The People, Appellant,v.Rebecca Guthrie, Respondent.

Brief

N.Y.February 19, 2015

STATE OF NEW YORK COUNTY OF WAYNE COUNTY COURT THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OFNEW YORK, PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT v. APL-2014-00043 REBECCA GUTHRIE, DEFENDANT-RESPONDENT. BRIEF FOR APPELLANT Richard M. Healy, Esquire Wayne County District Attorney Bruce A. Rosekrans, Esquire Assistant District Attorney, of counsel Attorney for Appellant 54 Broad Street, Suite 202 Lyons, New York 14489 Telephone: 315-946-5905 Facsimile: 315-9464-5911 Brief completed: May 2, 2014 To be argued: 10 minutes By: Bruce Rosekrans Assistant District Attorney TABLE OF CONTENTS TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 2 PROCEDURAL STATEMENT 3 QUESTION PRESENTED 4 STATEMENT OF FACTS 5 POINT 1: THE COURT ERRED IN DETERMINING THERE WAS NO PROBABLE CAUSE OR REASONABLE CAUSE TO STOP DEFENDANT'S VEHICLE FOR A TRAFFIC INFRACTION 7 CONCLUSION 10 TABLE OF AUTHORITIES Statutes Cited N.Y. Const. art. I,§ 12 .................................................................................................................... 7 VTL § 1172(a) .................................................................................................. 7 VTL §lllO(a) ................................................................................................ 7 VTL §1172(a) ................................................................................................. 5 VTL §§1192(2),(3) ........................................................................................... 5 VTL §lllO(d) ................................................................................................ 7 VTL §11 lO(e) ................................................................. : . ............................. 7 VTL §1 lOO(b) ................................................................................................ 7 Cases Cited People v. Davis, 32 A.D. 2d 445 (2d Dept. 2006) .......................................................................... 8 People v. Estrella, 48 A. D. 3d 1283 (41h Dept. 2008); ............................................................... 8, 9 People v. Robinson, 97 N.Y. 2d 341 (2001) ................................................................................... 7 People v. Scott, 191A.D.2d200(1 51 Dept. 1993); .......................................................................... 8 U.S. v. Stewart, 551 F. 3d 187 (2nd Circuit 2009) ....................................................................... 7, 8 U.S. v. Whren, 517 U.S. 806 (1996) ........................................................................................... 7, 8 2 PROCEDURAL STATEMENT This Court has jurisdiction to entertain this appeal pursuant to CPL 450.90(1). 3 QUESTION PRESENTED POINT 1: DID THE COURT ERR IN DETERMINING THAT THERE WAS NO PROBABLE CAUSE OR REASONABLE CAUSE TO STOP DEFENDANT'S VEHICLE FOR A TRAFFIC INFRACTION? 4 STATEMENT OF FACTS On September 27, 2009, at approximately 12:15 AM Officer Daniel Weegar observed a car being driven by the Ms. Guthrie, the Defendant, in Wegman's parking lot, Village of Newark. The officer saw the vehicle go through a stop sign without stopping. (Al). The stop sign was located at the intersection of Finch Street and Miller Street, Village of Newark, New York. Further it was the stop sign for northbound traffic coming out of the Plaza's parking lot. (If you disregard the parking lot the public highways of Finch and Miller would otherwise form a "T" intersection). Officer Weegar pursued the vehicle stopping it for failure to stop at that stop sign for northbound traffic. Based upon observations of the Defendant made after the stop, the Officer suspected that the Defendant was intoxicated while operating the motor vehicle. (Al 0) After conducting coordination tests (All), the Officer charged the Defendant with failure to stop at a stop sign in violation ofVTL §l 172(a) and driving while intoxicated in violation ofVTL §§1192(2) and (3). (Al0-Al4). Defense counsel brought a motion to suppress evidence based upon lack of probable cause to stop the Defendant's car. The parties stipulated to the facts without a hearing that: 1) The Defendant went through the stop sign at approximately 15 miles per hour; and 2) The reason for the arresting officer stopping the vehicle was for failure to stop at the stop sign; and 3) Newark Village Code §140-46 (Code) listed the intersections of the stop signs in the Village; and 4) The stop sign in question (northbound Finch Street) was not listed in the Code. 5 (See, A7) While not stated clearly in the record of the proceeding, as all parties were familiar with the intersection in question, it is implied in the stipulation that the stop sign was ofregulation color, height and dimension. (See, A8, where the Court corrected the assistant district attorney as to which comer of the intersection the sign was located). The local Village Court Justice held that the stop sign in question was not properly registered, "(t)herefore, the stop sign violation cannot stand and subsequently the Driving While Intoxicated must be dismissed". (A5). The local Court's ruling was affirmed by Wayne County Court, Honorable John B. Nesbitt, presiding. Judge Nesbitt held that since the stop sign had no legal significance (A3) the stop by the officer was not justified and affirmed the lower court's decision dismissing both the stop sign violation and the two counts of driving while intoxicated .. (A4). 