Center For Biological Diversity et al v. Ilano et al

MOTION for SUMMARY JUDGMENT

E.D. Cal.March 16, 2017

Center for Biological Diversity et al., v. Eli Ilano et al., Case No. 2:16-cv-02322-VC DEF-INT. CROSS MOT. IN SUPPORT OF SUMMARY JUDGMENT 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 Shelley Addison (CA Bar #178846) Dun & Martinek P.O. Box 1266 Eureka, California 95502 Telephone: (707) 442-3791 Fax: (707) 442-9251 sca@dunmartinek.com Lawson E. Fite (Ore. Bar #055573) Pro Hac Vice American Forest Resource Council 5100 S.W. Macadam, Suite 350 Portland, Oregon 97239 Telephone: (503) 222-9505 Fax: (503) 222-3255 lfite@amforest.org Attorneys for Defendant-Intervenor UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA SACRAMENTO DIVISION CENTER FOR BIOLOGICAL DIVERSITY and EARTH ISLAND INSTITUTE, Plaintiffs, v. ELI ILANO, in his official capacity as Supervisor for the Tahoe National Forest, THOMAS TIDWELL, Chief of the United States Forest Service, and the UNITED STATES FOREST SERVICE, Defendants, and SIERRA PACIFIC INDUSTRIES, a California Corporation, Defendant-Intervenor. No. 2:16-cv-02322-VC DEFENDANT-INTERVENOR’S NOTICE OF MOTION AND CROSS-MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT; COMBINED MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF CROSS-MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND IN OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT Date: May 4, 2017 Time: 2:00 p.m. Courtroom: 4, 17th Floor, San Francisco Hon. Vince Chhabria Case 2:16-cv-02322-VC Document 30 Filed 03/16/17 Page 1 of 24 Center for Biological Diversity et al., v. Eli Ilano et al., Case No. 2:16-cv-02322-VC DEF-INT. CROSS MOT. IN SUPPORT OF SUMMARY JUDGMENT - i 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 TABLE OF CONTENTS NOTICE .......................................................................................................................................... 1 MOTION......................................................................................................................................... 1 MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES ................................................................ 1 I. INTRODUCTION .................................................................................................................. 1 II. BACKGROUND .................................................................................................................... 2 A. Legal Background ........................................................................................................... 2 B. Facts and Proceedings ..................................................................................................... 3 1. Congress included a statutory CE in the 2014 Farm Bill........................................... 3 2. The Sunny South project area is in a designated landscape....................................... 4 3. The Sunny South Project will address severe insect, disease, and fire risk ............... 5 III. LEGAL STANDARDS .......................................................................................................... 7 IV. ARGUMENT .......................................................................................................................... 8 A. Farm Bill landscape designations, in themselves, do not trigger the need for an EA or EIS ......................................................................................................................... 9 B. Because the Farm Bill CE was established by Congress, not the agency, the “extraordinary circumstances” test does not apply and the Forest Service may not be compelled to prepare NEPA documentation based on “extraordinary circumstances.” ............................................................................................................... 11 C. No “extraordinary circumstances” exist ....................................................................... 14 V. CONCLUSION ..................................................................................................................... 15 Case 2:16-cv-02322-VC Document 30 Filed 03/16/17 Page 2 of 24 Center for Biological Diversity et al., v. Eli Ilano et al., Case No. 2:16-cv-02322-VC DEF-INT. CROSS MOT. IN SUPPORT OF SUMMARY JUDGMENT - ii 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 TABLE OF AUTHORITIES Page(s) Cases Abrego v. Dow Chem. Co., 443 F.3d 676 (9th Cir. 2006) ...................................................................................................12 Alaska Ctr. for Env’t v. U.S. Forest Serv., 189 F.3d 851 (9th Cir. 1999) .....................................................................................................8 Alcoa, Inc. v. Bonneville Power Admin., 698 F.3d 774 (9th Cir. 2012) ...................................................................................................14 Apache Survival Coal. v. United States, 21 F.3d 895 (9th Cir. 1994) ...........................................................................................2, 12, 13 Asarco, Inc. v. Air Quality Coal., 601 P.2d 501 (Wash. 1979)......................................................................................................13 Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837 (1984) .............................................................................................................8, 13 Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. Salazar, 706 F.3d 1085 (9th Cir. 2013) .................................................................................................12 Del Cerro Mobile Estates v. City of Placentia, 197 Cal.App.4th 173 (2011) ....................................................................................................14 Enos v. Marsh, 769 F.2d 1363 (9th Cir. 1985) .................................................................................................14 Envtl. Prot. Info. Ctr. v. U.S. Forest Serv., 451 F.3d 1005 (9th Cir. 2006) .................................................................................................15 Friends of Southeast’s Future v. Morrison, 153 F.3d 1059 (9th Cir. 1998) .................................................................................................11 Heartwood, Inc. v. U.S. Forest Serv., 230 F.3d 947 (7th Cir. 2000) ...................................................................................................10 Kleppe v. Sierra Club, 427 U.S. 390 (1976) .................................................................................................................10 Lands Council v. McNair, 537 F.3d 981 (9th Cir. 2008) (en banc) .................................................................................7, 8 Case 2:16-cv-02322-VC Document 30 Filed 03/16/17 Page 3 of 24 Center for Biological Diversity et al., v. Eli Ilano et al., Case No. 2:16-cv-02322-VC DEF-INT. CROSS MOT. IN SUPPORT OF SUMMARY JUDGMENT - iii 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 Longview Fibre Co. v. Rasmussen, 980 F.2d 1307 (9th Cir. 1992) ...................................................................................................9 