The People, Respondent,v.Antonio Aragon, Appellant.

Brief

N.Y.September 7, 2016

APL-2015-00055 To be argued by PHILIP MORROW (15 Minutes Requested) COVER Court of Appeals STATE OF NEW YORK THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK, Respondent, - against - ANTONIO ARAGON, Defendant-Appellant. BRIEF FOR RESPONDENT CYRUS R. VANCE, JR. District Attorney New York County Attorney for Respondent One Hogan Place New York, New York 10013 Telephone: (212) 335-9000 Facsimile: (212) 335-9288 danyappeals@dany.nyc.gov ALAN GADLIN PHILIP MORROW ASSISTANT DISTRICT ATTORNEYS Of Counsel SEPTEMBER 11, 2015 TABLE OF CONTENTS Page TABLE OF AUTHORITIES .............................................................................................. ii PRELIMINARY STATEMENT ......................................................................................... 1 INTRODUCTION................................................................................................................ 1 SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT ........................................................................................... 3 THE RELEVANT RECORD ............................................................................................. 4 The Accusatory Instrument ....................................................................................... 4 Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss ................................................................................ 5 The Plea and Sentencing Proceedings ...................................................................... 7 POINT THE MISDEMEANOR COMPLAINT WAS JURISDICTIONALLY SUFFICIENT ....................................................... 8 CONCLUSION ................................................................................................................... 28 TABLE OF AUTHORITIES FEDERAL CASES Small v. Bud-K Worldwide, Inc., 895 F.Supp.2d 438 (E.D.N.Y. 2012), aff’d sub nom Small v. Rice, 546 Fed.Appx. 41 (2d Cir. 2013) ............................ 16-17 United States v. Guel, 184 F.3d 918 (8th Cir. 1999) ........................................................ 17 United States v. Irizarry, 509 F.Supp.2d 198 (E.D.N.Y. 2007)....................................... 15 STATE CASES People v. Casey, 95 N.Y.2d 354 (2000) ....................................................................... 10, 19 People v. Dreyden, 15 N.Y.3d 100 (2010) ....................................................... 3, 5-6, 22-26 People v. Dumay, 23 N.Y.3d 518 (2004) ...................................................... 9-10, 22-23, 27 People v. Hansen, 95 N.Y.2d 227 (2000) .......................................................................... 22 People v. Jackson, 18 N.Y.3d 738 (2012) ..................................................... 9-10, 21, 25-26 People v. Jones, 73 N.Y.2d 427 (1989) .............................................................................. 20 People v. Kalin, 12 N.Y.3d 225 (2009) ........................................................... 10, 23, 25, 27 People v. Kasse, 22 N.Y.3d 1142 (2014) ........................................................................... 23 People v. Konieczny, 2 N.Y.3d 569 (2004) ................................................................. 19, 22 People v. Laurore, 30 Misc.3d 1237(A), 2011 WL 903184 (Rockland Cty. Sup. Ct., 2011) ............................................................................................................ 12-13 People v. McPherson, 220 N.Y. 123 (1917) ...................................................................... 27 People v. Morales, 20 N.Y.3d 240 (2012) .......................................................................... 12 People v. Persce, 204 N.Y. 397 (1912) ................................................................ 3, 6, 12, 16 People v. Prescott, 66 N.Y.2d 216 (1985) ......................................................................... 22 People v. Santana, 7 N.Y.3d 234 (2006) ............................................................................ 20 -ii- People v. Singleton, 127 Misc.2d 735 (N.Y. Cty. Crim. Ct. 1985) ..................... 13-14, 27 People v. Suber, 19 N.Y.3d 247 (2012).......................................................................... 9, 22 State v. Neighbors, 908 P.2d 649 (Kan. Ct. App. 1995) .................................................. 17 We’re Assoc. Co. v. Cohen, Stracher & Bloom, P.C., 65 N.Y.2d 148 (1985) ................................................................................................................................ 13 STATE STATUTES Alaska Stat. § 11.81.900(37) ................................................................................................. 17 Cal. Penal Code § 16920 ................................................................................................. 17-18 CPL 70.10(2) ......................................................................................................................... 10 CPL 100.15(2) ................................................................................................................... 9, 11 CPL 100.15(3) ................................................................................................................... 9, 11 CPL 100.40(1) ....................................................................................................................... 19 CPL 100.40(1)(c) ..................................................................................................................... 9 CPL 100.40(4) ......................................................................................................................... 9 CPL 100.40(4)(a) ..................................................................................................................... 9 CPL 100.40(4)(b) .................................................................................................................... 9 CPL 170.65(3) ......................................................................................................................... 9 CPL 240.20(f) ........................................................................................................................ 24 Laws of 1866, Ch. 716, § 1 .................................................................................................. 14 Mo. Ann. Stat. § 571.010(13) .............................................................................................. 17 Neb. Rev. Stat. § 28-1201(6) ............................................................................................... 