed 11/17/16 Page 5 of 10 Page ID #:1447 R O BI N S K A PL A N L LP A T T O R N E Y S A T L A W LO S A N G E L E S 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 61246126.1 ‐ 6 ‐ STATEMENT OF UNCONTROVERTED FACTS AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AUTHORITY 11. Moreover, as the Ninth Circuit has explained, Section 412 “leaves no room for discretion,” mandating that attorney's fees and statutory damages are barred where the infringement “commences” after publication but before registration and the plaintiff does not register within three months of publication. Derek Andrew, Inc., 528 F.3d at 701 (emphasis added), citing Polar Bear Prods., Inc. v. Timex Corp., 384 F.3d 700, 707 n.5 (9th Cir. 2004); see also Gerig v. Krause Publications, Inc., 58 F. Supp. 2d 1261, 1268 (D. Kan. 1999) (Section 412 “leaves no room for discretion, mandating that no attorney's fees or statutory damages be awarded so long as the infringement commenced before registration of the copyright.”), citing Johnson v. Jones, 149 F.3d 494, 505 (6th Cir. 1998). 12. Further, “[e]very court to consider the issue has held that infringement 'commences' for the purposes of § 412 when the first act in a series of acts constituting continuing infringement occurs.” Derek Andrew, Inc., 528 F.3d at 701 (emphasis added); Parfums Givenchy, Inc., 832 F. Supp. at 1393 (“the first act of infringement in a series of ongoing separate infringements ‘commence[s]’ one continuing ‘infringement’ under Section 412(2).”); Ez‐Tixz, Inc. v. Hit‐Tix, Inc., 919 F. Supp. 728, 736 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (“The alleged acts of infringement that occurred after the copyright was registered do not constitute new acts of infringement but a continuation of the infringement that ‘commenced’ prior to registration.”); Singh v. Famous Overseas, Inc., 680 F.Supp. 533, 535–36 (E.D.N.Y. 1988) (holding that infringement does not “commence” with each new act in an ongoing infringement, because “it would be peculiar if not inaccurate to use the word ‘commenced’ to describe a single act”). See also Johnson v. Univ. of Virginia, 606 F. Supp. 321, 325 (W.D. Va. 1985); Johnson, 149 F.3d at 506. Case 2:15-cv-09301-AB-KS Document 88-2 Filed 11/17/16 Page 6 of 10 Page ID #:1448 R O BI N S K A PL A N L LP A T T O R N E Y S A T L A W LO S A N G E L E S 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 61246126.1 ‐ 7 ‐ STATEMENT OF UNCONTROVERTED FACTS AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AUTHORITY 13. Indeed, Courts have consistently rejected attempts by plaintiffs to parse an ongoing pattern of infringing conduct into pre‐and post‐registration events, and routinely find a “continuing infringement,” where “the pre‐ and post‐registration infringement is part of one continuing pattern of conduct.” See, e.g., Livingston v. Art.com, Inc., 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 95519,*24‐28 (N.D. Cal. July 11, 2014) (finding continuing infringement as to chain of events amongst several defendants, including infringement by one defendant by way of improper licensing agreement prior to registration and sales and purchases by other defendants after registration) (emphasis added); Parfums Givenchy, Inc., 832 F. Supp. at 1393 (finding continuing course of infringement which “commenced” with the initial act of copying; subsequent importations and sales did not commence separate acts of infringement); Morgan v. Hawthorne Homes, Inc., 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 59210, *9 (W.D. Pa. June 2, 2011) (inquiry is “whether Defendants' alleged acts of post‐registration infringement were a continuation of its initial pre‐ registration infringement.”). Case 2:15-cv-09301-AB-KS Document 88-2 Filed 11/17/16 Page 7 of 10 Page ID #:1449 R O BI N S K A PL A N L LP A T T O R N E Y S A T L A W LO S A N G E L E S 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 61246126.1 ‐ 8 ‐ STATEMENT OF UNCONTROVERTED FACTS AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AUTHORITY 14. Thus, where there is a continuing pattern of conduct, the single infringement rule applies although the defendant violates separate provisions of the Copyright Act, or sells different products that violate the same copyright. See, e.g., Parfums Givenchy, Inc., 832 F. Supp. at 1393 (rejecting argument a new infringement occurred “each time the defendant infringed a separate provision of the