Hagstrom v. Johnson & Johnson et al

MOTION to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction

D.N.J.February 8, 2017

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA DAVID HAGSTROM, Individually and as Personal Representative of the ESTATE OF LOIS ANN HAGSTROM, deceased 2501 Arabian Court Finksburg, MD 21048, Plaintiff, vs. JOHNSON & JOHNSON, et al. Defendants. Case No. 1:17-cv-00224-RC DEFENDANT IMERYS TALC AMERICA, INC.’S, F/K/A LUZENAC AMERICA, INC., MOTION TO DISMISS PLAINTIFF’S CLAIMS AGAINST IMERYS FOR LACK OF PERSONAL JURISDICTION COMES NOW Defendant, Imerys Talc America, Inc., f/k/a Luzenac America, Inc., (“Imerys”), through counsel, files its Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Claims Against Imerys for Lack of Personal Jurisdiction, and states as follows: Plaintiff’s claims should be dismissed for want of personal jurisdiction. Plaintiff has not made a prima facie showing that this Court may assert specific or general personal jurisdiction over Imerys. Plaintiff has not demonstrated that Imerys has “purposefully directed” its activities at the District of Columbia residents and that the litigation is related to those specific activities. Additionally, Plaintiff has not shown this is the exceptional case where a corporation’s operations in a forum other than its formal place of incorporation or principal place of business is so substantial and of such a nature as to render it “at home” in that forum. Exercising personal jurisdiction over Imerys would violate Imerys’ due process rights. This Court, therefore, may not constitutionally assert personal jurisdiction over Imerys and must dismiss Plaintiff’s claims against Imerys. Imerys further incorporates its memorandum in support of its motion. Case 1:17-cv-00224-RC Document 9 Filed 02/08/17 Page 1 of 3 2 WHEREFORE, Defendant Imerys Talc America, Inc. respectfully requests that this Court grant its Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Personal Jurisdiction and enter a dismissal of Imerys Talc America, Inc. from this case, as well as such other and further relief as the Court deems reasonable and just. Dated: February 8, 2017 Respectfully Submitted, GORDON REES SCULLY MANSUKHANI LLP By: /s/ Angela Hart-Edwards___________ Angela Hart-Edwards (DC Bar #991110) Julia K. Whitelock (DC Bar #992929) 1300 I Street, NW, Suite 825 Washington, DC 20005 Phone: (202) 399-1009 Fax: (202) 800-2999 Email: ahartedwards@gordonrees.com Email: jwhitelock@gordonrees.com Attorneys for Defendant Imerys Talc America, Inc. Case 1:17-cv-00224-RC Document 9 Filed 02/08/17 Page 2 of 3 3 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I hereby certify that on this 8th day of February, 2017, I electronically filed the forgoing document with the Clerk of the Court using CM/ECF system, which will send notification of such filing to the following CM/ECF participants: Peter G. Angelos Gary J. Ignatowski Armand J. Volta, Jr. Craig M. Silverman LAW OFFICES OF PETER G. ANGELOS, P.C. 601 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW Suite 900 Washington, D.C. 20004 Attorneys for Plaintiff Michelle R. Mangrum SHOOK, HARDY & BACON, LLP 1155 F Street, NW Suite 200 Washington, DC 20004 Attorneys for Defendants Johnson & Johnson And Johnson & Johnson Consumer Inc. /s/ Angela Hart-Edwards Angela Hart-Edwards Case 1:17-cv-00224-RC Document 9 Filed 02/08/17 Page 3 of 3 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA DAVID HAGSTROM, Individually and as Personal Representative of the ESTATE OF LOIS ANN HAGSTROM, deceased 2501 Arabian Court Finksburg, MD 21048, Plaintiff, vs. JOHNSON & JOHNSON, et al. Defendants. Case No. 1:17-cv-00224-RC DEFENDANT IMERYS TALC AMERICA, INC.’S, F/K/A LUZENAC AMERICA, INC., MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF ITS MOTION TO DISMISS PLAINTIFF’S CLAIMS AGAINST IMERYS FOR LACK OF PERSONAL JURISDICTION COMES NOW Defendant, Imerys Talc America, Inc., f/k/a Luzenac America, Inc., (“Imerys”), through counsel, files its memorandum in support of its Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Claims Against Imerys for Lack of Personal Jurisdiction, and states as follows: Plaintiff filed this action against Imerys and the other defendants, alleging that the