17 Penal Law § 240.20 ............................................................................................................. 1, 7 Penal Law § 265.00(5) .......................................................................................................... 25 -iii- Penal Law § 265.00(5-b) ...................................................................................................... 15 Penal Law § 265.01(1) .......................................................................... 1, 4, 10-11, 15-16, 25 Penal Law § 265.01(2) .......................................................................................................... 25 New York State Statutes, Article 172 § 1897 (1909) ........................................................ 15 Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-17-1301(10) .................................................................................... 17 Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 46.01(8) ........................................................................................ 18 W. Va. Code Ann. § 61-7-2(6) ............................................................................................ 18 OTHER AUTHORITIES Black’s Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014) ............................................................................. 13 Daniel Shelton, Chapter 346: Increasing Protection from Knuckle Weapons, 40 McGeorge L. Rev. 530, 531 (2009)............................................................................... 14 Donnino, Practice Commentary to Penal Law § 265.00 ................................................. 15 McKinney’s Cons. Laws of N.Y., Book 1, Statutes § 232 ............................................... 12 New York Bill Jacket, 2008 S.B. 7528, Ch. 257 ................................................................ 16 New York Criminal Law § 33:6 (3d. ed., 2014) ................................................................ 12 Oxford American Dictionary .............................................................................................. 13 Sutherland Statutory Construction § 46:1 (7th ed.) ......................................................... 12 -iv- COURT OF APPEALS STATE OF NEW YORK THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK, Respondent, -against- ANTONIO ARAGON, Defendant-Appellant. BRIEF FOR RESPONDENT PRELIMINARY STATEMENT By permission of the Honorable Susan Phillips Read, former Associate Judge of the Court of Appeals, Antonio Aragon appeals from an order of the Appellate Term, First Department, entered on July 31, 2014. That order affirmed a March 14, 2012 judgment of the Criminal Court, New York County (Joanne Quinones, J.), convicting defendant, upon his guilty plea, of Disorderly Conduct (Penal Law § 240.20). Defendant was sentenced to time served. INTRODUCTION At approximately 7:20 p.m. on June 18, 2011, at a particular location in Manhattan, Police Officer Carlos Habrahamshon recovered a set of brass metal knuckles from the right front pocket of defendant’s pants. By misdemeanor complaint (Docket Number 2011NY044855), defendant was charged in New York County Criminal Court with one count of Criminal Possession of a Weapon in the Fourth Degree (Penal Law § 265.01[1]) (A5–A6).1 On August 22, 2011, the complaint was converted to an information through the filing of a supporting deposition from Officer Habrahamshon (A6). On October 28, 2011, defendant filed an omnibus motion, in which he moved to dismiss the criminal court information on facial sufficiency grounds (A9–A15). On January 20, 2012, the court denied defendant’s motion to dismiss the accusatory instrument (A34). On March 14, 2012, defendant waived prosecution by information and formal allocution and then pled guilty to disorderly conduct (A37–A39). On that same day, the court imposed the promised sentence of time served (A39). Defendant appealed to the Appellate Term, First Department. He argued that the accusatory instrument was facially insufficient to provide reasonable cause to believe that he possessed metal knuckles, because it contained only conclusory allegations regarding the weapon. On July 31, 2014, the Appellate Term unanimously affirmed the judgment of conviction (A2–A3). In light of defendant’s waiver of prosecution by information, the court determined that sufficiency of the accusatory instrument had to be 1 Parenthetical citations preceded by “A” are to defendant’s appendix. -2- measured against the standards applicable to a misdemeanor complaint (A2). Applying those standards, the court held that the allegation in the complaint that the police recovered “one set of brass metal knuckles” from defendant was “sufficiently evidentiary in character to establish reasonable cause to believe” that defendant was guilty of Criminal Possession of a Weapon in the Fourth Degree (A2–A3). Noting that brass or metal knuckles had a “‘well-understood character’” (quoting People v. Persce, 204 N.Y. 397, 402 [1912]), the court rejected defendant’s argument that “additional descriptive detail” of the object recovered by the police was necessary for him to have adequate notice to prepare a defense and to protect himself from double jeopardy (A3). Finally, the court distinguished this case from People v. Dreyden, 15 N.Y.3d 100 (2010), where this Court found jurisdictionally defective a misdemeanor complaint that contained a conclusory statement by a police officer that an object recovered from the defendant was a gravity knife (A3). The court pointed out that the gravity knife at issue in Dreyden was an “esoteric” weapon for which there was a complicated and detailed definition in the Penal Law (A3). In this Court, defendant renews the same claim that the Appellate Term unanimously rejected. