Davis v. City of Atlanta et al

MOTION TO DISMISS FOR FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM with Brief In Support

N.D. Ga.August 19, 2016

-1- IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA ATLANTA DIVISION MELISA DAVIS, ) ) Plaintiff, ) ) v. ) NO. 1:16-cv-02037-TWT-JKL ) THE CITY OF ATLANTA, ) RICHARD MENDOZA in his ) individual and official capacity as ) Commissioner of the Department of ) Public Works, and YVONNE ) YANCY in her individual and official ) capacity as Commissioner of the ) Department of Human Resources, ) ) Defendants. ) CITY DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS AND INCORPORATED BRIEF IN SUPPORT I. BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL POSTURE On June 17, 2016, Plaintiff filed the instant lawsuit against the City of Atlanta, Commissioner Richard Mendoza, and Commissioner Yvonne Yancy (collectively “the City Defendants”) alleging violation of Title VII sex discrimination (Count I), violation of the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses of the United States Constitution §1983 against all Defendants and the Case 1:16-cv-02037-TWT-JKL Document 12 Filed 08/19/16 Page 1 of 13 -2- Equal Pay Act against City of Atlanta (combined in Complaint at Doc. 1 as Counts II, III, and IV), and breach of employment contract against Defendant City of Atlanta (Count V). City Defendants executed waivers of service dated June 20, 2016, and now hereby file this timely Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Complaint. II. STANDARD OF REVIEW Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) authorizes dismissal of an action when the complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.1 In considering a motion to dismiss, the Court must accept plaintiff’s allegations as true and construe the complaint in her favor.2 “While a complaint attacked by a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss does not need detailed factual allegations, a plaintiff’s obligation to provide the grounds of [her] entitle[ment] to relief requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.”3 “Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level,” as the complaint must contain “enough facts to state a claim to 1 Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). 2 Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 73 (1984); Duke v. Cleland, 5 F.3d 1399, 1402 (11th Cir. 1993); Tapsoba v. Khiani Alpharetta, LLC, Civil Action No. 1:13-CV-1519-RWS, 2013 WL 4855255, at *1 (N.D. Ga. Sept. 11, 2013). 3 Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (second alteration in original) (citations and internal marks omitted). Case 1:16-cv-02037-TWT-JKL Document 12 Filed 08/19/16 Page 2 of 13 -3- relief that is plausible on its face.”4 “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.”5 “Regardless of the alleged facts, however, a court may dismiss a complaint on a dispositive issue of law.”6 III. ARGUMENT AND CITATION OF AUTHORITY A. Count I for violation of Title VII should be dismissed for failure to show satisfaction of administrative prerequisites. Although she asserts that her EEOC charge was filed within 180 days of having knowledge upon which her charge was based, Plaintiff fails to allege that she filed the instant lawsuit within ninety (90) days of receipt of her EEOC right to sue letter.7 Plaintiff further failed to attach a right to sue letter to her Complaint to indicate compliance with the ninety-day rule. [I]n order for [a plaintiff] to maintain his Title VII claims…he has the initial burden of establishing that he filed his Complaint within ninety days of his receipt of the EEOC's right-to-sue letter. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1) (1994); see also Santini v. Cleveland Clinic Fla., 232 F.3d 823, 825 (11th Cir.2000). Once the defendant contests this issue, 4 Id. at 555, 570 (citation omitted). 5 Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). 6 Moore v. McCalla Raymer, LLC, 916 F. Supp. 2d 1332, 1342 (N.D. Ga. 2013), adopted at 1336 (citations and internal marks omitted); see also Glover v. Liggett Grp., Inc., 459 F.3d 1304, 1308 (11th Cir. 2006) (per curiam); Marshall Cnty. Bd. of Educ. v. Marshall Cnty. Gas Dist., 992 F.2d 1171, 1174 (11th Cir. 1993). 