In the Matter of County of St. Lawrence, Respondent,v.Nirav R. Shah,, et al., Appellants. (And Two Other Related Proceedings.)BriefN.Y.September 7, 2016To be argued by: Christopher E. Mickey, Esq. 20 minutes requested Court of appeat5 of the tate of nal) Pork In the Matter of the Application of COUNTY OF ST. LAWRENCE, Petitioner-Plaintiff-Respondent, -against- APL-2015-00089 NIRAV R. SHAH, AS COMMISSIONER OF THE NEW YORK STATE DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND THE NEW YORK STATE DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, Respondents-Defendants-Appellants. Appellate Division, Third Department Case Nos.: 1518097, 518220, 518221 St. Lawrence County Index Nos.: 2013-140712, 2013-0140998, 2013-0141656 In the Matter of the Application of COUNTY OF CHEMUNG, Petitioner-Plaintiff-Respondent, -against- APL-2015-00088 NIRAV R. SHAH, AS COMMISSIONER OF THE NEW YORK STATE DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND THE NEW YORK STATE DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, Respondents-Defendants-Appellants. Appellate Division, Third Department Case No.: 518222 Chernung County Index No.: 2013-1849 Continued on Next Page In the Matter of the Application of COUNTY OF CHAUTAUQUA, Petitioner-Plaintiff-Appellant, -against- APL-2015-00115 NIRAV R. SHAH, AS COMMISSIONER OF THE NEW YORK STATE DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND THE NEW YORK STATE DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, Respondents-Defendants-Respondents. Appellate Division, Fourth Department Docket No.: CA14-00923 Chautauqua County Index No.: K1-2013-1266 In the Matter of the Application of COUNTY OF JEFFERSON, Petitioner-PlaintAppellant, -against- APL-2015-00116 NIRAV R. SHAH, AS COMMISSIONER OF THE NEW YORK STATE DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND THE NEW YORK STATE DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, Respondents-Defendants-Respondents. Appellate Division, Fourth Department Docket No.: CA 14-00926 Jefferson County Index No.: 2013-1956 In the Matter of the Application of COUNTY OF ONEIDA, Petitioner-PlaintsAppellant, -against- APL-2015-00140 NIRAV R. SHAH, AS COMMISSIONER OF THE NEW YORK STATE DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND THE NEW YORK STATE DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, Respondents-Defendants-Respondents. Appellate Division, Fourth Department Docket No.: CA 14-010405 Oneida County Index No.: 2013-1788 Continued on Next Page In the Matter of the Application of COUNTY OF GENESEE, Petitioner-Plaintiff-Appellant, -against- APL-2015-00141 NIRAV R. SHAH, AS COMMISSIONER OF THE NEW YORK STATE DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND THE NEW YORK STATE DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, Respondents-Defendants-Respondents. Appellate Division, Fourth Department Docket No.: CA14-01041 Genesee County Index No.: 2013-63493 In the Matter of the Application of COUNTY OF CAYUGA, Petitioner-Plaintiff-Appellant, -against- APL-2015-00195 NIRAV R. SHAH, AS COMMISSIONER OF THE NEW YORK STATE DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND THE NEW YORK STATE DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, Respondents-Defendants-Respondents. Appellate Division, Fourth Department Docket No.: 14-01886 Cayuga County Index No.: 2013-0000261 In the Matter of the Application of COUNTY OF MONROE, Petitioner-Plaintiff-Appellant, -against- AFL-2015-00196 NIRAV R. SHAH, AS COMMISSIONER OF THE NEW YORK STATE DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND THE NEW YORK STATE DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, Respondent-Defendants-Respondents. Appellate Division, Fourth Department Docket No.: CA14-01888 Monroe County Index No.: 2014-3162 Continued on Next Page REPLY BRIEF. OF RESPONDENTS COUNTY OF ST. LAWRENCE AND COUNTY OF CHEMUNG AND APPELLANTS COUNTY OF CHAUTAUQUA, COUNTY OF JEFFERSON, COUNTY OF ONEIDA, COUNTY OF GENESEE, COUNTY OF CAYUGA, AND COUNTY OF MONROE Dated: October 15, 2015 WHITEMAN OSTERMAN & HANNA LLP Christopher E. Buckey, Esq., Of Counsel Robert S. Rosborough IV, Esq., Of Counsel One Commerce Plaza Albany, New York 12260 (518) 487-7600 (518) 487-7777 (facsimile) NANCY ROSE STORMER, P.C. Nancy Rose Stormer, Esq., Of Counsel Michael Bagge, Esq., Of Counsel 1325 Belle Avenue Utica, New York 13501 (315) 797-0110 Attorneys for County of St. Lawrence, County of Chemung, County of Chautauqua, County of Jefferson, County of Oneida, County of Genesee, County of Cayuga, and County of Monroe BOND SCHOENECK & KING, PLLC Raymond A. Meier, Esq., Of Counsel Co-Counsel for Petitioners-Plaintiffs-Appellants County of Oneida and County of Monroe 501 Main Street Utica, New York 13501 (315) 738-1223 TABLE OF CONTENTS TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ii PRELIMINARY STATEMENT ARGUMENT 3 POINT I THE THIRD DEPARTMENT ORDERS SHOULD BE AFFIRMED 3 A. Under the Third Department's Interpretation, Section 61 Extinguishes All Remedies to Recover Overburden Reimbursement 5 B. Petitioners are Entitled to Mandamus Relief Compelling Respondents to Identify, Calculate, and Pay the Total Outstanding Overburden Reimbursement Liability 12 POINT II THE FOURTH DEPARTMENT ORDERS SHOULD BE REVERSED 14 A. Municipalities are Persons Entitled to Exercise Due Process Rights under the New York Constitution 14 B. The Fourth Department's and Respondents' Construction of Section 61 Renders it Unconstitutional. 28 CONCLUSION 38 ADDENDUM 40 TABLE OF AUTHORITIES State Cases Alliance of Am. Insurers v Chu, 77 NY2d 573 (1991) Barenboim v Starbucks Corp., 21 NY3d 460 (2013) Black Riv. Regulating Dist. v Adirondack League Club, 29, 37 28 307 NY 475 (1954), appeal dismissed 351 US 922 (1956) 17, 18, 20 Board of Educ., Levittown Union Free School Dist. v Nyquist, 57 NY2d 27 (1982) 16, 17, 21 Boltja v Southside Hosp., 186 AD2d 774 (2d Dept 1992) 11, 37 Brothers v Florence, 95 NY2d 290 (2000) 4, 11, 33 Cady v County of Broome, 87 AD2d 964 (3d Dept 1982), lv denied 57 NY2d 602 (1982) 35, 36 Caprio v New York State Dept. of Taxation & Fin., 25 NY3d 744 (2015) 34 City of New York v State of New York, 76 NY2d 479 (1990) 16, 17 City of New York v State of New York, 86 NY2d 286 (1995) passim County of Albany v Hooker, 204 NY 1 (1912) 18, 19 County of Rensselaer v Regan, 173 AD2d 37 (3d Dept 1991), affd 80 NY2d 988 (1992) 23, 25 County of Rensselaer v Regan, 80 NY2d 988 (1992) 25 Easley v New York State Thruway Auth., 1 NY2d 374 (1956) 32 Empire State Ch. of Associated Bldrs. & Contrs., Inc. v Smith, 21 NY3d 309 (2013) 16 Gilbert v Ackerman, 159 NY 118 (1899) 33 James Sq. Assoc. LP v Mullen, 21 NY3d 233 (2013) 25, 28, 37 Kilcer v Niagara Mohawk Power Corp., 86 AD3d 682 (3d Dept 2011) 22 Klostermann v Cuomo, 61 NY2d 525 (1984) 14 Matter of City of New York v Lawton, 128 AD2d 202 (3d Dept 1987) 23 Matter of County of Cayuga v McHugh, 4 NY2d 609 (1958) 19 Matter of County of Herkimer v Daines, 60 AD3d 1456 (4th Dept 2009), lv denied 63 AD3d 1672 (4th Dept 2009), lv denied 13 NY3d 707 (2009) 11, 28, 31 Matter of County of Niagara v Daines, 60 AD3d 1460 (4th Dept 2009), lv denied 13 NY3d 708 (2009) 10 Matter of County of Niagara v Daines, 91 AD3d 1288 (4th Dept 2012), lv denied 94 AD3d 1481 (4th Dept Apr. 20, 2012) 10, 35 Matter of County of St. Lawrence v Daines, 81 AD3d 212 (3d Dept 2011), lv denied 17 NY3d 703 (2011) 7, 31 Matter of County of St. Lawrence v Shah, 95 AD3d 1548 (3d Dept 2012) passim Matter of County of St. Lawrence v Shah, 124 AD3d 88 (3d Dept 2014), lv denied AD3d (3d Dept Jan 23, 2015), lv granted 25 NY3d 903 (2015), appeal PU 6, 32 Matter of Crespo, 123 Misc 2d 862 (Sup Ct, New York County 1984) 15 Matter of Hodes v Axelrod, 70 NY2d 364 (1987) 29 Matter of Island Waste Servs., Ltd. v Tax Appeals Trib. of State of N,Y, 77 AD3d 1080 (3d Dept 2010), lv denied 16 NY3d 712 (2011) 11, 37 Matter of deter v Ellenville Cent. School Dist., 41 NY2d 283 (1977) 17, 20, 21, 22 Matter of Krauskopf v Perales, 139 AD2d 147 (3d Dept 1988), affd 74 NY2d 730 (1989) 23, 24 Matter of Roosevelt Raceway v Monaghan, 9 NY2d 293 (1961) 11, 37 O'Neil v State of New York, 223 NY 40 (1918) 28 People ex rel. Nonhuman Rights Project, Inc. v Lavery, 124 AD3d 148 (3d Dept 2014), lv denied 26 NY3d 902 (2015) 17 People ex rel. Rodgers v Coler, 166 NY 1 (1901) 15, 19 People v Ingersoll, 58 NY 1 (1874) 15 Phil Kriegel Assoc. v Lahm Knitting Mill, 179 AD2d 539 (1st Dept 1992), lv dismissed 80 NY2d 893 (1992) 36 Purcell v Regan, 126 AD2d 849 (3d Dept 1987), lv denied 69 NY2d 613 (1987) 24 Silver v Pataki, 96 NY2d 532 (2001) 20 Town of Newburgh v Chumard, 271 AD2d 597 (2d Dept 2000), appeal dismissed 95 NY2d 850 (2000) 21 Town of Oyster Bay v Kirkland, 81 AD3d 812 (2d Dept 2011), affd 19 NY3d 1035 (2012) 21 Federal Cases Rhem v Malcolm, 507 F2d 333 (2d Cir 1974) 28, 37 Yonkers Commn. on Human Rights v City of Yonkers, 654 F Supp 544 (SD NY 1987) 22 Constitutional Provisions NY Const, art I, § 11 17 NY Const, art 1, § 6 17 NY Const, art IX, § 1 24 Statutes General Construction Law § 93 33 L 2005, ch 58, part C, § 1 (c) 10 L 2012, ch 56, part D, § 61 9 L 2012, ch 56, part D, § 65(k) 9 Social Services Law § 368-a passim Social Services Law § 368-41)(h) passim Social Services Law § 368-a(1)(h)(i) passim Other Authorities Brief for Defendants-Respondents in City of New York v State of New York, 86 NY2d 286 (1995), available at 1995 WL 17051565 21 Div of Budget, Budget Report on Bill S 6793, July 26, 1983, Bill Jacket, L 1983, ch 816, at 9 26 Ltr from NY St Assoc of Counties, June 30, 1983, Bill Jacket, L 1983, ch 816, at 45 27 Ltr from St Commn on Quality of Care for the Mentally Disabled, July 1, 1983, Bill Jacket, L 1983, ch 816, at 30 26 Ltr from St Off of Mental Health, July 12, 1983, Bill Jacket, L 1983, ch 816, at 26 26 PRELIMINARY STATEMENT Petitioners-Plaintiffs County of St. Lawrence, County of Chemung, County of Chautauqua, County of Jefferson, County of Genesee, County of Oneida, County of Cayuga, and County of Monroe (collectively, "Petitioners") respectfully submit this reply brief (1) in further support of their appeals from the orders of the Appellate Division, Fourth Department, dated March 20, 2015, May 1, 2015, and June 12, 2015, and (2) in further opposition to the appeals of Respondents- Defendants Nirav R. Shah, M.D., M.P.H., as Commissioner of the New York State Department of Health, and the New York State Department of Health (collectively, "Respondents"). Respondents ask this Court to overrule 140 years of New York precedent establishing that municipalities are persons entitled to protection under the Due Process Clause of the New York Constitution. Since at least 1874, this Court has recognized that municipalities, bestowed with rights and duties independent of the State, are entitled to due process protection when, as here, the State improperly attempts to extinguish the financial incentives guaranteed to municipalities for shouldering a burden that would have otherwise been borne by the State. Indeed, here, Social Services Law § 368-a was intended to provide Petitioners and the other local social services districts with guaranteed fiscal incentives to support the 1 State's policy of