PROSKAUER ROSE LLP
Bettina B. Plevan (BP-7460)
Brian J. Gershengorn (BG-7544)
1585 Broadway
New York, NY 10036-8299
Telephone 212.969.3000
Attorneys for Defendant
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
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JON ADAMS,
Plaintiff,
against
LABATON, SUCHAROW & RUDOFF LLP,
Defendant.
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Case No.: 07-CV-7017 (DAB)
ECF Case
DEFENDANT'S MEMORANDUM OF LAW IN SUPPORT OF ITS
MOTION TO DISMISS PLAINTIFF’S COMPLAINT
Case 1:07-cv-07017-DAB Document 4 Filed 10/09/2007 Page 1 of 9
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
On or about August 6, 2007 Plaintiff Jon Adams (“Plaintiff” or “Adams”) commenced
this action against Labaton Sucharow & Rudoff LLP, now known as Labaton Sucharow LLP
(“Defendant” or the “Firm”), where he worked as an associate. The Complaint asserts a total of
seven claims against the Firm, all premised on an alleged oral promise made by an associate that
the Firm would pay him ten percent of all business he brought into the Firm. Plaintiff’s claims
should be dismissed with prejudice, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) on two
grounds. First, the facts alleged are not sufficient as a matter of law to establish the existence of
apparent authority. In order to establish the existence of apparent authority, a principal, such as
the Firm must manifest to a third party, such as Plaintiff, its consent to have an act done on its
behalf by a person purporting to act for the Firm and Plaintiff must have reasonably relied on
that manifestation. The Complaint fails to allege sufficient facts to establish either element.
Second, the claim fails as a matter of law because the facts alleged fail to satisfy N.Y. GEN.
OBLIG. LAW § 5-701(a)(10) since the alleged oral promise was never reduced to writing.
SUMMARY OF ALLEGED FACTS
Plaintiff’s claims arise out of an alleged oral promise that the Firm pay him ten percent of
all fees on all business Plaintiff brought into the Firm. (Complaint [hereinafter “Compl.”] ¶ 1.)
(A copy of the Complaint is annexed as Exhibit A to the Declaration of Bettina B. Plevan dated
October 8, 2007.) Prior to joining the Firm, Plaintiff worked for the New Mexico Attorney
General, Patricia Madrid, as an Assistant Attorney General. (Compl. ¶¶ 3 & 11.) In early 2004,
Plaintiff considered returning to work in private practice in New York at a firm where he could
utilize his connections with New Mexico’s political and governmental leaders. (Compl. ¶ 12.)
In March 2004, Plaintiff interviewed with various lawyers at the Firm, including, Chris Keller
Case 1:07-cv-07017-DAB Document 4 Filed 10/09/2007 Page 2 of 9
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(“Keller”), an associate and Tom Dubbs (“Dubbs”), a partner. (Compl. ¶ 15-16.) Plaintiff
alleges that during his interview, Keller told him “[y]ou get ten percent of the business you bring
in.” (Compl. ¶ 15.) Shortly after his interview, Plaintiff was told by the Firm not to accept any
other offers since an offer would be “coming soon” from the Firm. (Compl. ¶ 17.) Plaintiff was
hired as an associate by the Firm in or about July 2004 and began working at the Firm on or
about July 26, 2004. (Compl. ¶¶ 2 & 19.) Plaintiff alleges that he accepted the associate
position at the Firm based upon Keller’s promise that Plaintiff would receive ten percent of the
business he brought into the Firm. (Compl. ¶ 18.)
THE COMPLAINT FAILS TO ALLEGE A
VIABLE CAUSE OF ACTION UNDER NEW YORK LAW
In reviewing a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the court must take the facts alleged in the
complaint as true and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff. Jackson Nat’l Life
Ins. Co. v. Merrill Lynch & Co., 32 F.3d 697, 699-700 (2d Cir. 1994). However, a motion to
dismiss should be granted if Plaintiff fails to provide the grounds upon which his claim rests
through factual allegations sufficient “to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Bell
Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 1965 (2007); Dorcely v. Wyandanch Union Free Sch.
Dist., No. 06-CV-1265 (DRH) (AKT), 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 71068, at *8 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 25,
2007).
Plaintiff alleges, inter alia, that the Firm refused to pay him ten percent of the business he
allegedly brought into the Firm, as Keller promised in or about March 2004. (Compl. ¶¶ 1 & 5.)