N. Cal. River Watch v. Wilcox, 633 F.3d 766 (9th Cir. 2011) .....................................................................................................8 Napa Valley Wine Train, Inc. v. Pub. Util. Comm’n, 50 Cal.3d 370 (1990) ...............................................................................................................13 Native Ecosystems Council v. U.S. Forest Serv., 418 F.3d 953 (9th Cir. 2005) .....................................................................................................8 Northwest Ecosystem Alliance v. United States Fish & Wildlife Serv., 475 F.3d 1136 (9th Cir. 2007) ...................................................................................................8 Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council, 490 U.S. 332 (1989) ...................................................................................................................2 Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16 (1983) ...................................................................................................................12 Sierra Club v. Bosworth, 510 F.3d 1016 (9th Cir. 2007) ...........................................................................................10, 11 Snohomish County v. State, 850 P.2d 546 (Wash. App. 1993) .............................................................................................13 United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218 (2001) .............................................................................................................8, 11 Statutes 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A)........................................................................................................................7 16 U.S.C. § 6554 ............................................................................................................................12 16 U.S.C. § 6554(d)(2)(B) .............................................................................................................12 16 U.S.C. §§ 6591a-6591d ...............................................................................................................3 16 U.S.C. § 6591a(b)(1) ...............................................................................................................3, 4 16 U.S.C. § 6591a(b)(2) ...............................................................................................................3, 9 16 U.S.C. § 6591a(c)....................................................................................................................3, 9 16 U.S.C. § 6591a(d) ...................................................................................................................3, 9 16 U.S.C. § 6591b(a)(1) ...................................................................................................................9 Case 2:16-cv-02322-VC Document 30 Filed 03/16/17 Page 4 of 24 Center for Biological Diversity et al., v. Eli Ilano et al., Case No. 2:16-cv-02322-VC DEF-INT. CROSS MOT. IN SUPPORT OF SUMMARY JUDGMENT - iv 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 16 U.S.C. §§ 6591b(a), (a)(1) ........................................................................................................12 16 U.S.C. § 6591b(a)(2) ...................................................................................................................4 16 U.S.C. § 6591b(b) .......................................................................................................................4 16 U.S.C. § 6591b(b)(1) ..................................................................................................................6 16 U.S.C. §§ 6591b(b), (c), (d) ......................................................................................................12 16 U.S.C. § 6591b(b)(1)(B) .............................................................................................................4 16 U.S.C. § 6591b(b)(1)(C) .............................................................................................................4 16 U.S.C. § 6591b(c) .......................................................................................................................4 16 U.S.C. § 6591b(c)(1), (2) ............................................................................................................4 16 U.S.C. § 6591b(f) ..................................................................................................................7, 12 42 U.S.C. § 4332(C) ........................................................................................................................2 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4347 ..................................................................................................................2 42 U.S.C. § 4331(a) .........................................................................................................................2 42 U.S.C. § 4331(b)(6) ....................................................................................................................2 Agricultural Act of 2014, Pub. L. No. 113-79, Title VIII, §§ 8204, 128 Stat. 649, 915-17 (2014).......................................................................................................................3, 12 Other Authorities 36 C.F.R. Part 220............................................................................................................................2 36 C.F.R. § 220.4 ...........................................................................................................................13 36 C.F.R. § 220.4(a)(4) ....................................................................................................................2 36 C.F.R. § 220.6(b)(2) ..................................................................................................................15 36 C.F.R. § 220.6(e).........................................................................................................................3 40 C.F.R. §§ 1500-1508 ...................................................................................................................2 40 C.F.R. § 1501.4(b) ......................................................................................................................2 40 C.F.R. § 1506.8 .........................................................................................................................11 40 C.F.R. § 1507.3(b)(2)(ii) .............................................................................................................3 Case 2:16-cv-02322-VC Document 30 Filed 03/16/17 Page 5 of 24 Center for Biological Diversity et al., v. Eli Ilano et al., Case No. 2:16-cv-02322-VC DEF-INT. CROSS MOT. IN SUPPORT OF SUMMARY JUDGMENT - v 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 40 C.F.R. § 1508.4 .....................................................................................................................3, 11 40 C.F.R. § 1508.9 ...........................................................................................................................2 40 C.F.R. § 1508.23 .................................................................................................................10, 11 H.R. Rep. 113-92, Part 1, Report of the Committee on Agriculture to Accompany H.R. 1947, Federal Agriculture Reform and Risk Management Act of 2013, May 29, 2013 .............................................................................................................................4 H.R. Rep. 113-333, Conference Report to Accompany H.R. 2642 Jan. 27, 2014 ..............................................................................................................................4 Richard L. Settle, The Washington State Environmental Policy Act: A Legal and Policy Analysis § 12.01[1] ......................................................................................................13 Case 2:16-cv-02322-VC Document 30 Filed 03/16/17 Page 6 of 24 Center for Biological Diversity et al., v. Eli Ilano et al., Case No. 2:16-cv-02322-VC DEF-INT. CROSS MOT. IN SUPPORT OF SUMMARY JUDGMENT - vi 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 INDEX OF ACRONYMS CE – Categorical Exclusion CEQ – Council on Environmental Quality CEQA – California Environmental Quality Act EA – Environmental Assessment EIS – Environmental Impact Statement ESA – Endangered Species Act FONSI – Finding of No Significant Impact HFRA – Healthy Forests Restoration Act NEPA – National Environmental Policy Act SEPA – State Environmental Policy Act (Washington) Case 2:16-cv-02322-VC Document 30 Filed 03/16/17 Page 7 of 24 Center for Biological Diversity et al., v. Eli Ilano et al., Case No. 2:16-cv-02322-VC DEF-INT. CROSS MOT. IN SUPPORT OF SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 1 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 NOTICE TO THIS HONORABLE COURT AND COUNSEL FOR THE PARTIES: PLEASE TAKE NOTICE, pursuant to Northern District of California Civil L.R. 7-2, that on May 4, 2017, at 2:00 p.m., or as soon thereafter as the matter may be heard, in the courtroom of the Honorable Vince Chhabria, at the United States Courthouse, Northern District of California, 450 Golden Gate Avenue, San Francisco, CA 94102, defendant-intervenor Sierra Pacific Industries will bring to hearing its cross-motion, set forth below, for summary judgment in the above-entitled action. MOTION Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a) and N.D. Cal. Civil L.R. 56, defendant-intervenor Sierra Pacific Industries (Sierra Pacific or SPI) respectfully moves the Court for summary judgment. This motion is supported by the accompanying Memorandum, the administrative record lodged by the United States Forest Service, see Dkt. 24, the Court file herein, and such oral argument as the Court may entertain. MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES I. INTRODUCTION Summary judgment is appropriate, and the Court should uphold the Sunny South Insect Treatment Project, for three main reasons. First, the landscape designation which applies to this project, and makes the project eligible for a Categorical Exclusion (CE), is not subject to the procedural requirements of the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA). Second, the Forest Service rationally found the Sunny South Project qualified for the CE established by the 2014 Farm Bill, and this determination is all that was required to satisfy NEPA. The statutory CE is not subject to an exception for “extraordinary circumstances” which would apply to CEs established by regulation. Third, to the extent “extraordinary circumstances” review applies, the Forest Service rationally concluded no such circumstances exist. The Sunny South Project is badly needed to address continued bark beetle infestations and prevent further destruction of the area’s forest ecosystem. It avoids Protected Activity Centers for California spotted owls and the Case 2:16-cv-02322-VC Document 30 Filed 03/16/17 Page 8 of 24 Center for Biological Diversity et al., v. Eli Ilano et al., Case No. 2:16-cv-02322-VC DEF-INT. CROSS MOT. IN SUPPORT OF SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 reduction in fire and disease risk will ultimately benefit area wildlife. The Forest Service is proceeding with the project just as Congress envisioned. Accordingly, the Court should deny plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment and grant the instant motion as well as the government’s cross-motion. II. BACKGROUND A. Legal Background. Plaintiffs’ claims arise under NEPA, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4347. Dkt. 1, Complaint, ¶¶ 2, 36-43. NEPA’s purpose is “to create and maintain conditions under which [people] and nature can exist in productive harmony, and fulfill the social, economic, and other requirements of present and future generations of Americans.” Id. § 4331(a). NEPA also directs federal agencies, among other goals, to “enhance the quality of renewable resources. …” Id. § 4331(b)(6). NEPA establishes the procedures by which federal agencies must consider the environmental impacts of their actions, but does not dictate substantive results. Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council, 490 U.S. 332, 350 (1989). Regulations promulgated by the Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ), 40 C.F.R. §§ 1500-1508, provide guidance for implementing NEPA, and the Forest Service has its own set of regulations. 36 C.F.R. Part 220. Under NEPA, federal agencies must prepare an Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) for “major Federal actions significantly affecting the quality of the human environment. ...” 42 U.S.C. § 4332(C). To determine whether an action requires an EIS, an agency prepares an Environmental Assessment (EA). 40 C.F.R. § 1501.4(b). An EA is a concise public document that briefly describes the proposal, examines alternatives, considers environmental impacts, and provides a list of individuals and agencies consulted. 40 C.F.R. § 1508.9. However, certain actions are “categorically excluded” from NEPA. Since NEPA is a statute, subsequent Congressional enactments define actions that are not subject to NEPA procedures. Apache Survival Coal. v. United States, 21 F.3d 895, 904 (9th Cir. 1994) (holding a statute “exempt[ed] the Project [at issue] from those requirements [of NEPA and other laws] and substitute[d] new ones”); 36 C.F.R. § 220.4(a)(4). Agencies are directed to establish by Case 2:16-cv-02322-VC Document 30 Filed 03/16/17 Page 9 of 24 Center for Biological Diversity et al., v. Eli Ilano et al., Case No. 2:16-cv-02322-VC DEF-INT. CROSS MOT. IN SUPPORT OF SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 3 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 regulation their own categorical exclusions for activities that are unlikely to have a significant impact on the environment. 40 C.F.R. § 1507.3(b)(2)(ii). A regulatory categorical exclusion “shall provide for extraordinary circumstances in which a normally excluded action may have a significant environmental effect.” 