talc in Baby Powder® (collectively the “Product”) that Decedent Lois Hagstrom allegedly used caused her to develop ovarian cancer and her subsequent death. Compl. ¶¶ 5-6. Plaintiff asserts that Imerys mined and distributed the talc that was ultimately used in the Product manufactured and sold by Defendant Johnson & Johnson Consumer Inc. Compl. ¶ 16. Plaintiff can establish neither specific nor general personal jurisdiction for his claims against Imerys. In regard to general jurisdiction, in Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746 (2014), the United States Supreme Court emphasized that general jurisdiction may be exercised over a corporation only in those states where the corporation can be considered to be “at home.” Plaintiff properly alleges that Imerys is a Delaware corporation with its principal place of Case 1:17-cv-00224-RC Document 9-1 Filed 02/08/17 Page 1 of 12 2 business in California. Compl. ¶ 15. And, there are no other facts sufficient to render Imerys at home in the District of Columbia in order to support the exercise of general jurisdiction. In regard to specific jurisdiction, Plaintiff’s claims do not arise from or relate to any in- state activities of Imerys. First, Decedent Lois Hagstrom allegedly used the Product outside the District of Columbia in the State of Maryland. Id. at ¶ 7. Second, Plaintiff does not assert, nor could he, that Imerys mined, manufactured, sold, or distributed the talc within, to, or from the District of Columbia that was used in the Product or that the business transactions between Imerys and Johnson & Johnson Consumer Inc. occurred in the District. None of these activities did occur within the District of Columbia. Rather, the business transactions between Imerys and Johnson & Johnson Consumer Inc. occurred outside of the District of Columbia and have no bearing on whether this Court may constitutionally exercise personal jurisdiction over Imerys. Subjecting Imerys to the jurisdiction of a District of Columbia court would violate the Due Process Clause’s mandate that “the assertion of personal jurisdiction . . . comport with ‘fair play and substantial justice.’” Burger King Corp. v. Rudezewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 474, 476 (1985) (quoting Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316, 320 (1945)). Because this Court’s exercise of personal jurisdiction over Imerys would offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice, this Court should dismiss Plaintiff’s claims against Imerys for lack of personal jurisdiction. STATEMENT OF POINTS, AUTHORITIES, AND FACTS Plaintiff alleges that he is a resident of the State of Maryland. Compl. ¶ 7. Thus, he is neither a citizen of nor resident of the District of Columbia. Imerys is a Delaware Corporation with its principal place of business in California. Imerys is not subject to specific jurisdiction in the District of Columbia because it did not mine, import, manufacture, sell, distribute, or Case 1:17-cv-00224-RC Document 9-1 Filed 02/08/17 Page 2 of 12 3 otherwise provide the talc that was used in the Product in, to, or from the District of Columbia. Burger King Corp. v. Rudezewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 474, 476 (1985). Imerys is not subject to general jurisdiction, because to establish the existence of general jurisdiction, a plaintiff must show that the defendant’s affiliations with the forum state “are so ‘continuous and systematic’ as to render [it] essentially at home in the forum State.” Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746, 761 (2014). Plaintiff cannot meet his burden to establish jurisdiction here. I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND As set forth in its affidavit, Imerys is a Delaware corporation with its principal place of business in California. Exhibit A: Aff. ¶ 5. Imerys is not a resident of the District of Columbia. Id. at ¶ 6. It does not own, possess, or lease property in the District. Id. at ¶ 7. It does not maintain an office or operations in the District of Columbia. Id. at ¶ 10. Imerys does not have an address, telephone number, or bank account in the District of Columbia. Id. at ¶¶ 11-13. None of its officers reside in the District of Columbia, and