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT The misdemeanor complaint provided sufficient factual allegations establishing every element of Criminal Possession of a Weapon in the Fourth Degree. Specifically, the complaint properly pled that defendant possessed prohibited “metal knuckles” by -3- averring that the officer recovered a set of brass metal knuckles from defendant’s pants pocket. The term “metal knuckles” has a commonly understood and self- evident meaning, and it is obvious upon looking at an item whether it constitutes metal knuckles. Defendant is certainly wrong to compare the complaint with an accusatory instrument that charges a defendant with possession of a gravity knife. A gravity knife is an esoteric weapon with a specific and technical definition set forth in the Penal Law, and a gravity knife often cannot be readily distinguished from a legal knife, making more detail necessary in that case. Further, because defendant waived his right to prosecution by information and pled guilty, defendant can prevail only if the flaw he purports to find in the complaint rises to the level of a jurisdictional defect. It does not, because, as defendant does not even dispute, the factual allegations in the complaint provided defendant with notice of the charges against him and protected him against a successive prosecution. THE RELEVANT RECORD The Accusatory Instrument On June 18, 2011, police officers arrested defendant after recovering metal knuckles from him. Following his arrest, defendant was charged, by misdemeanor complaint, with Criminal Possession of a Weapon under Penal Law Section 265.01(1). The criminal court complaint stated that Police Officer Carlos Habrahamshon had informed Officer Victor Charles that, on June 18, 2011, at about 7:20 p.m., in a -4- particular location in Manhattan, Officer Habrahamshon “recovered one set of brass metal knuckles from defendant’s right front pants pocket” (A5). On August 22, 2011, the People certified that they were ready for trial. On the same date, the People filed a supporting deposition, signed by Officer Habrahamshon, in which he averred that he read the complaint, that all of the factual allegations “attributed to” him were true, and that he knew “these facts from [his] personal knowledge” (A6). Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss On October 28, 2011, defendant filed an omnibus motion that included a motion to dismiss the criminal court information for facial insufficiency (A9–A15). Defendant complained that “the statements attributed to Police Officer Habrahamshon [we]re conclusory assertions” that did not provide “reasonable cause to believe that” defendant “possessed metal knuckles” (A12). More specifically, defendant argued that the information lacked “support” or an explanation for “the officer’s belief in identifying the object as metal knuckles,” and thus failed “to meet the reasonable cause prong of the facial sufficiency test” set forth by this Court in Dreyden, 15 N.Y.3d at 100 (A12). According to defendant, it was critical that the officer identify the basis for his conclusion that the object recovered from defendant was a set of metal knuckles because, in contrast to the gravity knife at issue in Dreyden, the Penal Law does not define “metal knuckles” (A13). In the absence of a statutory definition, defendant -5- contended that it was necessary for the court to look to caselaw for a definition (A13). Although this Court had observed almost a century ago in Persce, 204 N.Y. at 397, that brass knuckles were among a group of per se weapons of “well-understood character,” defendant contended that courts in the intervening century had found it necessary to “further clarify” and provide definitions for these weapons, including brass knuckles (A13–A14). Defendant pointed to two decisions of the New York County Criminal Court in which one judge had considered the dictionary and the other common sense to determine whether an item constituted metal knuckles (A14). As far as this case was concerned, defendant alleged that the accusatory instrument did not satisfy Dreyden because the officer did not explain how he was able to identify the object recovered from defendant as metal knuckles (A15). In addition, defendant complained that there was no factual support for the officer’s conclusion that the object was a set of brass knuckles (A15). Defendant contended that the court was required to dismiss the accusatory instrument because it thus failed to provide reasonable cause to believe that he possessed an illegal set of metal knuckles (A15). The People did not file a response to defendant’s motion. The Honorable Felicia A. Mennin denied defendant’s motion to dismiss, “find[ing] the accusatory instrument to be facially sufficient” (A34). The court ordered a suppression hearing and said that a written decision would follow (A34), but there is no written decision in the court file. -6- The Plea and Sentencing Proceedings On March 14, 2012, defendant appeared with his attorney before the Honorable Joanne Quinones. The prosecutor confirmed that the People were ready for trial, and he told the judge that the People had proposed a disposition under which defendant would plead guilty to disorderly conduct in exchange for a promised sentence of “time served” (A37). Defense counsel stated that the parties had agreed to a disposition, and that defendant had authorized her to enter a guilty plea on his behalf to disorderly conduct in violation of Penal Law Section 240.20, with the understanding that the sentence imposed would be time served (A37). Counsel noted that defendant had no prior criminal record, and that he would not have one as a consequence of his plea because disorderly conduct was a violation and not a crime (A37). Further, counsel informed the court that she had discussed with defendant any negative immigration consequences related to his plea (A37). In response to the court’s question, defendant confirmed that he did, indeed, wish to plead guilty to disorderly conduct, which was a violation (A37–A38). Defendant assured the court that nobody had threatened him or forced him to plead guilty, and that he had enough time to discuss the decision to plead guilty with his attorney (A38). Next, defendant said he understood that, as a result of his guilty plea, he was “giving up” his rights to go to trial, to remain silent, and to have the People prove his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt (A38). Defendant confirmed that he was pleading guilty to disorderly conduct because he was, in fact, guilty of that charge -7- (A38). When the judge asked defendant if he wished to address the court before the imposition of sentence, defendant declined (A38). The court then sentenced defendant to time served (A38). Defense counsel asked the court for “judgment on the surcharge” because defendant was incarcerated on another case and had a sick child, and the court granted counsel’s request (A38–A39). POINT THE MISDEMEANOR COMPLAINT WAS JURISDICTIONALLY SUFFICIENT (Answering Defendant’s Brief). Before this Court, defendant renews his argument that the misdemeanor complaint was “jurisdictionally defective” because it “failed to allege sufficient evidentiary facts” to support the “conclusory allegation” that defendant possessed “metal knuckles” (Defendant’s Brief: 8). More specifically, defendant contends that the allegations in the complaint were conclusory because they did not include a “physical description” of the recovered item, did not identify the factual basis for the officer’s conclusion that the item was metal knuckles, did not describe how the item