Durfee v. Register Tapes Unlimited, L.P.MOTION to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction , MOTION TO DISMISS FOR FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIMW.D.N.Y.November 11, 2016UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT WESTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK JASON DURFEE, Plaintiff, - against - REGISTER TAPES UNLIMITED, L.P., Defendant. Civil Action No.: 1:16-cv-00702-LJV NOTICE OF MOTION TO DISMISS THE COMPLAINT PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that upon the accompanying Memorandum of Law in Support of its Motion To Dismiss, Defendant Register Tapes Unlimited, L.P., by its attorneys, Littler Mendelson, P.C., will move this Court, on a date and time to be set by the Court, before the Honorable Lawrence J. Vilardo, United States District Judge, in the United States Courthouse located at 2 Niagara Square, Buffalo, New York, for an Order pursuant to Rules 12(b)(1) and (b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, granting Defendant Register Tapes Unlimited, L.P.’s Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Complaint in its entirety, with prejudice as to the First Cause of Action and without prejudice as to the Second, Third, Fourth, and Fifth Causes of Action, and granting such other and further relief as this Court deems just and proper. PLEASE TAKE FURTHER NOTICE that Defendant intends to file and serve Reply papers. Case 1:16-cv-00702-LJV Document 5 Filed 11/11/16 Page 1 of 2 -2- Date: November 11, 2016 Fairport, New York /s/Jacqueline Phipps Polito Jacqueline Phipps Polito, Esq. Hinna M. Upal, Esq. LITTLER MENDELSON, P.C. 375 Woodcliff Drive, 2nd Floor Fairport, NY 14450 585.203.3400 Attorneys for Defendant REGISTER TAPES UNLIMITED, L.P. 143756610 Case 1:16-cv-00702-LJV Document 5 Filed 11/11/16 Page 2 of 2 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT WESTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK JASON DURFEE, Plaintiff, -against- REGISTER TAPES UNLIMITED, L.P., Defendant. Civil Action No. 1:16-cv-00702-LJV MEMORANDUM OF LAW IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO DISMISS PURSUANT TO FED. R. CIV. PROC. 12(b)(1) AND 12 (b)(6) Jacqueline Phipps Polito, Esq. Hinna M. Upal, Esq. LITTLER MENDELSON, P.C. 375 Woodcliff Drive, 2nd Floor Fairport, NY 14450 585.203.3400 Attorneys for Defendant REGISTER TAPES UNLIMITED, L.P. Case 1:16-cv-00702-LJV Document 5-1 Filed 11/11/16 Page 1 of 13 TABLE OF CONTENTS Page(s) -i- PRELIMINARY STATEMENT ...............................................................................................1 STATEMENT OF FACTS AS ALLEGED IN THE COMPLAINT ........................................1 ARGUMENT .............................................................................................................................2 A. STANDARDS APPLICABLE TO A MOTION TO DISMISS ...........................2 1. Rule 12(b)(1) Motion for Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction ....................2 2. Rule 12(b)(1) Motion for Failure to State a Claim ......................................2 B. PLAINTIFF’S FIRST CLAIM MUST BE DISMISSED BECAUSE IT DOES NOT ARISE UNDER ANY FEDERAL PRIVATE CAUSE OF ACTION ...........................................................................................3 C. PLAINTIFF’S REMAINING STATE LAW CLAIMS SHOULD BE DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE ................................................................6 CONCLUSION ..........................................................................................................................9 Case 1:16-cv-00702-LJV Document 5-1 Filed 11/11/16 Page 2 of 13 TABLE OF AUTHORITIES Page(s) Cases Arvin v. Go Go Inv. Club, No. 97-15307, 1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 32141 (9th Cir. Nov. 7, 1997) .....................................4 Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 127 S. Ct. 1955 (2007) ...............................................................................................................3 Bello v. Cty. of Niagara, No. 12-CV-799S, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 151989 (W.D.N.Y. Oct. 27, 2014) .........................7 Bennett-Kolasa v. Town of Alleghany, No. 13-CV-279S, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 121293 (W.D.N.Y. Aug. 28, 2014) ........................2 Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66 (1975) .....................................................................................................................6 Deleu v. Scaife, 775 F. Supp. 712 (S.D.N.Y. 1991).............................................................................................5 