7 Doc. 1, ¶¶ 15-16. Case 1:16-cv-02037-TWT-JKL Document 12 Filed 08/19/16 Page 3 of 13 -4- the plaintiff has the burden of establishing that he met the ninety day filing requirement. Jackson v. Seaboard Coast Line R.R. Co., 678 F.2d 992, 1010 (11th Cir.1982).8 Failure to meet the burden of establishing that a lawsuit was filed within ninety days of receiving a right to sue letter is a proper basis for dismissal of a plaintiff’s Title VII claims.9 Therefore, Count I of Plaintiff’s Complaint for alleged violation of Title VII sex discrimination should be dismissed unless Plaintiff shows compliance with the requirement. B. Plaintiff’s equal protection and due process claims against the individual Defendants in their official capacities should be dismissed because those claims are duplicative of the claims against Defendant City of Atlanta. Plaintiff’s claims against the individual Defendants in their official capacities should be dismissed because the claims are duplicative of her claim against the City, which is both redundant and potentially confusing. Because suits against a municipal officer sued in his official capacity and direct suits against municipalities are functionally equivalent, there no longer exists a need to bring official-capacity actions against local government officials, because local government units can be sued directly (provided, of course, that the public entity receives notice and an opportunity to respond). See Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. at 166, 105 S.Ct. at 3105; Brandon v. Holt, 469 U.S. at 471-72, 105 S.Ct. at 877-78. In Busby's action against the City of Orlando, the district court recognized that the intended defendant was actually the City. To keep both the City and the officers sued in their official capacity as defendants in this case would have been redundant and 8 Green v. Union Foundry Co., 281 F.3d 1229, 1233-34 (11th Cir. 2002). 9 Id. Case 1:16-cv-02037-TWT-JKL Document 12 Filed 08/19/16 Page 4 of 13 -5- possibly confusing to the jury.10 C. Plaintiff’s equal protection and due process claims against the individual Defendants in their individual capacities should be dismissed because Commissioner Mendoza and Commissioner Yancy are entitled to qualified immunity. Aside from Plaintiff’s conclusory statements about the City Defendants in Counts II, III, and IV of her Complaint, Plaintiff offers no factual allegations that-even if taken as true for purposes of a motion to dismiss-would show the two Commissioners were operating outside the scope of their discretionary authority or that they violated Plaintiff’s clearly established constitutional rights. Qualified immunity protects government actors performing discretionary functions from being sued in their individual capacities.11 The doctrine shields government officials from liability to the extent that the conduct does not violate clearly established constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.12 The doctrine protects government officials from always erring on the side of caution by shielding them both from liability and the other burdens of litigation, 10 Busby v. City of Orlando, 931 F.2d 764, 776 (11th Cir. 1991). 11 Williams v. Ala. State Univ., 102 F.3d 1179, 1182 (11th Cir. 1997); Lassiter v. Ala. A & M Univ., Bd. of Trustees, 28 F.3d 1146, 1149 (11th Cir. 1994)(en banc). 12 Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 817-18 (1982); Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 131 S.Ct. 2074, 2085 (2011); Lane v. Franks, 134 S. Ct. 2369, 2381 (2014) (emphasis added). Case 1:16-cv-02037-TWT-JKL Document 12 Filed 08/19/16 Page 5 of 13 -6- including discovery.13 A public official who asserts a defense of qualified immunity must establish that he was engaged in a discretionary function when he performed the acts of which the plaintiff complains.14 Once the discretionary function is established, a court then evaluates the defense of qualified immunity using a two-step inquiry: (1) whether the defendant's conduct violated a clearly established constitutional right; and, (2) whether a reasonable government official would have been aware of that fact.15 This two-step inquiry is designed to provide protection to all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law.16 A government actor's discretionary authority encompasses all actions that: (1) were undertaken pursuant to the performance of his duties; and (2) were within the scope of the actor's authority.17 Here, the Plaintiff asserts that Commissioner Mendoza and Commissioner Yancy failed to properly train18, denied Plaintiff’s 13 Lassiter, 28 F.3d at 1149. 14 Holloman ex rel. Holloman v. Harland, 370 F.3d 1252, 1264 (11th Cir. 2004); Epps v. Watson, 492 F.3d 1240, 1243 (11th Cir. 2007). 15 Tindal v. Montgomery County Comm'n, 32 F.3d 1535, 1539 (11th Cir. 1994). 16 Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341 (1986); Gonzalez v. Lee County Hous. Auth., 161 F.3d 1290, 1294-95 (11th Cir. 1998) (quoting Evans v. Hightower, 117 F.3d 1318, 1320 (11th Cir. 1997)); Gonzalez, 161 F.3d at 1295; Harbert Int'l Inc. v. James, 157 F.3d 1271, 1281; see also Rowe v. Schreiber, 139 F.3d 1381, 1383 (11th Cir. 1998); Maggio v. Sipple, 211 F.3d 1346, 1350 (11th Cir. 2000). 17 Harbert Int'l, Inc., 157 F.3d at 1281. 