corresponded to a definition of metal knuckles, and did not set forth the training and experience relied upon by the officer to identify the item as metal knuckles (id.: 8–9). Defendant’s argument is meritless, especially in light of the limited scope of review available to him after his waiver of prosecution by information and guilty plea. To begin, at the plea proceeding, counsel stated that defendant was waiving his right to be prosecuted by an information (A37). Defendant does not contest the -8- validity of that waiver, and he implicitly acknowledges that as a consequence of the waiver, any appellate challenge to the accusatory instrument must be judged under the standards applicable to a misdemeanor complaint, not those applicable to an information (Defendant’s Brief: 8). See CPL 170.65(3); People v. Dumay, 23 N.Y.3d 518, 522–24 (2004). Specifically, “[a]n information is valid for jurisdictional purposes if it contains nonconclusory factual allegations that, if assumed to be true, address each element of the crime charged, thereby affording reasonable cause to believe that defendant committed that offense.” People v. Jackson, 18 N.Y.3d 738, 741 (2012) (citing, inter alia, CPL 100.40[1][c]). In contrast, the factual portion of a misdemeanor complaint need not satisfy the “prima facie case requirement” applicable to an information, in that it need not contain non-hearsay allegations establishing every element of the offense charged and the defendant’s commission of the offense. Dumay, 23 N.Y.3d at 522; People v. Suber, 19 N.Y.3d 247, 250–51 (2012); compare CPL 100.40(1)(c) with CPL 100.40(4). A misdemeanor complaint is instead sufficient when it meets just two requirements. First, a complaint must “substantially conform[] to the requirements prescribed in section 100.15” (CPL 100.40[4][a]), by containing an accusatory portion that charges the designated offense (CPL 100.15[2]) and a factual section that alleges “facts of an evidentiary character supporting or tending to support the charges” (CPL 100.15[3]). Second, CPL 100.40(4)(b) requires that “[t]he allegations of the factual part of” a misdemeanor complaint “provide reasonable cause to believe that the -9- defendant committed the offense charged in the accusatory part of such instrument.” See Dumay, 23 N.Y.3d at 511; People v. Kalin, 12 N.Y.3d 225, 228 (2009). “Reasonable cause” exists when there are “facts or circumstances which are collectively of such weight and persuasiveness as to convince a person of ordinary intelligence, judgment and experience that it is reasonably likely that such offense was committed and that such person committed it.” CPL 70.10(2). Even in the case of an information, however, this Court has repeatedly declared that, so long as the factual allegations “provide notice sufficient to prepare a defense and are adequately detailed to prevent a defendant from being tried twice for the same offense, they should be given a fair and not overly restrictive or technical reading.” People v. Casey, 95 N.Y.2d 354, 360 (2000); see Jackson, 18 N.Y.3d at 746; Kalin, 12 N.Y.3d at 230. Moreover, in assessing the adequacy of an accusatory instrument, the court should consider not only the facts expressly alleged, but also the reasonable inferences and obvious implications that can be drawn from those allegations. See, e.g., Dumay, 23 N.Y.3d at 525–26; Jackson, 18 N.Y.3d at 747; Casey, 95 N.Y.2d at 360. The complaint need not “negate every possible way” the charged conduct might fall short of making out the elements of the crime. Dumay, 23 N.Y.3d at 525. Judged by these standards, the misdemeanor complaint was unquestionably sufficient to charge defendant with Criminal Possession of a Weapon in the Fourth Degree under Penal Law Section 265.01(1). The accusatory instrument had to allege that defendant “possesse[d] any firearm” or other enumerated weapon, including -10- “metal knuckles.” Penal Law § 265.01(1). The misdemeanor complaint, sworn to by Officer Charles, alleged that at about 7:20 p.m. on June 18, 2011, in a particular location in Manhattan, defendant committed the offense of Criminal Possession of a Weapon in the Fourth Degree under Penal Law Section 265.01(1), in that he possessed “metal knuckles” (A5). By identifying the statute under which defendant was charged and including language from that statute, the misdemeanor complaint clearly satisfied the CPL 100.15(2) requirement that the accusatory instrument designate the charged offense. Moreover, the complaint alleged sufficient “facts of an evidentiary character” to support that charge, CPL 100.15(3), by specifying that Police Officer Carlos Habrahamshon “recovered one set of brass metal knuckles from defendant’s right front pants pocket” (A5). As an initial matter, defendant incorrectly claims that the complaint “failed to provide any physical description of the recovered item,” and in particular that it did not specify the “type of metal” used in the knuckles he possessed and did not give any indication of the size of the recovered knuckles (Defendant’s Brief: 8). Actually, the complaint specified that Officer Habrahamshon recovered “brass metal knuckles” (A5) (emphasis added). Further, by alleging that Habrahmashon recovered the metal knuckles from inside defendant’s pants pockets (A5), the complaint provided an indication of the size of the knuckles—they fit inside a pants pocket. -11- These details, coupled with the allegation that the item was a set of metal knuckles, provided more than enough factual information to establish that the recovered item was precisely the weapon whose possession is prohibited by the statute under which defendant was charged. Indeed, it is so obvious when an object constitutes “metal knuckles” that little more need be, or even could be, said to make clear that the object falls within the statutory prohibition. In fact, that there is no definition in the Penal Law for “metal knuckles” is “an indication that the legislature was well aware” of their “self-defining nature.” People v. Laurore, 30 Misc.3d 1237(A), 2011 WL 903184, at *8 (Rockland Cty. Sup. Ct., 2011); see also Richard A. Greenberg, New York Criminal Law § 33:6 (3d. ed., 2014) (Article 265 of the Penal Law does not define metal knuckles, “no doubt because the Legislature assumed that there was no mistaking what ‘metal knuckles’ are”). It is not just the Legislature that has reached that conclusion: as the Appellate Term pointed out (A3), this Court remarked, more than a century ago, on the “well-understood character” of “brass knuckles.” Persce, 204 N.Y. at 402. Where a word in a statute is undefined, it should be given its “usual and commonly understood meaning.” McKinney’s