treating mentally disabled individuals in the community instead of in State-run institutions, at substantial expense to Petitioners. Between January 1, 1984 and January 1, 2006, Petitioners satisfied their end of the bargain. Community-based treatment facilities were established in municipalities throughout the State for the treatment of Medicaid-eligible patients, including the mentally disabled, and Petitioners paid their full Medicaid local shares to Respondents to support the treatment the facilities offered. In return, after Respondents took Petitioners' local share payments and placed them in the State's "special bank account" (R 436),' thereby completing the transactions, Petitioners were entitled to 100 percent reimbursement of that portion of the local share payments that were for the treatment of overburden-eligible patients. Respondents' and the Fourth Department's construction of Section 61, however, defeats the very purpose for which Social Services Law § 368-a was enacted, after Petitioners performed all of their obligations under the legislative scheme and their entitlement to reimbursement vested. To avoid such an unconstitutional deprivation of Petitioners' vested rights, the Third Department adopted Respondents' argument below that Section 61 should be construed as a statute of limitations extinguishing all remedies Petitioners may have to recover Unless otherwise noted, all record citations are to the Record on Appeal in Matter of County of Chautauqua v Shah. Citations to the Record on Appeal in Matter of County of St. Lawrence v Shah (Appellate Division case number 518097, Supreme Court index number 140712) are referred to as "St. Lawrence RI." 2 overburden reimbursement, and added the six month grace period to satisfy due process. The Third Department's interpretation of Section 61 is the only reading that provides the State with the finality it seeks, while also preserving Petitioners' vested entitlement to reimbursement in accordance with the unambiguous intent of Social Services Law § 368-a(1)(h)(i). Because the Third Department properly harmonized both statutes to preserve the Legislature's intent and avoided an unconstitutional construction of Section 61, in accordance with well-settled principles of statutory interpretation, the Third Department's orders should be affirmed and the Fourth Department's orders reversed. ARGUMENT POINT I THE THIRD DEPARTMENT ORDERS SHOULD BE AFFIRMED Respondents argue that the Third Department's interpretation of Section 61 as imposing a statute of limitations permitting Petitioners one last chance to seek to recover the overburden reimbursement indisputably owed "strips the amendment of meaning and makes it a nullity" (Brief for Nirav R. Shah, M.D., M.P.H. et al., dated September 15, 2015 ["Resps' Bill, at 20). Contrary to Respondents' argument, the Third Department's interpretation not only effectuates the Legislature's intent to extinguish Petitioners' remedy to recover overburden 3 reimbursement, and thereby provide the State with fiscal certainty concerning the total overburden liability owed, but does so in the only manner in which Section 61 can be sustained under the New York Constitution. In fact, the Third Department merely adopted Respondents' argument below that Section 61 imposed a statute of limitations extinguishing Petitioners' right to submit reimbursement claims (see Resps' App Div Brf in Matter of County of Chautauqua v Shah [hereinafter, "Resps' App Div Brf'], at 21, citing Brothers v Florence, 95 NY2d 290, 301 [2000]). The Third Department only rejected Respondents' erroneous contention that the Legislature had "afforded counties a grace period for one last round of claims, allowing payment of pre-2006 overburden claims submitted before April 1, 2012," the effective date of the statute (id.). Because the Legislature did not provide a grace period after Section 61's effective date, as due process requires, the Third Department was compelled to impose the reasonable six-month grace period in order to preserve Section 61's constitutionality.2 Contrary to Respondents' argument, it is precisely where no 2 Notably, Respondents have not raised any objection to the Third Department's discretionary decision to run the six-month grace period from the date of its decision in St. Lawrence III (see St. Lawrence III, 124 AD3d at 93 ["The grace period would normally run from the enactment of the statute but, due to possible reliance by potential claimants on Supreme Court's declaration that the 2012 amendment was unconstitutional, we will begin the grace period from the date of this decision reversing that declaration."]). Respondents have, therefore, abandoned any such objection on these appeals (see CO; of New York v State of New York, 86 NY2d 286, 292 [1995] [discussing State's abandonment of defense of lack of capacity by failing to raise it on appeal to this Court in Board of Educ., Levittown Union Free School Dist. v Nyquist (57 NY2d 27 [1982])]; Miller v Genoa AG Ctr., Inc., 124 AD3d 1113, 1114 n 1 [3d Dept 2015]). 4 grace period is mentioned or provided in the statute that the courts must impose one; otherwise, Section 61 would indeed have been declared a nullity. A. Under the Third Department's Interpretation, Section 61 Extinguishes All Remedies to Recover Overburden Reimbursement. Respondents claim that this Court should reject the Third Department's interpretation of Section 61 because it would lead to an allegedly anomalous result "where the amendment only eliminates the State's obligation to pay pre-2006 overburden claims submitted by counties after the court's grace period, while still subjecting the State to the much more burdensome obligation of identifying, calculating, and paying all outstanding overburden reimbursements dating as far back as 1984 — without any claims for such amounts submitted by the counties" (Resps' Brf, at 23). By compelling Respondents to satisfy their mandatory reimbursement obligation under Social Services Law § 368-a(1)(h)(i) to calculate and pay Petitioners the total liability owed, they argue, the Third Department vitiated the effect of the six-month grace period it imposed and rendered Section 61 meaningless. Respondents, however, misconstrue the Third Department's decision. Under the Third Department's interpretation, Section 61 operates as it was intended; it extinguishes "any remedy" that Petitioners may have had to obtain overburden reimbursement pursuant to Social Services Law § 368-a(1)(h) for expenses incurred prior to January 1, 2006, including the submission of 5 reimbursement claims, following the expiration of the Third Department's six- month grace period (Matter of County of St. Lawrence v Shah, 124 AD3d 88, 92 [3d Dept 2014] ["St. Lawrence lin, lv denied AD3d [3d Dept Jan 23, 2015], lv granted 25 NY3d 903 [2015], appeal PU; see also R 473 [intent of Section 61 was to "clarify that local governments cannot claim for overburden expenses incurred prior to January 1, 2006," a remedy most counties used to obtain the reimbursements]). As the Third Department explained, we have herewith determined that the amendment did not extinguish petitioner's substantive right to reimbursement; the amendment only prevents petitioner from obtaining any remedy in relation to that right after a certain date. The amendment did not, therefore, retroactively affect any substantive rights, but was only retroactive in that it shorten[ed] a limitations period for claims that accrued prior to the statute's effective date (id. [internal quotation marks omitted]). Therefore, properly applying well-settled principles of statutory construction, the Third Department held that both Section 61 and Social Services Law § 368-a(1)(h)(i) could be given effect by preserving Petitioners' "inherent right to reimbursement," but extinguishing "any remedy" Petitioners may have to enforce that right after May 26, 2015 (id). Respondents' objection to the Third Department's interpretation is premised upon the incorrect assumption that the submission of reimbursement claims "was the only legally mandated process that was available for the counties" to recover the overburden reimbursement withheld by Respondents (Resps' Brf, at 25, 61). 6 Social Services Law § 368-41)(h) requires reimbursement of the total amount paid by the counties to the State for medical assistance for overburden qualified individuals. There is no reference in the statute to the counties' submission of reimbursement claims under 18 NYCRR § 601 et seq. or any other regulatory scheme, much less a requirement to do so. Additionally, the State did not "establish" the claiming process used by the counties for recovery of the overburden local share payments (Resps' Brf, at 61). Rather, as the Third Department previously held, the counties were forced to submit claims "because the state erroneously failed to reimburse [the counties] for such overburden expenses" (Matter of County of St. Lawrence v Daines, 81 AD3d 212, 218, n 2 [3d Dept 2011] ["St. Lawrence 1"] [holding that "no claim for overburden expense reimbursement need be submitted by a county"], lv denied 17 NY3d 703 [2011]; see also Matter of County of St. Lawrence v Shah, 95 AD3d 1548, 1553 [3d Dept 2012] ["St. Lawrence ill [holding that the state cannot convert the overburden payments made by counties into state property]). Despite their contention on this appeal, Respondents did not dispute in this litigation that submission of the reimbursement claims was purely voluntary (see R 449 [conceding that Petitioners have "no obligation to submit reimbursement claims"]; R 465 ["the local districts receive a check on a quarterly basis, and therefore, need to take no action"]). 