Plaintiff’s claims are dismissible on two grounds. First, Plaintiff has failed to allege a sufficient
factual basis to establish Keller’s apparent authority to make and bind the Firm to such a
Case 1:07-cv-07017-DAB Document 4 Filed 10/09/2007 Page 3 of 9
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promise. Second, Plaintiff’s claims are barred by the Statute of Frauds under N.Y. GEN. OBLIG.
LAW §5-701(a)(10).
A. Plaintiff Cannot Establish That Keller Had Apparent
Authority To Bind The Firm
Plaintiff cannot pursue a breach of contract claim against the Firm based on Keller’s
alleged oral representation because he has not alleged that Keller had actual or apparent authority
to bind the Firm. See Ferrostaal, Inc. v. M/V Sea Baisen, No. 02 Civ. 1900 (RJH) (DCF), 2004
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 24083, *11 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 24, 2004). Since Keller was an associate at the
Firm, Plaintiff understandably does not allege that he had actual authority to bind the Firm. The
facts alleged in Plaintiff’s detailed Complaint are insufficient to establish apparent authority.
Apparent authority is “the power to affect the legal relations of another person by
transactions with third persons, professedly as agent for the other, arising from and in accordance
with the other’s manifestation to such third persons.” RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 8.
It is well settled in the Second Circuit that apparent authority is created only by the
representations of the principal to the third party and that an agent cannot create apparent
authority by his or her own actions or representations. See Trustees of UIU Health & Welfare
Fund v. New York Flame Proofing Co., 828 F.2d 79, 84 (2d Cir. 1987); Karavos Compania
Naviera S.A. v. Atlantica Export Corp., 588 F.2d 1, 10 (2d Cir. 1978).
Also, “key to the creation of apparent authority is that the third person, accepting the
appearance of authority as true, has relied upon it.” Anglo-Iberia Underwriting Mgmt. Co. v. PT
Jamsostek, No. 97 Civ. 5116 (HB), 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1563, at *9 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 10, 1999),
citing Green v. Hellman, 51 N.Y.2d 197 (1980), aff’d in part, vacated in part on other grounds,
No. 03-9260-cv, 2007 U.S. App. LEXIS 12311 (2d Cir. May 25, 2007).
Case 1:07-cv-07017-DAB Document 4 Filed 10/09/2007 Page 4 of 9
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In Ferrostaal, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 24083 at *11, the court stated that “in order to state
a claim sufficient as a matter of law to establish actual or apparent authority, plaintiff must allege
some action on the part of [the principal] from which [the agent’s] agency may be inferred.” See
also Cooperative Agricloe Groupement Bovins L’Ouest v. Banesto Banking Corp., No. 86-cv-
8921 (PKL), 1989 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8368, at *45-49 (S.D.N.Y. July 19, 1989), aff’d, 904 F.2d
35 (2d Cir. 1990) (apparent authority depends upon a factual showing that a third party relied
upon the misrepresentation of an agent because of some misleading conduct on the part of the
principal, not the agent.)
Plaintiff makes no allegations in his Complaint that the Firm designated Keller to
negotiate Plaintiff’s terms and conditions of employment. In addition, Plaintiff does not allege
one fact or proffer one event that demonstrates that the Firm represented Keller as its agent.
Rather, all Plaintiff states in his Complaint is that Keller, an associate at the Firm, told him that
he would receive ten percent of the business he brought into the Firm and that he accepted the
associate position based upon this promise. (Compl. ¶¶ 15 & 18.)
Nor does Plaintiff allege one fact that could demonstrate that he relied on the alleged acts
or omissions of the Firm in concluding that Keller had the apparent authority to establish his
terms and conditions of employment. To be sustained, a claim based on apparent authority
requires alleged facts sufficient to establish reasonable reliance. Cooperative Agricole
Groupement, 1989 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8368 at *43; Chelsea Nat’l. Bank v. Lincoln Plaza Towers
Assocs., 93 A.D.2d 216, 219, 461 N.Y.S.2d 328, 331 (1st Dep’t 1983), aff’d, 61 N.Y.2d 817, 473
N.Y.S.2d 953 (1984); Ford v. Unity Hosp., 32 N.Y.2d 464, 472, 346 N.Y.S.2d 238, 244 (1973).