it does not maintain any records in the state. Id. at ¶¶ 14-15. Imerys is not registered to do business in the District of Columbia, and it has no registered agent for service of process in the District. Id. at ¶ 8-9. The talc that is used in the Product is not mined in the District of Columbia. Id. at ¶ 16. Indeed, Imerys neither sells talc in the District of Columbia for use in the Product, nor ships or distributes talc in the District of Columbia for use in the Product. Id. at ¶¶ 17-19. Imerys’ commercial transactions with Johnson & Johnson Consumer Inc., whose relevant manufacturing facilities are not located within the District of Columbia, also took place outside the District of Columbia. II. ARGUMENT The Court’s exercise of either general or specific jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s claims against Imerys would violate Imerys’ due process rights. While the Long Arm statute for the Case 1:17-cv-00224-RC Document 9-1 Filed 02/08/17 Page 3 of 12 4 District of Columbia does allow the exercise of jurisdiction over non-residents in some circumstances, D.C. Code § 13-4231, none of these circumstance apply here. Moreover, the statute must bend to the requirements of due process, which cannot be satisfied here. The Court, therefore, must dismiss Plaintiff’s claims against Imerys for lack of personal jurisdiction. A. Plaintiff Bears the Burden of Establishing a Prima Facie Basis for This Court’s Assertion of Personal Jurisdiction Over Imerys. When personal jurisdiction is challenged, the plaintiff must demonstrate that each defendant is subject to personal jurisdiction in the forum. See Crane v. N.Y. Zoological Soc'y, 894 F.2d 454, 456, 282 U.S. App. D.C. 295 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (citation omitted). The plaintiff bears the “burden of establishing a factual basis for the [Court’s] exercise of personal jurisdiction over the defendant[,]” Shibeshi v. United States, 932 F. Supp. 2d 1, 2 (D.D.C. 2013) (alteration in original) (quoting Crane, 894 F.2d at 456), and to meet that burden, the plaintiff “must allege specific facts connecting [the] defendant with the forum[.]” Second Amendment Found. v. U.S. Conference of Mayors, 274 F.3d 521, 524, 348 U.S. App. D.C. 238 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (first alteration in original) (citation omitted). If the plaintiff contends that the court has specific jurisdiction—i.e., that his claim arises from a specific contact that the defendant had with the forum—the plaintiff must allege facts demonstrating that the nonresident defendant had contact with the forum and that that contact bears a “discernable relationship” to the plaintiff’s claim. Shoppers Food Warehouse, 746 A.2d at 333. Alternatively, where general jurisdiction is alleged, the plaintiff must demonstrate that the defendant “purposefully avail[ed] itself of the 1 Plaintiff’s reference to section 13-423 of the D.C. Code is unavailing. Compl. ¶ 20. Section 13-243(a) extends personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant where the plaintiff’s claims arise from the defendant transacting any business in the District of Columbia. Here, Plaintiff concedes that Decedent Lois Hagstrom used the Product outside the District of Columbia and in the State of Maryland. Compl. ¶ 7. Thus, any alleged in-state activities of Imerys necessarily could not have given rise to Plaintiff’s purported claims. Daimler, 134 S. Ct. at 761. Case 1:17-cv-00224-RC Document 9-1 Filed 02/08/17 Page 4 of 12 5 privilege of conducting activities with the forum state, thus invoking the benefits and protections of its laws.” Burger King, 471 U.S. at 475. Plaintiff also bears the burden of demonstrating that any exercise of jurisdiction also comports with the limits imposed by federal due process. Walden v. Fiore, 134 S. Ct. 1115, 1121 (2014); Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746 (2014). B. Due Process Requires “Minimum Contacts.” The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment limits the District of Columbia’s authority to exercise personal jurisdiction over a non-resident defendant. Id. The non-resident defendant must have “certain minimum contacts . . . such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend ‘traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.’” Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945) (quoting Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940)). Accordingly, absent one of the traditional territorial bases of personal jurisdiction – presence, domicile, or consent– a court may assert personal jurisdiction over a defendant only if certain minimum contacts between the District of Columbia and the defendant are established. Id. When evaluating minimum contacts, the inquiry is whether there is “some act by which the defendant purposefully avails itself of the privilege of conducting activities within the forum State, thus invoking the benefits and protections of its laws.” Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253, 78 S. Ct. 1228, 2 L. Ed. 2d 1283 (1956). “It is essential that ‘the defendant’s conduct and connection with the forum State are such that he should reasonably anticipate being haled into court there.” World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297 (1980) (emphasis added). A court can acquire personal jurisdiction over a non-resident defendant under two mechanisms: specific jurisdiction and general jurisdiction. Daimler, 134 S. Ct. at 754. Specific jurisdiction arises when the non-resident defendant has “purposefully directed its activities at the forum state and the litigation results from injuries that arise out of or relate to those activities.” Burger King, 471 U.S. at 472. General jurisdiction arises when the defendant’s “continuous Case 1:17-cv-00224-RC Document 9-1 Filed 02/08/17 Page 5 of 12 6 corporate operations within a state [are] so substantial and of such a nature as to justify suit against it on causes of action arising from dealings entirely distinct from those activities.” Daimler, 134 S. Ct. at 754 (quoting Int’l Shoe Co., 326 U.S. at 316). C. This Court Cannot Exercise Specific Jurisdiction Over Imerys. To assert specific jurisdiction over a non-resident defendant, a state must inquire into the relationship among the defendant, the forum, and the litigation. Walden, 134 S. Ct. at 1121. The focus must be on whether the in-state activities of the non-resident, corporate defendant “gave rise to the liabilities sued on.” Daimler, 134 S. Ct. at 761 (internal citation omitted). For the exercise of specific jurisdiction to comport with due process, the defendant’s “suit-related conduct must create a substantial connection with the forum State.” Walden, 134 S. Ct. at 1121. It is not enough that a defendant have some minimum contacts with the forum state by way of the plaintiff’s injury. Id. at 1125. (“[M]ere injury to a forum resident is not a sufficient connection to the forum. . . . The proper question is not where the plaintiff experienced a particular injury or effect but whether the defendant’s conduct connects him to the forum in a meaningful way.”). Rather, “the relationship must arise out of contacts that the ‘defendant himself’ creates with the forum State,” for due process limits on a state’s “adjudicative authority protect the liberty of the nonresident defendant—not the convenience of plaintiffs or third parties.” Id. at 1122. No matter how significant the plaintiff’s contacts with the forum, it is the defendant’s contacts with the forum that must be considered. Id. “The plaintiff cannot be the only link between the defendant and the forum state.” Id. The benchmark in determining specific jurisdiction is “whether the defendant purposefully established minimum contacts in the forum state,” Burger King, 471 U.S. at 474, such that the defendant could “reasonably anticipate being haled into court” for its forum-based activities. World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 297. Purposeful availment is necessary to Case 1:17-cv-00224-RC Document 9-1 Filed 02/08/17 Page 6 of 12 7 ensure a non-resident is not haled into a jurisdiction as the result of attenuated contact. Burger King, 471 U.S. at 475. If a non-resident has not purposefully availed itself of the laws of the forum state, the non-resident is not subject to personal jurisdiction there. The Supreme Court has further clarified that “[t]he placement of a product into the stream of commerce, without more, is not an act of the defendant purposefully directed toward the forum State” and that “a defendant’s awareness that the stream of commerce may or will sweep the product into the forum State does not convert the mere act of placing the product into the stream into an act purposefully directed toward the forum State.” Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court of Cal., 480 U.S. 102, 112 (1987) (plurality op.). The Supreme Court also explained that “the mere ‘unilateral activity of those who claim some relationship with a non- resident defendant cannot satisfy the requirement of contact with the forum State.’” World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 298 (quoting Hanson, 357 U.S. at 253). To be subject to specific personal jurisdiction in the District of Columbia, Plaintiff must show that Imerys “purposefully directed” its activities at the District of Columbia residents and that the litigation is related to those specific activities. See Burger King, 471 U.S. at 473. Plaintiff cannot satisfy that burden here. Imerys did not mine, import, manufacture, sell, distribute, or otherwise provide the talc that was used in the Product in, to, or from the District of Columbia. Ex. A: Aff. at ¶¶ 16-19. The mere fact that Imerys placed talc into the stream of commerce outside the District of Columbia and that products manufactured by a third party using that talc ultimately made their way to the District of Columbia does not satisfy the requirement of meaningful contact with the District of Columbia. The only wrongful act Plaintiff alleges was committed by Imerys relates to its commercial relationship with its customer, Johnson & Johnson Consumer Inc., whose relevant manufacturing facilities are not located in the District of Case 1:17-cv-00224-RC Document 9-1 Filed 02/08/17 Page 7 of 12 8 Columbia. As previously noted, mere “placement of a product into the stream of commerce, without more, is not an act of the defendant purposefully directed toward the forum State.” Asahi, 480 U.S. at 112. Imerys has conducted no activity in the District of Columbia tied to the Product that Mrs. Hagstrom allegedly used in the State of Maryland. Accordingly, the Court cannot constitutionally exercise specific personal jurisdiction over Imerys in the District of Columbia. To hold otherwise would violate Imerys’ due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment. But even if the Court were to accept as true the facts as pled by Plaintiff, there is no basis for the exercise of specific jurisdiction. Plaintiff admits that he is not a citizen of the District of Columbia, nor was Mrs. Hagstrom. Compl. ¶¶ 7. Plaintiff and Decent have always been citizens of Maryland. See id. Plaintiff further concedes that Mrs. Hagstrom used the Product at issue and was diagnosed with ovarian cancer in the State of Maryland. See id. Plaintiff sets forth no allegations connecting his claims in any way to the District of Columbia. Plaintiff does not allege that his claims arise from any alleged Imerys contact with the District of Columbia. Given these undisputed facts, any alleged in-state activities of Imerys, in relationship to the Plaintiff’s claims could not have “[given] rise to the liabilities sued on.” Daimler, 134 S. Ct. at 760 (emphasis added); see also Glater v. Eli Lilly & Co., 744 F.2d 213, 216 (1st Cir. 1984) (holding that New Hampshire court lacked specific jurisdiction over the plaintiff’s claim for injuries from a drug “purchased and consumed in Massachusetts,” and rejecting argument that the court could rely on alleged unrelated sales of drug in New Hampshire because that claim “did not arise from Lilly’s New Hampshire activities”); Locke v. Ethicon Inc., No. 4:14–CV–2648, 2014 WL 5819824, at 1–3, 7–8 (S.D. Tex. Nov. 10, 2014) (holding that court lacked personal jurisdiction over Johnson & Johnson for claims brought by out-of-state plaintiffs who alleged injury in their Case 1:17-cv-00224-RC Document 9-1 Filed 02/08/17 Page 8 of 12 9 home states); Evans v. Johnson & Johnson, 2014 WL 7342404, at *6 (S.D. Tex. Dec. 23, 2014) (finding that there were “no claims supporting specific jurisdiction” in regard to non-Texas plaintiffs who alleged injury in their respective states of residency (citation omitted)); In re Plavix Related Cases, 2014 WL 3928240, at *8–10 (holding that Illinois court lacked specific jurisdiction over Eli Lily as to claims by non-Illinois plaintiffs who alleged injury in their home states, stating that there was no “causal or logical link between their claims and Defendants’ Illinois operations”). Because the exercise of specific jurisdiction over Imerys would violate Imerys’ due process rights, Plaintiff’s claims must be dismissed. D. The Exercise of General Jurisdiction Over Imerys Would Violate Due Process. In contrast to specific jurisdiction, general jurisdiction is “all-purpose jurisdiction.” Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 131 S. Ct. 2846, 2851 (2011). General jurisdiction arises when the defendant’s “continuous corporate operations within a state [are] so substantial and of such a nature as to justify suit against in on causes of action arising from dealings entirely distinct from those activities.” Daimler, 134 S. Ct. at 754 (citation omitted). In order to establish the existence of general jurisdiction, a plaintiff must show that the defendant’s affiliations with the forum state “are so ‘continuous and systematic’ as to render [it] essentially at home in the forum State.” Daimler, 134 S.Ct. at 761 (quoting Goodyear, 131 S. Ct. at 2851) (emphasis added). Only in an exceptional case will a corporation’s operations in a forum other than its formal place of incorporation or principal place of business be so substantial and of such a nature as to render it “at home” in the forum state. Daimler, 134 S.Ct. at 761 n.19. Here, Plaintiff fails to allege any facts that would indicate Imerys is “at home” in the District of Columbia. He does not plead any facts that Imerys conducted any business in the District of Columbia. Plaintiff’s allegations are simply insufficient to support the exercise of general jurisdiction in the District of Columbia. See Daimler, 134 S. Ct. at 762 n.20 (“[a] Case 1:17-cv-00224-RC Document 9-1 Filed 02/08/17 Page 9 of 12 10 corporation that operates in many places can scarcely be deemed at home in all of them”). Moreover, the Supreme Court has rejected jurisdictional arguments based solely on a stream of commerce theory. See Goodyear, 131 S. Ct. at 2856 (the flow of a defendant’s products into the forum does not “warrant a determination that . . . the forum has general jurisdiction over a defendant”). Plaintiff’s vague allegations are exactly the sort of “unacceptably grasping” form of general jurisdiction that the Supreme Court criticized in Daimler and that is now rejected in federal and state courts across the country. Daimler, 134 S. Ct. at 760; see Sonera Holding B.V. v. Cukurova Holding A.S, 750 F.3d 221, 223 (2d Cir. 2014) (noting that the Daimler opinion “reaffirms that general jurisdiction extends beyond an entity’s state of incorporation and principal place of business only in the exceptional case where its contacts with another forum are so substantial as to render it ‘at home’ in that state”) (emphasis added); Eaves v. Pirelli Tire, LLC, No. 13–1271–SAC, 2014 WL 1883791, at *9 (D. Kan. May 12, 2014) (determining that “plaintiffs’ stream of commerce arguments are to no avail for general jurisdiction”) (unpublished); Lexion Medical, LLC v. SurgiQuest, Inc., No. 13–2453, 2014 WL 1260761, at *4 (D. Minn. Mar. 26, 2014) (explaining that although defendant had “repeatedly transacted business” in State, a corporation’s “continuous activity of some sorts within a state” is not sufficient to support general jurisdiction) (unpublished); In re Plavix Related Cases, No. 2012L5688, 2014 WL 3928240, at *5–8 (Trial Order) (Ill. Cir. Ct. Aug. 11, 2014) (“Plaintiffs’ jurisdictional framework, taken to its logical conclusion, would produce exactly that forbidden result: national general jurisdiction in every state in which Defendants are doing business and generating sales revenue. Daimler makes clear that such an approach to general jurisdiction does not comport with due process.”). Case 1:17-cv-00224-RC Document 9-1 Filed 02/08/17 Page 10 of 12 11 Imerys has demonstrated that it is in no way “at home” in the District of Columbia. See Ex. A: Aff. Imerys is neither incorporated nor maintains its