40 C.F.R. § 1508.4. The Forest Service has established many such exclusions that do not require an EA or EIS, ranging from repaving a parking lot to salvage timber harvest of up to 250 acres. 36 C.F.R. § 220.6(e). B. Facts and Proceedings. 1. Congress included a statutory CE in the 2014 Farm Bill. Recognizing that forest mortality due to insects, disease, and fire is a growing threat to forest health, environmental protection, clean water, and economic stability, Congress enacted the 2014 Farm Bill containing a statutory CE for projects like Sunny South. Agricultural Act of 2014, Pub. L. No. 113-79, Title VIII, §§ 8204, 128 Stat. 649, 915-17 (2014), codified at 16 U.S.C. §§ 6591a-6591d. President Obama signed the bill into law on February 7, 2014. SS_03734. The Farm Bill requires the Secretary of Agriculture to designate landscape areas, if requested by a state, “in at least 1 national forest in each State that is experiencing an insect or disease epidemic.” 16 U.S.C. § 6591a(b)(1). Additionally, the Secretary may designate areas “as needed to address insect or disease threats.” 16 U.S.C. § 6591a(b)(2). The Secretary delegated these authorities to the Chief of the Forest Service. SS_03764. The criteria for landscape designations are: [T]he area shall be-- (1) experiencing declining forest health, based on annual forest health surveys conducted by the Secretary; (2) at risk of experiencing substantially increased tree mortality over the next 15 years due to insect or disease infestation, based on the most recent National Insect and Disease Risk Map published by the Forest Service; or (3) in an area in which the risk of hazard trees poses an imminent risk to public infrastructure, health, or safety. 16 U.S.C. § 6591a(c). In such designated landscapes, the Forest Service may carry out projects “to reduce the risk or extent of, or increase the resilience to, insect or disease infestation in the areas.” Id. § 6591a(d). Such a project “may be . . . considered an action categorically excluded from the Case 2:16-cv-02322-VC Document 30 Filed 03/16/17 Page 10 of 24 Center for Biological Diversity et al., v. Eli Ilano et al., Case No. 2:16-cv-02322-VC DEF-INT. CROSS MOT. IN SUPPORT OF SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 4 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 requirements of [NEPA].” Id. § 6591b(a)(2). The only requirements for using the CE are set forth in the Farm Bill itself. Id. §§ 6591b(b), 6591b(c). These requirements are that the project (1) maximizes the retention of old-growth and large trees, id.; (2) “considers the best available scientific information to maintain or restore the ecological integrity, including maintaining or restoring structure, function, composition, and connectivity, id. § 6591b(b)(1)(B); and (3) is developed through a collaborative process that is diverse, transparent, and nonexclusive. Id. § 6591b(b)(1)(C). Farm Bill CE projects are limited to 3,000 acres and must occur in areas where fire risk is a concern. Id. §§ 6591b(c)(1), (2). In northern California this concern is present; the recent drought led to significant tree mortality and increasingly severe fires. SS_00005. The enactment of this CE reflects Congressional concern that “the current system for managing national forests affected by historic insect infestations has not been responsive to the speed and widespread impact of the infestations.” H.R. Rep. 113-333, Conference Report to Accompany H.R. 2642, Jan. 27, 2014, at 512. Congress stated “[t]he outbreak of the pine bark beetle affecting states across the nation is a great concern ... .” Id. A report on early versions of the legislation reflected the aim to “exclude[] projects . . . from the requirements for an environmental assessment or an environmental impact statement.” H.R. Rep. 113-92, Part 1, Report of the Committee on Agriculture to Accompany H.R. 1947, Federal Agriculture Reform and Risk Management Act of 2013, May 29, 2013, at 278. Congress intended to streamline the process, recognizing the large swaths of forest in need of restorative treatments to avoid further insect or disease infestation or catastrophic fire. These concerns are particularly acute in light of the ongoing massive tree dieoff throughout the southern Sierras. Nearly 70 million trees have died in the last 1-2 years and another nearly 60 million are at risk. Hoover Decl. ¶ 13, Dkt. 14-1; see SS_03665-66. As one Member of Congress remarked, “The state of California’s forests has become dire as a result of the drought and bark beetle induced mortality.” SS_03667. The Forest Service identified over 81 million forested acres at risk of mortality. SS_03784. 2. The Sunny South project area is in a designated landscape. Pursuant to Farm Bill Section 602(b)(1), 16 U.S.C. § 6591a(b)(1), the State of California Case 2:16-cv-02322-VC Document 30 Filed 03/16/17 Page 11 of 24 Center for Biological Diversity et al., v. Eli Ilano et al., Case No. 2:16-cv-02322-VC DEF-INT. CROSS MOT. IN SUPPORT OF SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 5 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 initially requested designation of areas in the Eldorado, Shasta-Trinity, Modoc, Klamath and San Bernardino National Forests. Letter from John Laird, California Secretary for Natural Resources, to Secretary Tom Vilsack, U.S. Department of Agriculture, Apr. 7, 2014. The Chief of the Forest Service, defendant Tidwell, made these designations in May 2014. Letter from Thomas L. Tidwell, Chief, United States Forest Service, to Hon. Edmund G. Brown, Jr., Governor of the State of California, May 20, 2014. Additionally, the Pacific Southwest Region requested further designations throughout the state. SS_03707. The Region stated it “actively collaborated with the California Resources Agency and Cal Fire and state agencies support these designations.” Id. The designation request included detailed information regarding poor forest health in the affected landscapes. SS_03707-10, 3679 (photographs of mortality). It did not propose any specific projects for implementation. SS_03707-10. The California Resources Agency submitted a letter in support. SS_03705-06. The Chief made these designations in November 2015. SS_03696. As noted, the designation does not authorize any on-the-ground activity. It allows the Forest Service “to further evaluate these areas for potential treatments.” SS_03696 (emphasis added). As such the Forest Service has articulated by memorandum that such designations are not subject to NEPA procedures. SS_03785-86. 