Plaintiff, who had been an Assistant Attorney General in New Mexico for four years, should
have known or at the very least should have questioned whether an associate such as Keller
Case 1:07-cv-07017-DAB Document 4 Filed 10/09/2007 Page 5 of 9
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could have made such a representation on behalf of the Firm. In addition, Plaintiff alleges that
he interviewed with Dubbs; however, Plaintiff fails to allege that he discussed his terms and
conditions of employment with Dubbs. Moreover, while Plaintiff alleges that he was waiting to
receive an offer from the Firm and that he accepted his offer based upon Keller’s alleged promise
that he would receive ten percent of the business he brought into the Firm, Plaintiff fails to state
who offered him the associate position and what if anything this individual stated about his terms
and conditions of employment. (Compl. ¶¶ 17 & 18.)
Nowhere in Plaintiff’s Complaint does he allege that the Firm made any representations
that Keller had the authority to negotiate his terms and conditions of employment or that he
questioned Keller’s authority or his alleged oral representation. As a result, Plaintiff’s
allegations do not allege facts sufficient to establish that the apparent authority doctrine is
applicable. See Anglo-Iberia Underwriting, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1563 at *9 (granting
defendant’s motion to dismiss since the apparent authority doctrine was not applicable when a
third-party misrepresents his authority which plaintiff fails to confirm.) See also Fletcher v.
Atex, Inc., 68 F.3d 1451, 1462 (2d Cir. 1995) (affirming grant of summary judgment where
plaintiffs offered no evidence that the principal authorized or gave the appearance of having
authorized the third-party statements.) Thus, Plaintiff’s breach of contract claim should be
dismissed.
Similarly, Plaintiff’s fraud1, promissory estoppel2 and negligent misrepresentation3
claims should also be dismissed since, once again, Plaintiff has not set forth any facts
1 In order to establish a fraud claim, Plaintiff must demonstrate that the Firm made a material false representation of
fact; that the Firm knew the representation to be untrue or made it with reckless disregard of its truth or falsity; tha t
the Firm made the representation with the intent to deceive the Plaintiff and to induce the Plaintiff to part with or
refrain from obtaining something of value; that the Plaintiff reasonably relied on the representation and that the
representation resulted in damages to the Plaintiff. See Katara v. D.E. Jones Commodities, Inc., 835 F.2d 966, 970-
71 (2d Cir. 1987).
Case 1:07-cv-07017-DAB Document 4 Filed 10/09/2007 Page 6 of 9
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establishing the essential element of reasonable reliance regarding Keller’s alleged oral promise.
Moreover, in regards to Plaintiff’s fraud cause of action, Plaintiff has failed to plead with
sufficient particularity any facts to support an inference that the Firm possessed the requisite
fraudulent intent. See Cosmas v. Hassett, 866 F.2d 8, 12-13 (2d Cir. 1989).
Finally, Plaintiff’s conversion claim4 should also be dismissed since an action for
conversion cannot be maintained “where damages are merely being sought for breach of
contract.” Moses v. Martin, 360 F. Supp. 2d 533, 541 (S.D.N.Y. 2004), citing Peters Griffin
Woodward, Inc. v. WCSC, Inc., 88 A.D.2d 883, 884, 452 N.Y.S.2d 599, 600 (1st Dep’t. 1982).
Thus, the Court should dismiss the entire Complaint with prejudice.
2 In order to establish a promissory estoppel claim, Plaintiff must demonstrate, “[1] a promise clear and
unambiguous in its terms; [2] reliance by the party to whom the promise is made, such reliance to be both reasonable
and foreseeable; [3] the party asserting the estoppel must be injured by his reliance.” Triology Variety Stores, Ltd. v.
City Prods. Corp., 523 F. Supp. 691, 696-97 (S.D.N.Y. 1981).
3 In order to establish a negligent misrepresentation claim, Plaintiff must demonstrate, “(1) carelessness in imparting
words; (2) upon which others were expected to rely; (3) upon which they did justifiably rely; (4) to their detriment;
and (5) the author must express the words directly, with knowledge they will be acted upon, to one whom the author
is bound by some relation or duty of care.” DVCi Techs., Inc. v. Timessquaremedia.com, Inc., No. 00 Civ. 0207
(VM) (RLE), 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17324, *13 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 29, 2000).