DiGiovanni v. City of Rochester, 680 F. Supp. 80 (W.D.N.Y.1988) ..............................................................................................4 DiStefano v. Sedita, No. 11-CV-1125 (MKB), 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12592 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 31, 2014) ..........................................................................................................................................8 Empire Healthchoice Assur., Inc. v. McVeigh, 547 U.S. 677 (2006) ...................................................................................................................3 Ferro v. Metro. Ctr. for Mental Health, No. 13 Civ. 2347 (PKC), 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 41477 (S.D.N.Y., Mar. 26, 2014) ..........................................................................................................................................5 Gebhardt v. Allspect, Inc., 96 F. Supp. 2d 331 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) ..........................................................................................2 Hochstein v. U.S., 900 F.2d 543 (2d Cir. 1990).......................................................................................................4 Mateo v. Paez, No. 10-CV-3568 (PKC), 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 79022 (E.D.N.Y. June 10, 2014) ..........................................................................................................................................8 Miller v. Am. Stock Exch., Inc., 317 F.3d 134 (2d Cir. 2003)...................................................................................................3, 4 Case 1:16-cv-00702-LJV Document 5-1 Filed 11/11/16 Page 3 of 13 TABLE OF AUTHORITIES (CONT.) Page(s) -iii- One Commc’ns Corp. v. J.P. Morgan SBIC LLC, 381 F. App’x 75 (2d Cir. 2010) .................................................................................................8 Perpetual Sec., Inc. v. Tang, 290 F.3d 132 (2d Cir. 2002)...................................................................................................4, 7 Reynolds v. de Silva, No. 09 Civ 9218 (CM), 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18040 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 24, 2010) ..........................................................................................................................................5 Rumfelt v. Jazzie Pools, Inc., No. 1:11cv217, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 59547 (E.D.VA. May 31, 2011).................................4 Simpson v. Uniondale Union Free Sch. Dist., 702 F.Supp.2d 122 (E.D.N.Y. 2010) .........................................................................................3 Spilky v. Helphand, No. 91 Civ. 3045, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6196 (S.D.N.Y. May 11, 1993) ..........................6, 7 Sullivan v. City of N.Y., No. 10 Civ. 0038 (NRB), 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 96461 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 26, 2011) ..........................................................................................................................................8 United Mine Workers of Am. v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715 (1966) ...............................................................................................................7, 8 Statutes 26 U.S.C. § 6672 .................................................................................................................... passim 28 U.S.C. § 1331 ..............................................................................................................................3 28 U.S.C §§ 1331, 1340 ...................................................................................................................1 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a) .........................................................................................................................7 Other Authorities FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(1) and (b)(6) ..................................................................................................1 Rule 12(b)(1) ....................................................................................................................................2 Rule 12(b)(6) ................................................................................................................................2, 6 Case 1:16-cv-00702-LJV Document 5-1 Filed 11/11/16 Page 4 of 13 PRELIMINARY STATEMENT Defendant Register Tapes