7 In sum, Petitioner were entitled to full reimbursement of the overburden local share payments without the submission of reimbursement claims and, therefore, were entitled to exercise all other available remedies, including demanding that Respondents satisfy their unilateral statutory reimbursement duty under Social Services Law § 368-41)(h) to identify, calculate, and pay the total overburden reimbursement owed for expenses incurred prior to January 1, 2006. Upon Respondents' refusal or failure to satisfy their statutory reimbursement duty, Petitioners properly sought mandamus relief from the courts below pursuant to CPLR Article 78. Because Petitioners' demands that Respondents perform their statutory reimbursement duty under Social Services Law § 368-a(l)(h) were made prior to the expiration of the six-month grace period, and Section 61 "did not specifically repeal any part of Social Services Law § 368—a or affect the counties' inherent right to reimbursement," the Third Department properly held that Petitioners were entitled to mandamus to compel Respondents to identify, calculate, and pay the total outstanding overburden reimbursement (St. Lawrence III, 124 AD3d at 92). On the other hand, had Petitioners' demands that Respondents satisfy their statutory reimbursement duty been made after May 26, 2015, or should any other local social services district now attempt to make a new demand that Respondents pay the total overburden reimbursement owed, Section 61 would operate as the bar 8 that the Legislature intended. The Third Department's grant of mandamus relief compelling Respondents to satisfy their statutory reimbursement duty, therefore, does not vitiate the effect of the six-month grace period or lead to the allegedly anomalous result that Respondents suggest. The Third Department's interpretation of Section 61 is fully consistent with its plain language and legislative intent. The text of Section 61 makes clear that the Legislature intended to extinguish the remedies through which Petitioners had obtained overburden reimbursement in the past (see L 2012, ch 56, part D, § 61 ["Notwithstanding the provisions of [Social Services Law § 368—a] or any other contrary provision of law, no reimbursement shall be made for social services districts' claims submitted on and after the effective date of this paragraph, for district expenditures incurred prior to January 1, 2006, including, but not limited to, [overburden expenditures]."]). Indeed, the focus of Section 61's legislative history on the extinguishment of Petitioners' claims remedy (R 473 ["Section 61 of the bill would . . . clarify that local governments cannot claim for overburden expenses incurred prior to January 1, 2006" (emphasis added)]), and the Legislature's clear intent that Section 61 avoid the impairment of vested rights (see L 2012, ch 56, part D, § 65[k] ["this act shall not be construed to alter, change, affect, impair or defeat any rights, obligations, duties or interests accrued, incurred or conferred prior to the effective date of this act"]; see also e.g. Matter of County 9 of Niagara v Daines, 91 AD3d 1288, 1289 [4th Dept 2012] [rejecting Respondents' construction of the 2010 Amendment to "defeat[ ] their preexisting duty to reimburse petitioner for the overburden expenditures" because this precise language unambiguously preserved the county's overburden reimbursement rights]), confirms the Third Department's interpretation. Respondents, in effect, attempt to reargue before this Court the decisions of the nine appellate courts in the prior related litigations, which unanimously held that the Medicaid Cap Statute did not retroactively extinguish Petitioners' statutory right to overburden reimbursement (see e.g. St. Lawrence 1, 81 AD3d at 215 ["upon our review of the language of the Medicaid Cap Statute and the legislative history, we find no clear indication that it is to be applied retroactively. To the contrary, the statute expressly states that the calculation of medical assistance expenditure amounts for social services districts 'shall be' governed by its provisions `[c]ommencing with the calendar year beginning January 1, 2006' (L 2005, ch 58, part C, § 1 [c]). The fact that the statute speaks only of the present and future militates against retroactive application" (emphasis added)]; Matter of County of Niagara v Daines, 60 AD3d 1460, 1461 [4th Dept 2009], lv denied 13 NY3d 708 [2009]; Matter of County of Herkimer v Daines, 60 AD3d 1456, 1457 [4th Dept 2009] ["in light of the lack of legislative history or statutory language indicating that the Legislature intended that the statute in question should be 10 applied retroactively, we conclude that the Legislature did not intend it to be retroactively applied" (emphasis added)], lv denied 63 AD3d 1672 [4th Dept 2009], lv denied 13 NY3d 707 [2009]). Reading Section 61's legislative history as Respondents suggest—as a post-hoc attempt to "clarify" the legislative intent of the Medicaid Cap Statute—however, runs afoul of well-settled precedent in this State that a "'clarifying' amendment cannot retroactively declare a different legislative intent contrary to the plain meaning of the earlier law" (Bolya v Southside Hosp., 186 AD2d 774, 775 [2d Dept 1992]; see also Matter of Roosevelt Raceway v Monaghan, 9 NY2d 293, 304 [1961]; Matter of Island Waste Servs., Ltd. v Tax Appeals Trib. of State ofKY , 77 AD3d 1080, 1083 n 2 [3d Dept 2010], lv denied 16 NY3d 712 [2011]). Contrary to Respondents' argument, only one construction of Section 61 ensures that Respondents obtain the fiscal certainty they so strongly desire, while also preserving Petitioners' vested rights to overburden reimbursement. Accordingly, the Third Department properly interpreted Section 61 as a statute of limitations extinguishing any remedy Petitioners may have had to obtain overburden reimbursement and imposed the six-month grace period to preserve its constitutionality (see Brothers, 95 NY2d at 301). The Third Department orders should be affirmed. 11 B. Petitioners are Entitled to Mandamus Relief Compelling Respondents to Identify, Calculate, and Pay the Total Outstanding Overburden Reimbursement Liability. Respondents contend that Petitioners are not entitled to an award of mandamus relief compelling compliance with Social Services Law § 368-a(1)(h) because that section does not specify "the method by which the Department makes payment" (Resps' Brf, at 61). The Third Department order, however, does not compel Respondents to undertake any particular method to satisfy their statutory reimbursement duty. Notably, Respondents do not dispute Petitioners' clear right to payment of the total reimbursement liability for 100% of the overburden expenditures made prior to January 1, 2006 and that such payment may be compelled by mandamus, which is solely what the Third Department ordered. Respondents' statutory obligation to pay the reimbursements necessarily requires them to identify and verify the total amount owed, after subtracting the amounts that were previously paid to Petitioners and the other local social services districts during the quarterly review process, the voluntary claims process, and in the prior litigations. In fact, Respondents admit that they were responsible for performing these calculations (R 449 [conceding that "the Department is responsible for calculating the overburden reimbursement . . . duel), and that the quarterly review process did not capture 100% of the reimbursements owed (Resps' App Div Brf, at 5 ["The State's 12 overburden reimbursement system largely accomplished its objectives . . But due to the large number of Medicaid recipients and the complexity of identifying those who were overburden-eligible, the Department's quarterly review process did not capture all overburden reimbursements owed to counties."]). Therefore, because Respondents have not satisfied their unambiguous statutory reimbursement duty to pay Petitioners the total outstanding overburden liability, the Third Department properly compelled them to do so. Finally, as demonstrated in Petitioners' initial brief (see Brief for County of St. Lawrence et al., dated Sept. 15, 2015 ["Pets' Brf'], Point V), Respondents' reimbursement duty is purely ministerial. Respondents must identify the individuals for whom Petitioners paid a local share, determine whether those individuals are overburden-eligible under the purely factual criteria established under the Medicaid Reference Guide Manual (R 953), and then verify whether 100% of the expenditures for overburden-eligible recipients were reimbursed to Petitioners either through the quarterly review process, the voluntary claims process, or litigation. Any expenditures that were not previously reimbursed to Petitioners must then be paid in accordance with Social Services Law § 368- a(1)(h)(i). Contrary to Respondents' argument, the mere complexity of performing that task, and the age of the expenditures, does not introduce any discretion into 13 Respondents' determination of overburden-eligibility and whether reimbursement has previously been paid for the identified overburden-eligible recipients. Regardless, even if Respondents had some discretion in calculating the total overburden reimbursement due to Petitioners, that would not defeat Petitioners' entitlement to the mandamus relief granted by the Third Department compelling Respondents to satisfy their mandatory duty to pay (see Klostermann v Cuomo, 61 NY2d 525, 539-541 [1984] ["Defendants argue that preparing written service plans and creating follow-up programs are activities replete with decisions involving the exercise of judgment or discretion. This is inarguably true. What must be distinguished, however, are those acts the exercise of which is discretionary from those acts which are mandatory but are executed through means that are discretionary."}), Therefore, the Third Department's orders should be affirmed. POINT II THE FOURTH DEPARTMENT ORDERS SHOULD BE REVERSED A. Municipalities are Persons Entitled to Exercise Due Process Rights under the New York Constitution. Respondents admit that states are free to interpret their own constitutions differently than the federal courts have construed the federal constitution, and that a number of states have in fact permitted municipalities to challenge state legislation on due process grounds (Resps' Brf, at 32 n 3). Nonetheless, in a novel attempt to deprive municipalities of any constitutional due process rights under the 14 New York Constitution, Respondents urge this Court to overrule a line of well- established New York jurisprudence recognizing, for at least 140 years, that municipalities are, in fact, persons under the New York Due Process Clause. Respondents cite no New York precedent expressly supporting their novel argument, but instead continue to rely almost exclusively on inapplicable federal precedent under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Respondents' construction of New York law is without merit, and should be rejected. Contrary to Respondents' argument, this Court's precedent, dating back to at least 1874, establishes that Petitioners are persons under the New York Due Process Clause entitled to seek redress for the deprivation of their rights to reimbursement of the overburden local share funds in the Comptroller's "special bank account" (R 436; see People ex rel. Rodgers v Coler, 166 NY 1, 11 [1901] ["The city is a corporation possessing all the powers of corporations generally and cannot be deprived of its property without its consent or due process of law any more than a private corporation can"]; People v Ingersoll, 58 NY 1, 29-30 [1874]; see also Matter of Crespo, 123 Misc 2d 862, 866 [Sup Ct, New York County 1984] ["The three putative defendants are municipal and public benefit corporations. As such, each is a person, like any other litigant, entitled to due process of law."]). Just as Respondents assert that the trial courts below necessarily decided that 15 Petitioners were persons under the New York Due Process Clause in order to declare Section 61 unconstitutional on due process grounds (Resps' Brf, at 43 ["In order to find in the Counties' favor, Supreme Court necessarily had to resolve the threshold legal issue — inherent in all due process claims — that the plaintiffs are entitled to protection under New York's due process clause."]), so too was this Court required determine the issue before resolving the merits of the municipalities' due process and equal protection challenges in Board of Educ., Levittown Union Free School Dist. v Nyquist (57 NY2d 27 [1982]) and the cases following it. This Court has repeatedly addressed the merits of municipal