3. The Sunny South Project will address severe insect, disease, and fire risk. The Tahoe National Forest “right now has the components of a perfect storm for an outbreak of bark beetles: four years of drought causing moisture stress in the trees and dense stands of almost pure ponderosa pine in sizes attractive to the bark beetle.” SS_00013. The Sunny South Project began development to address these problems in early 2016, months after the landscape designation was finalized. SS_1639-40. The Forest Service plans to treat about 2,700 acres of the Tahoe National Forest which have been affected by bark beetle outbreaks and drought or are at risk of future mortality. SS_00003. Project units are within three watersheds designated pursuant to the Farm Bill. SS_03663. The entire project area is classified as Fire Regime Condition Class 3—the highest departure from historic fire regimes and therefore the greatest risk. SS_00443-44. Absent treatment, existing conditions would “eventually limit the ability of firefighters to safely and effectively control future wildfires, particularly in Case 2:16-cv-02322-VC Document 30 Filed 03/16/17 Page 12 of 24 Center for Biological Diversity et al., v. Eli Ilano et al., Case No. 2:16-cv-02322-VC DEF-INT. CROSS MOT. IN SUPPORT OF SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 6 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 communities or recreation areas.” SS_00460. Due to the fire risk concerns, the project garnered support from a broad spectrum of the community, including Placer County Firewise Communities and Foresthill and Iowa Hill Firesafe Council. SS_00021. Members of the public were concerned about how they could conduct similar treatment on their private lands. Id.; SS_01635. The Forest Service designed the project with an eye toward restoring natural forest conditions. Over 80% of the acres to be treated are in monotypic (single-species) plantations that were planted in the 1960s after the area was ravaged by the Volcano fire. SS_00009 (Table 1). These stands do not exhibit the type of variability or complexity that is found in older forest landscapes. SS_00013. Moreover, the stands have become overcrowded due to ongoing fire suppression, resulting in competition between trees that weakens the stands. Id. Weakened trees are more susceptible to drought and to bark beetle attacks. SS_00005, 00396. The project area contains several large pockets of beetle-killed trees, with more areas at risk. SS_00006. Forest Service staff have observed continued expansion of insect infestation and damage during the planning process. SS_00369-71 (photographs of expanding infestation and damage). The Forest entomologist observed, “Average stand density within most of the proposed treatment areas is well above recommended levels that would reduce the risk of successful western pine beetle attacks in ponderosa pine stands. In fact, many of these stands are at extreme risk of bark beetle-cause mortality.” SS_00395-96 (emphasis added). The stand density was measured at “close to three to four times the density that is desired for healthy ponderosa pine stands.” SS_00396. The entomologist recommended that “[t]he best strategy to decrease the amount of additional mortality in the immediate and long-term is to reduce stand density through thinning. Thinning will increase the health and vigor of residual ponderosa pines by reducing competition for limited soil moisture.” SS_00397. Further, “[o]pening up the canopy may also disrupt the pheromone communication system by creating convection currents and air turbulence through increases in soil temperature.” Id. The Forest Service engaged in collaboration prescribed by statute, 16 U.S.C. § 6591b(b)(1), involving a substantial portion of the public. SS_00020. The Forest Service Case 2:16-cv-02322-VC Document 30 Filed 03/16/17 Page 13 of 24 Center for Biological Diversity et al., v. Eli Ilano et al., Case No. 2:16-cv-02322-VC DEF-INT. CROSS MOT. IN SUPPORT OF SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 7 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 notified the public of its intent to proceed with the project and solicited scoping comments, fulfilling the Farm Bill’s public notice requirements. See 16 U.S.C. § 6591b(f) (providing “[t]he Secretary shall conduct public notice and scoping for any project or action proposed in accordance with this section”). Sierra Pacific participated in this process, including attending field trips and submitting comments. SS_00020, 22. Plaintiffs submitted voluminous comments and references. SS_00530-550, 00609-634, 00637-01276. Many members of the public, but not plaintiffs, attended meetings relating to the project as part of collaboration. SS_01574-75, 01603. The Forest Service met separately with Sierra Forest Legacy, an environmental group. SS_01570-71. The Forest Service approved the project on August 3, 2016. SS_00027. The Forest Service developed a timber sale contract to implement commercial elements of the project. Sierra Pacific was declared the apparent high bidder and awarded the contract in late September 2016. Hoover Decl. ¶ 10, Ex. 1. SPI intends to operate the sale beginning about July 1, 2017. Id. ¶ 12. Timber from the sale will supply Sierra Pacific’s two mills at Lincoln and its small-log incense cedar mill at Oroville. Id. ¶ 11. The timber from the project is important to keep these facilities operating at current levels. Id. ¶ 12. These mills employ nearly 500 people with family-wage jobs. Id. ¶¶ 5-7. From the mills, substantial support flows into the regional economy—over $50 million annually from Lincoln alone. Id. ¶ 5. This case was filed September 29, 2016. Dkt. 1. On November 29, 2016, the Court granted Sierra Pacific leave to intervene. Dkt. 17. III. LEGAL STANDARDS The arbitrary and capricious standard of review under the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A), applies to plaintiffs’ claims. Lands Council v. McNair, 537 F.3d 981, 987 (9th Cir. 2008) (en banc). Under this standard, a court should not substitute its judgment for that of the agency. Id. Rather, an agency may only be reversed as arbitrary and capricious “if the agency relied on factors Congress did not intend it to consider, entirely failed to consider an important aspect of the problem, or offered an explanation that runs counter to the evidence before the agency or is so implausible that it could not be ascribed to a difference in view or the Case 2:16-cv-02322-VC Document 30 Filed 03/16/17 Page 14 of 24 Center for Biological Diversity et al., v. Eli Ilano et al., Case No. 2:16-cv-02322-VC DEF-INT. CROSS MOT. IN SUPPORT OF SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 8 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 product of agency expertise.” Id. In McNair, the unanimous en banc panel held “the Forest Service acts arbitrarily and capriciously only when the record plainly demonstrates that the Forest Service made a clear error in judgment . . ..” Id. at 994. Courts must defer to the Forest Service’s interpretation of its own regulations, as well as its interpretations of forest plans. Native Ecosystems Council v. U.S. Forest Serv., 418 F.3d 953, 960 (9th Cir. 2005). “[A]n agency’s interpretation of the meaning of its own categorical exclusion should be given controlling weight unless plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the terms used in the regulation.” Alaska Ctr. for Env’t v. U.S. Forest Serv., 189 F.3d 851, 857 (9th Cir. 1999). Deference extends to agency interpretations of statutes like the 2014 Farm Bill. An agency’s interpretation of an ambiguous statutory term is entitled to deference—“controlling weight”— so long as the interpretation is not “arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly contrary to the statute.” Northwest Ecosystem Alliance v. United States Fish & Wildlife Serv., 475 F.3d 1136, 1141 (9th Cir. 2007) (quoting Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837, 844 (1984)). Chevron deference may apply to an agency determination so long as (1) “Congress clearly delegated authority to the agency to make rules carrying the force of law, and (2) the agency interpretation was promulgated in the exercise of that authority.” N. Cal. River Watch v. Wilcox, 633 F.3d 766, 772-73 (9th Cir. 2011) (citing United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 226–27 (2001)). IV. ARGUMENT Plaintiffs challenge the Sunny South Project at both the landscape and project level. At the landscape level, they claim the Forest Service Chief’s designation of landscapes including the project area was itself subject to NEPA documentation requirements. Pls.’ MSJ at 13-18. The language and structure of the statute make clear no EA or EIS can be required. Further, the designation has no effect on the environment as it does not authorize any particular project or treatment. Requiring NEPA documentation would undo the Farm Bill’s direction to achieve treatments expeditiously. At the project level, plaintiffs allege the Farm Bill CE is inapposite to the project due to significant effects on California spotted owls. Pls.’ MSJ at 19-24. Plaintiffs allege these effects Case 2:16-cv-02322-VC Document 30 Filed 03/16/17 Page 15 of 24 Center for Biological Diversity et al., v. Eli Ilano et al., Case No. 2:16-cv-02322-VC DEF-INT. CROSS MOT. IN SUPPORT OF SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 9 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 are “extraordinary circumstances” precluding use of a CE. This argument fails, in the first instance, because the regulatory exception from CEs for extraordinary circumstances have no application to the statutory Farm Bill CE. Second, the Forest Service undertook an “extraordinary circumstances” review, in an abundance of caution, and its decision was rational and is supported by the record. The Sunny South Project is sorely needed to address urgent and worsening conditions in the project area. The Court should uphold the project and the Decision Memorandum approving the project. A. Farm Bill landscape designations, in themselves, do not trigger the need for an EA or EIS. The Sunny South Project is eligible for the Farm Bill CE because it is in a designated landscape. 16 U.S.C. §§ 6591a(d), 6591b(a)(1). Plaintiffs argue NEPA required the Chief to evaluate indirect effects of the designation, including projects using the CE and social consequences of less public participation. Plaintiffs are wrong. Plaintiffs’ argument fails as a matter of statutory structure. The Farm Bill first gives the Secretary authority to designate treatment areas “as needed to address insect or disease threats.” 16 U.S.C. § 6591a(b)(2). Such designations must satisfy one of three guidelines: the area must be experiencing declining forest health, at risk of increased tree mortality, or where hazard trees pose an immediate public health of safety risk. Id. § 6591a(c). These precise limitations, incorporating specific data sources, are all that is required for the Chief to designate a landscape. The Farm Bill’s requirements for application of the CE are similarly detailed. By formulating such detailed requirements but leaving out any suggestion of other analysis, the statute implies no NEPA analysis is required. Such “specificity and precision” on the one hand, and silence on the other hand, shows the statute should not be read to impose additional unstated requirements. See, e.g., Longview Fibre Co. v. Rasmussen, 980 F.2d 1307, 1313 (9th Cir. 1992) (holding, “No sensible person accustomed to the use of words in laws would speak so narrowly and precisely of particular statutory provisions, while meaning to imply a more general and broad coverage than the statutes designated.”). Case 2:16-cv-02322-VC Document 30 Filed 03/16/17 Page 16 of 24 Center for Biological Diversity et al., v. Eli Ilano et al., Case No. 2:16-cv-02322-VC DEF-INT. CROSS MOT. IN SUPPORT OF SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 10 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 Plaintiffs’ argument is also undermined by Sierra Club v. Bosworth, 510 F.3d 1016 (9th Cir. 2007). In Bosworth, the plaintiffs claimed the regulatory promulgation of a CE required an EA or an EIS. The Ninth Circuit rejected that argument. It held “a categorical exclusion is by definition not a major federal action because the CEQ regulations define it to be ‘a category of actions which do not individually or cumulatively have a significant effect on the human environment. …’” Id. at 1025 (quoting 40 C.F.R. § 1508.4)). Promulgating a categorical exclusion “is an implementing procedure of the CEQ regulations, regulations which do not require an EA/FONSI [Finding of No Significant Impact] prior to promulgation of a CE.” Id. Significantly, the plaintiffs could identify “no prior instance where an agency has produced an EA/FONSI to accompany promulgation of a new CE.” Id. at 1026 (emphasis added). Here, although the CE was promulgated by Congress, the Forest Service is taking narrowly-defined administrative action to implement the CE. This is analogous to Bosworth, where the Forest Service promulgated a CE in furtherance of CEQ regulations. Congress enacted the Farm Bill CE to expedite treatment of high-priority landscapes suffering from epidemics of insects and disease. It set criteria for designating the landscapes and told the Forest Service what data to use in assessing those criteria. As such the designation “looks more like an implementing procedure than a federal action of the type contemplated in [NEPA].” Heartwood, Inc. v. U.S. Forest Serv., 230 F.3d 947, 954 (7th Cir. 2000) (holding promulgation of CEs did not require NEPA compliance). To require additional NEPA analysis would undermine the whole point of the Farm Bill CE and frustrate the will of Congress. The Chief of the Forest Service also prepared a memorandum determining that landscape designations are not subject to NEPA. SS_03785-86. The memorandum found, pursuant to direction from CEQ and its regulations, that NEPA did not apply to the designations. SS_03786. NEPA only applies at the stage that a proposal for an action has been developed and its effects can be meaningfully evaluated. 40 C.F.R. § 1508.23; Kleppe v. Sierra Club, 427 U.S. 390, 410 n. 20 (1976) (noting that NEPA applies once “contemplated actions later reach the stage of actual proposals”). The regulation defines a “proposal” as “that stage in the development of an action when an agency subject to the Act has a goal and is actively preparing to make a decision on one Case 2:16-cv-02322-VC Document 30 Filed 03/16/17 Page 17 of 24 Center for Biological Diversity et al., v. Eli Ilano et al., Case No. 2:16-cv-02322-VC DEF-INT. CROSS MOT. IN SUPPORT OF SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 11 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 or more alternative means of accomplishing that goal and the effects can be meaningfully evaluated.” 