Cons. Laws of N.Y., Book 1, Statutes § 232; see also 2A Sutherland Statutory Construction § 46:1 (7th ed.); People v. Morales, 20 N.Y.3d 240, 247 (2012) (undefined language in the Penal Law must be given its “most natural and obvious meaning based on common sense and reasonableness in the context of the purpose and history” of the statute) (internal -12- citations and quotations omitted); We’re Assoc. Co. v. Cohen, Stracher & Bloom, P.C., 65 N.Y.2d 148, 151 (1985) (“Words of ordinary import in a statute are to be given their usual and commonly understood meaning, unless it is clear from the statutory language that a different meaning was intended”). Although defendant contends that the accusatory instrument was insufficient because it failed to set forth a detailed explanation for the officer’s conclusion that the weapon constituted “metal knuckles,” available definitions for the commonly-used term “brass knuckles” are basic and do not include a host of identifying characteristics for the weapon. For instance, brass knuckles have been defined as a “piece of metal designed to fit over the fingers as a weapon for use in a fistfight,” Black’s Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014), and “a metal guard worn over the knuckles in fighting, especially to increase the effect of the blows,” Oxford American Dictionary and Language Guide (1999). In Laurore, the court noted that the common dictionary definition for brass knuckles was “‘a small metal weapon; worn over the knuckles on the back of the hand.’” 30 Misc.3d 1237(A), 2011 WL 903184, at *2 (quoting Webster’s dictionary online and dictionary.com). These definitions of the term “brass knuckles” add little to the words “brass” and “knuckles,” themselves, reinforcing the conclusion that there was little more that could or needed to be pled in the complaint other than that defendant possessed “brass metal knuckles.”2 2 In People v. Singleton, 127 Misc.2d 735 (N.Y. Cty. Crim. Ct. 1985), the defendant -13- (Continued…) The long-established nature of metal knuckles further supports the view that the complaint here needed no further factual exposition. “Modern metal knuckles have been around for at least two centuries and have found their way into popular culture.” Daniel Shelton, Chapter 346: Increasing Protection from Knuckle Weapons, 40 McGeorge L. Rev. 530, 531 (2009). Legislation banning the possession of metal knuckles has been in force in several states since the nineteenth century. Id. Indeed, the term “metal knuckles,” and prohibitions on their possession and use, have featured in the laws of New York State since at least 1866. See Laws of 1866, Ch. 716, § 1 (making it a felony to use, attempt to use, or conceal with the intent to use against another person, “any instrument or weapon of the kind commonly known as a slung-shot, billy, sand club or metal knuckles”) (emphasis added). In 1909, the was charged with possession of metal knuckles, and the trial court denied his motion to dismiss the accusatory instrument on the ground that the weapon in question did not constitute “metal knuckles.” The item possessed by the defendant consisted of two connected leather straps, worn around the wrist and the arm, on which there were one-half inch metal spikes on the portions of the straps that covered the fist and knuckle. Id. at 735– 36. The court rejected the defendant’s argument that the meaning of metal knuckles should be limited to a dictionary definition, reasoning, “Common sense is not exhausted by dictionary definitions.” Id. at 736. Thus, although the item in Singleton may not have been a traditional pair of brass knuckles, the judge concluded that it still constituted “metal knuckles.” The court noted that the metal spikes on the object were “carefully positioned so as to be held in place over the fist and knuckles,” and that the spikes therefore would have made contact with the victim if the recovered item was worn across someone’s hand and used to inflict a punch. Id. at 737. In essence, then, the item did include metal that was worn on the knuckles. In any event, whether or not the judge was right to find it proper to conclude that items other than traditional metal knuckles qualified as that weapon has no bearing on this case. Here, there is absolutely no reason to suspect that defendant possessed some non-standard version of metal knuckles. Rather, the complaint specifically alleged that defendant possessed “brass metal knuckles” (A5). -14- ______________________ (…Continued) Legislature used the term again, making it a felony to carry a “‘slungshot, billy, sandclub, or metal knuckles,’” regardless of whether the person who possessed any of those weapons had a criminal intent. United States v. Irizarry, 509 F.Supp.2d 198, 206 (E.D.N.Y. 2007) (quoting New York State Statutes, Article 172 § 1897 [1909]). Of course, the term “metal knuckles” is still used in the Penal Law, and the Legislature still has not deemed it necessary to define the term, even though it has been presented with several convenient opportunities to do so. For instance, in 1995, the Legislature amended several sections of the Penal Law to address “metal knuckle knives.” Donnino, Practice Commentary to Penal Law § 265.00. A “metal knuckle knife” is a per se weapon, Penal Law § 265.01(1), and that term is specifically defined as a weapon that, when open, can function as both a “set of metal knuckles and a knife[,]” Penal Law § 265.00(5-b). By defining that weapon as essentially a combination of metal knuckles and a knife without defining those two terms, the Legislature obviously reasoned that a person reading the statute would easily understand what is meant by metal knuckles, without further exposition of that phrase. Subsequently, in 2008, a “number of statutes which prohibit the possession, manufacture, and transportation of various deadly weapons,” including metal knuckles, “were amended to include a prohibition on the possession of ‘plastic knuckles.’” Donnino, Practice Commentary to Penal Law § 265.00. The impetus for the legislation was that knuckles made out of plastic, which could easily be passed -15- through metal detectors in schools, airports, and government buildings, posed the same threat to safety as illegal metal knuckles. See New York Bill Jacket, 2008 S.B. 7528, Ch. 257 (New York State Senate, Introducer’s Memorandum in Support). Although the possession of plastic knuckles was a new offense, the Legislature did not believe that it needed to provide a definition for that weapon, reflecting the fact that it is commonly understood what is meant when someone talks of “knuckles” as a weapon. Thus, although it can hardly be disputed that, as defendant