challenges to state statutes on due process and equal protection grounds, without dismissing the claims on the threshold basis that municipalities are not persons entitled to due process or equal protection under the New York Constitution (see e.g. Empire State Ch. of Associated Bldrs. & Contrs., Inc. v Smith, 21 NY3d 309, 315, 322-323 [2013] [considering the merits of a county's challenge to a state statute as unconstitutional in an action against the New York State Department of Labor, including on equal protection and due process grounds]; City of New York v State of New York, 76 NY2d 479, 486-487 [1990] [addressing the City's equal protection claim on the merits]; Levittown, 57 NY2d at 42-44 [addressing a municipality's equal protection claim on the merits]; see also Pets' Brf, Point III[C] [collecting 16 New York cases]; People ex rel. Nonhuman Rights Project, Inc. v Lavery, 124 AD3d 148, 152 [3d Dept 2014] ["Associations of human beings, such as corporations and municipal entities, may be considered legal persons, because they too bear legal duties in exchange for their legal rights."], lv denied 26 NY3d 902 [2015]). Implicit in each of this Court's holdings, which were binding on the Fourth Department, is a determination that a municipality is a person under the Due Process Clause of the New York Constitution.3 The only two New York cases on which Respondents rely—Black Riv. Regulating Dist. v Adirondack League Club (307 NY 475 [1954], appeal dismissed 351 US 922 [1956]) and Matter of Jeter v Ellenville Cent. School Dist. (41 NY2d 283 [1977])—do not undermine this Court's holdings. In Black Riv. Regulating Dist., for example, this Court held that a river regulating district lacked capacity to challenge, on constitutional grounds, a state statute restricting its delegated "governmental functions" (Black Riv. Regulating Dist., 307 NY at 487489). This Court held, 3 Respondents' suggestion that this Court's holding in City of New York is not relevant to the analysis because only an equal protection claim was pled in that case lacks merit. No basis exists to distinguish a "person" entitled to equal protection of the laws under Article I, § 11 of the New York Constitution from a "person" entitled to due process of law under Article I, § 6 (compare NY Const, art I, § 6 ["No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law."] with NY Const, art I, § 11 ["No person shall be denied the equal protection of the laws of this state or any subdivision thereof-1). Thus, this Court's implicit determinations that municipalities are persons under the New York Equal Protection Clause are equally applicable to Petitioners' claims under the Due Process Clause (see e.g. Levittown, 57 NY2d at 42-44). 17 political power conferred by the Legislature confers no vested right as against the government itself. It is on the theory that the power conferred by the Legislature is akin to that of a public trust to be exercised not for the benefit or at the will of the trustee but for the common good. How long it shall exist or how it may be modified or altered belongs exclusively to the people to determine (id. at 488 [emphasis added]). Thus, this Court held, the district lacked capacity to challenge the alteration of its delegated powers (see id at 488-489 ["Inherent in the grant of legislative power is the plenary power to alter or revoke."]). Indeed, the rationale for this Court's holding in Black Riv. Regulating Dist. is clear: municipalities, as subdivisions of the State, are created by and derive their governmental powers exclusively from the delegation of the Legislature (see City of New York v State of New York, 86 NY2d 286, 289-290 [1995] ["the traditional principle throughout the United States has been that municipalities and other local governmental corporate entities and their officers lack capacity to mount constitutional challenges to acts of the State and State legislation. This general incapacity to sue flows from judicial recognition of the juridical as well as political relationship between those entities and the State"]; County of Albany v Hooker, 204 NY 1, 9-10 [1912] ["The state, in the exercise of its sovereign power, has done so in part by dividing its territory into counties and imposing upon them certain governmental and political powers and duties. It has been and is a convenient way of exercising its sovereign authority. In the exercise of such powers and in the performance of such duties the counties are mere agents of the state and 18 component parts of it. They are not, in the exercise of such authority, subject to suit any more than the state itself, and certainly they cannot maintain an action against the state of whose sovereign power they are a part, or against state officers who are expressly charged with the performance of sovereign power."]). They cannot, therefore, be heard to complain when the Legislature acts to restrict or even extinguish their delegated governmental authority (see Matter of County of Cayuga v McHugh, 4 NY2d 609, 614-615 [1958] ["it is clear that the Legislature, within constitutional limitations, may by legislative fiat diminish, modify or recall any power delegated to a county of governmental or political nature and retake unto itself direct control of matters relating to local government"]). Where, as here, legislative acts affect a municipality's proprietary interest in a specific fund of money, however, the same rationale simply does not apply (see County of Albany, 204 NY at 18 ["With no fund or property in existence, the title to which is in the county, and no funds or property in the possession of another to which the county is entitled to possession, and the entire subject being one of governmental and public policy, independent of the corporate rights of the county, the action cannot be maintained by the plaintiff, and the wrong, if any, created and existing by the acts of the legislature, must be corrected by the legislature" (emphasis added)]; People ex rel. Rodgers, 166 NY at 11). 19 Contrary to Respondents' contention, therefore, the river regulating district's due process claim in Black Riv. Regulating Dist. failed not because it was not a person under the New York Due Process Clause, but because it lacked capacity to challenge the Legislature's alteration of its governmental powers (see Black Riv. Regulating Dist., 307 NY at 489 ["the plaintiffs are without power to challenge the validity of the act or the Constitution" (emphasis added)]; see also Silver v Pataki, 96 NY2d 532, 537 [2001] ["As a general matter, capacity concerns a litigant's power to appear and bring its grievance before the court" (internal quotation marks omitted)]). In fact, this Court confirmed, in City of New York, that its holding in Black Riv. Regulating Dist. was limited to the issue of municipal capacity (see City of New York, 86 NY2d at 291 ["our Court has extended the doctrine of no capacity to sue by municipal corporate bodies to a wide variety of challenges based as well upon claimed violations of the State Constitution," citing Black Riv. Regulating Dist., 307 NY at 489]). As such, Black Riv. Regulating Dist. does not support Respondents' argument that Petitioners are not persons entitled to protection under the New York Due Process Clause. Nor does this Court's holding in Jeter lend any support to Respondents' novel assertion. As demonstrated in Petitioners' initial brief (see Pets' Brf, at 63.- 65), Jeter was similarly limited to the doctrine of municipal capacity (see Jeter, 41 NY2d at 287), and has never been construed as precedent supporting Respondents' 20 contention that municipalities are not "persons" under the New York Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses (see e.g. Levittown, 57 NY2d at 42-47). In fact, no New York court has ever held that a municipality is not a person within the meaning of the New York Due Process Clause.4 The State in City of New York specifically relied on Jeter in support of its argument that the City lacked capacity to raise an equal protection challenge to the State's system of funding public education, and did not fit within any of the recognized exceptions to the general rule of municipal incapacity (see Brief for Defendants-Respondents in City of New York v State of New York, 86 NY2d 286 [1995], available at 1995 WL 17051565, *4-9). In light of the State's express assertions in City of New York that a municipality cannot raise a constitutional challenge to state legislation because it lacks capacity vis-a-vis the State to do so, this Court should reject Respondents' attempt to take a contrary position here that 4 Although municipalities have had limited success on the merits of due process and equal protection claims, the basis of the courts' holdings has never been that municipalities are not entitled to protection as "persons" under the New York Constitution (see e.g. Levittown, 57 NY2d at 42-44 [rejecting equal protection challenge under New York Constitution because the state financing system for public education served a legitimate interest and was reasonably related to its justification]; Town of Oyster Bay v Kirkland, 81 AD3d 812, 817 [2d Dept 2011] [affirming dismissal of town's due process challenge to state statute because the "combination of investigative and adjudicative functions in a single administrative agency or officer is not, ipso facto, a denial of due process" (internal quotation marks omitted)], affd 19 NY3d 1035 [2012]). Where, as here, the facts establish a violation of due process, municipalities may indeed succeed on the merits of their New York due process claims (see e.g. Town of Newburgh v Chumard, 271 AD2d 597, 598 [2d Dept 2000] [holding that "the plaintiff, a municipal corporation, [was] entitled to the same reasonable time to interpose its claim as is afforded a private litigant" under principles of procedural due process], appeal dismissed 95 NY2d 850 [2000]). 21 Petitioners' status as subdivisions of the State deprives them of personhood under the New York State Constitution.5 Even in Yonkers Commn. on Human Rights v City of Yonkers (654 F Supp 544 [SD NY 1987]), on which Respondents rely in an attempt to distinguish capacity from substantive rights under the New York Due Process Clause, the Court "notes that the determinative issue . . . is one of capacity to sue," not whether municipalities have substantive due process rights under the New York Constitution (id. at 551). Indeed, the Yonkers Commn. on Human Rights Court cites Jeter as further support for its ultimate conclusion that the municipality lacked capacity to raise its constitutional challenges (see id. at 553).6 Therefore, no basis exists in New York law for Respondents' assertion that municipalities' mere status as subdivisions of the State deprives them of any protection under the New York Due Process Clause. 