40 C.F.R. § 1508.23. The Chief found the designation did not qualify as a “proposal” subject to NEPA, and did so rationally. He stated the designations are “without regard to future projects, if any, that may take place in a land-scape scale area.” SS_03785 (emphasis added). “[D]esignation does not compel or prohibit any action.” SS_03786. These findings are rational and are supported by the record in this case. At the time watersheds were designated by the Chief, the planning process for Sunny South had not yet begun. There were no meaningful environmental effects that could have been evaluated at the designation stage. Nor has there been any commitment of resources that would preclude or require any future project, as the designation does not authorize any ground-disturbing activity. Cf. Friends of Southeast’s Future v. Morrison, 153 F.3d 1059, 1063 (9th Cir. 1998) (holding a timber sale plan complied with NEPA where “the government retains absolute authority to decide whether any such activities will ever take place”). Further, although NEPA applies to some program-level actions, the designation does not fall within any of the relevant definitions. 40 C.F.R. § 1506.8. The Farm Bill establishes that landscape designations do not require an EA or EIS. Further, to the extent a “reasoned decision” is required to support the designation, cf. Bosworth, 510 F.3d at 1026, one has been provided. The Chief’s determination is entitled to deference under the APA and to respect, as a statutory interpretation, under Mead. B. Because the Farm Bill CE was established by Congress, not the agency, the “extraordinary circumstances” test does not apply and the Forest Service may not be compelled to prepare NEPA documentation based on “extraordinary circumstances.” Plaintiffs further assert that the use of the Farm Bill CE was inappropriate due to effects on California spotted owls and other resources. They allege that these effects constitute “extraordinary circumstances” precluding use of a CE. Pls.’ MSJ at 18. As implied by plaintiffs’ reliance on regulation, “extraordinary circumstances” is a regulatory creation. It has no applicability to a CE created by statute. NEPA regulations provide each agency may provide for categorical exclusions. 40 C.F.R. § 1508.4. “Any procedures Case 2:16-cv-02322-VC Document 30 Filed 03/16/17 Page 18 of 24 Center for Biological Diversity et al., v. Eli Ilano et al., Case No. 2:16-cv-02322-VC DEF-INT. CROSS MOT. IN SUPPORT OF SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 12 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 under this section shall provide for extraordinary circumstances in which a normally excluded action may have a significant environmental effect.” Id. (emphasis added). “This section” means the regulation, only. There is no “extraordinary circumstances” review required when the CE does not arise from the overall NEPA regulation or Forest Service regulations. Farm Bill Section 6591b provides a subject project “may be . . . considered an action categorically excluded from the requirements of [NEPA].” 16 U.S.C. §§ 6591b(a), (a)(1)). It further lists the specific requirements for using the CE, which include the area limitation, use of a collaborative process, location requirements, and limitations on road construction. Id. §§ 6591b(b),(c),(d). The statute also provides the Forest Service must engage in public scoping of the project. Id. § 6591b(f). Congress chose to qualify these projects for CEs subject to specific limitations, not to subject them to a separate regulatory structure. The CE is Section 602 of the Healthy Forests Restoration Act and the Farm Bill provisions were designated as an amendment to Title VI of the Healthy Forests Restoration Act (HFRA). Pub. L. No. 113-79, § 8204, 128 Stat. 649, 915 (2014). Section 404 of HFRA, 16 U.S.C. § 6554, by contrast with the language added by the Farm Bill, uses similar language to section 6591b but also provides such actions “shall be subject to the [Forest Service’s] extraordinary circumstances procedures.” 16 U.S.C. § 6554(d)(2)(B). “[W]here Congress includes particular language in one section of a statute but omits it in another section of the same Act, it is generally presumed that Congress acts intentionally and purposely in the disparate inclusion or exclusion.” Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16, 23 (1983). Further, Congress is presumed to be aware of the legal context in which it legislates. Abrego v. Dow Chem. Co., 443 F.3d 676, 683-84 (9th Cir. 2006). Given the emphasis on speed in the legislation, and the Ninth Circuit’s recognition of the importance of the “efficiencies that the abbreviated categorical exclusion process provides,” Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. Salazar, 706 F.3d 1085, 1097 (9th Cir. 2013), it is appropriate to hold that Congress did not intend the Farm Bill CE to be subject to extraordinary circumstances review. Although no case has directly addressed whether extraordinary circumstances review applies to statutory categorical exemptions, the Ninth Circuit has acknowledged that Congress is Case 2:16-cv-02322-VC Document 30 Filed 03/16/17 Page 19 of 24 Center for Biological Diversity et al., v. Eli Ilano et al., Case No. 2:16-cv-02322-VC DEF-INT. CROSS MOT. IN SUPPORT OF SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 13 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 free to replace NEPA procedures for certain projects or classes of project. Apache Survival Coal. v. United States, 21 F.3d 895, 904 (9th Cir. 1994). The Forest Service’s regulation, 36 C.F.R. § 220.4, declares that NEPA does not apply to actions subject to a statutory exemption. This is a reasonable interpretation of a statutory scheme entitled to Chevron deference. Caselaw interpreting California and Washington’s “mini-NEPAs” also finds that statutory exemptions are not subject to review for the equivalent of extraordinary circumstances. Though not binding on this Court, this authority is persuasive because the state laws both were modeled after NEPA and have more stringent requirements than NEPA. Washington courts have held, interpreting its State Environmental Policy Act (SEPA), that “the public policy behind SEPA is considerably stronger than that behind NEPA.” Asarco, Inc. v. Air Quality Coal., 601 P.2d 501, 516 (Wash. 1979). The California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA) contains mitigation and minimization requirements that are not found in NEPA. Cal. Pub. Res. Code § 21002. Washington courts have held “[b]y virtue of their source, statutory exemptions [from SEPA] are limited only by their own terms. …” Richard L. Settle, The Washington State Environmental Policy Act: A Legal and Policy Analysis § 12.01[1] at 12-8. Thus “statutory exemptions immunize the specified activities from SEPA regardless of their environmental significance.” Id. at 12-9. In Snohomish County v. State, 850 P.2d 546 (Wash. App. 1993), the Washington Court of Appeals held that no separate environmental review of categorically excluded forest practices was necessary; to do so, the court stated, “would render SEPA's