Copyright Act.”) (emphasis added); Dyer v. Napier, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11855, at *8‐10 (D.Ariz. March 16, 2006) (finding continuing infringement where the defendant infringed by “creating” an infringing sculpture before registration and then “selling” the sculpture after registration; post‐ registration customizing of sculpture by changing its size, surface texture and adding features did not commence a new infringement); Gloster v. Relios, Inc., 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 43995, at *4 (E.D. Pa. June 28, 2006) (holding that creating and selling new jewelry designs after plaintiff's copyright registration did not commence a new infringement even though the defendant sold different accused jewelry items); Derek Andrew, Inc., 528 F.3d at 701 (statutory damages claim barred where infringement through sale of certain garments commenced before registration, even though infringement continued after registration through sale of different garments) (emphasis added). 15. Indeed, Courts have found continuing infringement under Section 412 where one defendant infringes before the registration, and separate defendants infringe after registration. See Bouchat v. Bon‐Ton Dep't Stores, Inc., 506 F.3d 315, 331 (4th Cir. 2007); Morgan v. Hawthorne Homes, Inc., 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 59210, *9 (W.D. Pa. June 2, 2011). Case 2:15-cv-09301-AB-KS Document 88-2 Filed 11/17/16 Page 8 of 10 Page ID #:1450 R O BI N S K A PL A N L LP A T T O R N E Y S A T L A W LO S A N G E L E S 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 61246126.1 ‐ 9 ‐ STATEMENT OF UNCONTROVERTED FACTS AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AUTHORITY 16. The continuing infringement rule under Section 412 is also rooted in the remedial statutory framework underlying Section 504 of the Copyright Act, which provides that an eligible plaintiff may only recover a single “award of statutory damages for all infringements involved in the action…” See 15 U.S.C 504(c)(1) (emphasis added); cf. Bouchat v. Bon‐Ton Dep't Stores, Inc., 506 F.3d at 331 (“Because a statutory damages award covers ‘all infringements involved in the action ... for which infringers are liable,’ id. it is appropriate to treat the earliest date of infringement by any participant in a line of related copyright violations as the date of commencement.”); Morgan, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 59210, *11 (same); Gloster, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 43995, *7 (citing H.R. Rep. No. 1476 at 162, reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5659, 5778). 17. Summary adjudication is proper because the alleged infringement “commenced” under Section 412 before Plaintiff’s registration. Plaintiff did not register “Great Architect” until April 7, 2015. See SSF, ¶¶ 4‐5. 18. On February 12, 2015, almost two months prior to Plaintiff’s registration, rue21 reproduced the Accused Design and distributed it to MJCK. SSF, ¶ 6. 19. Assuming arguendo that Plaintiff’s copyright in the Subject Design is valid, rue21’s February 12, 2015 unauthorized reproduction and distribution of the Accused Design constitutes “the first act in a series of acts constituting continuing infringement.” See SSF, ¶¶ 6‐7; Derek Andrew, Inc., 528 F.3d at 701; Parfums Givenchy, Inc., 832 F. Supp. at 1393; Ez‐Tixz, Inc. v. Hit‐Tix, Inc., 919 F. Supp. 728, 736 (S.D.N.Y. 1996); Singh v. Famous Overseas, Inc., 680 F.Supp. 533, 535–36 (E.D.N.Y. 1988); Johnson v. Univ. of Virginia, 606 F. Supp. 321, 325 (W.D. Va. 1985); Johnson, 149 F.3d at 506. Case 2:15-cv-09301-AB-KS Document 88-2 Filed 11/17/16 Page 9 of 10 Page ID #:1451 R O BI N S K A PL A N L LP A T T O R N E Y S A T L A W LO S A N G E L E S 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 61246126.1 ‐ 10 ‐ STATEMENT OF UNCONTROVERTED FACTS AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AUTHORITY 20. The incontrovertible evidence establishes that the alleged infringement alleges “commenced” for purposes of Section 412 prior to Plaintiff’s April 7, 2015 registration. SSF, ¶¶ 6‐7. 