5 To the extent the State took the position in City of New York that, pursuant to Jeter, the municipality lacked capacity to assert an equal protection claim and prevailed in maintaining that position, the State should be judicially estopped from taking the position in these proceedings that, under Jeter, municipalities are not persons under the Due Process Clause of the New York Constitution simply because the State waived the capacity defense in these proceedings (see Kilcer v Niagara Mohawk Power Corp., 86 AD3d 682, 683 [3d Dept 2011] [applying judicial estoppel in connection with different proceedings and holding that a "litigant should be bound by the prior stance he or she clearly asserted"]). 6 Even if Yonkers Commn. on Human Rights could be read as Respondents suggest (it cannot), the Court's analysis on the merits is not only dicta — having already concluded that the plaintiff lacked capacity to maintain the lawsuit — but is also based primarily on federal law under the Fourteenth Amendment and a misconstruction of this Court's holding in Jeter. 22 Notwithstanding their attempt to mischaracterize their capacity defense as one affecting Petitioners' substantive rights, Respondents do not dispute that they failed to raise their capacity defense before the trial courts by answer or motion (R 364). Nor do they dispute that Petitioners' challenge to Section 61 fits within the well-settled proprietary interest exception to the general rule of municipal incapacity in any event (see e.g. Matter of Krauskopf v Perales, 139 AD2d 147, 153 [3d Dept 1988], affd 74 NY2d 730 [1989]). Therefore, Petitioners not only have capacity to maintain these claims challenging Section 61 on state constitutional due process grounds, but also are persons entitled to due process protection under the New York Constitution in accordance with this Court's well- settled precedent. Strong policy reasons exist for reaffirming this Court's repeated holdings that municipalities are persons entitled to protection under the New York Due Process Clause, and rejecting the Fourth Department's holding to the contrary. First, accepting Respondents' assertion that municipalities have no substantive right to challenge state legislation on due process grounds would eliminate the long-recognized capacity exception for proprietary interests held by municipalities in a specific fund of money (see e.g. County of Rensselaer v Regan, 173 AD2d 37, 40 [3d Dept 1991], affd 80 NY2d 988 [1992]; Matter of City of New York v Lawton, 128 AD2d 202, 206 [3d Dept 1987]; Purcell v Regan, 126 AD2d 849, 850 23 [3d Dept 1987], lv denied 69 NY2d 613 [1987]). As here, one of the interests protected by this exception is municipalities' due process vested rights. For example, if the Fourth Department's interpretation of Section 61 prevailed, and the statute was read to retroactively extinguish Petitioners' statutory right to the overburden reimbursement held in the State's "special bank account" (R 436), Petitioners would have no right to vindicate their proprietary interest in that fund of moneys because, under Respondents' theory, they are not persons entitled to assert a due process challenge to the statute, and Section 61 would otherwise bar recovery under mandamus or tort theories (see e.g. Matter of Krauskopf v Perales, 139 AD2d 147, 153 [3d Dept 1988], affd 74 NY2d 730 [1989]). Respondents' assertion would, therefore, defeat the very purpose of the proprietary interest exception to the general rule of municipal incapacity, a result which should be avoided. Second, contrary to Respondents' argument, the Home Rule exception does not protect municipalities' proprietary interests in the overburden reimbursement funds. Specifically, the Home Rule article of the New York Constitution protects only certain powers conferred upon local governments, such as the "power to adopt local laws," the "power to take by eminent domain private property within their boundaries for public use," and the right to profit from the operation of a municipal gas, electric, or water utility, among others (see NY Const, art IX, § 1). None of 24 the powers preserved by the Home Rule article, however, protect municipalities' proprietary interests in a specific fund, such as Petitioners' interests in overburden reimbursement here, from retroactive deprivation by legislative act. That is precisely why this Court has repeatedly recognized the separate, narrow exception to the general rule of municipal incapacity permitting municipalities to seek to vindicate their proprietary interests in a specific fund of moneys in the courts (see City of New York, 86 NY2d at 291-292; County of Rensselaer v Regan, 80 NY2d 988, 991 [1992]). Finally, one of the primary intents of the extremely limited proprietary interest exception is to discourage the State from legislatively extinguishing or altering its financial obligations to municipalities where, as here, the legislative scheme has induced the municipalities to incur an obligation they would not otherwise have been required to bear, merely because the State budget would benefit from extinguishing the liability (see e.g. County of Rensselaer, 173 AD2d at 40; see also James Sq. Assoc. LP v Mullen, 21 NY3d 233, 250 [2013] ["raising money for the state budget is not a particularly compelling justification" for the retroactive extinguishment of a State obligation]). Here, Social Services Law § 368-a(1)(h)(i) was enacted to "provide fiscal incentives to localities to support the State's deinstitutionalization program by relieving localities of the full cost of services provided to the mentally disabled" (Div of Budget, Budget Report on Bill 25 S 6793, July 26, 1983, Bill Jacket, L 1983, ch 816, at 9 [attached as an addendum hereto]; see also Letter from St Off of Mental Health, July 12, 1983, Bill Jacket, L 1983, ch 816, at 26 ["State assumption of local medicaid costs for this [mentally disabled] population eliminates disincentives for local governments to assist in the creation of community mental health services which would require funding under the medicaid program. The bill also responds to charges that the state's long standing policy of providing services to the mentally disabled in the community rather than institutions effectively shifts costs traditionally borne by the state to local governments."]; Ltr from St Commn on Quality of Care for the Mentally Disabled, July 1, 1983, Bill Jacket, L 1983, ch 816, at 30 ["We particularly support [the overburden reimbursement] provision because it will encourage the elimination of resistance of local social services districts to placements of mentally disabled persons into local communities from institutions since the State would assume the entire cost beyond the federal share beginning in 1984."]). As the Division of Budget recognized, however, the amendment "inadvertently increase[d] the local share of Medicaid costs in portions of the long- term program which now require no local contribution" (icl. at 10). Thus, in return for supporting the State's program of deinstitutionalizing mentally disabled Medicaid recipients, and bearing the burden to pay a full local share of all Medicaid expenditures, even those for which no local share was owed, the 26 Legislature guaranteed Petitioners 100% reimbursement of their overburden expenditures (see Social Services Law § 368-a[1][h][i]; see also Ltr from NY St Assoc of Counties, June 30, 1983, Bill Jacket, L 1983, ch 816, at 45 ["Medical assistance is the single largest and most financially burdensome mandate on local governments. County officials indicate that an average of 40% of their real property tax dollars are obligated to the Medicaid program alone. It is projected that in 1984, the local government share for Medicaid will reach $1.7 billion, and that by 1988 that cost will increase to $3.0 billion."]). Respondents' construction of Section 61 defeats the very incentive for which Social Services Law § 368-a was enacted after Petitioners performed all of their obligations under the legislative scheme, and their entitlement to reimbursement vested (see St. Lawrence II, 95 AD3d at 1553 ["since 1982, it has been the state's statutory obligation to pay the county share for Medicaid expenditures incurred in providing medical services to certain mentally disabled individuals. While the state, and not the county, has been obligated to pay for these medical services, it has continued to charge petitioner for these expenses and used these funds to satisfy its obligations under this statute. Since the state was never entitled to these funds, the 2010 amendment, even if found to apply to overburden expenditures, cannot serve to transform these county funds into state property and relieve the state of the legal obligation to return them."]; St. Lawrence I, 81 AD3 d at 216 27 ["petitioner's right to reimbursement for (Medical Assistance) expenditures accrued" "prior to 2006, upon payment to DOH for services provided to overburden patients for which no local share was owing" (emphasis added)]; County of Herkimer, 60 AD3d at 1457 ["petitioner had rendered services in accordance with the law in existence at the time, and those transactions were complete"]). The proprietary interest exception, as repeatedly reaffirmed by this Court, therefore would be necessary to preserve Petitioners' rights to challenge the deprivation of the legislatively guaranteed financial incentives accorded them under Social Services Law § 368-a(1)(h), had Respondents not waived their capacity defense. Indeed, the State lacks authority to simply abrogate its own debts whenever it determines it no longer desires to pay them, especially when doing so destroys Petitioners' proprietary interest in the overburden reimbursement funds (see e.g. O'Neil v State of New York, 223 NY 40, 43-44 [1918]; see also Rhem v Malcolm, 507 F2d 333, 341 n 20 [2d Cir 1974]). Therefore, the Fourth Department's orders should be reversed. B. The Fourth Department's and Respondents' Construction of Section 61 Renders it Unconstitutional. As this Court has emphasized, "[f]or centuries our law has harbored a singular distrust of retroactive statutes" (James Sq. Assoc. LP, 21 NY3d at 246; see also Barenboim v Starbucks Corp., 21 NY3d 460, 472 n 4 [2013] ["retroactive operation of an enactment is generally disfavored"]). Although retroactive laws 28 are not per se unconstitutional, New York's distrust for retroactive enactments continues today. Indeed, under the Fourth Department's and Respondents' interpretation of Section 61, the statute retroactively extinguishes Petitioners' vested rights to overburden reimbursement in violation of the New York Constitution, and should be invalidated. As demonstrated comprehensively in Petitioners' initial brief (see Pets Brf, Point IV[B]), the balance of factors articulated by this Court in Alliance of Am. Insurers v Chu (77 NY2d 573, 578 [1991]) and Matter of Hodes v Axelrod (70 NY2d 364, 369-370 [1987]) establishes that Section 61 cannot be retroactively applied to extinguish Petitioners' vested rights. Indeed, Respondents seek only to revive the same arguments that failed in the nine prior Appellate Division cases — that Petitioners are seeking a double recovery, that Petitioners' reimbursement claims were stale, and that the cash basis accounting system prohibited DOH from paying reimbursements. Just as the nine prior appellate courts rejected Respondents' attempts to avoid their overburden reimbursement duty, so too should this Court decline to give credence to