4 In order to establish a conversion claim, Plaintiff must demonstrate, “(1) the property subject to conversion is a
specific identifiable thing; (2) plaintiff had ownership, possession or control over the property before its conversion;
and (3) defendant exercised an unauthorized dominion over the thing in question, to the alteration of its condition or
to the exclusion of the plaintiff's rights.” AD Rendon Commc’ns, Inc. v. Lumina Ams, Inc., No. 04-CV-08832
(KMK), 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 37600, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. June 7, 2006), citing Moses, 360 F. Supp 2d at 541.
Case 1:07-cv-07017-DAB Document 4 Filed 10/09/2007 Page 7 of 9
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B. Plaintiff’s Claims Are Barred By The Statute Of Frauds
Plaintiff’s breach of contract claim is also barred by the Statue of Frauds because a
contract to pay a “finder’s fee” must be in writing. Under N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW § 5-701(a)(10)
the following must be in writing:
[any] contract to pay compensation for services rendered in negotiating a loan, or
in negotiating the purchase, sale, exchange, renting or leasing of any real estate or
interest therein, or of a business opportunity, business, its good will, inventory,
fixtures or an interest therein, including a majority of the voting stock interest in a
corporation and including the creating of a partnership interest. “Negotiating”
includes procuring an introduction to a party to the transaction or assisting in the
Negotiation or consummation of the transaction. This provision shall apply to a
contract implied in fact or in law to pay reasonable compensation but shall not
apply to a contract to pay compensation to an auctioneer, an attorney at law, or a
duly licensed real estate broker or real estate salesman.
Plaintiff cannot and does not allege any writing that would satisfy the requirements of this
statute. Rather, Plaintiff merely alleges that Keller made an oral promise to him, stating that he
would receive ten percent of the business that he brought into the Firm. (Compl. ¶ 15.)
It is well-settled in New York that, under this statute, a party may not state a finder’s fee
claim based upon an oral agreement. See Millennium Capital Mkts. LLC v. U.S. Nat'l Leasing
Corp., No. 97 Civ. 8397 (RPP), 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7221, at *11 (S.D.N.Y. May 13, 1999),
citing Kubin v. Miller, 801 F. Supp. 1101, 1121 (S.D.N.Y. 1992); see also Fort Howard Paper
Co. v. William D. Witter, Inc., 787 F.2d 784, 789 n.2 (2d Cir. 1986) (“There is no doubt that [NY
GEN. OBLIG. LAW] § 5-701(a)(10) bars oral finder’s-fee contracts.”)
Plaintiff’s claims based upon unjust enrichment, fraud and quantum meruit are precluded
as well. In Zeising v. Kelly, 152 F. Supp. 2d 335, 345 (S.D.N.Y. 2001), the court stated that
where a contract claim is barred by the Statute of Frauds, Plaintiff cannot simply restate an
unjust enrichment, fraud and quantum meruit claim in an attempt to obtain damages. See also,
Abrams v. Unity Mut. Life Ins. Co., 237 F.3d 862, 864-865 (7th Cir. 2001); Huntington Dental &
Case 1:07-cv-07017-DAB Document 4 Filed 10/09/2007 Page 8 of 9
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Med. Co. v. 3M, No. 96 civ. 10959 (JFK), 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1526, at *19 (S.D.N.Y. Feb.
11, 1998).
In addition, even if the Plaintiff could establish a claim for promissory estoppel, the New
York courts have restricted this claim so as not to undermine the statute of frauds, “to the limited
class of cases in which ‘the circumstances are such as to render it unconscionable’ to refuse to
enforce the promise upon which the promisee has relied.” Tri-Country Motors, Inc. v. American
Suzuki Motor Corp., 494 F. Supp. 2d 161, 173 (E.D.N.Y. 2007) citing Sterling Interiors Group,
Inc. v. Haworth, Inc., No. 94 Civ. 9216 (CSH), 1996 WL 426379, at *21 (July 30, 1996) citing
Philo Smith & Co., Inc. v. USLIFE Corp., 554 F.2d 34, 36 (2d Cir. 1977).
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Defendant’s motion to dismiss should be granted and
Plaintiff’s Complaint should be dismissed with prejudice.
Dated: October 9, 2007
New York, New York
PROSKAUER ROSE LLP
By: /s/ Bettina B. Plevan
Bettina B. Plevan (BP-7460)
Brian J. Gershengorn (BG-7544)
1585 Broadway
New York, New York 10036
(212) 969-3000
Attorneys for Defendant
Case 1:07-cv-07017-DAB Document 4 Filed 10/09/2007 Page 9 of 9