21. For these reasons, summary adjudication of Plaintiff’s claims for statutory damages and attorney’s fees is warranted. SSF, ¶¶ 1‐7. DATED: November 17, 2016 ROBINS KAPLAN LLP By: /s/ David Martinez _ David Martinez Attorneys for Defendant rue21, Inc. Case 2:15-cv-09301-AB-KS Document 88-2 Filed 11/17/16 Page 10 of 10 Page ID #:1452 Case 2:15-cv-09301-AB-KS Document 88-3 Filed 11/17/16 Page 1 of 3 Page ID #:1453 Case 2:15-cv-09301-AB-KS Document 88-3 Filed 11/17/16 Page 2 of 3 Page ID #:1454 Case 2:15-cv-09301-AB-KS Document 88-3 Filed 11/17/16 Page 3 of 3 Page ID #:1455 R O BI N S K A PL A N L LP A T T O R N E Y S A T L A W LO S A N G E L E S 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 61246021.1 DECLARATION OF DAVID MARTINEZ ISO MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT David Martinez, Bar No. 193183 DMartinez@robinskaplan.com Jill S. Casselman, Bar No. 266085 JCasselman@robinskaplan.com ROBINS KAPLAN LLP 2049 Century Park East, Suite 3400 Los Angeles, CA 90067‐3208 Telephone: (310) 552‐0130 Facsimile: (310) 229‐5800 Attorneys for Defendant rue21, Inc. UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA MS. BUBBLES, INC., a California corporation, Plaintiff, v. RUE 21, INC., a Delaware corporation; MJCK CORPORATION, a California corporation dba NOBILITY; and DOES 1‐10, inclusive, Defendants. Case No. CV 15‐09301 AB (KLSx) [Assigned to the Honorable André Birotte Jr.] DECLARATION OF DAVID MARTINEZ IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT RUE21, INC.’S MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT Date: December 19, 2016 Time: 10:00 a.m. Courtroom: 4 [Notice of Motion and Motion for Partial Summary Judgment; Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Motion for Partial Summary Judgment; Separate Statement of Uncontroverted Facts and Conclusions of Law; [Proposed] Order; Declaration of Gretchen Stryker filed concurrently herewith] Case 2:15-cv-09301-AB-KS Document 88-4 Filed 11/17/16 Page 1 of 15 Page ID #:1456 R O BI N S K A PL A N L LP A T T O R N E Y S A T L A W LO S A N G E L E S 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 61246021.1 ‐ 1 ‐ DECLARATION OF DAVID MARTINEZ ISO MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT DECLARATION OF DAVID MARTINEZ 1. I am a partner in the law firm of Robins Kaplan LLP, counsel for Defendant rue21, Inc. (“rue21”) in the above‐captioned action. I have personal knowledge regarding the matters set forth below and submit this declaration in support of rue21’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (“Motion”). 2. Attached hereto as Exhibit A is a true and correct copy of the United States Copyright Office’s (“USCO”) Certificate of Registration for “Design 6627/Great Architect” bearing Registration Number VA 1‐958‐351, with an effective date of registration April 7, 2015 and a date of first publication of March 31, 2014, produced by plaintiff in this litigation and attached to the Complaint. 3. For purposes of this Motion, Exhibit B has been intentionally left blank. 4. Attached hereto as Exhibit C is a true and correct copy of a February 12, 2015 Email from Michelle Kilian of rue21 to Johnny Choi of rue21’s vendor, defendant MJCK, Inc. (“MJCK”) and attachments thereto. This document was produced by rue21 in this action at BUBBLES/R&S – RUE21 0025‐0027. 5. Attached hereto as Exhibit D is a true and correct copy of rue21’s purchase orders to MJCK dated February 18, 2015 for garments bearing the accused design in this case (“Accused Garments”), produced by rue21 at BUBBLES/R&S ‐ RUE21 0002‐0003. The relevant portions are highlighted for the court. Case 2:15-cv-09301-AB-KS Document 88-4 Filed 11/17/16 Page 2 of 15 Page ID #:1457 R O BI N S, K A PL A N L LP A T T O R N E Y S A T L A W LO S A N G E L E S 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 61246021.1 ‐ 2 ‐ DECLARATION OF DAVID MARTINEZ ISO MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT 6. On or about July 7, 2016 and August 17‐18, 2016, I unsuccessfully conferred with Plaintiff’s counsel regarding the subject of this Motion. I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the United States and the State of California that the foregoing is true and correct to the best of my knowledge. Executed this 17th day of November, 2016, in Los Angeles, California. /s/ David Martinez David Martinez Case 2:15-cv-09301-AB-KS Document 88-4 Filed 11/17/16 Page 3 of 15 Page ID #:1458 EXHIBIT A Case 2:15-cv-09301-AB-KS Document 88-4 Filed 11/17/16 Page 4 of 15 Page ID #:1459 33 Exhibit A, Page 2 Case 2:15-cv-09301-AB-KS Document 88-4 Filed 11/17/16 Page 5 of 15 Page ID #:1460 34 Exhibit A, Page 3 Case 2:15-cv-09301-AB-KS Document 88-4 Filed 11/17/16 Page 6 of 15 Page ID #:1461 