Unlimited L.P. (“RTUI” or “Defendant”) submits this Memorandum of Law in support of its FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(1) and (b)(6) motion to dismiss the Complaint filed September 1, 2016 (See Dkt. No. 1, “Cplt.”) for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. In this action, Plaintiff alleges that this Court has jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C §§ 1331, 1340 and 26 U.S.C. § 6672 for Defendant’s failure to pay Federal Insurance Contributions Act (“F.I.C.A.”) withholdings (See generally, Dkt. No. 1). However, as more fully set forth below, there is no viable private right of action under the Federal Statute cited by Plaintiff. Moreover, Plaintiff’s remaining claims brought pursuant to New York State law should be dismissed without prejudice, as the Court lacks supplemental jurisdiction over those claims. Since Plaintiff’s First Cause of Action fails to establish subject matter jurisdiction, and/or in the alternative, fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, the entire Complaint should be dismissed because this Court lacks supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining state law claims. STATEMENT OF FACTS AS ALLEGED IN THE COMPLAINT1 Plaintiff Jason Durfee (“Plaintiff”) contracted with RTUI as an independent contractor until on or about March 28, 2016. (Cplt. ¶ 14). Plaintiff now alleges that he was misclassified by RTUI and should have been treated as an employee and not an independent contractor. (Cplt. ¶ 9). In his First Cause of Action, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant failed to collect and pay F.I.C.A. taxes in violation of 26 U.S.C. § 6672. (Cplt. ¶¶ 19, 20). Plaintiff’s remaining claims against Defendant, based on the same allegations that Defendant failed to pay F.I.C.A. withholdings on his behalf, all arise under New York state law: Unlawful Withholding of Wages 1 Solely for purposes of this Motion to Dismiss, the factual allegations of the Complaint are treated as true. Case 1:16-cv-00702-LJV Document 5-1 Filed 11/11/16 Page 5 of 13 -2- in Violation of Art. 6 of Labor Law (Second Cause of Action); Failure to Pay Wages in Violation of Art. 6 of Labor Law (Third Cause of Action); Breach of Contract for Payment of Commissions (Fourth Cause of Action); and Breach of Contract (Alternative Relief) (Fifth Cause of Action). (Cplt. ¶¶ 23, 27, 35, 40). ARGUMENT A. STANDARDS APPLICABLE TO A MOTION TO DISMISS 1. Rule 12(b)(1) Motion for Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction Plaintiff, as the party seeking to invoke the court’s jurisdiction, bears the burden of demonstrating proper subject-matter jurisdiction. Bennett-Kolasa v. Town of Alleghany, No. 13- CV-279S, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 121293 (W.D.N.Y. Aug. 28, 2014) (quoting McNutt v. Gen. Motors Acceptance Corp., 298 U.S. 178, 189 (1936); Scelsa v. City Univ. of N.Y., 76 F.3d 37, 40 (2d Cir. 1996)). In assessing a Rule 12(b)(1) motion, the court accepts as true all material factual allegations in the complaint, but does not draw inferences favorable to the party asserting jurisdiction. Bennett-Kolasa, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12193 (citing J.S. ex rel. N.S. v. Attica Cent. Sch., 386 F.3d 107, 110 (2d Cir. 2004); Shipping Fin. Svcs. Corp. v. Drakos, 140 F.3d 129, 131 (2d Cir. 1998)). The court may also consider affidavits and other materials beyond the pleadings, but may not rely on conclusory or hearsay statements. Id. In this case, the only basis for jurisdiction is found in the First Cause of Action, which is based upon an alleged violation of 26 U.S.C. § 6672 (“§ 6672”). However, that statute does not confer jurisdiction because it does not create a private cause of action. 2. Rule 12(b)(6) Motion For Failure to State a Claim Similarly, while the Court must accept as true, for purposes of a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the well-pleaded factual allegations of the Complaint, the Court need not accept as true wholly “conclusory allegations or legal conclusions masquerading as factual conclusions.” Gebhardt v. Case 1:16-cv-00702-LJV Document 5-1 Filed 11/11/16 Page 6 of 13 -3- Allspect, Inc., 96 F. Supp. 2d 331, 333 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (citation omitted). A plaintiff’s obligation to state the grounds for his entitlement to relief requires “more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of a cause of action’s elements will not do.