Koch v. Mack Trucks, Inc.

MOTION TO DISMISS FOR FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM

E.D. Pa.November 14, 2016

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA MELISSA KOCH Plaintiff, v. MACK TRUCKS, INC., Defendant. Civil Action No. 16-04857 DEFENDANT MACK TRUCK, INC.’S PARTIAL MOTION TO DISMISS PLAINTIFF’S AGE DISCRIMINATION IN EMPLOYMENT CLAIM Defendant Mack Truck, Inc. (“Mack” or “Defendant”), through its undersigned counsel and pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), moves to partially dismiss Plaintiff Melissa Koch’s (“Plaintiff”) Complaint because it fails to allege facts sufficient to establish Plaintiff’s Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. § 621 et. seq. (“ADEA”), Count V, as a matter of law. For these reasons and as more fully explained in the accompanying memorandum of law, Defendant respectfully requests this Court to dismiss Plaintiff’s Count V with prejudice. Respectfully submitted, /s/ Katharine Thomas Batista Katharine Thomas Batista (312366) JACKSON LEWIS P.C. Three Parkway, 1601 Cherry Street, Suite 1350 Philadelphia, PA 19102-1317 Tel: (267) 319-7802 katharine.thomas@jacksonlewis.com Ellison McCoy Pro Hac Vice Admission Pending 15 South Main Street, Suite 700 Greenville, SC 29601 Tel 864-232-7000 Fax 864-235-1381 mccoye@jacksonlewis.com ATTORNEYS FOR DEFENDANT Date: November 14, 2016 MACK TRUCK, INC. Case 5:16-cv-04857-EGS Document 3 Filed 11/14/16 Page 1 of 1 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA MELISSA KOCH Plaintiff, v. MACK TRUCKS, INC., Defendant. Civil Action No. 16-04857 DEFENDANT MACK TRUCK, INC.’S MEMORANDUM OF LAW SUPPORTING ITS PARTIAL MOTION TO DISMISS PLAINTIFF’S AGE DISCRIMINATION CLAIM Defendant Mack Trucks, Inc. (“Mack Trucks” or “Defendant”) submits this memorandum in support of its motion to dismiss Count V of the Complaint (“Count V”) filed by Plaintiff Melissa Koch (“Plaintiff”). Plaintiff fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) because Plaintiff fails to allege a single fact that supports that she was discriminated against based on her age in violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. § 621 et. seq. (“ADEA”). I. BACKGROUND For purposes of this motion only, and without admitting the truth of any allegations in the Complaint, the relevant factual allegations are as follows. This case arises out of Plaintiff’s employment with Defendant Mack Trucks. Defendant initially hired Plaintiff at its Winnsboro, South Carolina location in or around April 1997. (Compl. ¶ 15.) In May 2010, Defendant hired Plaintiff as a Production Supervisor at its Macungie, Pennsylvania location. (Compl. ¶ 18.) Plaintiff alleges that beginning around 2010, she was treated unfairly based on her gender, was not given promotions and/or transfers due to her gender, and received less compensation than her male comparators. (Compl. ¶¶ 20-23, 31-32, 35, 43-45, Case 5:16-cv-04857-EGS Document 3-1 Filed 11/14/16 Page 1 of 5 2 54-55.) Plaintiff also alleges that she was treated unfairly based on her alleged disability, was not properly provided reasonable accommodations, and was not properly provided FMLA leave. (Compl. ¶¶ 19, 24- 30, 33-34, 38-39, 48-40, 56-57.) Plaintiff also alleges that she complained about this alleged unlawful conduct, but the company took no action. (Compl. ¶¶ 23, 25-26, 34, 40-42, 46-47.) Plaintiff is a current employee of Defendant. On or around June 5, 2015, Plaintiff dual-filed a Charge of Discrimination with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission and the Pennsylvania Human Rights Commission alleging sex, age and disability discrimination and retaliation. (Compl. ¶ 11.) On June 16, 2016, Plaintiff received a right to sue notice and on September 9, 2016, Plaintiff filed her Complaint in this action. (Compl. ¶ 11.) Specifically, Plaintiff claims that she was subjected to gender, disability and age discrimination and retaliated against for engaging in protected activity in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VII”), the Americans with Disabilities Act (42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq. (“ADA”), the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. § 621 et. seq. (“ADEA”), the Equal Pay Act, 29 U.S.C. § 206(d) et seq., the Family Medical Leave Act 29 U.S. Code § 2601 (“FMLA”) and the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act, 43 P.S. §§ 951-963 (“PHRA”). II. LEGAL ARGUMENTS A. Plaintiff’s Age Claim Should Be Dismissed Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(b) a. Legal Standard A motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) admits the well-pleaded allegations of the complaint but denies their legal sufficiency. See Hospital Building Co. v. Trustees of the Rex Hospital, 425 U.S. 738, 740 (1976). In reviewing a motion to dismiss under 12(b)(6), the court must accept as a true all factual allegations of the complaint and draw all reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Case 5:16-cv-04857-EGS Document 3-1 Filed 11/14/16 Page 2 of 5 3 Board of Trustees of Bricklayers and Allied Craftsmen Local 6 of New Jersey v. Wettlin Assoc., Inc., 237 F.3d 270, 272 (3d Cir. 2001) (citation omitted). A complaint must be dismissed if it fails to contain “sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 2009 U.S. LEXIS 3472, at *29 (U.S. May 18, 2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)); Phillips v. County of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224 (3rd Cir. 2008). “Rule 12(b)(6) authorizes a court to dismiss a claim on the basis of a dispositive issue of law.” Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 326, (1989); see also Bishop v. GNC Franchising LLC, 248 Fed.Appx. 298, 299 (3d Cir. 2007). “[I]f as a matter of law it is clear that no relief could be granted under any set of facts that could be proved consistent with the allegations . . . a claim must be dismissed.” Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 327 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). In this case, even accepting every allegation in the Complaint as true, Plaintiff’s claims fail as a matter of law. Accordingly, the Court should dismiss Plaintiff’s Count V with prejudice pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6). b. Plaintiff Fails to Allege Any Facts to Support her Age Discrimination Claim and It, Therefore, Fails as a Matter of Law. To satisfy Rule 8(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, a complaint’s “factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level” and have “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. The complaint must plead “factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). The Supreme Court’s plausibility standard requires “more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully,” and if the complaint alleges facts that are “merely consistent with” liability, then the pleading “stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility of entitlement to relief.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. Here, while Plaintiff’s Complaint presents a myriad of scattered allegations, not one of those Case 5:16-cv-04857-EGS Document 3-1 Filed 11/14/16 Page 3 of 5 4 allegations addresses any facts that would support Plaintiff was treated unfairly based on her age. Accordingly, this Court should dismiss Plaintiff’s age discrimination claim. In Count V of the Complaint, Plaintiff purports to state a claim for discrimination in violation of the ADEA. While a plaintiff is not require to prove a prima facie case in order to survive a motion to dismiss under the ADEA, the plaintiff must “put forth allegations that raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence of the necessary elements” of the prima facie case of discrimination. See Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside., 578 F.3d 203, 213 (3d Cir. 2009). To establish a prima facie case of age discrimination under the ADEA, Plaintiff must demonstrate that she (1) was over the age of 40; (2) was qualified for the position; (3) suffered an adverse employment decision; and (4) was treated less favorably than a person sufficiently younger to permit an inference of age discrimination. See Barbee v. SEPTA, 323 Fed. Appx. 159, 161 (3d Cir. 2009). While Plaintiff’s Complaint claims that Defendant discriminated against Plaintiff based upon her age, it does not assert facts establishing the plausibility of that allegation. Specifically, Plaintiff asserts that she was over forty (40) and that Defendant “subjected Plaintiff to adverse employment actions because of her age.” However, Plaintiff does not allege a single fact about any age-related comments or situations, the ages of any potential comparators who Plaintiff believes were treated more favorably, or any other fact indicating that her age was a factor in any of Defendant’s alleged actions. Essentially, Plaintiff includes hollow allegations of age discrimination in Count V of the Complaint, but fails to provide a single fact to support her assertion that age played a role in any adverse employment action that allegedly occurred. The Third Circuit has clearly held that where the Complaint fails to put forth any plausible allegations that raise a reasonable expectation that discovery would show that age played a role Case 5:16-cv-04857-EGS Document 3-1 Filed 11/14/16 Page 4 of 5 5 in the adverse employment action, dismissal of the Complaint is appropriate. See Badger v. City of Philadelphia Office of Property Assessment, 563 Fed.Appx. 152 (3d Cir. 2014). Even accepting Plaintiff’s allegations in the Complaint as true, Plaintiff has failed to plead sufficient facts to state a plausible claim for relief as required by the Supreme Court in Iqbal and Twombly. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s cause of action for age discrimination in violation of the ADEA should be dismissed for failure to state a plausible claim. III. CONCLUSION For these reasons, Defendant respectfully submits that its Partial Motion to Dismiss should be granted and that an Order be entered dismissing Plaintiff’s Count V of the Complaint with prejudice. Respectfully submitted, JACKSON LEWIS P.C. By: /s/ Katharine Thomas Batista. Katharine Thomas Batista (312366) Three Parkway 1601 Cherry Street, Suite 1350 Philadelphia, PA 19102-1317 Tel: (267) 319-7802 Fax: (215) 399-2249 katharine.thomas@jacksonlewis.com Ellison McCoy Pro Hac Vice Admission Pending 15 South Main Street, Suite 700 Greenville, SC 29601 Tel 864-232-7000 Fax 864-235-1381 mccoye@jacksonlewis.com ATTORNEYS FOR DEFENDANT MACK TRUCK, INC. Dated: November 14, 2016 Case 5:16-cv-04857-EGS Document 3-1 Filed 11/14/16 Page 5 of 5 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA MELISSA KOCH Plaintiff, v. MACK TRUCKS, INC., Defendant. Civil Action No. 16-04857 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE The undersigned hereby certifies that on this 14th day of November, 2016, a copy of the foregoing Defendant, Mack Truck, Inc.’s Partial Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Age Discrimination in Employment Claim, was filed electronically and served by mail on anyone unable to accept electronic filing. Notice of this filing will be sent by email to all parties of record by operation of the Court’s electronic filing system or by mail to anyone unable to accept electronic filing. Parties may access this filing through the Court’s system. /s/ Katharine Thomas Batista. Katharine Thomas Batista (312366) Three Parkway 1601 Cherry Street, Suite 1350 Philadelphia, PA 19102-1317 Tel: (267) 319-7802 Fax: (215) 399-2249 katharine.thomas@jacksonlewis.com Ellison McCoy Pro Hac Vice Admission Pending 15 South Main Street, Suite 700 Greenville, SC 29601 Tel 864-232-7000 Fax 864-235-1381 mccoye@jacksonlewis.com ATTORNEYS FOR DEFENDANT MACK TRUCK, INC. Case 5:16-cv-04857-EGS Document 3-2 Filed 11/14/16 Page 1 of 1