515 U.S. 277 (1995) Cited 4,289 times 7 Legal Analyses
Holding that in declaratory judgment actions, district courts have “greater” discretion to abstain than under Colorado River's “exceptional circumstances” test
Holding that even if "the complaint does not state facts sufficient to clearly bring the case within or without the coverage, the general rule is that the insurer is obligated to defend if there is, potentially , a case under the complaint within the coverage of the policy"
In Fisk Elec. Co. v. Constructors Assoc. Inc., the indemnity clause provided that "[t]o the fullest extent permitted by law, [Fisk] shall indemnify, hold harmless, and defend [Constructors]... from and against all claims, damages, losses, and expenses, including but not limited to attorney's fees..." arising out of or resulting from the performance of Fisk's work. 888 S.W.2d at 814.
Explaining that a contract for indemnity is read as any other contract, such that the words and phrases in the agreement are given their "ordinary, popular, and commonly accepted meaning," and once the parties' intent is ascertained, the doctrine of strictissimi juris applies
In Tubb, the court noted that a right to bring suit with respect to a promise to indemnify against damages "does not accrue until the indemnitee has suffered damage or injury by being compelled to pay the judgment or debt."
In Continental Steel Co. v. H.A. Lott, Inc., 772 S.W.2d 513 (Tex.App. 1989), the court found that the express negligence doctrine did not apply to the determination of an indemnitor's duty to indemnify when an indemnitee is found not negligent and is not seeking reimbursement for loses that are not related to the indemnitee's negligence.