Holding that, when there is inadequate evidence of a prevailing market rate for a particular service, the district court is considered an expert on the question of reasonable fees and can consider its own knowledge and experience without additional pleadings or a hearing
Holding that for purposes of claiming a fee award pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988, "counsel bears the burden of submitting detailed time records justifying the hours claimed to have been expended."
Holding that district court abused its discretion in presuming jury award included prejudgment interest because prejudgment interest was never mentioned
Holding "that the United States may not oppose a `fees for fees' request [under the Equal Access to Justice Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2412,] solely on the ground that its position in the fee litigation was substantially justified"
Holding that "costs such as general copying, computerized legal research, postage, courthouse parking fees and expert witness fees . . . are clearly nonrecoverable" under § 1920
Holding plaintiff was entitled to attorney's fees where the underlying litigation “concerned a lack of public notice and comment,” and plaintiff “obtain[ed] the right to notice an comment on issue”
42 U.S.C. § 1988 Cited 21,750 times 42 Legal Analyses
Finding that 28 U.S.C. § 1920 defines the term "costs" as used in Rule 54(d) and enumerates the expenses that a federal court may tax as a cost under the discretionary authority granted in Rule 54(d)