Holding that the attorney's substantial evidence pointed to a rate lower than the one requested, but observing that if defendant had submitted no evidence on this issue, then the district court would be required to award fees at plaintiff's proposed rate
Holding that courts should award class counsel market-rate litigation expenses and that "[i]f counsel submit bills with the level of detail that paying clients find satisfactory, a federal court should not require more"
Finding that the district court is entitled to determine the probative value of each affidavit submitted in support of establishing a market rate for attorney's fees in FLSA case
Holding that interest runs from the date of the judgment authorizing the right to the award, not from the date of a later judgment establishing its exact amount
Holding that "uncertainty" in calculating prejudgment interest does not "defeat the presumption in favor of prejudgment interest" and "[i]t is not within the district court's discretion to deny the whole award of interest because of ... calculational ambiguities"
Holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion by denying plaintiff's motion to compel discovery in connection with plaintiff's fee petition of the hours worked by Sealy's attorney "[w]ithout suggesting the court would have erred by compelling discovery"