principal place of business (nor any place of business) in the District of Columbia. Id. at ¶ 5. Imerys is a Delaware corporation with its principal place of business located in California. Id. Imerys is not a resident of the District of Columbia. Id. at ¶ 6. It does not maintain an office or any operations in the District of Columbia or own or possess any real property located in the state. Id. at ¶¶ 7, 10. Plaintiff’s generic allegations pertaining to Imerys’ alleged activities are insufficient to satisfy the limitations imposed by the Due Process Clause. Traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice would be offended by haling Imerys into a court in a state where it is neither incorporated nor has its principal place of business. Consequently, this Court may not constitutionally exercise personal jurisdiction over Imerys in this matter, and Plaintiff’s claims against Imerys must be dismissed for lack of personal jurisdiction. See Daimler, 134 S. Ct. at 751–54, 760–62; In re Plavix, 2014 WL 3928240, at *5–8. III. CONCLUSION Plaintiff has not made a prima facie showing that this Court may assert personal jurisdiction over Imerys. Plaintiff has not demonstrated that Imerys has “purposefully directed” its activities at the District of Columbia residents and that the litigation is related to those specific activities. Moreover, Plaintiff has not shown this is the exceptional case where a corporation’s operations in a forum other than its formal place of incorporation or principal place of business is so substantial and of such a nature as to render it “at home” in that forum. This Court, therefore, may not constitutionally assert personal jurisdiction over Imerys and must dismiss Plaintiff’s claims against Imerys. WHEREFORE, Defendant Imerys Talc America, Inc. respectfully requests that this Court grant its Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Personal Jurisdiction and enter a dismissal of Case 1:17-cv-00224-RC Document 9-1 Filed 02/08/17 Page 11 of 12 12 Imerys Talc America, Inc. from this case, as well as such other and further relief as the Court deems reasonable and just. Dated: February 8, 2017 Respectfully Submitted, GORDON REES SCULLY MANSUKHANI LLP By: /s/ Angela Hart-Edwards___________ Angela Hart-Edwards (DC Bar #991110) Julia K. Whitelock (DC Bar #992929) 1300 I Street, NW, Suite 825 Washington, DC 20005 Phone: (202) 399-1009 Fax: (202) 800-2999 Email: ahartedwards@gordonrees.com Email: jwhitelock@gordonrees.com Attorneys for Defendant Imerys Talc America, Inc. Case 1:17-cv-00224-RC Document 9-1 Filed 02/08/17 Page 12 of 12 EXHIBIT A Case 1:17-cv-00224-RC Document 9-2 Filed 02/08/17 Page 1 of 5 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA DAVID HAGSTROM, Individually and as Personal Representative of the ESTATE OF LOIS ANN HAGSTROM, deceased 2501 Arabian Court Finksburg, MD 21048, Plaintiff, vs. JOHNSON & JOHNSON, et al. Defendants. Case No. 1:17-cv-00224-RC Case 1:17-cv-00224-RC Document 9-2 Filed 02/08/17 Page 2 of 5 Case 1:17-cv-00224-RC Document 9-2 Filed 02/08/17 Page 3 of 5 Case 1:17-cv-00224-RC Document 9-2 Filed 02/08/17 Page 4 of 5 Case 1:17-cv-00224-RC Document 9-2 Filed 02/08/17 Page 5 of 5 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA DAVID HAGSTROM, Individually and as Personal Representative of the ESTATE OF LOIS ANN HAGSTROM, deceased 2501 Arabian Court Finksburg, MD 21048, Plaintiff, vs. JOHNSON & JOHNSON, et al. Defendants. Case No. 1:17-cv-00224-RC [PROPOSED] ORDER This matter comes before the Court on Imerys Talc America, Inc. f/k/a Luzenac America, Inc.’s Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Claims Against Imerys for Lack of Personal Jurisdiction. Upon consideration of the Motion, any opposition and reply thereto, and the record herein, it is this ___ day of ______________, 2017, hereby: ORDERED that Imerys Talc America, Inc. f/k/a Luzenac America, Inc.’s Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Claims Against Imerys for Lack of Personal Jurisdiction is GRANTED; and it is FURTHER ORDERED that Defendant Imerys Talc America, Inc. is dismissed without prejudice. SO ORDERED. ____________________________ Hon. Rudolph Contreras Case 1:17-cv-00224-RC Document 9-3 Filed 02/08/17 Page 1 of 1