flippantly observes, “Times change” (Defendant’s Brief: 18), he is wrong to suggest that time has altered the understanding of what is meant by the term “metal knuckles” (id.). The Legislature’s continued use of the term in criminal statutes without determining that a definition was necessary is a clear indication that it is just as self-evident to a person in the 21st century as it was to someone living in the 1860’s, or in 1912 when Persce was decided, what “metal knuckles” are. Moreover, in rejecting a void for vagueness challenge to Penal Law Section 265.01(1), a federal court determined that an ordinary person would be able to understand the meaning of “metal knuckles” as it is used in the statute. Small v. Bud- K Worldwide, Inc., 895 F.Supp.2d 438, 450 (E.D.N.Y. 2012), aff’d sub nom Small v. Rice, 546 Fed.Appx. 41 (2d Cir. 2013). As the court explained, “[A]n ordinary person would understand, in the context of the entire statute, that the term ‘metal knuckles’ is criminalizing a broad category of metal weapons that can be placed over multiple -16- knuckles[.]” Small, 895 F.Supp.2d at 450. Given that ordinary people readily understand what is meant by “metal knuckles,” it is unsurprising that New York appellate courts have not had cause to explicitly define the term, and that the trial courts “have rarely addressed the meaning of the term” (see Defendant’s Brief: 16– 17). The fact that there are practically no cases that address what is meant by the term “metal knuckles,” even though the term has appeared in criminal statutes since the time of the Civil War, is further proof that the meaning of the term is self-evident. As a result, for an accusatory instrument to be sufficient, it need only allege that the defendant possessed metal knuckles. The use of “metal knuckles” or similar terms throughout the country confirms this conclusion. Metal knuckles are regarded as dangerous weapons in many jurisdictions. See United States v. Guel, 184 F.3d 918, 923 (8th Cir. 1999) (approximately 30 states define brass knuckles as per se weapons). And, outside of New York, “metal knuckles” also has a commonly understood meaning that needs no elaboration. As the Court of Appeals of Kansas observed, “The term ‘metal knuckles’ is ‘not a term which is foreign to the vocabulary of the average juror as to require definition.’” State v. Neighbors, 908 P.2d 649, 655 (Kan. Ct. App. 1995) (internal citation omitted). Indeed, while 44 of the 50 states appear to use some variation of the term “metal knuckles” in their statutes, only seven states have a statutory definition for the term. See Alaska Stat. § 11.81.900(37); Cal. Penal Code § 16920; Mo. Ann. Stat. § 571.010(13); Neb. Rev. Stat. § 28-1201(6); Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-17- -17- 1301(10); Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 46.01(8); W. Va. Code Ann. § 61-7-2(6). The Alaska, Missouri, Nebraska, Tennessee, and Texas statutes are more or less identical. They commonly define metal or brass knuckles as “any instrument that consists of finger rings or guards made of a hard substance that is designed, made, or adapted for the purpose of inflicting serious bodily injury or death by striking a person with a fist enclosed in the knuckles.” Texas Penal Code § 46.01(8). Apart from specifying that metal knuckles consist of finger rings or guards, these definitions add nothing to the common understanding that brass knuckles are a metal instrument worn across the knuckles and used in fighting.3 As demonstrated by the authority discussed above, the term “metal knuckles” has a commonly understood meaning that is self-evident from the very words “metal” and “knuckles.” Consequently, there was no need to discuss the officer’s experience or training in the complaint (Defendant’s Brief: 20); the officer’s background was of no moment, for his identification of the item as metal knuckles was simply a matter of 3 Although slightly more detailed, the remaining two statutory definitions also do little more to explain when an object constitutes metal knuckles. West Virginia defines “metallic knuckles” as “a set of finger rings attached to a transverse piece to be worn over the front of the hand for use as a weapon and constructed in such a manner that, when striking another person with the fist or closed hand, considerable physical damage may be inflicted upon the person struck.” W. Va. Code Ann. § 61-7-2(6). California defines the term as an instrument, “made wholly or partially of metal,” that is worn “in or on the hand,” and that either protects the wearer’s punching fist or increases the force of his blow. California Penal Code § 16920. The statute explains that “the metal contained in the device may help support the hand or fist, provide a shield to protect it, or consist of projections or studs which would contact the individual receiving a blow,” and that the purpose of the weapon can be either offensive or defensive. Id. -18- him looking at it and seeing that that is what the item plainly was. For the same reason, it was not necessary for the officer to include in the complaint the detailed description of the item demanded by defendant (Defendant’s Brief: 21). In that regard, defendant complains that the accusatory instrument did not specify that the metal knuckles were “wearable on a person’s hand” (Defendant’s Brief: 21). However, based on a fair and not overly technical reading of the complaint, Casey, 95 N.Y.2d at 360, the officer’s use of the term “metal knuckles” indicates in and of itself that he believed that the object was capable of being worn over one’s hand and used as a weapon. As a matter of plain English, it would not make sense to call something “knuckles” if it could not actually fit over one’s knuckles. Moreover, some of the details defendant targets are immaterial. Certainly, the “color” of the recovered object (Defendant’s Brief: 21), has no relevance on whether the object was an illegal set of metal knuckles. In order to bolster his argument, defendant has searched Amazon.com for the term “brass knuckles” and included in his appendix 89 pages of items from that website that feature the term in the product description (Defendant’s Brief: 18–20; A40–A129). Initially, defendant’s effort is simply improper. It is well established that the sufficiency of an information must be judged by a “facial reading of the accusatory instrument,” Casey, 95 N.Y.2d at 361, without resort to “external factors to create jurisdictional defects not evident from the face of the document.” People v. Konieczny, 2 N.Y.3d 569, 574–76 (2004); see CPL 100.40(1) (an accusatory -19- instrument is valid if sufficient “on its face”). Further, these printed