18 Doc. 1, ¶ 54. Case 1:16-cv-02037-TWT-JKL Document 12 Filed 08/19/16 Page 6 of 13 -7- right of administrative appeal19. The alleged failure to properly act under their authority as Commissioner of Public Works and Commissioner of Human Resources falls squarely within the scope of their discretionary authority as municipal officials. The next step of the inquiry is to determine (1) whether the defendant's conduct violated a clearly established constitutional right; and, (2) whether a reasonable government official would have been aware of that fact.20 A constitutional right is clearly established if controlling precedent has recognized the right in a “concrete and factually defined context.”21 In fact, if case law “does not factually stake out a bright line, qualified immunity almost always protects the defendant.”22 A plaintiff cannot avoid the qualified immunity defense by referring to general rules and to the violation of abstract rights.23 To establish that the right at issue is clearly established, the plaintiff must show that the relevant law has earlier been developed in such a concrete and factually defined context to make it obvious to all reasonable government actors, in the defendant's place, that ‘what he 19 Doc. 1, ¶ 55. 20 Tindal v. Montgomery County Comm'n, 32 F.3d 1535, 1539 (11th Cir. 1994). 21 Lassiter, 28 F.3d at 1149; see also Post v. City of Fort Lauderdale, 7 F.3d 1552, 1557 (11th Cir. 1993). 22 Post 7 F.3d at 1557. 23 Lassiter, 28 F.3d at 1150. Case 1:16-cv-02037-TWT-JKL Document 12 Filed 08/19/16 Page 7 of 13 -8- is doing’ violates federal law.24 Moreover, clearly established law is law that is sufficiently defined so as to provide public officials with “fair notice” that the conduct alleged is prohibited.25 A plaintiff must next demonstrate that a reasonable government actor would have known that what he was doing infringed that right.26 Accordingly, a plaintiff must satisfy and always bears the burden of pointing to case law which pre-dates the alleged improper conduct, involves materially similar facts, and truly compels the conclusion that the plaintiff had a right under federal law.27 In the instant case, the allegation that two government officials made decisions within the scope of their discretionary authority regarding training and non-specified employee appeal rights fails to show a violation of a clearly established constitutional right about which any reasonable official should have been aware. Therefore, Plaintiff’s claims against Commissioner Mendoza and Commissioner Yancy in their individual capacities should be dismissed. 24 Lassiter, 28 F.3d at 1150; see also Denno v. School Bd. of Volusia County, 218 F.3d 1267, 1270 (11th Cir. 2000) cert. denied, 531 U.S. 958 (2000); Hammond v. Gordon Cnty., 316 F. Supp. 2d 1262, 1283-84 (N.D. Ga. 2002). 25 Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 739 (2002); Epps v. Watson, 492 F.3d 1240, 1245 (11th Cir. 2007). 26 Williams, 102 F.3d at 1182; Chesser v. Sparks, 248 F.3d 1117, 1121-22 (11th Cir. 2001). 27 Ensley v. Soper, 142 F.3d 1402, 1406 (11th Cir. 1998)(citing Lassiter, 28 F.3d at 1150); see also Santamorena v. Georgia Military Coll., 147 F.3d 1337, 1340 (11th Cir. 1998). Case 1:16-cv-02037-TWT-JKL Document 12 Filed 08/19/16 Page 8 of 13 -9- D. Plaintiff’s claims violate the prohibition against shotgun pleadings. Plaintiff, in shotgun fashion, incorporates by reference all other facts into the causes of actions without discernable reference to which facts or conclusions apply to which claims. The Court is not required to accept Plaintiff’s conclusory legal assertions as true for the purposes of a motion to dismiss.28 Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires that a pleading contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2). Though there is no required technical form, “each allegation must be simple, concise, and direct.” Id. at 8(d)(1). Each separate claim is required to be presented in a separate numbered paragraph, with each paragraph “limited as far as practicable to a single set of circumstances.”29 When a complaint fails to follow Rules 8 and 10, it may be classified as a shotgun pleading. A shotgun pleading is a pleading that “incorporate[s] every antecedent allegation by reference into each subsequent claim for relief or 28 Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. 