6 POINT 1: THE COURT ERRED IN DETERMINING THAT THERE WAS NO PROBABLE CAUSE OR REASONABLE CAUSE TO STOP DEFENDANT'S VEHICLE FOR A TRAFFIC INFRACTION Vehicle and Traffic Law (VTL) Title VII sets forth the "Rules of the Road" for operating a motor vehicle in New York State. It is a violation of the Vehicle and Traffic Law (VTL) to proceed through an intersection without stopping when that intersection is controlled by a stop sign. VTL §1172(a); VTL §11 lO(a). "Whenever official traffic-control devices are placed in position approximately conforming to the requirements of this chapter, such devices shall be presumed to have been so placed by the official act or direction oflawful authority, unless the contrary shall be established by competent evidence" VTL § 1110( d) (Emphasis added). An "intersection" includes "the area embracing the juncture of a highway with a private road or a driveway". VTL § 1110( e ). The laws of Title VII relating to stop signs apply to a "parking lot only when the legislative body of any city, village or town has adopted a local law, ordinance, rule or regulation ordering such signs." VTL § 11 OO(b ). "An automobile stop is subject to the constitutional imperative that it not be 'unreasonable' under the circumstances." U.S. v. Whren, 517 U.S. 806, 810 (1996). The Supreme Court stated that "(a)s a general matter, the decision to sop an automobile is reasonable where the police have probable cause to believe that a traffic violation has occurred". Id. This Court adopted that standard in People v. Robinson, 97 N.Y. 2d 341, 349 (2001). (Where a police officer has probable cause to believe that the driver of an automobile has committed a traffic violation, a stop does not violate N.Y. Const. art. I, § 12"). But see U.S. v. Stewart, 551 F. 3d 187, 191-192 (2"d Circuit 2009) (The Whren Court did not state that a decision to stop an automobile is reasonable only when the police have probable cause to believe that a traffic violation has occurred. The Court noted instead that probable cause was sufficient 7 to render the stop reasonable".) (Emphasis supplied). (Holding that traffic stops are reasonable when they arise from the reasonable suspicion of a traffic violation. Stewart, at 192.) In People v. Estrella, 48 A. D. 3d 1283 (4th Dept. 2008); affirmed 10 N.Y. 3d 945 (2008); Leave to Appeal denied 555 U.S. 1032 (2008), this Court affirmed the Appellate Division's determination that the stop of the defendant's vehicle was lawful, even though the officer was mistaken as to the validity of the traffic infraction. In Estrella, the defendant was observed by the arresting officer as having windows that the officer believed had too much tint. (VTL §375(12-a)(b)(3)). The vehicle had Georgia plates on it. Another officer had to be called with an instrument to determine the amount of light that passed through the window. It was less than allowed by New York Law and Georgia Law. At the Fourth Department it was conceded that the Georgia Law had been declared unconstitutional. This Court, affirming the order held that "the officer who stopped the car reasonably believed the windows to be over-tinted". Id. at 946. (Emphasis added). This Court further ruled that the "officer was not chargeable with knowledge that the tinting was legal in Georgia, where the car was registered". Id. An officer is justified in stopping an automobile where the vehicle does not stop at a stop sign. People v. Davis, 32 A.D. 2d 445 (2d Dept. 2006); People v. Scott, 191A.D.2d200, 201 (1st Dept. 1993); affirmed 82 N.Y. 2d 729 (1993). The majority of cases on the issue of whether a stop of a motor vehicle violates the US constitution and the NY state constitution are "pretext cases"; cases where the conduct actually being investigated by the arresting officer was other than the vehicle and traffic infraction. In the present case, the defendant was not suspected of doing anything more than failing to stop at the stop sign. The officer observed what he reasonably believed to be a violation of the vehicle and traffic law. Even though the defendant could not be prosecuted for the alleged stop sign 8 violation as the sign was not registered in the Village Code, it did not make a permissible stop of the defendant's vehicle invalid. The present case is similar to the Georgia tinted window case (Estrella) in that the officer in Estrella was not aware that the Georgia tinting law had been declared unconstitutional by Georgia's highest court. The officer in Estrella was making a judgment call about the legality of the tinting as he had to call another officer to the scene of the stop with equipment to measure the amount of light passing through the window. In the present case, the officer observed the defendant fail to stop at a stop sign. Absent "competent evidence" the officer was entitled to rely on the presumption provided by VTL § 1110( d). Any reasonable person would believe that the defendant in this case had violated VTL § 1172. 9 CONCLUSION Based upon the foregoing it is respectfully requested that the Court reverse the decision of Wayne County Court and remand the matter to Newark Village Court for further proceedings. 10 Respectfully submitted, Richard M. Healy, Wayne County District Attorney By: Bruce A. Rosekrans, Esquire Assistant District Attorney 54 Broad Street, Suite 202 Lyons, New York 14489 Telephone: 315-946-5905 Facsimile: 315-946-5911 STATE OF NEW YORK COURT OF APPEALS THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK, Respondent, vs. REBECCA GUTHRIE, Defendant/ Appellant. I, Darcey Koller, being duly sworn, depose and say: AFFIDAVIT OF SERVICE BY MAIL Wayne County APL-2014-00043 1. I am not a party to this action. I am over 18 years of age and reside in Wayne County, New York. 2. On May 2, 2014, three (3) copies of Appellant's Brief and Appendix for Appellant's Brief on behalf of the People of the State of New York were forwarded to: Wayne C~unty Public Defender 26 Church Street Lyons, New York enclosed in a post-paid properly addressed wrapper, in a post office official depository under the exclusive care and custody of the United States Postal Service within the State of New York. Sworp to before me this ~ ·~ day of May 2014 ~Qlif:_~~ BR~