pages from Amazon are not part of the record on appeal. They were not before the court that ruled on defendant’s motion to dismiss the accusatory instrument. In addition, the printouts are hardly a proper subject for judicial notice. See, e.g., People v. Jones, 73 N.Y.2d 427, 431–32 (1989). In any event, defendant’s belated attempt to shop online for “brass knuckles” curios is, at best for defendant, completely beside the point. In assessing the adequacy of an accusatory instrument, a standard of “common sense and reasonable pleading” applies. People v. Santana, 7 N.Y.3d 234, 237 (2006) (internal citation and quotation omitted). That standard is not remotely compatible with the idea that defendant possessed a small piece of costume jewelry shaped like a piece of brass knuckles such as one-inch earrings (A41) or a “sexy cute belly button navel ring” (A58). A fair reading of the complaint also rules out the notion that defendant possessed some kind of legitimate object on which there was a brass knuckle insignia or logo, such as: a “business card holder with brass knuckle pendant” (A73); a “keychain flask with brass knuckle pendant” (A74); or “knuckle duster cufflinks” (A124). Because defendant was charged with possession of “brass metal knuckles,” the officer obviously did not recover a luggage tag that appears to be made out of leather or some kind of fabric (A83), or a bar of soap (A90). In addition, because the officer specified that he recovered the metal knuckles from inside defendant’s pants pocket, the complaint plainly did not charge defendant with possession of something that would not -20- reasonably be expected to fit inside someone’s pocket, such as: a “knuckle duster clutch/evening purse” (A81); “combat gothic boots lace up brass knuckles chains” (A110, A112); or “5 inch black high heel sexy shoes brass knuckles” (A115). Plainly, that sellers on Amazon have chosen to affix the term “brass knuckles” to these various products in order to market them has no bearing on the term as it is used in a criminal statute, and thus does nothing to undermine the misdemeanor complaint’s straightforward allegation that defendant possessed metal knuckles. Moreover, defendant provides no reason to think that the vendors’ mere use of the term “brass knuckles” somewhere in their description of the product means that even the vendors themselves think that the products actually are brass knuckles. On the contrary, the sellers have used the term “brass knuckles” to sell a vast array of items, from shoes to bars of soap. At the same time, it is telling that the sellers have used the term “brass knuckles” to market their items. There would be little point in doing so if the general public did not understand the meaning of the term. And, a quick glance through defendant’s appendix reinforces the idea that brass knuckles has a well-understood meaning. The brass knuckles feature of practically all of the products has the same appearance and can easily be identified by simply looking at the product. Thus, defendant’s printouts actually undermine his argument that a more detailed description of the weapon was needed. Defendant’s arguments also ignore that, to be sufficient, the factual allegations in an accusatory instrument need not be “a model of specificity[.]” Jackson, 18 N.Y.3d -21- at 747. In light of the commonly understood and self-evident meaning of the term “metal knuckles,” the complaint here was undoubtedly sufficient to make out that the recovered item was, indeed, metal knuckles. And it is especially inappropriate for defendant now to engage in hypertechnical parsing, produce far-fetched possibilities based on shopping websites, or protest the lack of even further detail in the complaint, because he waived his right to be prosecuted by information and then pled guilty. “A plea of guilty, as we have repeatedly observed, generally marks the end of a criminal case, not a gateway to further litigation.” People v. Hansen, 95 N.Y.2d 227, 230 (2000); see Konieczny, 2 N.Y.3d at 572; People v. Prescott, 66 N.Y.2d 216, 219 (1985). Giving defendants free rein to attack accusatory instruments on appeal even after they have waived their right to be prosecuted by information and have pled guilty “would allow defendants to manipulate the plea bargaining system” and to “undermine the finality of the conviction.” Dumay, 23 N.Y.3d at 523–24. Thus, a defendant who has pled guilty has “forfeited any challenges to nonjurisdictional defects in the accusatory instrument – only jurisdictional and certain constitutional issues may be raised on appeal.” Suber, 19 N.Y.3d at 250. Only “‘defects implicating the integrity of the process’” amount to jurisdictional defects in accusatory instruments, while “‘less fundamental flaws, such as evidentiary or technical matters,’” do not. Dreyden, 15 N.Y.3d at 103 (quoting Hansen, 95 N.Y.2d at 231). A misdemeanor complaint is jurisdictionally defective only if it “failed to supply -22- defendant with sufficient notice of the charged crime to satisfy the demands of due process and double jeopardy.” Dreyden, 15 N.Y.3d at 103; see Dumay, 23 N.Y.3d at 524; People v. Kasse, 22 N.Y.3d 1142, 1143 (2014). The factual averments in the misdemeanor complaint filed against defendant easily clear that low jurisdictional hurdle. Indeed, defendant does not even allege that the complaint failed to give him sufficient notice of the charges or protect him against a successive prosecution. Nor could he succeed on such a claim, given that the complaint “states the time, date and location of the[] events,” and the allegations “provide[d] him with enough information to put him on notice of the crime.” Dumay, 23 N.Y.3d at 524-26. The complaint specifically alleged that Officer Habrahamshon recovered a set of brass metal knuckles from defendant’s front right pocket (A5). These factual averments sufficed to permit defendant to prepare a defense. See Kalin, 12 N.Y.3d at 231. He knew what he was accused of doing and where and when he had done it. That enabled him to assess the possibility of contending, for example, that he had been somewhere else at the relevant time and place, or that he had not possessed anything. Even as to the allegation that the object he possessed was a set of brass metal knuckles—the portion of the accusatory instrument that defendant claims was inadequately pled—the complaint as drafted unquestionably afforded him the opportunity to prepare a defense that the object was not a set of “metal knuckles.” Although the complaint specifically identified what weapon he was charged with -23- possessing, defendant insists that more information was necessary. However, to prepare a defense that the recovered