Respondents' assertions. First, Section 61 is patently unfair. Contrary to Respondents' arguments, the payment of overburden reimbursement for expenses incurred prior to January 1, 2006 does not permit a double recovery or permit Petitioners to "reap the benefits of the new [Medicaid Cap] system without fulfilling their end of the bargain, i.e., 29 paying their full cap amount" (Resps' Brf, at 48-49). In fact, the Third Department in St. Lawrence II rejected this precise argument concerning the 2010 amendment, aptly noting that "the cap calculation is based on what a county's net Medicaid expenditures were in 2005. A refund made years later does not alter that baseline computation or change what the counties paid for these expenditures prior to January 1, 2006" (St. Lawrence II, 95 AD3d at 1553). Thus, regardless of when the reimbursement is paid, Petitioners are simply obtaining what they are owed for the pre-Cap period, without affecting the payment of their full cap amount after January 1, 2006. Respondents' post hoc attempt to argue that the "Legislature determined that the failure to pay the counties — regardless of fault — was offset by the savings the counties would receive under the new cost-sharing system" finds absolutely no support in the legislative history of Section 61 or the Medicaid Cap Statute (Resps' Brf, at 52). In fact, the legislative history of Section 61 makes no mention of the alleged costs savings to Petitioners, but instead confirms that the statute was solely intended to extinguish Petitioners' remedy to recover the reimbursements owed (R 473). Further, as the appellate courts held in the prior reimbursement litigations, the legislative history of the Medicaid Cap Statute does not contain any indication that it was intended to apply retroactively to bar reimbursement of pre-2006 overburden expenditures, much less reflect a trade-off in exchange for post-Cap 30 savings (see St. Lawrence I, 81 AD3d at 215 ["upon our review of the language of the Medicaid Cap Statute and the legislative history, we find no clear indication that it is to be applied retroactively"]; County of Herkimer, 60 AD3d at 1457 ["in light of the lack of legislative history or statutory language indicating that the Legislature intended that the statute in question should be applied retroactively, we conclude that the Legislature did not intend it to be retroactively applied"]). Indeed, there is no indication that all counties were owed overburden reimbursement at the time the Medicaid Cap Statute was enacted, yet all counties were afforded the same benefits under the Medicaid Cap for post-January 1, 2006 Medicaid expenditures. Furthermore, Respondents made the identical staleness argument in St. Lawrence I as they forward here, namely that Petitioners should have submitted the otherwise "stale" reimbursement claims earlier based upon the limited pro forma statistical reports allegedly provided by Respondents and the availability of the voluntary claims process (compare St. Lawrence R1 314-316 with St. Lawrence R1 171-172). The Third Department rejected Respondents' assertions that Petitioners' reimbursement claims were stale or somehow untimely (see St. Lawrence I, 81 AD3d at 216-218 & n 2), and this Court should reject them again here (see Pets' Brf, at 77-78). The Legislature's decision to extinguish Respondents' liability for overburden claims could not have been because any 31 claims were allegedly stale. Indeed, it was the Legislature's reasoned choice in the first place to require Respondents to undertake the sole burden of reimbursement without the submission of claims under Social Services Law § 368-a (see St. Lawrence III, 124 AD3 d at 94 ["the statute does not include any requirement that petitioner make a claim for those payments. Thus, DOH was required to pay those reimbursements even without any claims being made, and should have done so by 2006"]; St. Lawrence I, 81 AD3d at 218 ["where it is the state that is billed for and pays a medical provider for services rendered on behalf of a Medicaid recipient, and then subsequently collects from a county its local share of those costs . . . no claim for overburden expense reimbursement need be submitted by a county. Rather, the state (which directly incurred the costs) identifies the reimbursement patients and unilaterally issues reimbursement to the county"]). Once Petitioners paid their local share, and completed their duties under the legislative scheme, the Legislature, understanding the law that it enacted, knew that Petitioners' entitlement to reimbursement vested (see e.g. Easley v New York State Thruway Auth., 1 NY2d 374, 379 [1956] ["Legislatures are presumed to know what statutes are on the books and what is intended by constitutional amendments approved by the Legislature itself."]). For the Legislature to deprive Petitioners of that vested entitlement through Section 61, a due process grace period was required, as the Third Department held 32 (see Brothers, 95 NY2d at 301). Contrary to Respondents' contention, however, the two and a half month period between introduction and enactment of-Section 61 cannot satisfy due process (see Gilbert v Ackerman, 159 NY 118, 123-124 [1899]). Moreover, absolutely no proof exists in the record to support Respondents' contention that Petitioners had any opportunity to "lobby against the 2012 amendment" (Resps' Brf, at 53). Indeed, there was no "political battle" (id. at 54); Section 61 was buried deep within a voluminous budget bill where Petitioners could not have even noticed Respondents' admitted attempt to "wall-off' their overburden reimbursement liability (R 447). Because Section 61 did not provide Petitioners with any pre-deprivation opportunity to recover the remaining overburden reimbursement owed, it indisputably violates due process, and is patently unfair. Second, at the time Respondents took the local shares, Petitioners were entitled to rely on their vested entitlement to overburden reimbursement under Social Services Law § 368-a(1)(h) because, as the nine prior appellate courts held, the Medicaid Cap Statute and 2010 Amendment did not repeal or otherwise extinguish Respondents' reimbursement obligation (see General Construction Law § 93; see also St. Lawrence II, 95 AD3d at 1554 ["the 2010 amendment, even if it was intended by the Legislature to repeal Social Services Law § 368-a(l)(h), cannot serve to relieve the state of its obligation to refund the counties for these 33 expenditures made prior to January 1, 2006"]). In fact, every court that considered Respondents' interpretations rejected them (see also e.g. Caprio v New York State Dept. of Taxation & Fin., 25 NY3d 744, 753-754 [2015] ["plaintiffs have not shown that their reliance on their own reading of the law, at the time of the transaction in 2007, was reasonable"]). Nonetheless, contrary to Respondents' characterization, Petitioners did not delay seven years to submit reimbursement claims. Rather, Respondents failed to notify the counties that overburden recipients had been miscoded and then abjectly refused to reimburse Petitioners. Respondents, in fact, have not voluntarily reimbursed Petitioners without being compelled to do so by the courts since April 2005, when Respondents' claims processing agent ceased paying the overburden reimbursement claims that the counties submitted, purportedly on the basis of the Medicaid Cap Statute, which would not become effective until January 1, 2006 (eight months later). Indeed, Respondents did not pay the alleged "flurry of claims" that they allege were submitted between January 2012 and the effective date of Section 61 until June 2012, after the Third Department, in May 2012, rejected their argument that the 2010 Amendment extinguished their reimbursement obligation and the Fourth Department denied their motion for leave to appeal to this Court from a similar holding (see St. Lawrence II, 95 AD3d at 1551-1554 [decided May 17, 2012]; Matter of County of Niagara v Daines, 91 34 AD3d 1288 [4th Dept 2012], lv denied 94 AD3d 1481 [4th Dept Apr. 20, 2012]). Thus, having satisfied their statutory obligations to support the State's program of deinstitutionalization and to pay their full local share of all Medicaid expenditures incurred, Petitioners reasonably relied on their vested entitlement to pursue overburden reimbursement. Third, Respondents concede that Section 61 is and was intended to be expressly retroactive, and seeks to deprive Petitioners and other counties, in 2012, of reimbursement for local share payments taken and concealed by Respondents as far back as 1984. Respondents seek to avoid their concession by now calling Section 61 a "remedial statute" (Resps' Brf, at 56). Respondents' argument, however, fails. • A remedial amendment is generally intended to "rectify an inequity by extending existing benefits to a class of persons arbitrarily denied those benefits by the original legislation" (Matter of Cady v County ofBroome, 87 AD2d 964, 965 [3d Dept 1982], lv denied 57 NY2d 602 [1982]). Thus, retroactive application of a remedial statute properly confers additional benefits on the aggrieved class of persons from the date that those benefits should have been granted in the first place. Section 61, however, does no such thing. It does not correct any inequity to Petitioners, and other social services districts, under the Medicaid Cap Statute. Instead, Section 61 purports to afford the State brand new authority to extinguish 35 unilaterally its longstanding overburden reimbursement debts owed to Petitioners simply because it no longer wishes to pay (see Phil Kriegel Assoc. v Lahm Knitting Mill, 179 AD2d 539, 539 [1st Dept 1992] ['It is questionable whether, as plaintiff argues, these provisions are remedial in nature, and therefore to be liberally interpreted and retroactively applied, since they do not merely correct inequities in existing law but create new rights and remedies where none previously existed." (emphasis added)], lv dismissed 80 NY2d 893 [1992]; Cady, 87 AD2d at 965 [noting that "statutes creating new rights and remedies where none previously existed" may not be applied retroactively, even if remedial]). Respondents pursue retroactive application of Section 61 by calling it a remedial amendment not to confer a benefit on Petitioners, as aggrieved parties that have been denied the overburden reimbursements to which they are statutorily entitled, but to deprive Petitioners of their statutory entitlement entirely. Respondents' implication that the State is somehow an aggrieved party in this case, notwithstanding that the sole reason why Petitioners have been forced to submit unnecessary claims for and obtain the reimbursements to which they are entitled through litigation is Respondents' abject failure to calculate and pay the total overburden reimbursement liability as required under Social Services Law § 368- a(1)(h), strains credulity. Thus, Section 61 simply is not a remedial amendment. 