Exhibit A, Page 4 Case 2:15-cv-09301-AB-KS Document 88-4 Filed 11/17/16 Page 7 of 15 Page ID #:1462 EXHIBIT B [Intentionally Left Blank] Case 2:15-cv-09301-AB-KS Document 88-4 Filed 11/17/16 Page 8 of 15 Page ID #:1463 EXHIBIT C Case 2:15-cv-09301-AB-KS Document 88-4 Filed 11/17/16 Page 9 of 15 Page ID #:1464 1 Castiglioni, Lilia C From: Kilian, Michelle Sent: Thursday, February 12, 2015 1:58 PM To: Johnny (johnny@xzavierusa.com) Cc: Stryker, Gretchen; Wood, Dana; BamBam Williams (bambam@xzavierusa.com) Subject: Sublimated Tanks Attachments: photo 2.jpg; photo 1.jpg Importance: High Hi Johnny! I’m excited to see what you have for us next week. In the meantime, I’m pretty desperate for sublimated tanks and would love to give you an order for approximately 20k units for a quick delivery (4 5 weeks). Can you review the art below and attached – we would like you to counter the art very closely (all 4 styles). Please get back to me by tomorrow morning on whether you will accept the order. Price target is the same as LY $4.75. Let me know if you have any questions! Mint colored diamond print with verbiage on the chest – we would prefer either Keep It 100 or Good Vibes. Mixing Americana w/ the Pyramid Eye that we’ve sold well (see attached bandana pyramid style that was a bestseller). Americana Aztec tank as pictured attached (as is). Bandana Pyramid Eye tank as pictured attached (as is). Michelle Kilian Buyer Guys Tops rue21 800 Commonwealth Drive Warrendale, PA 15086 724.776.9833 724.776.4111 Fax mkilian@rue21.com Visit us @ www.rue21.com BUBBLES/R&S - RUE21 0025 Exhibit C, Page 5 Case 2:15-cv-09301-AB-KS Document 88-4 Filed 11/17/16 Page 10 of 15 Page ID #:1465 BUBBLES/R&S - RUE21 0026 Exhibit C, Page 6 Case 2:15-cv-09301-AB-KS Document 88-4 Filed 11/17/16 Page 11 of 15 Page ID #:1466 BUBBLES/R&S - RUE21 0027 Exhibit C, Page 7 Case 2:15-cv-09301-AB-KS Document 88-4 Filed 11/17/16 Page 12 of 15 Page ID #:1467 EXHIBIT D Case 2:15-cv-09301-AB-KS Document 88-4 Filed 11/17/16 Page 13 of 15 Page ID #:1468 Exhibit D, Page 8 Case 2:15-cv-09301-AB-KS Document 88-4 Filed 11/17/16 Page 14 of 15 Page ID #:1469 Exhibit D, Page 9 Case 2:15-cv-09301-AB-KS Document 88-4 Filed 11/17/16 Page 15 of 15 Page ID #:1470 R O BI N S K A PL A N L LP A T T O R N E Y S A T L A W LO S A N G E L E S 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 61246954.1 [PROPOSED] ORDER David Martinez, Bar No. 193183 DMartinez@robinskaplan.com Jill S. Casselman, Bar No. 266085 JCasselman@robinskaplan.com ROBINS KAPLAN LLP 2049 Century Park East, Suite 3400 Los Angeles, CA 90067‐3208 Telephone: (310) 552‐0130 Facsimile: (310) 229‐5800 Attorneys for Defendant rue21, Inc. UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA MS. BUBBLES, INC., a California corporation, Plaintiff, v. RUE 21, INC., a Delaware corporation; MJCK CORPORATION, a California corporation dba NOBILITY; and DOES 1‐10, inclusive, Defendants. Case No. CV 15‐09301 AB (KLSx) [Assigned to the Honorable André Birotte Jr.] [PROPOSED] ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT RUE21, INC.’S MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT Date: December 19, 2016 Time: 10:00 a.m. Courtroom: 4 [Notice of Motion and Motion for Partial Summary Judgment; Memorandum of Points and Authorities; Separate Statement of Uncontroverted Facts and Conclusions of Law; Declarations of Gretchen Stryker and David Martinez filed concurrently herewith] Having considered Defendant rue21, Inc.’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, the papers submitted in support of and in opposition thereto, and good cause appearing: The Court hereby GRANTS the Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on Plaintiff Ms. Bubbles, Inc.’s claim for statutory damages and attorneys’ fees in its entirety. Because the alleged copyright infringement “commenced” prior to Case 2:15-cv-09301-AB-KS Document 88-5 Filed 11/17/16 Page 1 of 2 Page ID #:1471 R O BI N S K A PL A N L LP A T T O R N E Y S A T L A W LO S A N G E L E S 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 61246954.1 ‐ 2 ‐ [PROPOSED] ORDER Plaintiff’s registration of the subject copyright, 17 U.S.C. § 412 bars any recovery of statutory damages or attorneys’ fees by Plaintiff. IT IS SO ORDERED. Dated: _________________ ____________________________ André Birotte Jr. United States District Court Judge Case 2:15-cv-09301-AB-KS Document 88-5 Filed 11/17/16 Page 2 of 2 Page ID #:1472