item did not qualify as “metal knuckles,” defense counsel could have simply inspected the item, see CPL 240.20(f), to determine there was a viable argument that it was not the type of weapon prohibited by the charged statute. To that end, in defendant’s demand to produce, defense counsel requested the opportunity to inspect the recovered weapon (A29). Presumably, defense counsel could have determined at such an inspection if the police had actually recovered a “dangle belly button ring” (A54), a lapel pin (A75), or a “lace crochet cocktail party clutch” (A82), rather than something that obviously constituted metal knuckles. In contending that the complaint was jurisdictionally inadequate, defendant relies heavily on Dreyden. As an initial matter, although defendant asserts that Dreyden “employed an extremely strict analysis of the facial sufficiency requirements in a case involving a misdemeanor complaint” (Defendant’s Brief: 11), this Court did no such thing. In truth, the Court reiterated that a misdemeanor complaint merely must give the defendant “sufficient notice of the charged crime to satisfy the demands of due process and double jeopardy.” Dreyden, 15 N.Y.3d at 103. Under that standard, the Court held that a complaint merely alleging that the defendant possessed a gravity knife, which “failed to give any support or explanation” for the officer’s belief that the knife recovered was actually a gravity knife, was jurisdictionally defective. Dreyden, 15 N.Y.3d at 103. The Court emphasized that “[n]ot every knife is a weapon” under the section of the Penal Law that prohibits the -24- possession of a gravity knife, and it highlighted that there is a specific statutory definition of a “gravity knife” set forth in Penal Law Section 265.00(5). Dreyden, 15 N.Y.3d at 103–04. Accordingly, the Court held that the accusatory instrument was defective because it contained only a “conclusory” statement that the knife was a gravity knife, and thus failed to provide a factual basis for officer’s conclusion that the knife was not “a pocket knife, craft knife, or other type of knife that does not fit the definition of a per se weapon as defined in Penal Law article 265.” Id. at 104. Given the nature of the weapon involved, the holding in Dreyden clearly has no applicability here. Based upon merely looking at a knife, it is impossible to tell whether it is a gravity knife rather than a knife that is legal to possess absent an intent to use it unlawfully against another person. Compare Penal Law § 265.01(1) with Penal Law § 265.01(2). Rather, to determine whether a knife is a gravity knife, a police officer must examine and test it to see if it opens by the force of gravity or “centrifugal force,” and additionally whether the blade locks “into place by means of a button, spring, lever, or other device.” Penal Law § 265.00(5). The determination that a knife qualifies as a gravity knife thus falls within this Court’s rule that “when an allegation involves a conclusion drawn by a police officer that involves the exercise of professional skill or experience, some explanation concerning the basis for that conclusion must be evident from the accusatory instrument.” Jackson, 18 N.Y.3d at 746; see also Kalin, 12 N.Y.3d at 230–31 (in the absence of a laboratory report, an -25- accusatory instrument must include a police officer’s explanation for why he concluded that an item was a controlled substance). Defendant’s attempt to equate “metal knuckles” with the gravity knife at issue in Dreyden (Defendant’s Brief: 14–16) fails because, unlike a gravity knife, a police officer need not conduct any kind of testing to determine whether an object is a set of metal knuckles. No scientific or technical principles, such as gravity, centrifugal force, or mechanisms for locking blades, are at issue when it comes to metal knuckles. Likewise, no application of professional skill or expertise is necessary to identify metal knuckles. Cf. Jackson, 18 N.Y.3d at 747 (holding that an observation that marijuana was open to public view did “not require the exercise of professional skill or experience on the part of a police officer”). Rather, it should be immediately obvious from simply looking at an item whether it constitutes “metal knuckles.” Consequently, the accusatory instrument’s averment that Officer Habrahamshon recovered “brass metal knuckles” from defendant’s pants pocket was enough by itself to establish reasonable cause to support the weapon possession charge. Nonetheless, in defendant’s eyes, the level of specificity mandated in Dreyden is “even more necessary” in this case because, unlike with gravity knives, there is no Penal Law definition for metal knuckles (Defendant’s Brief: 15). However, the opposite is true. As set forth above, the Legislature clearly determined that no statutory definition was necessary for certain weapons like metal knuckles precisely because the nature of those weapons is self-evident. -26- Defendant misses the point when he complains that not requiring additional details “would simply allow a police officer to simply state that a purported per se weapon is illegal, based solely on his statement that it is one” (Defendant’s Brief: 21– 22). The officer’s averment that he recovered brass metal knuckles from defendant merely had to provide defendant with adequate notice of the charges against him and protection against further prosecution. That was accomplished here. Suffice it to say, though, that would not be the end of the matter. This case concerns the sufficiency of a misdemeanor complaint. If defendant had decided not to plead guilty and to exercise his right to trial, then the trier of fact would have been required to determine whether the object recovered from defendant was a set of metal knuckles. See Singleton, 127 Misc.2d at 737 (“Because the issue before me is whether the accusatory instrument should be dismissed as defective, I make no ultimate finding of fact that the item constitutes metal knuckles. Only the trier of fact may make such a finding”); see generally People v. McPherson, 220 N.Y. 123, 125–26 (1917) (whether object constituted “bludgeon” was a question for trier of fact). In this case, the complaint “adequately” pled all elements of the crime, and defendant therefore forfeited any further challenge to the validity of the complaint by pleading guilty. See Kalin, 12 N.Y.3d at 232. Indeed, it is ironic that defendant is now protesting the level of detail in the complaint, because he could have insisted on being prosecuted under an information, yet he “decline[d] the protection” afforded by that right. See Dumay, 23 N.Y.3d at 522. Instead, defendant willingly pled guilty to a -27-