36 Nor can the Legislature change the intent of the prospective Medicaid Cap Statute after the fact, as Respondents suggest (see Roosevelt Raceway, 9 NY2d at 304; Island Waste Servs., Ltd., 77 AD3d at 1083 n 2; Bolt/a, 186 AD2d at 775). Indeed, if Respondents are correct, Section 61 merely clarifies that the Medicaid Cap Statute unconstitutionally extinguishes Petitioners' vested rights to reimbursement for overburden expenditures made prior to January 1, 2006 under Social Services Law § 368-a, without providing the mandatory due process grace period. Notably, however, Respondents do not, and cannot, point to any case where a court has upheld as constitutional an amendment clarifying that a prior statute was intended to unconstitutionally abrogate a vested right. Finally, as this Court held in James Sq. Assoc., "raising money for the state budget is not a particularly compelling justification" for the retroactive extinguishment of Petitioners' vested rights to overburden reimbursement (James Sq. Assoc., 21 NY3d at 250). This is precisely the same interest that the State attempted to articulate in Alliance (see Alliance, 77 NY2d at 588-589 ["[t]he only justification the State can offer for the breach of its commitment is the enhancement of the State's general revenues"]). Here, as in Alliance, "[i]t is self- evident that this [interest] cannot justify the State's actions" (id.; see also Rhem, 507 F2d at 341 n 20 ["Inadequate resources can never be an adequate justification for the state's depriving any person of his constitutional rights" (internal quotation 37 marks omitted)]). Section 61 is not merely a reordering of the State's fiscal priorities, as Respondents claim; it is the unambiguous elimination of the very fiscal incentives guaranteed to Petitioners and the other local social services districts after the payment of county tax revenue for their full Medicaid local shares and shouldering the burden of the State's deinstitutionalization of mentally disabled patients. Therefore, if Section 61 is not construed as a statute of limitations with the grace period imposed by the Third Department, it should be declared unconstitutional. CONCLUSION For the foregoing reasons, Petitioners respectfully request that this Court affirm the orders of the Appellate Division, Third Department in County of St. Lawrence and County of Chen/lung, reverse the orders of the Appellate Division, Fourth Department in County of Chautauqua, County of Jefferson, County of Genesee, County of Oneida, County of Cayuga, and County of Monroe, declare Section 61 unconstitutional and void to the extent the Court deems necessary in the alternative, and award Petitioners such other relief as this Court shall deem just, proper or equitable. 38 Dated: October 15, 2015 WHITEMAN OSTERMAN & HANNA LLP Albany, New York By: Christopher E. Buckey, Esq. Robert S. Rosborough IV, Esq. Attorneys for Petitioners-Plaintiffs-Appellants One Commerce Plaza Albany, New York 12260 (518) 487-7600 NANCY ROSE STORMER, P.C. Nancy Rose Stormer, Esq. Michael Bagge, Esq. Attorneys for Petitioners-Plaintiffs-Appellants 1325 Belle Avenue Utica, New York 13501 (315) 797-0110 BOND SCHOENECK & KING, PLLC Raymond A. Meier, Esq. Co-Counsel for Petitioners-Plaintiffs-Appellants County of Monroe, County of Oneida 501 Main Street Utica, New York 13501 (315) 738-1223 39 ADDEN DUM R fi v¥nT);,th t tollirGriVernor. 4411..".r. STAT,E:OE!NEW 'roar NATE w¥ckt of the Clavigritii..rt,Oetpiwiteleturn of t An G f Eiiiie4 I 1:1: without amencimanti conetirYijfial a reipectliiliti, iragio.14,01 •6 • i:161.1-1,, • ,' — IsAiij1,104;-4.00#*0?..1414.titlttltk.Vg.: i ' '11.0004il'Iat'slitttilidee.qm.Q.:1..7i9..r- .....;,.k, c. - ,:,..i,:.:...: 60 f:ifp%ri;60*.,, ,...:Iri,,,T1,1.6,1f0.1T414,rli-sapleo,, 0',0.:',0Pd timMar tii',-:,15/r.t:siobsT400gq. glAi..„:40,t;,-S4 't11 1 . ✓ TPPIPTIliA0A747-.:Pg04'qY4-Pr.00.01911, a4r410..fk„. 01tli*::: , 4001iti:j4041*iit,?:ie*000Ai:oilt*i:Q:001.4.-!,: hiik.00"8**,i,151400*4 f ii40i0:4110000.4.01:ig001413 k:'1,601:0Ali00.04:0:].0040.04 i :. i:;0.4444..*** •P:1 iO4:;*AOg.ii-..0,00*,:'!?::141.•:I•V ii0.4:iid..4111 ay -0Y*1:**,Li**pa6e*-404400040iigs;1*00AiOJT4*.0*4* oAt6qIit0,iIia**4,„- Ah4Wt0100WPW60W404:tWOk.o. 'Or4 10ivoav,Viite4.0-0.q;,0:-.40641iolitv.t6eiii:pr6.460.,:y a t6i-i- -:t64 p e 441W4. 00ii'.ii6V;:.:,.,iii- T172:4W ''''::-' £or dates of 4..rYJ'..4V.r.AM Argo,4ft0,4-orluo;:s.1, 1984 ~li ate 'titi'.00rie to 117.5i$*06: '– N-..4,,. ':4arr'''441:i''::;11:11'76;1.:;4.'''11-.;.::::::',.,":6:7:1;;;:i3:::..-:6:'''''''.'''',.:.,,‘::::6:1'(:::- :*7:8a::6'vs:1''':t-':;f:j:t6:4'PPr6rs:'t- ''''Ij-'a.':-:t'tl;tk:tlu.:a :rz::*t-'''d:- 'C-" a_ ally :6:1i3:6::''l 46' :6u..:--'1014,:-':t'. r -hill- - 40,':'.-440,,,•.4--te,10t ' 4..p„4:::: .--2;4 41- ;:: 1::::::4,6 ;A: : °". cii,t, ,--- . of1:6 : –..----,0ti_ i'-,-- it Av,40...,- ,,fri iv 04.--rati0Y''-,on' 6rillu 410 ",E,Ae ' -kgIr'l:7°44% ael;ln %;t1 Meri-t '1i.iiiiiii!"!:-'equIV-" .T.1). tle_rtt*O- iseibled. LegiVOtOe Riatou: During ti*081, 1982 .and 1983 lek414,tive !ilii7°;;C1-1: q11!;34IllililE:1: ndt -le!!iTi!T7d!al r4r6, e -.Hi '°Ireleligiirn:rtli°:" thle'M fo 0 :4- to- 10 ti-p.t–p --Cha' Psi:ti:::;':{11:17:70:::,1k 1-14)::iftd. 0441)4441,_. ttlic40 “mm_ - A.103' -_ • :thi .iriAie- d008,'- • • ' -,Al!._:, ...6.- 4. Arguments in Support: a. While this bill isnot as far-reaching*tj:the,:equeet Governor's Program Bill in regardato.rthef;S4te assumption of local Medicaid costsit doba:metibife local governments of a aubstantial.:PertiOnOUtliOr Medicaid liabilities(approximately.:W6,.:billioW0tr the first three-year:period. In addiiien", bill, the State will be assuming local,:edats.:145iSTO4 term care services: %that portion of:,-the.*4.11.004rOgra which has historically grown as thellidatr4pOlp*CO, b. This bill will continue to provide fist..-) localities to support the State 'a deinatitd400tIL6 tido program by relieving localities of,OWT(.111.0st of services provided to the mentally ilailbredbiS,p has been included in past Governor!SIlfOgilOOW is included in the Human Services Overburden Aid 5. Possible Objections: a. Under the instant bill, the State 46aU00.43he of local costs for that portion oftheMedi60i0rogi5am whieh, to a large extent, is distribil.0&0crOsajhe State based on the numbers of elde4IyA*iiOnSineach county. However, overall MediceiC'ebeWAt0nottOoetred across the State on the same basiat4MSesilltAOKOore, this bill does not assume an equally0iW40100 640 locality's Medicaid costs, ItualiefieOlanghodeerei*of the State with large: numbers or:indl-kidUSISe06141k* assistance. b. It could be argued that byrbmoving.-theLbolk of 10k1 fiscal responsibilfthisbill, wig:remove,rintentives for local governdentextd*O4ustely4;pnttol thbiie Portions of:theirAbbg-tetare 00000 ovig4lhith they have control 2W0'.4aitat, thAeloug-term :`care costs;',OoniArne at ̀ a' more tEll-rde prettent. Otnerztate 4‘hciAiUsted The DeParialentaSottal Sery teg and Pe41111, thi1/410.f4te for! Oit. Aging 4ndth.80gArlidf;4fent.d1 iiiiathliA4,,RARPWRetardAti n %c4dreveloptiefttx4.0 '04tkh:eiv0 InetailfiAn this bill., ' — Other lhteteted - Grt 1. wa Local . gtv'eiiltponts 01,7)t.11 1Ly be Buppprtive , 0f- • . , • . A4:10;iaryaIiiiiilicationa! During the firAt- full yo4i_o_t that this bill 11 itICV4A110 X114 $ ty oVer-1400M Ilion. Over the first three years, ?":As -ated,ihat:,thle State's Medicaid expenditures will 2i0prOximately $1.6 billion over what they 117:444Whave,been. It is expected, however, that 4' 'is-hilXV041nert impact projected expenditures for fiscal yaar 103441dUeto normal billing lags and the ability of systems. .to immediately reflect the changes in the :State's contributions to the program. 9, Recommendation:' 1h2s bill would, decrease local government expenditures for (221-ger.m4gre.Services and services provided to the IperiV0:1400661ed such that the costs of providing services 'the'*6-0411Ydisabled would immediately be totally :assumed and that the proportion of costs 'longerM:.tate services borne by local governments would neer u' period, phased-down to 20 percent of l athe..ponF4ffeder2ilshare. Since this bill is consistent Nq tb4he Adminis'tration's goal of relieving local governments a of a major portion of their liability to finance the Medicaid ,Pr°grem: this office recommends approval. 400iftii J,TO AS drafted, this bill inadvertently increases ,abarebf Medicaid costs in portions of the long-term .04At42ehndWrequire no local contribution. In addition, 1I04Aevertently removes the limitation on State 02-onferpersonal care service costs as enacted in breover, New York City officials have argued Hrafted,this bill inappropriately impacts the amount of -,fiilanCing which the City is obligated, under tAk 0*idt-kto the Health and Hospitals Corporation. ,BeinIfitroduced to correct these technical problems #W.Shbbld,hemade to ensure that it is enacted as a ter ,,4.41endi2i4W. Eothis bill. 00611_0 . Hoaorabie 0-1,t nag! toi,,ifi:e:ip. 9rertpr.: Executive btate Capitbi Albany, New Yorky1222i r r .. - . , ,. 7 _ ,. , -. 1 i :r .. ,I .- .., :, '.. . „ ::";, - -8. ,: !" -' _ , "7 -. . „ ...na .r-.P „ S, .r. , '. ., „ . ..:i..i• '. • elu , -,e . , . .,,.... t . .. . , i . .. . f' ., 4 . . , :!. c . . .' i t . ' . 1; . , - _...„ . i . . ' ... n :- -'i''1:..7 ,- , 6. :79-'- : 3 't' ., 'k , sad . ' lL.ri::.h6.:.--° .r' " . 1 7: t' !, . .dAittth'pr9!t9 ,i.,t6;clmtali7°.1eHin thi State's : ha :1 4c!:"::::: . ,ij : l : is s This'; tioi79 f::e::41:Il:Ii payment fEdiiFR!P g :: :eiii**r 4F ' 1 'i.1 prn is }80$ . „50fi60,4i;i dce#'!7i i3' x t6g9 be lunuary 1884 "io'44!7- ;6iti#: - ' to8.1it term . . ,ii,rh 1, 76% in 13135 and 80 in 15 €. - The long term care seryice!ppytirt*(irV:ifila-,ipriciRaiaa1; intermediate care facilities, l'iciri4*;iliff,:*aiiiiirCii•-' ' ''' -• • l Cara aervkds and the of the Nursin=gHurne Withoutt VialW.,_1,4-or4r ...'.,' - g'''''''' irkaddition, the non-federalatare-!ut,/i;4tlicaia to Ono mentally dews 1'd continua to be toy reiri4iirieq:,'-aa'iiri$44aci by the Human Services Overburden H Of ra b e ce Daniel 'j983 Ai the:same' time this .'proposal .will enrourage,fiscel 'prudeixe hn tiie part of 3oca1'. . . tt.aeichiwairu "1"..hri strongly urge that Governor Cuomo affix his signature to this worthy measure. Sincerely STAT IL or 14 L-W ,n. .c IF"Vq?p,91 0.100 at; H l':".XN-x,;ANDun L11.1,1 ,fith 5,1natu 'AN n', to 41non-thQ,aocial 4services114W, tatreiigigi;.seiqn (acteils'oer,idos'distrzate4dr- ati:fistahoe for, nut*: The bill illiTowho'stnte.PaV:i.64nt-fdr:lorig-orT1 cdxe 4.004Xue01i'cuntlx 1-v-114i4i90.4440.901Cti01115.0'.',40% ?tot.aa.,&6Wofrib'es 6345-ilidkededgwri§061i1416.1.4I'k-ctiitr forYiiitiionQ ' The! Fii l rurtbc r continuos Statti; tiaimbur~e rent of local asA1.6gLirCby Th41 164X314X193 x0Pre60nx:m31PPIX?at1W4 to isadf8AIC.044iiraimU*aho .Stin'tbatikleijiidAb6rri*b -.1.1cb:b40,4116tar04,,f000:0171, ,16fie 6e2:irkhi4114WJ:Oicritiqs Tadar'40141a-t'd,4e40460 lc 14-'114X1W0q!ii4*.4!.,""41,1,' ralsef to local govorCa>nerat b4c144';fif-E.11 66.FXtrikii --1.1,2ilic407K4'X't4htW.66.600e16hut',6iEhIr4or. 1.1*40'tY vsn-pormanont,blidgetztry, brit ns fft, l qp rdil7 ion m,.saripg4±br01;4444:6i&:Ne4Ybik,dfti #4i.C;;rl':°90E0k14t:ine,*G0 . .1 The 4tOt assumption ca A*4hcrP6=lud sang to hoa1t.r1 rhea -4ii.tE01011' 44ifitOn T5,174ya 1(41114*in"cesamrY, A4440470 ,,:dr avoided. cspr r ins thi3 iobal,'11004 rali-at but 1 Ncopet of long-terra '440-t %pilot, the litato cdtvtrolit!