Missel v. Csx Transportation, Inc. et al

MOTION to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim

S.D. Ill.February 8, 2017

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS EAST ST. LOUIS DIVISION CHARLES MISSEL, Plaintiff, v. CSX TRANSPORTATION, INC., and UNITED TRANSPORTATION UNION, Defendants. Civil Action No. 3:16-CV-01300 Judge David R. Herndon CSX TRANSPORTATION, INC.’S MOTION TO DISMISS Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), Defendant CSX Transportation, Inc. (“CSXT”) respectfully moves the Court to dismiss with prejudice the claim asserted against CSXT in Plaintiff Charles Missel’s (“Plaintiff’s”) Complaint. The grounds for this motion are set forth below.1 I. INTRODUCTION CSXT should not be a defendant in this lawsuit. Plaintiff has added CSXT to his dispute with the International Association of Sheet Metal, Air, Rail and Transportation Workers - Transportation Division2 (“SMART-TD”) arising out of an alleged breach of the duty of fair representation (“DFR”) by bringing a “hybrid unfair representation/breach of contract action[]” under the Railway Labor Act (“RLA”). (Compl. ¶ 4, ECF No. 1.) On either of two potential 1 Pursuant to SDIL-LR 7.1(c), this motion and the brief in support are presented as a single submission. 2 Plaintiff names the United Transportation Union as defendant, but that entity is now known as the International Association of Sheet Metal, Air, Rail and Transportation Workers - Transportation Division. (See Mot. Dismiss 2 n.1, ECF No. 23.) Case 3:16-cv-01300-DRH-DGW Document 38 Filed 02/08/17 Page 1 of 7 Page ID #117 - 2 - bases for attaching an employer to a DFR lawsuit under the RLA, however, Plaintiff’s Complaint fails to state a claim and should be dismissed. First, Plaintiff has not alleged facts sufficient to link CSXT to SMART-TD’s alleged DFR violation. A plaintiff may name an employer in a DFR suit under the RLA if the employer “acts in collusion” with the union’s DFR breach. United Indep. Flight Officers, Inc. v. United Air Lines, Inc., 756 F.2d 1274, 1283 (7th Cir. 1985); see also Steffens v. Bhd. of Ry., Airline & S.S. Clerks, 797 F.2d 442, 445 (7th Cir. 1986). Plaintiff’s Complaint is devoid of any factual allegations that CSXT colluded with SMART-TD in connection with the alleged DFR breach. Indeed, Plaintiff does not allege facts even suggesting that CSXT contributed in any way to the alleged DFR violation. Plaintiff thus lacks a basis for naming CSXT as a defendant in this action on this theory. Second, an employer may be named as a defendant in an RLA DFR suit if the employer is necessary for the provision of relief sought in the complaint. See Steffens, 797 F.2d at 445. But Plaintiff fails to allege any reason why CSXT is necessary in this lawsuit for purposes of effectuating relief. Plaintiff thus lacks a basis to name CSXT as a defendant in this case on this theory as well. Because Plaintiff’s allegations are insufficient to attach CSXT to this suit on any basis, Plaintiff’s claim against CSXT should be dismissed.3 3 Defendant SMART-TD has filed its own motion to dismiss in this matter. (Mot. Dismiss, ECF No. 23.) Should the Court grant SMART-TD’s motion for any of the reasons provided therein, the claims against both SMART-TD and CSXT must be dismissed. United Indep. Flight Officers, 756 F.2d at 1283 (“If the RLA-based DFR claim against the union is dismissed, the claim against the employer must also be dismissed.”). Case 3:16-cv-01300-DRH-DGW Document 38 Filed 02/08/17 Page 2 of 7 Page ID #118 - 3 - II. FACTS ALLEGED IN THE COMPLAINT In relevant part, Plaintiff, a former CSXT employee and SMART-TD member, (Compl. ¶¶ 6–7), alleges that CSXT discharged him while he was on a medical leave, (id. ¶ 9), and that his discharge was “wrongful,” (id. ¶ 13). Those allegations are the extent of Plaintiff’s allegations concerning CSXT’s conduct in this matter. Plaintiff also alleges that he sought to pursue a grievance, (id. ¶ 11), that SMART-TD would not process it, (id.), and that SMART-TD breached the DFR by not doing so, (id. ¶ 14). III. ARGUMENT Plaintiff’s claim against CSXT should be dismissed because he does not allege any basis for attaching CSXT to this RLA DFR action: (i) he does not allege any facts to establish that CSXT “colluded in”—or even contributed to—SMART-TD’s alleged DFR breach; and (ii) Plaintiff does not allege any facts showing that CSXT is necessary for obtaining relief. In short, Plaintiff fails to state a claim against CSXT, which has no place in this action. A. Legal Standard “To survive a motion to dismiss, the complaint must ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Roberts v. City of Chicago, 817 F.3d 561, 564 (7th Cir. 2016) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). A claim is facially plausible “when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). In other words, the complaint must allege facts sufficient to “raise a right to relief above the speculative level[.]” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. “The complaint must do more than recite the elements of a cause of action in a conclusory fashion.” Roberts, 817 F.3d at 565. Case 3:16-cv-01300-DRH-DGW Document 38 Filed 02/08/17 Page 3 of 7 Page ID #119 - 4 - B. Plaintiff’s Allegations Are Insufficient to State a DFR Claim Against CSXT. Unlike the Labor Management Relations Act, see 29 U.S.C. § 185, the RLA does not afford employees a right to “bring a direct claim against the employer” for an alleged breach of a CBA. Steffens, 797 F.2d at 445 n.2. “Instead, the employer is merely joined as a party in the duty of fair representation action.” Id. An employee may so join the employer “if he can allege that the employer’s conduct somehow contributed to the union’s breach.” Id. at 445. In the Seventh Circuit, such contribution has meant collusion by the employer in the union’s alleged breach of the DFR arising out of a dispute over grievance processing or a collective bargaining negotiation. See, e.g., Corzine v. Bhd. of Locomotive Eng’rs, 147 F.3d 651, 653 (7th Cir. 1998) (permitting employer to be “named as an additional defendant” in RLA DFR claim concerning disputed negotiation of contract provision because plaintiff alleged that employer was “complicit with the union in violating the duty” (emphasis added)); Steffens, 797 F.2d at 445 n.2 (permitting employer to be named as defendant in RLA DFR case concerning seniority displacement and discharge “since the plaintiffs did allege collusion”); United Indep. Flight Officers, 756 F.2d at 1283 (explaining that an “employer is liable together with the union for the union’s breach of its DFR if it acts in collusion with the union” in RLA DFR case concerning disputed negotiation of amendments to benefits plans). In other words, a plaintiff must show that the employer colluded in the “arbitrary, discriminatory, or . . . bad faith” misconduct required to be shown to establish a DFR violation by the union. See Cunningham v. Air Line Pilots Ass’n, Int’l, 769 F.3d 539, 541– 42 (7th Cir. 2014) (quoting Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 190 (1967)). Here, even viewing the Complaint in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, Plaintiff does not allege any form of collusion between CSXT and SMART-TD. Rather, Plaintiff alleges only that CSXT discharged him and that the discharge was “wrongful.” (Compl. ¶¶ 9, 13.) The Complaint is silent as to any collaboration, coordination, or interaction at all between CSXT and Case 3:16-cv-01300-DRH-DGW Document 38 Filed 02/08/17 Page 4 of 7 Page ID #120 - 5 - SMART-TD. Cf. Steffens, 797 F.2d at 444, 445 (although dismissing hybrid RLA DFR claim as time barred, accepting allegations that “union and employer had colluded” where complaint suggested union and employer jointly submitted plaintiffs to unfair grievance proceedings); United Indep. Flight Officers, 756 F.2d at 1283 (although finding no evidence of collusion in granting summary judgment to employer, entertaining allegations of “requisite collusion” as negotiation and agreement between union and employer over adverse changes to benefits plan). Because Plaintiff does not allege collusion by CSXT, Plaintiff lacks a basis to attach CSXT to this suit as a party to SMART-TD’s alleged DFR breach. See Cunningham v. United Airlines, Inc., No. 13 C 5522, 2014 WL 441610, at *3–8, *11 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 4, 2014) (Holderman, J.) (granting employer’s Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss with prejudice concerning claim for breach of CBA under RLA and finding an “absence of well-pled allegations of collusion against [employer]” to state a breach of contract claim against employer or attach employer to DFR claim against union). In sum, Plaintiff’s threadbare allegations do not constitute a basis for attaching CSXT in a DFR claim under the RLA as a party to SMART-TD’s alleged breach. The Complaint does not even allege that CSXT colluded in or otherwise contributed to SMART-TD’s alleged breach. Therefore, Plaintiff does not a state a claim against CSXT on this basis. C. CSXT Is Not Necessary for the Provision of Relief and Should Be Dismissed from This Action. An employer may be named as a defendant in an RLA DFR suit if the employer is necessary for the provision of relief sought in the complaint. See Steffens, 797 F.2d at 445. Plaintiff, however, does not allege any basis or reason why CSXT would be necessary in this RLA DFR action for him to obtain the relief he seeks. Plaintiff’s sparse allegations, therefore, Case 3:16-cv-01300-DRH-DGW Document 38 Filed 02/08/17 Page 5 of 7 Page ID #121 - 6 - are insufficient to show that CSXT would be necessary for effectuating relief. Plaintiff thus does not state a claim against CSXT on such a theory. IV. CONCLUSION For the foregoing reasons, Defendant CSXT respectfully requests that the Court grant its Motion to Dismiss and dismiss Plaintiff Charles Missel’s claim against CSXT with prejudice. Dated: February 8, 2017 Respectfully submitted, /s/ Benjamin M. Gavel David S. Birnbaum (Illinois #6285756; pro hac vice admission forthcoming) JONES DAY 77 West Wacker Chicago, IL 60601-1692 Telephone: (312) 782-3939 Facsimile: (312) 782-8585 dbirnbaum@jonesday.com Benjamin M. Gavel (Ohio #0092641; generally admitted to S.D. Ill.) JONES DAY 901 Lakeside Ave. Cleveland, OH 44114-1190 Telephone: (216) 586-3939 Facsimile: (216) 579-0212 bgavel@jonesday.com Attorneys for Defendant CSX Transportation, Inc. Case 3:16-cv-01300-DRH-DGW Document 38 Filed 02/08/17 Page 6 of 7 Page ID #122 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I hereby certify that, on February 8, 2017, a copy of CSX Transportation, Inc.’s Motion to Dismiss was filed electronically. Notice of this filing will be sent by operation of the Court’s electronic filing system to all parties indicated on the electronic filing receipt. Parties may access this filing through the Court’s system. /s/ Benjamin M. Gavel Benjamin M. Gavel Attorney for Defendant CSX Transportation, Inc. Case 3:16-cv-01300-DRH-DGW Document 38 Filed 02/08/17 Page 7 of 7 Page ID #123