29 Fed.R.Civ.P. 10(b)); see Anderson v. Dist. Bd. of Trs. of Cent. Fla. Cmty. Coll., 77 F.3d 364, 366 (11th Cir. 1996) (stating that multiple claims should be presented separately in adherence to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 10(b) “and with such clarity and precision that the defendant will be able to discern what the plaintiff is claiming and to frame a responsive pleading”). Case 1:16-cv-02037-TWT-JKL Document 12 Filed 08/19/16 Page 9 of 13 -10- affirmative defense.”30 As a result, it is “virtually impossible to know which allegations of fact are intended to support which claim(s) for relief.”31 The Eleventh Circuit has “repeatedly condemned shotgun pleadings.”32 “Shotgun pleadings wreak havoc on the judicial system.”33 In the instant case, each Count incorporates all preceding Counts and allegations, and Plaintiff’s shotgun pleading further includes a consolidation of Counts II, III, and IV that “completely disregards Rule 10(b)'s requirement that discrete claims should be plead in separate counts.”34 Accordingly, Defendants move the Court to dismiss Plaintiff’s Complaint based on a violation of Fed.R.Civ.P. 8 and 10, or to order repleading for a more definite statement of the claim.35 30 Wagner v. First Horizon Pharm. Corp., 464 F.3d 1273, 1279 (11th Cir. 2006); Magluta v. Samples, 256 F.3d 1282, 1284 (11th Cir. 2001) (per curiam). 31 Anderson, 77 F.3d at 366. 32 Hickman v. Hickman, 563 F. App'x 742, 743-44 (11th Cir.) cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 873 (2014) reh'g denied, 135 S. Ct. 1489 (2015); See Davis v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co. Consol., 516 F.3d 955, n. 54 (11th Cir. 2008) (providing a long list of cases in which we have rejected shotgun pleadings). 33 Byrne v. Nezhat, 261 F.3d 1075, 1130 (11th Cir. 2001); Wagner v. First Horizon Pharm. Corp., 464 F.3d 1273, 1279 (11th Cir. 2006). 34 See Anderson v. Dist. Bd. of Tr., 77 F.3d 364, 366-67 (11th Cir. 1996); See, e.g., BMC Indus., Inc. v. Barth Indus., Inc., 160 F.3d 1322, 1326-27 n. 6 (11th Cir. 1998); GJR Invs., Inc., 132 F.3d at 1368; Pelletier v. Zweifel, 921 F.2d 1465, 1518-19 (11th Cir. 1991); Magluta v. Samples, 256 F.3d 1282, 1284 (11th Cir. 2001). 35 Wagner, 464 F.3d at 1280. Case 1:16-cv-02037-TWT-JKL Document 12 Filed 08/19/16 Page 10 of 13 -11- E. Plaintiff’s state law claim for breach of employment contract as asserted in Count V should be dismissed Should the Court dismiss Plaintiff’s federal claims in Counts I-IV, the sole remaining claim would be the state law claim for breach of employment contract found in Count V. In such instances, Courts are encouraged to decline supplemental jurisdiction and dismiss remaining state law claims.36 IV. CONCLUSION For the reasons cited herein, City Defendants move the Court to dismiss Plaintiff’s Complaint in its entirety. Respectfully submitted this 19th day of August, 2016. [signatures on following page] 36 Raney v. Allstate Ins. Co., 370 F.3d 1086, 1089 (11th Cir. 2004) (“We have encouraged district courts to dismiss any remaining state claims when, as here, the federal claims have been dismissed prior to trial. L.A. Draper & Son v. Wheelabrator-Frye, Inc., 735 F.2d 414, 428 (11th Cir.1984).”) See also Ingram v. Sch. Bd. of Miami-Dade Cty., 167 F. App'x 107, 108-09 (11th Cir. 2006) (“Where, as here, a court has dismissed all federal claims from a case, there is a very strong argument for dismissal, especially where the federal claims are dismissed prior to trial. Id. (citing Gibbs, 383 U.S. at 726, 86 S.Ct. at 1139). In fact, ‘if the federal claims are dismissed prior to trial, Gibbs strongly encourages or even requires dismissal of state claims.’ Mergens v. Dreyfoos, 166 F.3d 1114, 1119 (11th Cir.1999) (citations omitted).”) Case 1:16-cv-02037-TWT-JKL Document 12 Filed 08/19/16 Page 11 of 13 -12- CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE WITH RULE 5.1(B) Pursuant to Local Rule 7.1(D), the undersigned counsel hereby certify that the font and point size, Times New Roman 14 point, used in this document, comply with Local Rule 5.1(C). /s/ Y. Soo Jo ROBERT N. GODFREY Chief Counsel Georgia Bar No. 298550 Y. SOO JO Sr. Assistant City Attorney Georgia Bar No. 385817 Attorneys for Defendants City of Atlanta Law Department 55 Trinity Avenue, SW, Suite 5000 Atlanta, GA 30303 (404) 546-4100(telephone) rgodfrey@atlantaga.gov ysjo@atlantaga.gov Case 1:16-cv-02037-TWT-JKL Document 12 Filed 08/19/16 Page 12 of 13 -13- IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA ATLANTA DIVISION MELISA DAVIS, ) ) Plaintiff, ) ) v. ) NO. 1:16-cv-02037-TWT-JKL ) THE CITY OF ATLANTA, ) RICHARD MENDOZA in his ) individual and official capacity as ) Commissioner of the Department of ) Public Works, and YVONNE ) YANCY in her individual and official ) capacity as Commissioner of the ) Department of Human Resources, ) ) Defendants. ) Certificate of Service I hereby certify that on, August 19, 2016, I electronically filed the Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss and Incorporated Brief in Support with the Clerk of Court using the CM/ECF system which will provide notice to all attorneys of record. /s/ Y. Soo Jo Y. SOO JO Sr. Assistant City Attorney Georgia Bar No. 385817 Case 1:16-cv-02037-TWT-JKL Document 12 Filed 08/19/16 Page 13 of 13