categorical exemptions meaningless.” Id. at 554. Similarly, California’s Supreme Court refused to require “unusual circumstances” review of a project under CEQA. Napa Valley Wine Train, Inc. v. Pub. Util. Comm’n, 50 Cal.3d 370 (1990). The Court held “it defeats the very purpose of the exemption to apply it only to projects that will have no significant environmental effects.” Id. at 381. “The Legislature determined that each [exemption] promoted an interest important enough to justify forgoing the benefits of environmental review.” Id. at 382 (emphasis omitted). Thus California’s “statutory exemptions Case 2:16-cv-02322-VC Document 30 Filed 03/16/17 Page 20 of 24 Center for Biological Diversity et al., v. Eli Ilano et al., Case No. 2:16-cv-02322-VC DEF-INT. CROSS MOT. IN SUPPORT OF SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 14 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 have an absolute quality not shared by [regulatory] categorical exemptions: a project that falls within a statutory exemption is not subject to CEQA even if it has the potential to significantly affect the environment.” Del Cerro Mobile Estates v. City of Placentia, 197 Cal.App.4th 173, 184 (2011) (emphasis original) (quotation omitted). As with the state statutes, the Farm Bill represents Congress’ determination that the urgent need for insect and disease treatment projects overrides any benefits that might accrue from extended environmental review. That determination should be implemented, and the project insulated from “extraordinary circumstances” review. C. No “extraordinary circumstances” exist. The Court need not examine whether extraordinary circumstances exist that would preclude application of a CE. If it does reach the issue, it should find in favor of the Forest Service. An agency’s decision to apply a categorical exclusion will be upheld “if ‘the application of the exclusions to the facts of the particular action is not arbitrary and capricious.’” Alcoa, Inc. v. Bonneville Power Admin., 698 F.3d 774, 795 (9th Cir. 2012) (quoting Bicycle Trails, 82 F.3d at 1456 & n.5)). The determination of no extraordinary circumstances is reasonable and supported by the record. As an initial matter, the Forest Service is not bound by its precautionary issuance of an extraordinary circumstances determination. The Ninth Circuit confronted a similar situation in Enos v. Marsh, 769 F.2d 1363 (9th Cir. 1985). There the 'akoko plant species was proposed for Endangered Species Act (ESA) listing during part of project development, but the proposal was withdrawn. Id. at 1370. The agency, in its EIS, “assured that it would treat the 'akoko as if it were listed as an endangered species.” Id. The court found the agency was not then bound to treat the plant as if listed, when it was not in fact listed. “We decline to hold the Corps to the standards of the ESA because it stated that it intended to treat the species as endangered. Such a ruling could deter voluntary efforts which could both work in the best interest of the species and permit agency action to go forward if the species does become listed.” Id. Here, the Forest Service’s precautionary action should not be held to be binding, as to do so would discourage other actions in the future. Case 2:16-cv-02322-VC Document 30 Filed 03/16/17 Page 21 of 24 Center for Biological Diversity et al., v. Eli Ilano et al., Case No. 2:16-cv-02322-VC DEF-INT. CROSS MOT. IN SUPPORT OF SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 15 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 Plaintiffs quote a long list of items they allege constitute significant effects to owls. Pls.’ MSJ at 19-22. At bottom, their allegation is that a project affecting potentially six owl nests, but which will have no direct effects, is extraordinary. This does not pass muster. The project is designed to avoid owl Protected Activity Centers and will incorporate limited operating periods and tree retention guidelines. SS_00017. Within Home Range Core Areas, the project will retain at least 50% canopy cover. These activities are expected to “reduce the resulting risk of stand-replacing fire and thus benefit late seral closed canopy habitat.” SS_00273. Less than half the project is in HRCAs, and in that area, again, 50% of canopy cover will be retained. SS_00143. The project will also treat plantations that need diversity to develop into late seral habitat. SS_00146. Given the “very high potential for wildfire” in these areas, the wildlife biologist concluded “the adverse effects to habitat quality and individual territories anticipated under the proposed action are generally outweighed by the benefits.” SS_00147. There is no evidence, nor have plaintiffs put forward any, that habitat would be removed in any substantial part. Legally, the owls are not ESA-listed species but are Forest Service sensitive and Management Indicator Species. The “[m]ere presence of one or more of these resource conditions does not preclude use of a categorical exclusion (CE).” 36 C.F.R. § 220.6(b)(2). Rather “the degree of the potential effect of a proposed action on these resource conditions … determines whether extraordinary circumstances exist.” Id. Additionally, under NEPA, the agency must consider effects at the species, not individual level. “NEPA regulations direct the agency to consider the degree of adverse effect on a species, not the impact on individuals of that species.” Envtl. Prot. Info. Ctr. v. U.S. Forest Serv., 451 F.3d 1005, 1010 (9th Cir. 2006). Because the project will not significantly affect California spotted owls, the Forest Service appropriately concluded no extraordinary circumstances exist. V. CONCLUSION The Court should grant Sierra Pacific’s cross-motion for summary judgment, grant the government’s motion, and deny plaintiffs’ motion. Case 2:16-cv-02322-VC Document 30 Filed 03/16/17 Page 22 of 24 Center for Biological Diversity et al., v. Eli Ilano et al., Case No. 2:16-cv-02322-VC DEF-INT. CROSS MOT. IN SUPPORT OF SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 16 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 DATED this 16th day of March, 2017. /s/ Shelley Addison Shelley Addison (CA Bar #178846) Dun & Martinek P.O. Box 1266 Eureka, California 95502 Telephone: (707) 442-3791 Fax: (707) 442-9251 sca@dunmartinek.com /s/ Lawson E. Fite Lawson E. Fite (Ore. Bar #055573) Pro Hac Vice American Forest Resource Council 5100 S.W. Macadam, Suite 350 Portland, Oregon 97239 Telephone: (503) 222-9505 Fax: (503) 222-3255 lfite@amforest.org Attorneys for Defendant-Intervenor Case 2:16-cv-02322-VC Document 30 Filed 03/16/17 Page 23 of 24 Center for Biological Diversity et al., v. Eli Ilano et al., Case No. 2:16-cv-02322-VC DEF-INT. CROSS MOT. IN SUPPORT OF SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 17 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I, Lawson E. Fite, hereby certify that I, on March 16, 2017, I caused the foregoing to be served upon counsel of record through the Court’s electronic service system. Dated: March 16, 2017 /s/ Lawson E. Fite Lawson E. Fite Case 2:16-cv-02322-VC Document 30 Filed 03/16/17 Page 24 of 24