‘. c""ALOwP*P4Ittiniantlof ktatt, milio.oitiott of 06ukties STATE OF NEW YORK Of THE STATE cowl-W:0AI Me ANY, NEIN yErti K 2U,̀";3983 £-PORT: TO ' ITIE GOVh1d1DR .... ON Tlef '' Senate 6793 TN2REMICED liYt Senatotn . S17'l.Ei AN ACT to umetld the social:service/I :Igne,.,,Ip..'re...aktipp , to atate eirr.bitrsoiTkiit b abtial,aeYVlCe9,diattiicta for eedi 31 • 444441inc.:e 'elFY1=311E DATE: :I mmed 1.1.1 R.Ec93,204r*It . . L'r[der thin bill which xae -;sponsored by Seaatnr L, bards the; Statd ■cull sesame ra g eater share oC. ]aCAi.caste for; the Tledicaid prograa It3 A ,,utter dated dune '2 1483 to Covaroor (Uo o `and the 1;eaialatiy 40fC'ZPktiri44teiA*ieikti444601Ce.t.hiOi'of!,4n.*4ti4tPthie bill OL4411.140C-lidi4 to e#r~igr"bills which shitted or sited over [ e 7¶~'F12ltc to xnothur _ _ For theee,reartopoilitid ',11.11-O.10 se the:, prOg,tam s coats appazt utly cis tta, coftptrollet . ed the g....101,*4.440itcis:':44$(4ii0,,,W1.1i.ri:t.A.,.erltiy and evoat'oel aqp ud I by xnt in pt kotb-a-0,1rc:T .1-r1 another otop reward • • —• • " the •`• the ddpa 'sagic St* t-t'a i40:40f4e' add-td MhfJ M*1' caftl Siete the spying the neer-tan-6in he;:14eie for dicta-4:41u 0141/71Agralt, .it valid here herd - tar), negative •Ifatt an the State's Clonal atancling; 'Senatiqi Under thiSAiilliWhich applies to sereltesi provided beginning January 1984 the State obviously would have to increase its share of the weekly funding because payments are made directly to Medicaid providers on a current basis', rather than reimbursing localities retroactively. Thus, the Stare, under this arrangement, is not rolling over obligations from one fiscal period to another. Of course, the State will be required to fund the final $90 million quarterly installments of the overburden program as well as begin funding the increased State aid under this bill in the final quarter of fiscal 1983-84 (January to March). This additional expenditure Will have to be accommodated in the State's "Financial Plan". The Office of the State Comptroller strongly urges the approval of this bill. EDWARD V. REGAN State Comptroller Louis R. Tomson Counsel to the Comptroller ,ATOFcRAS.S0 2, JUL :=("}=5•§':1;,c-:1 • 2 198 12224 e r..ms , , The-New , ,n-rk:p.110;i9..lip1f4relAioodiamonlrecormeridti c,*/4:-,:.*404i66::..tti61:d4i'iiikYkeiii.Wiiiii,-64 tili'm,c'i,k6-i*Oiiii!' ' ' ' ' Thin )rgislation wtill groVide locai„99yernraonta dPOit. 4d4:*4404!=0-iWR&i4t1i4°ii0i07).7-6'-q term t! ,., i i-he'.7r4,3:1} 'iii,,Is7Aeki, ::,.11. :404t4i00A!,i! h.5ii..i. r... 40*0,: 440 t iFoi0;0:Ii!!hiii ! 6 4j460:.*i.E,4t:Oi.i'd4.01 491'. -00oo41:i: r044,:ii**.lie,..,A0***:.t4,,,i40446-.0ki:*il,c.0'49w-e 1644-;:174i#A641AiOi;iiNiA**.,44*O local iz..!i:*I5till i4iAWfO7.7IiiWIff WAt 6-4trigqiiietteiA.iii18ir-AiitIOPA94, ' - .. 7'7 7 q,"":' :'4-19 1"r4. 7 pi40,.,,y7 't:11 9,1).t0='f,-4 i41,4.44#' itoeiomotg *.iktet saseot cog son** upon Olis • ,:r,71:111p4 /LEG SLAttiftE VICTOkikIC SEIGERMA CourifY,.;.:dohe ebyj'eerti t\• the foregoIng ,iiiioRfithig Itt G • OE Clerk tire of RoOkloOd to ttie. Legislo Ajrue:Cppy:,:91:: AVe- NEW TOR/C-..SIrkii.E::!.31911.1i...A.:,:.:0PE "g.liA1-1.E by!::•§0.1'd r stature trr the; n the year one thou and moe.FmnLfi c e ........ th, 23rd da$:- JUNE' ridiqr.j.**1-:„ drj./60-c 3it1d(ok4 1 54 Referral No. June El, 3 RESOLUTION . 4 4 9 = OF 1963 141EisiORIALIZIN 'THE, LEGISLATURE, STATE oP;'NEW, YORK ;',170' ''.101,YE'NEW YORKATZ:,kgstME A 'itAtAtER SHARE OP; MJ:!JICAYL1 GUST. a4nar nanjiiiciuS WHEREAS, the New Yoik.State'Meclicaid::.lirOgeitift.,:i fundicl asloilOwst: Fe-c1OttilGoybrnment 2596:I:COitriy.; GOyafintient. WEEEEAS, - .the -::2596..CountSP.7:01artc:::ITEI,POS.e.S u severe fineraci.lK strain upon 'the County WHEREAS, State Senacor ':Te!1y Lombardf 'Jr. has introduced Senate•i 13111.,;61'. 3 nencFederal-ishare, iong-,. team 10 the five-year phase- in, verriment...mould„oill;;'F0,:W% ces.sta!::0:Iong term Nara, tinder WHEREAS;_. proosat :woUld-i'_igniffearitl:1,, :iit'diim:the amount of taxes to be raised from real property asse-ssmunts:t.6:iebithfl the Medicaid program, end Et is:estimated to rai.4:,:,'•eciuntrim 1.1 blllihh tfollrsrs iniiiitailY:„114:'103#,p now, therefore, he it RESDLVD, that the lArgislature or,. 11*,:ccup.t3c,or Rockland herelny mernorielizeis the Ligisiature of the State of hew York to,.enett Senate 1341,,ii610.4' which would increase New Yart< State assistance for ii,are of ifylerdi'. 410:e0,1a, and be ••r • it further P1e'. PFA'49':'4,7,- l littik'iLL, 4,04:?,,?4)7,ifie.:01:0,1,714'. i.,:iii,10,,, Lt.10sii ,:1,6:y. or 11°‘'NerrWlYilj6iClilt g.4141if ywottP rothr-- The ork State Stnitto arK14,Attten54jr; arid to tueh 0MtIV"Y N . ail 06n., may feel' propor irt.i4-i.-tr6r oftpetp-ate the pu;,..----r. of 0000 i 3 CA/bOtri M-4111 ,e. aiSd 1a hereby authorised and Hon. Mario Cuomo, rioverirc.- Cr orkv,aut. ts,n rim::-.40,porec NEW YORK STATE CATHOLI • .11, NORTH: PE ARi.,,STREET, 90,11ANY, NEW' YORK,12267 .• • • ALAN; 6.01 IL,: TolOk. ' • GENERAL edirkra lionorabk62:Aliee Daniel • Coan1Wto the GoVernor • .;Exeeative Chambet.:, 14ti,Y6State Capital 'Aibienyow.York12224 RE: 5,6793 Lombardi Relating to Local Medicaid Costs DeatiMa, Daniel: ? The above-mentioned bill has passed both haul se Ldgislitnro and is now .pending before the Governor::fot,,(. exedative action :Youhave,kindly asked fot our nOnmenf%;an rciffendation with roeilocCto it. This bill wonWOinVIde forthree-yoar plan toeeduce local governnentei f AdJit-Oreare provided ,dnder Medicaid. Meoik Zigte Catholic Coafdrence for7SeintlMe .vos:.h4veAeine10444.I.eandprlynre groups.. acressthop$iatWexpreasingteiWirqirtbeerr Pa!P4*vcoAedW f iM&IIaiidgr4#41W1iffaCtuontlie, local are ovcrnsbflt̀s to meet theca; expenditures >1le :.egna1:156icdridaRtUW611.,SUsonc to reduce local costs Such as that proposed=iiy this bill'; - Furthermore this' hill will encourage the provision of hole care„When=nppropratte treatreent _can be given in this>", tl 00nli we -:feel this bill represents anYiefforiable cinppropriite,apprOgich to erentingt4balance inNedienid financing nnaoStebnikinment. We therefore suppOrt ;this bill iWurge faVereble'jebnSideretion byyonrCommittee. Respeci"fu4lubmitticl, - • NYS CATHOLIC CONFERENCE: reliate -:VAtizAldt comminting me, However; , ift,here particular upon Which you wishOnbiar604#, pt*ase Advite unctions of -th ‘1,;:f• ' • Slate."-tCapitol Gee r 'Governor t -..', .--',":::: - - :-::-L ' " . -" . • . . 1 . : -•• ! ' ,. .. -, . • . . . - ...._ . : -. . 1 . - ' - •• . •-; •:' -- f ••. - •2 : ,. ' t .. -, 'h -t.t:.. 0 , •.. • " .:.- ) .. - .7 ••„-.•. : •.., , --" .•.. ,. • :. :.: -,- l-- ,.,, - ' V ., •.•, -- ,; -.1 - . : •l - : i- . . • • 6 . . •, . ) ,: : ...1. ' . :1. -.. .: ,, .= .! ;-:•:- . - ' s. •:, '!,7 . ' . . . -- _,.. hcen .l t . ' ....•. - . t- •- f •• . - , P • . . .•- •- ;, . : . .--• : ,t . t ? •. ...i t ...•.,.,1 ., - -: . , t . . - H ,. .' L- -: t V .: . ,t . ,: •, . •- .A , •-..-; ' :. ,:-- 5 ---, , t- 4 :•. .-; . - 1. ..' : t, - .. - ., •. . -., ' . .._• t : . :er ,t..i .• •c .:.: _ '., ,..-. . : ••,....:-, ., ,t . -,,: ,t :,. •• t t : .. t . • . c ., . ., .. . .,. S , ' ,• , •, .. • , . . t :•- a :• e a c sbtt l: . r ... _ g _ , . ' • cr • e iip:63pttirIie6t'tjat.'9- Y4aiej0-05??r!,,t-you have t aiIy, st146tirt- e : eP, t c,01.rpyii c d.,, cly)0,r n . ' S ,?::641,.c`pr i bdccf. ti,.a6i6;,f)ii: 'rcg,,, in tenl s. . - . 0- f ar_tthe - ,; ,61 - crec . T' e tr1eciI6j0:0: . E iit 14 r,,prccb4L 7 which asses , :i e '4te 491.3-r7{:6hb7011 ' . b0 - fundinrg , moAi0,-4ik11 TTiaCrtt05,,Pir1ttejt?kg118-*Or.f07Latt 4-6 •A-4r ' -tidtitr0tt , ':;i - ii i4!11t'W h,,flfte.. P -iiiled.Pver the ila w n 05515 as o y„ .'- • ,- • -•:::•''---'• .••,.-i t-,:: „,,,o f11,--r sari Else l plat *. strongty' rkf-.• -•iJhtte rtSb gc 4 J tb'C- •• A y and ,tvrtiAttal- al by the rjpvcr t i o: The co, iq.11t.T.6,in,1,141e4.'1:1 theLora bar di 1:11#, as welt to err xtenc'er Icr 1 you flied orr..Wiprct, represtrrt ai , othieroepyfropiroi-cl ottiv6.offo, is to, Reprove the States credit trf.#64*g ti 5t3g . sauna 660,rtiirr born the tvrittOrp-c!r, llorit6-f paymrtntst to the St:htik tt)4•'4 *1**00iiiiiit) 6oi•ot,,,v4(,6:itihfi:itti, or) -̀'fli6'-'''t:'00170y414:1-7.0,f._ c,it as tkleki4;45 for extehditAjp::0100.0041101.4:nt .,, meqor r40dilve effeci 0,:•'11-;%:''syficov,ftfai Under the Lombardi bill, which appOeSz nning, January E, 1904, the Statt., avettAAly sit the weekly functin-r4 b-ocau5c Otry to-rMedicaid - providers oh a current _ttaSISt:- r. retrttactively, Tht - the -St.:Att under thi: arrangement , ovor ottiit3"ations trot, etle fiscal p-teied to another. Of course; the State will he renuiretltu tuntt the final $50 million quarterly kustallmert of tht., overb4relert'l!0!= ?-q0i0,16 .!`ryejt:.e'! beftji0Junding tho kticreasel at der the Lombai di brat rn ;th fre.l quarter of fiscai 10.3:44:1"Jiantiacy tot Jarch) This adcfttioY i1 -, (5)01001 in bill oaclila10: Mario Cuomo , .4... the lig e's:.--- ta ° •,--,..b.t.;.!Wil,:14.1-447.:41 (.4400* 44' .-W14444:144*OW-4.1-a3.iiiiii.. ifot.qn4p. .._..... „.._...._ _. a City o the Itaia-#.i.,,'.494 .iiiil.;.dt.:,,,,h,firi:,::q94T!;'' - ,-.'-P= ' - ffeiiiiiSiititi4,::'9rP°— -,--- -.---a•eiiiii:-:.::a?-?..,.. 4i4i14!tl City.'ii.fr:1*."i47*0,i41401.P4:*°141ji..,0"../i. portion1..- '..:M4dIV4-04',14.,AP ,.• counted 441% -• legislation- itioi4142ii4,!---.,,idiiiiv* • ••• t10,.;i4#F4,..441i,4,0)# the4st.t.tfl_....,,,..,,,t tliie.A..1 09**),*p.-:g9.!ii:iii6iii,i4:0-.4..*.,f 9.14--9...,,...i:K:ta,i,i ,..:0; :i.,4.4% 0.P'...00:,4*44W44.t4ia::;:74::id.. ill vac iutanded „:_43.b,,.*,.-0v44p-,,,,- The, .".,.4,id:„..,,s ,.. :......„..,i received by 416:7,-*IP4AOY i Tzwiiit*i63A3A:1, _.-,. ----Ai,iif,#.dica, ...., . ... urge yoni_ , bi, *4.**bill. AddordincilY,: Dogialat N ,Y10 Assn S ma. Danie1.44 ank you referenced Yegisitrtibn. The New York StAtq.A21*ool*#oapfountica strongly its '77***0-ti4A0Aii11#001 T44g, pr~ov de qt cohthined i t e t3adicniI progr ./141a most finanCi414:4b,9r00i1444W* qp*Jgpyornater:It c' , ffi4,-,P44._ • the4r4T41 14°P-OW:t44414i,40.0*f!i4100eid440fikdicAia*-0!gram e4titik. ; ftA*4.*W4104A0iW*44.48***0004t"cal 't 4***16i4*U4-fk4g4**0*41X0OUitand th,*AY 19$8 that cost arill inciao to el.-644#10*,, l,17141sing the state a financial o ation to the nwl- fRderal costa for thia4: *0 *tfe,a 01_ 4r4sktt portion of the.40 :*er, eecOgn10 ''740i,:* hears Vost:Ot rRaporlaihdlity -forAkp 0-,tilopro4ittm-4.2,411"lag. the sothpi-ity for CoW.'orat*itagtent'14e**-14i015.,-, opitb143 31:iecau. lt..41s,r0.;,000(CAla?-Wnf.,34.1y4urtner assistance, pl not hesitdte to contaok me. yLyours, LejRST ljC HarGoxkbie , ?la r 0171f,eilioi7H ' - , - State .of l0e4 YOrk-, wish- to is ccrYra>iy, b-6f6sercCyo '52.4.V111'115,''•$trOn.it s • for.i..zikacutio-,', stance Prc Senate 67,53Hisititt • 'aGt,'`.State local Medichi.d ?his legf¢latian.reproaentt` sore than ;just flscal bsaistance c the i eourizir~ of Nehe York State and to Hew York-City-. It Trpresetta e ro4wIt- 4*WJYOA ta .ri10,44snmef edAition.I rraponsibility for- rn mail I know hat 4u have ns•,t.wc4.on of.,.: 0,e.,•11f511.0•1„r1 i;,-urcirn 19)11 F Oftis • isioe. Lon tern ervfrra Oiii;***4 44% 4::,..,**ffolk.p074,*'. exp-anditnms and are one oC1*4: