George Newman, et al., Appellants,v.RCPI Landmark Properties, LLC, et al., Respondents.

Brief

N.Y.October 18, 2016

To Be Argued By: GLENN A. KAMINSKA Time Requested: 15 Minutes APL-2015-00247 New York County Clerk’s Index No. 155632/12 Court of Appeals STATE OF NEW YORK GEORGE NEWMAN and JOANNE NEWMAN, Appellants, —against— RCPI LANDMARK PROPERTIES, LLC, TISHMAN SPEYER PROPERTIES, INC., and TISHMAN SPEYER PROPERTIES, L.P., Respondents. BRIEF FOR RESPONDENTS d AHMUTY, DEMERS & MCMANUS 200 I.U. Willets Road Albertson, New York 11507 Telephone: (516) 294-5433 Facsimile: (516) 294-5387 Attorneys for RespondentsOn the Brief: GLENN A. KAMINSKA NICHOLAS M. CARDASCIA Date Completed: December 30, 2015 i TABLE OF CONTENTS Page RESPONDENTS’ DISCLOSURE STATEMENTS PURSUANT TO RULE 500.1(f) .................................................................................................... ii TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ................................................................................... iii PRELIMINARY STATEMENT ............................................................................... 1 QUESTION PRESENTED ........................................................................................ 3 STATEMENT OF FACTS ........................................................................................ 4 LEGAL ARGUMENT: RCPI AND TISHMAN SPEYER WERE ENTITLED TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT BECAUSE THEY WERE NOT NEGLIGENT AND NEWMAN WAS THE SOLE PROXIMATE CAUSE OF HIS INJURIES AND THIS COURT SHOULD AFFIRM .................................................... 13 CONCLUSION ........................................................................................................ 21 ii RESPONDENT RCPI LANDMARK PROPERTIES, LLC’S DISCLOSURE STATEMENT PURSUANT TO RULE 500.1(f) RCPI Landmark Properties, LLC has no parents, subsidiaries, or affiliates. RESPONDENT TISHMAN SPEYER PROPERTIES, INC.’S DISCLOSURE STATEMENT PURSUANT TO RULE 500.1(f) Tishman Speyer Properties, Inc. has no parents, subsidiaries, or affiliates. RESPONDENT TISHMAN SPEYER PROPERTIES, L.P.’S DISCLOSURE STATEMENT PURSUANT TO RULE 500.1(f) Tishman Speyer Properties, L.P. has no parents, subsidiaries, or affiliates. iii TABLE OF AUTHORITIES Cases cited Page Cherry v. Time Warner, Inc., 66 A.D.3d 233 (1st Dep’t 2009) ........................................................................... 13, 14 Derdiarian v. Felix Contracting Corp., 51 N.Y.2d 308 (1980) .................................................................................................. 15 Egan v. A.J. Construction Corp., 94 N.Y.2d 839 (1999) ................................................................................................. 16 Green v. Mower, 302 A.D.2d 1005 (4th Dep’t 2003) ...................................................................... 17, 18 Green v. Mower, 100 N.Y.2d 529 (2003) ...................................................................................... 14, 18 Macey v. Truman, 70 N.Y.2d 918 (1987) ........................................................................................ 16, 17 Miro v. Plaza Constr. Corp., 9 N.Y.3d 948 (2007) ................................................................................................ 13 Montgomery v. Federal Express Corp., 4 N.Y.3d 805 (2005) ........................................................................12, 13, 14, 15, 16 Narducci v. Manhasset Assoc., 96 N.Y.2d 259, 267 (2001) ...................................................................................... 14 Rivera v. City of New York, 11 N.Y.2d 856 (1962) .............................................................................................. 15 Robinson v. East Med. Ctr., 6 N.Y.3d 550 (2006) .......................................................................................... 13, 16 iv Torres v. 1420 Realty, L.L.C., 111 A.D.3d 434 (1st Dep’t 2013) ...................................................................... 12, 19 Yun Tung Chow v. Reckitt & Colman, Inc., 17 N.Y.3d 29 (2011) ................................................................................................ 14 1 PRELIMINARY STATEMENT RCPI Landmark Properties, as the out-of-possession landowner, and Tishman Speyer Properties, L.P., as RCPI’s managing agent, were entitled to summary judgment where they demonstrated that there was no dangerous condition on the property, and they were not negligent in the ownership and maintenance of the property. The loading dock platform was not dangerous. And, not only was a wall-mounted ladder affixed to one side of the loading dock platform for individuals to enter or exit the platform, but a hallway in the basement of the building provided access to the platform as well. In this case, George Newman, a security guard for Lazard Freres—one of the commercial tenants at Rockefeller Center—decided to show his partner, Kenny Rinaldi a new Lazard Freres computer room in the sub-basement near one of the loading docks. They rode one of the elevators down to the sub-basement, walked down an internal hallway, and visited the computer room. After Newman showed Rinaldi the room, they intended on heading back upstairs to their office. Despite the fact that Newman testified he always returned to his office by way of the internal hallway, Rinaldi took the lead and walked out of the computer room and onto the loading dock platform. Then, Rinaldi choose to step off the front of the platform and step down onto milk crates that had been left on the ground. 2 Newman blindly followed Rinaldi’s lead. Unfortunately for Newman, when he stepped onto the two milk crates that were stacked on top of one another, they separated, and he fell forward. The evidence in the record showed that Newman did not see the ladder at the end of the loading dock because he never bothered to look for it. In reversing the order that denied RCPI and Tishman Speyer’s summary-judgment motion and dismissing Newman’s complaint, the Appellate Division, First Department correctly determined that Newman’s “choice to use the crates rather than the ladder was the sole cause of his injuries” and this Court should affirm. 3 QUESTION PRESENTED Were RCPI and Tishman Speyer, the out-of-possession owner and managing agent, respectively of a large commercial office building located at Rockefeller Center, entitled to summary judgment where they presented evidence that they were not negligent in the ownership and maintenance of the property and showed that Newman’s actions were the sole proximate cause of his injuries? The Appellate Division properly held: “Yes.” 4 STATEMENT OF FACTS The accident George Newman and his testimony On the date of his accident, April 29, 2012, George Newman worked as a part-time security officer with Lazard Freres, a position he held for 15 years after his retirement from the New York City Police Department. (R. 98, 100, 104) Newman’s security detail covered two buildings at Rockefeller Center: 30 Rockefeller Plaza and 600 Fifth Avenue. (R. 108) His duties involved making rounds and checking the security rooms, computer rooms, freight areas, elevator shaft areas, and elevators. (R. 113, 119) In addition, he was required to check a room in the sub-basement where Lazard Freres stored computers and other files. (R. 120) On April 29, 2012, Newman worked with a partner, Kenny Rinaldi. (R. 125) Before the accident, Newman and Rinaldi went to the sub-basement so Newman could show Rinaldi a new computer room located behind the loading dock. (R. 131-32) After they looked at the storage area, they were going to return to their office on the 59th floor. (R. 164) Newman followed Rinaldi as he walked 50-100 feet down a corridor to the loading dock platform. (R. 83, 162) Newman had been on 5 that loading dock approximately one month before his accident; but when he went there that time, he did not step down from the platform, he simply walked back out the passageway into the building. (R. 143-44, 154-55) Newman specifically testified that his normal routine was to walk back to the corridor to return to his office. (R. 164-65) Despite the fact that he normally walked down the corridor to return to his office, Newman decided to blindly follow Rinaldi and never asked where they were going. (R. 165-66) Rinaldi led him to the center of the loading dock platform where Newman observed him step onto black milk crates that were on the ground near a truck at the loading dock. (R. 167, 171, 174-75) There were three milk crates. One milk crate was on the ground by itself and then two milk crates were stacked on top of one another. (R. 172) Newman observed these crates as he approached the edge of the platform. (R. 171) He did not know who placed the crates in that area and did not see any truck drivers in the area. (R. 173) Newman watched Rinaldi step down onto the ground before he started to step onto the two crates stacked on top of one another. (R. 175) He stepped down first with his left leg. (R. 175) Then, after stepping down with his right leg, the crates separated and he fell. (R. 175) As Newman stepped down, Rinaldi held his 6 hand to help him down. (R. 176) When the crates separated and Newman started to fall, Rinaldi caught him before he hit the ground. (R. 179) Newman’s first time at the platform edge was just before the accident occurred. (R. 168) He never walked to the sides of the loading dock to see if there was a ladder or other means to step down from the loading dock. And he never knew if there was a ladder available for him to use to get down from the loading dock platform. (R. 157, 167) Newman testified as follows: Q. Are you aware of whether or not there were any ladders on the side walls of this loading dock area? A. No. Q. Did you ever see any ladders? A. No. Q. Did you ever walk towards those side walls prior to the day of your accident? A. No. Q. So you don’t even know there are any, correct? A. Yes. (R. 157) 7 Deposition testimony of James Hagen on behalf of the defendants James Hagen—a protection supervisor employed by Tishman Speyer Properties who has worked at the property for over thirty years—testified on behalf of RCPI and Tishman Speyer. (R. 268-330) As a protection supervisor in Tishman Speyer’s security department, Hagen oversees all of the uniformed guards at Rockefeller Center, a complex comprised of ten buildings located between Fifth and Sixth Avenues and running from West 48th Street to West 51st Street. (R. 273, 275, 279) The ten buildings at Rockefeller Center are connected by the concourse and sub-basement levels. (R. 276-77) Although Newman worked for Lazard Freres at 30 Rockefeller Plaza, his accident occurred at the loading dock in the sub- basement of 620 Fifth Avenue. (R. 276) Hagen was notified of the accident when he received a call from the Control Center at 30 Rockefeller Plaza. (R. 298-99) When Hagen responded, he met Rinaldi and Newman and they walked to the front of the loading dock. Hagen asked them how Newman fell off the loading dock. Rinaldi, with Newman present, explained that milk crates were positioned in front of the loading dock like steps, so they walked on the milk crates to get down, but they tipped over and Newman fell. (R. 301-02, 305) 8 Hagen testified that he saw a couple of milk crates that were scattered alongside a truck that was parked in the loading dock, a condition he had never previously seen. (R. 289, 290) Hagen assumed that the milk crates were part of a delivery to one of the delis or restaurants in the building. (R. 293) If he had seen them on the ground, he would have put them back on top of the loading dock platform because he would have considered them a tripping hazard for people walking on the ground in that area or because they could have been damaged by a truck running them over. (R. 294-95) After meeting with Rinaldi and Newman, Hagen prepared an incident report. (R. 331-32) Photographs of the loading dock area Hagen was present when additional photographs were taken of the loading dock area. (R. 335-44) He affirmed that the loading dock area where the accident occurred was accurately depicted in these photographs and that the physical structure, including the loading dock platform and ladder on the wall to the side depicted in the photographs, were present and in the same condition on the date of Newman’s accident. (R. 345-46) 9 RCPI and Tishman Speyer’s summary-judgment motion RCPI and Tishman Speyer moved for summary judgment. (R. 8-18) They pointed out that there was no defective condition on the property that caused Newman’s injuries. A ladder was in place on the side of the loading dock that was supposed to be used to step up to, or down from, the dock platform. Rather than use the ladder, Newman stepped onto milk crates that had been stacked on the ground in front of the loading dock platform. Newman’s actions, therefore, were the sole cause of his injuries. Thus, RCPI and Tishman Speyer were entitled to summary judgment. In support of their motion, RCPI and Tishman relied on the deposition transcripts of Newman and Hagen, Hagen’s accident report, and photographs of the loading dock platform and ladder. In addition, RCPI and Tishman submitted an affidavit from Hagen. (R. 345-47) Hagen attested that a ladder was affixed to the side wall of the loading dock for access on and off the loading dock platform; that the ladder was in place as shown in the photographs at the time of Newman’s accident; and that milk crates should not be used to get down from the loading dock platform. Newman opposed the motion. (R. 361-72) He claimed that there were numerous questions of fact that prevented the award of summary judgment. He argued that there was a question of fact as to whether RCPI and Tishman Speyer 10 knew about the presence of milk crates that were being used as stairs. And he argued that the location of the ladder was too remote to be seen. He claimed that he never even knew that a ladder existed at the platform until his deposition, when he was shown photographs of the ladder. Newman submitted the affidavit of Stanley Fein, P.E. (R. 376-78) Fein concluded that the loading dock did not contain a proper means of egress, thus rendering it defective and unsafe. (R. 376) He also stated that the wall-mounted ladder was not an acceptable, safe, and appropriate form of egress from the loading dock. (R. 377) Finally, Fein asserted that the loading dock violated sections 1007.3, 27-128, and 1009.4 of the New York City Building Code. RCPI and Tishman Speyer replied to Newman’s arguments. (R. 380-84) They argued that Newman’s opposition—in essence claiming that he was never on the loading dock before the accident; that he did not see the ladder at the end of the loading dock, that he did not see the ladder because two trucks were parked in front of the loading dock, and that he saw the milk crates so he decided to use them to get down—failed to raise an issue of fact as to negligence. They further argued that Newman’s testimony confirms that he made no effort to see if there was a ladder or ramp at the side of the loading dock platform. The only action Newman took was to follow the path of Rinaldi and purposely step onto the stacked milk crates. No one from RCPI or Tishman Speyer directed 11 Newman to step onto the milk crates; and there is no evidence to support a finding that anyone from RCPI or Tishman Speyer placed the milk crates adjacent to the loading dock as access for the platform. With respect to Fein, RCPI and Tishman Speyer submitted that Fein’s arguments are irrelevant to the facts of this case. The crates were not a staircase, or means of egress, supplied by the building to gain access to the loading dock platform. And the Building Code sections that Fein cites in his affidavit are inapplicable because both deal with exit stairways, not loading dock platforms. The Supreme Court’s decision After oral argument on the record, the Supreme Court denied RCPI and Tishman Speyer’s summary-judgment motion. (R. 6-7, 385-90) The court found that issues of fact exist as to whether RCPI and Tishman Speyer were negligent in allowing the crates to remain as makeshift steps and whether Newman was negligent, and if so, to what extent he was negligent. (R. 7) RCPI and Tishman Speyer appealed from this decision. (R. 3-4) The Appellate Division’s Decision The Appellate Division reversed the Supreme Court’s order and dismissed Newman’s complaint. The one-paragraph decision stated as follows: “It is undisputed that plaintiff George Newman was injured when he followed a coworker in climbing down from a loading platform by stepping 12 onto piled up milk crates, which were on the ground, although defendants provided a wall-mounted ladder for use in exiting the platform. Plaintiff’s choice to use the crates rather than the ladder was the sole cause of his injuries (see Torres v. 1420 realty, LLC, 111 AD3d 434 [1st Dept 2013]; see also Montgomery v. Federal Express Corp., 4 NY3d 805 [2005]). Whether the ladder was visible behind the trucks that were parked in the area is irrelevant, since plaintiff testified that he did not look for another means of accessing the parking level.” (R. 394-95) The Appellate Division denied Newman’s motion to reargue or for leave to appeal to the Court of Appeals. (R. 396) This Court, however, granted Newman’s motion for leave to appeal to the Court of Appeals. (R. 393) 13 LEGAL ARGUMENT RCPI AND TISHMAN SPEYER WERE ENTITLED TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT BECAUSE THEY WERE NOT NEGLIGENT AND NEWMAN WAS THE SOLE PROXIMATE CAUSE OF HIS INJURIES AND THIS COURT SHOULD AFFIRM As the Appellate Division wrote, Newman’s “choice to use the crates rather than the ladder was the sole cause of his injuries.” (R. 394) By so holding, the Appellate Division did not misconstrue this Court’s decision in Montgomery v. Fed. Express Corp., 4 N.Y.3d 805 (2005), and it progeny as Newman submitted. Rather, the Appellate Division cited to Montgomery as an example of a case in which the plaintiff’s conduct was found to constitute the sole proximate cause of his injuries. RCPI and Tishman Speyer submit that the Appellate Division’s decision was correct based on the evidence in the record and this Court should affirm. By arguing that the Appellate Division misconstrued and misapplied Montgomery and its progeny to the facts of this case, Newman requests that this Court apply the burden of proof under Labor Law § 240(1) to a traditional premises liability case. Like Montgomery, the other three cases relied upon by Newman—Robinson v. E. Med. Ctr., L.P., 6 N.Y.3d 550 (2006), Miro v. Plaza Constr. Corp., 9 N.Y.3d 948 (2007), and Cherry v. Time Warner, Inc., 66 A.D.3d 14 233 (1st Dep’t 2009)—involved the viability of a plaintiff’s cause of action premised upon a violation of Labor Law § 240(1). Newman’s complaint against RCPI and Tishman Speyer, however, sounded in negligence. (R. 26-29, 71-73) He was not a construction worker injured on a construction site seeking to recover damages under “the extraordinary protections of Labor Law § 240(1)”. See, Narducci v. Manhasset Assoc., 96 N.Y.2d 259, 267 (2001). The viability of his negligence cause of action against RCPI and Tishman Speyer must be analyzed under general negligence principles. And, as the defense of sole proximate cause is available in Labor Law cases, it is equally available in strict products liability cases (see, Yun Tung Chow v. Reckitt & Colman, Inc., 17 N.Y.3d 29 [2011]), and negligence cases (see, Green v. Mower, 100 N.Y.2d 529 [2003]). With all due respect to Newman’s counsel, the issue before this Court is not whether the Appellate Division “misconstrued” or “misapplied” Montgomery but whether the evidence in the record supported the Appellate Division’s dismissal of Newman’s complaint on the ground that he was the sole proximate cause of his injuries. RCPI and Tishman Speyer submit that the answer to this question is: “Yes” and that this Court should affirm that Appellate Division’s order dated January 15, 2015. 15 In order to establish a prima facie case, a plaintiff must demonstrate that the defendant’s act “was a substantial cause of the events which produced the injury”. Derdiarian v. Felix Contracting Corp., 51 N.Y.2d 308 (1980). In Rivera v. City of New York, 11 N.Y.2d 856 (1962), this Court held that proximate cause is a question for the court and not a jury. This Court dismissed the plaintiff’s case holding that: This Court has consistently held that the negligence complained of must have caused the occurrence of the accident from which the injuries flow. (citations omitted). It is clear in the present case that the condition of the bathtub’s plumbing was not the proximate cause of the accident. The hot water created the specific injuries for which damages were sought and determined the gravity of the consequences resulting from the accident, but it did not cause the intervening act which was not foreseeable. (citation omitted) The accident was caused by the slipping of a wet boot while the child balanced on the curved edge of the bathtub. (citation omitted). In Montgomery v. Federal Express Corp., supra, plaintiff and his supervisor were assigned to work in an elevator “motor room” that was located four feet above the roof level of the building. When they got to the roof, they found that the stairs from the roof to the motor room had been removed. Ladders were available at the jobsite but, instead, they found a bucket and placed it upside to get into the motor room. When plaintiff went to get down again, he jumped and injured his knee. Again, this Court affirmed dismissal of the plaintiff’s complaint, holding that 16 “since ladders were readily available, plaintiff’s ‘normal and logical response’ should have been to get one. Plaintiff’s choice to use a bucket to get up, and then to jump down, was the sole cause of his injury”. Id., at 806; see also, Robinson v. East Med. Ctr., supra. Here, the evidence in the record leads to the inescapable conclusion that Newman’s decision to step onto the milk crates, rather than use the available wall- mounted ladder or walk back out the corridor through which he had arrived on the loading dock, was the sole cause of his injuries. Egan v. A.J. Construction Corp., 94 N.Y.2d 839 (1999) is another example of a case in which the plaintiff’s actions superseded any alleged negligence on the part of the defendant. In Egan, this Court held as follows: “As a matter of law, plaintiff’s act of jumping out of a stalled elevator six feet above the lobby floor after the elevator’s doors had been opened manually was not a foreseeable result of the defendant’s alleged negligence….Plaintiff’s jump superseded defendant’s conduct and terminated defendant’s liability for his injuries (citations omitted).” Id., at 841. Similarly, in Macey v. Truman, 70 N.Y.2d 918 (1987), the defendant was entitled to summary judgment when plaintiff’s injury was not the result of any purported unsafe condition of the premises but was the direct result of the manner in which plaintiff alone did the work. In Macey, the defendant permitted the 17 plaintiff and others to enter his land to cut various trees that had been marked for removal. During the cutting of the marked trees, one of them fell and became entangled on a standing tree that was not marked. The plaintiff failed to dislodge the marked tree, so he and his two companions decided to cut down the unmarked tree that the marked one rested on. While they cut the tree, it fell on the plaintiff. This Court found that the plaintiff’s injury did not result from any unsafe condition the defendant had left uncorrected on his land. Rather, the plaintiff was injured as a direct result of the manner in which he and his companions chose to do their work. With respect to the defendant property owner in Macey, this Court found that the law imposed no duty upon the property owner to have protected the plaintiff from the unfortunate consequences of his own actions. The same rationale applies here. Newman was injured as a direct result of the manner in which he and Rinaldi decided to get down from the loading dock platform for which RCPI and Tishman had no duty to protect him. Green v. Mower, 302 A.D.2d 1005 (4th Dep’t 2003) is an example of the application of sole proximate cause in a non-construction context. In Green, the plaintiff's decedent was wearing dark clothing and riding a bicycle without illumination at 3:00 a.m. when he entered the roadway from a bicycle path and struck a vehicle driven by the defendant. The plaintiff's decedent subsequently died from the injuries he sustained. At the time of the accident, the defendant was 18 traveling five miles per hour while turning left into the parking lot of his employer, and the defendant felt the impact of the plaintiff's decedent as he struck the vehicle on the front quarter panel and windshield of the passenger side. The bicycle path was located in a wooded area northeast of the accident site and adjacent to a chain link fence blocking the roadway past the entrance to the parking lot. Id. The Appellate Division, Fourth Department reversed the trial court and granted the defendant summary judgment after finding that the plaintiff’s decedent failed to yield the right of way and was the sole proximate cause of the accident. Id. On appeal, this Court affirmed in a one-paragraph memorandum decision that stated, in pertinent part: “The Appellate Division correctly determined that, as a matter of law, decedent's failure to yield the right of way was the sole proximate cause of the accident.” Green v. Mower, 100 N.Y.2d 529, 530 (2003) Whether a plaintiff’s actions constitute the sole proximate cause of an accident so as to relieve a defendant of any alleged liability hinges on the specific facts of the case. Here, although Newman claimed that RCPI and Tishman Speyer allowed a dangerous condition to exist on the property, his decision to step down from the loading dock onto two milk crates stacked atop one another was unquestionably the sole cause of his injuries. Besides never bothering to look for an alternative method of descending from the loading dock and blindly following the lead of his coworker, Newman’s normal course of action would have been to 19 return to his office by walking back down the corridor by which he entered the loading dock. Finally, Newman submitted that Torres v. 1420 Realty, L.L.C., supra, did not support the Appellate Division’s “implied conclusion” that his use of the milk crates was unreasonable or unforeseeable as a matter of law. On the contrary, the actions of the plaintiff in Torres were similar to the actions of Newman and similarly independent and superseding. In Torres, the plaintiff fell when the paint bucket she was using as a step stool tilted over. In affirming the order that dismissed the plaintiff’s complaint, the First Department held that the plaintiff’s actions broke the chain of causation because it was not foreseeable that she would use the paint bucket as a step stool. Id. Here, Newman’s decision to step down from the loading dock platform onto two milk crates, which were stacked on top of one another, was equally unforeseeable. To support the argument that a triable issue existed as to whether Newman’s use of the milk crates was foreseeable, Newman’s counsel submitted that one of the questions the First Department panel posed to her at oral argument of this appeal by its very asking raised a triable issue of fact. With all due respect, perhaps counsel failed to discern that the question was facetious and meant to show the 20 absurdity of her position. The panel also asked at oral argument, “Where’s the negligence?” The answer is: there was none. Again, Newman was not injured because of a defect or a hazardous condition on the loading dock or the loading dock platform. If he had walked to the side of the platform and used the wall-mounted ladder to get from the platform to the ground, he would not have been injured. If he had turned around and walked down the hallway as he normally did, he would not have been injured. Instead, he decided to step off the center of the loading dock platform and step onto two milk crates that had been stacked on top of one another. This was the cause of his injuries, not any defect on the premises. The evidence in the record supported the Appellate Division’s determination that Newman was the sole cause of his injuries and RCPI and Tishman Speyer respectfully request that this Court affirm. 21 CONCLUSION RCPI Landmark Properties, LLC and Tishman Speyer Properties, L.P. demonstrated their entitlement to summary judgment. They showed that no dangerous or hazardous condition existed on the premises that caused Newman’s injuries and they showed that Newman was the sole cause of his injuries. RCPI and Tishman Speyer respectfully request that this Court affirm the Appellate Division’s decision that granted them summary judgment and dismissed Newman’s complaint. Dated: Albertson, New York December 30, 2015 Respectfully submitted, Nicholas M. Cardascia AHMUTY, DEMERS & McMANUS Attorneys for Defendants-Respondents 200 I.U. Willets Road Albertson, New York 11507 (516) 294-5433