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 1965 (2007) (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2)); Simpson v. Uniondale Union Free Sch. Dist., 702 F.Supp.2d 122, 128-29 (E.D.N.Y. 2010). In this case, since the Federal statute cited does not establish a private claim, there is no claim upon which relief can be granted so alternatively, even if subject matter jurisdiction was conferred, dismissal is warranted. B. PLAINTIFF’S FIRST CLAIM MUST BE DISMISSED BECAUSE IT DOES NOT ARISE UNDER ANY FEDERAL PRIVATE CAUSE OF ACTION Plaintiff’s First Cause of Action for “Violation of 26 U.S.C. § 6672 for Failure to Pay F.I.C.A Withholdings for Plaintiff” does not state a cognizable federal claim or any private cause of action under federal law and must be dismissed. Simply put, “A case generally arises under federal law when federal law creates the cause of action.” Empire Healthchoice Assur., Inc. v. McVeigh, 547 U.S. 677, 690 (2006) (quoting Franchise Tax Bd., v. Constr. Laborers Vacation Trust, 463 U.S. 1, 27-28 (1983) (“A case ‘aris[es] under’ federal law within the meaning of §1331 . . . if a ‘well-pleaded complaint establishes . . . that the federal law creates the cause of action[.]”). Federal courts do not have subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331 where a Complaint alleges a federal claim that is “immaterial, frivolous and insubstantial or made solely for the purpose of obtaining jurisdiction.” Miller v. Am. Stock Exch., Inc., 317 F.3d 134, 150 (2d Cir. 2003) (citing Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 681 (1946)). The “‘inadequacy’ of a federal claim is ground for dismissal for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction . . . when the claim is so insubstantial, implausible, foreclosed by prior decisions of this Court, or otherwise completely devoid of merit as not to involve a federal controversy.” Case 1:16-cv-00702-LJV Document 5-1 Filed 11/11/16 Page 7 of 13 -4- Miller, 317 F.3d at 150 (citing Steel Co. v. Citizens for Better Env’t., 523 U.S. 83, 89 (1998)). It is axiomatic that when there is no federal cause of action, there is no federal jurisdiction. Thus, the question the Court must ask is “whether the cause of action alleged is so patently without merit as to justify . . . the court’s dismissal for want of jurisdiction.” Perpetual Sec., Inc. v. Tang, 290 F.3d 132 (2d Cir. 2002) (quoting Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Env. Study Group, 438 U.S. 59 (1978) (emphasis original)). Here, Plaintiff’s allegations regarding federal jurisdiction are patently without merit and wholly insufficient to state a claim under federal law because there is no private federal cause of action for failure to pay F.I.C.A withholdings. See, DiGiovanni v. City of Rochester, 680 F. Supp. 80, 82-83 (W.D.N.Y.1988) (no private remedy existed where plaintiff asserted a cause of action based upon the alleged violations of improper withholding of F.I.C.A. and federal income taxes). Indeed, § 6672 is primarily a mechanism for the federal government to collect unpaid taxes and does not create an express or implied private right of action. See e.g. Hochstein v. U.S., 900 F.2d 543 (2d Cir. 1990) (discussing the government’s power to assess a penalty pursuant to § 6672 for failure to pay withholding and F.I.C.A. taxes); Arvin v. Go Go Inv. Club, No. 97-15307, 1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 32141 (9th Cir. Nov. 7, 1997) (holding § 6672 of the IRC did not create an express or implied private cause of action and affirming dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction); Rumfelt v. Jazzie Pools, Inc., No. 1:11cv217 (JCC/TCB), 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 59547 (E.D.VA. May 31, 2011) (holding § 6672 does not create a private right of action and dismissing for lack of subject matter jurisdiction). Courts in this Circuit have repeatedly held that a plaintiff cannot state a claim under the tax code provisions for failure to pay or withhold F.I.C.A. because these provisions do not Case 1:16-cv-00702-LJV Document 5-1 Filed 11/11/16 Page 8 of 13 -5- expressly or impliedly create any private right of action. Reynolds v. de Silva, No. 09 Civ 9218 (CM), 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18040 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 24, 2010) (citing Seabury v. City of N.Y., No. 06-CV-1477 (NGG), 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 32083 (E.D.N.Y. May 18, 2006) (dismissing plaintiff-employee’s IRC claims because “[p]rivate citizens cannot enforce the provisions of the Tax Code,” and noting that “[f]ederal courts have consistently refused to imply a private cause of action under the tax laws, including actions of employees against employers who have violated the requirements of the Tax Code”); Baraschi v. Silverwear, Inc., No. 01 Civ. 11263, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 24515 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 23, 2002) (“[I]f [plaintiff] is actually attempting to assert a claim based on the Internal Revenue Code, her claim is barred on the ground that the Internal Revenue Code provides no private right of action against employers.”); Spilky v. Helphand, No. 91 Civ. 3045, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6196 (S.D.N.Y. May 11, 1993) (“[T]here is no evidence that Congress intended to provide a private cause of action under the Internal Revenue Code for an employee who alleges that his employer failed to make the required withholdings and contributions.”); DiGiovanni, 680 F. Supp. at 82-83 (dismissing IRC claim alleging improper withholding because “[plaintiff] does not have a cause of action based on the federal tax withholding statutes”)); see also Deleu v. Scaife, 775 F. Supp. 712, 716-17 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) (finding no evidence that Congress intended to imply a private remedy for an employer’s “failing to pay federal F.I.C.A. and unemployment taxes on [plaintiff’s] behalf”); Ferro v. Metro. Ctr. for Mental Health, No. 13 Civ. 2347 (PKC), 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 41477 (S.D.N.Y., Mar. 26, 2014), motion for reconsideration denied, No. 13 Civ. 2347 (PKC), 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 67969 (May 16, 2014) (dismissing claim and holding there is no private cause of action under F.I.C.A. where employees allege they overpaid F.I.C.A. taxes as a consequence of being misclassified). Case 1:16-cv-00702-LJV Document 5-1 Filed 11/11/16 Page 9 of 13 -6- The overwhelming law in this Circuit supports that “[u]nder such circumstances . . . the plaintiff’s alleged claim . . . under the Internal Revenue Code is so patently without merit as to warrant dismissal of such claim for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.” Spilky, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6196. Indeed, the Cort factors also weigh against finding any implied right of action in § 6672. See Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 78 (1975). Like the plaintiff in Spilky, Plaintiff alleges that he was misclassified as an independent contractor and, as a basis for federal jurisdiction, asserts claims against his alleged employer for violations of the IRC. Spilky v. Helphand, No. 91 Civ. 3045, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6196 (S.D.N.Y. May 11, 1993). However, just as the court held therein that such a claim fails to establish jurisdiction because “none of the Code provisions expressly creates a private right of action for an employee against an employer who fails to make the required withholding deductions and contributions[,]” Plaintiff’s claim also fails. Id. For these reasons, Defendant’s motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction should be granted. Alternatively, Plaintiff’s First Cause of Action also fails to state a claim as a matter of law and as such, the Motion should be granted on that basis. Just as the court noted in Spilky, “[e]ven assuming that dismissal on jurisdictional grounds was unwarranted, the Court’s reasoning would support dismissal of this claim under Rule 12(b)(6) without leave to replead because the defect is incurable.” Spilky, at n. 5. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s First Cause of Action is barred and should be dismissed with prejudice. C. PLAINTIFF’S REMAINING STATE LAW CLAIMS SHOULD BE DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE As discussed in Section B above, Plaintiff’s only stated basis for federal jurisdiction is wholly without merit; therefore, this Court lacks supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining Case 1:16-cv-00702-LJV Document 5-1 Filed 11/11/16 Page 10 of 13 -7- state law claims, which must also be dismissed. Supplemental jurisdiction does not apply if there are no “claims in the action within such original jurisdiction” that the state law claims “are so related to . . . that they form part of the same case or controversy under Article III of the United States Constitution.” 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a). Plaintiff’s state law claims never had a relationship to any valid federal claim, thus no supplemental jurisdiction exists pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a). See e.g. Spilky, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6196. “The federal claim must have substance sufficient to confer subject matter jurisdiction on the court.” United Mine Workers of Am. v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 725 (1966). Indeed, the Second Circuit has confirmed that “[s]imply raising a federal issue in a complaint will not automatically confer federal question jurisdiction.” Perpetual Sec., Inc., 290 F.3d at 137. Here, Plaintiff has alleged no federal claim of substance and the remaining state law claims must also be dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Section 1367(c)(3) also provides that a district court may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over a claim where “the district court has dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction.” The Second Circuit has repeatedly held that “[i]n general, where the federal claims are dismissed before trial, the state claims should be dismissed as well.” Bello v. Cty. of Niagara, No. 12-CV-799S, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 151989 (W.D.N.Y. Oct. 27, 2014) (quoting Marcus v. AT&T Corp., 138 F.3d 46,57 (2d Cir. 1998) (citing Purgess v. Sharrock, 33 F.3d 134, 138 (2d Cir.1994); Baylis v. Marriott Corp., 843 F.2d 658, 664-65 (2d Cir.1988)); see also United Mine Workers of Am. v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726 (pendant jurisdiction should not be exercised when considerations of judicial economy, convenience and fairness to litigants weigh in favor of dismissal). Case 1:16-cv-00702-LJV Document 5-1 Filed 11/11/16 Page 11 of 13 -8- The U.S. Supreme Court has cautioned against exercising jurisdiction where no federal claims remain because making “[n]eedless decisions of state law should be avoided both as a matter of comity and to promote justice between the parties[.]” Gibbs, 383 U.S. at 726. “[I]n the usual case in which all federal-law claims are eliminated before trial, the balance of factors to be considered under the pendent jurisdiction doctrine -- judicial economy, convenience, fairness, and comity -- will point toward declining to exercise jurisdiction over the remaining state-law claims.” DiStefano v. Sedita, No. 11-CV-1125 (MKB), 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12592 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 31, 2014) (quoting Pension Ben. Guar. Corp. v. Morgan Stanley Inv. Mgmt. Inc., 712 F.3d 705, 727 (2d Cir. 2013); One Commc’ns Corp. v. J.P. Morgan SBIC LLC, 381 F. App’x 75, 82 (2d Cir. 2010) (“If all of a plaintiff’s federal claims are dismissed, a district court is well within its discretion to decline to assert supplemental jurisdiction over any state law claims”); Sullivan v. City of N.Y., No. 10 Civ. 0038 (NRB), 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 96461 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 26, 2011). Certainly, if the federal claims are dismissed before trial, even though not insubstantial in a jurisdictional sense, the state claims should be dismissed as well. Similarly, if it appears that the state issues substantially predominate, whether in terms of proof, of the scope of the issues raised, or of the comprehensiveness of the remedy sought, the state claims may be dismissed without prejudice and left for resolution to state tribunals. Once it appears that a state claim constitutes the real body of a case, to which the federal claim is only an appendage, the state claim may fairly be dismissed. Gibbs, 383 U.S. at 726. Dismissal of Plaintiff’s Complaint is particularly appropriate where it is early in the case and Plaintiff has made no substantial expenditure of time, effort, or money in preparing the state claims in this forum. See e.g. Mateo v. Paez, No. 10-CV-3568 (PKC), 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 79022 (E.D.N.Y. June 10, 2014) (declining to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over state law Case 1:16-cv-00702-LJV Document 5-1 Filed 11/11/16 Page 12 of 13 -9- claims after discovery was complete and dispositive motion practice resulted in the termination of all defendants other than the two remaining, defaulting defendants). Therefore, because Plaintiff asserted no valid federal claim, this Court lacks supplemental jurisdiction over the state claims, which must also be dismissed. CONCLUSION For the reasons discussed herein, Plaintiff’s First Cause of Action must be dismissed with prejudice, and all remaining claims in the Complaint must be dismissed in their entirety, together with such other and further relief as this Court deems just and proper. Date: November 11, 2016 Fairport, New York /s/ Jacqueline Phipps Polito Jacqueline Phipps Polito, Esq. Hinna M. Upal, Esq. LITTLER MENDELSON, P.C. 375 Woodcliff Drive, 2nd Floor Fairport, NY 14450 585.203.3400 Attorneys for Defendant REGISTER TAPES UNLIMITED, L.P. 143757412 Case 1:16-cv-00702-LJV Document 5-1 Filed 11/11/16 Page 13 of 13