The People, Respondent,v.Ronel Joseph, Appellant.BriefN.Y.Sep 14, 2016DISTRICT ATTORNEY COUNTY OF NEW YORK ONE HOGAN PLACE New York, N. Y. 10013 (212) 335-9000 CYRUS R. VANCE, JR. DISTRICT ATTORNEY July 15, 2015 Honorable Andrew W. Klein Clerk of the Court New York Court of Appeals 20 Eagle Street Albany, New York 12207 -1095 Re: People v. Ronel Joseph N.Y. Co. Indictment No. 3120/2010, Rule 500.11 submission, APL-2015-00108 Dear Sir: The People respectfully submit this response to the letter submission of defendant, dated June 15, 2015. Defendant asks this Court to reverse a January 13, 2015 order of the Appellate Division, First Department, affirming a February 22, 2011 judgment of the Supreme Court, New York County (Laura A. Ward, J.). By that judgment, defendant was convicted, after a jury trial, of one count each of Burglary in the Second Degree (Penal Law § 140.25), Burglary in the Third Degree (Penal Law § 140.20), Resisting Arrest (Penal Law § 205.30), and Attempted Escape in the Second Degree (Penal Law §§ 110/205.10). Defendant was sentenced to an aggregate, determinate prison sentence of seven years, to be followed by five years of post-release supervision. On April 21, 2015, the Honorable Sallie Manzanet-Daniels granted defendant leave to appeal to this Court. The People have no objection to summary consideration of defendant’s appeal pursuant to Rule 500.11. On June 28, 2010, defendant burglarized the basement of the Greenleaf Deli at 518 Amsterdam Avenue in Manhattan. The Deli was located on the first floor of a seven-story building; all six floors above it contained residential apartments. Beneath the deli was a basement, which was accessible via a ground-level entrance that was D I S T R I C T A T T O R N E Y C O U N T Y O F N E W Y O R K 2 July 15, 2015 adjacent to the building. At about 8:30 p.m. that evening, Shorojit Roy was working at the cash register at the Deli, when he saw on surveillance video defendant entering the Deli basement with a flashlight and looking around at shelves containing store merchandise. Roy had never before seen defendant, and defendant had no permission to be in the basement. Roy closed the basement doors and locked defendant in, while another store employee called the police, who soon arrested defendant. While the police were arresting defendant, he struggled and fought them, leaving one officer with “banged up” and “sore” knees and defendant with a broken arm. By New York County Indictment Number 3120/2010, filed on July 2, 2010, a grand jury charged defendant with one count each of second-degree and third-degree burglary, resisting arrest, and attempted second-degree escape. On December 1, 2010, defendant’s trial commenced before the Honorable Laura A. Ward and a jury. On December 6, 2010, the jury convicted defendant as charged, and on January 13, 2011, Justice Ward sentenced defendant as noted above. Defendant appealed his conviction, arguing that his second-degree and third- degree burglary convictions were not supported by legally sufficient evidence and were against the weight of the evidence. Specifically, with respect to the second- degree burglary count charging him with burglary of a dwelling, defendant argued that the Deli basement was not a dwelling. With respect to both burglary counts, defendant argued that the People failed to prove his intent to commit a crime in the basement. On January 13, 2015, a majority of the Appellate Division affirmed defendant’s conviction. People v. Joseph, 124 A.D.3d 437 (1st Dept. 2015). First, with respect to the second-degree burglary conviction, the majority concluded that defendant had burglarized a dwelling, because he “ent[ered] into the basement of the store located on the ground floor of a small apartment building.” Joseph, 124 A.D.3d at 438. The majority observed that this Court’s recent decision in People v. McCray, 23 N.Y.3d 621 (2014), “reaffirmed the rule, established in Quinn v. People (71 NY 561 ), that ‘if a building contains a dwelling, a burglary committed in any part of that building is the burglary of a dwelling ….’” Joseph, 124 A.D.3d at 438. The Appellate Division recognized that there is a narrow exception to this principle “where the building is large and the crime is committed in a place so remote and inaccessible from the living quarters that the special dangers inherent in the burglary of a dwelling do not exist.’” Id. (quoting McCray, 23 N.Y.3d at 624). However, because the building at issue in this case is not “large,” the majority D I S T R I C T A T T O R N E Y C O U N T Y O F N E W Y O R K 3 July 15, 2015 concluded that the exception to the normal rule for burglary of a dwelling did not apply. Id. Next, the Appellate Division unanimously rejected defendant’s “challenges [to] the sufficiency and weight of the evidence supporting both of his burglary convictions with respect to the element of intent.” Joseph, 124 A.D.3d at 440. In particular, the court held that the evidence supported the jury’s determination that defendant entered the basement with the intent to commit a crime therein, and that the “jury reasonably rejected defendant’s implausible explanation for his behavior.” Id. In a dissenting opinion joined by the Honorable Diane Renwick, Justice Manzanet-Daniels disagreed with the majority’s holding with respect to defendant’s second-degree burglary conviction. In particular, Justice Manzanet-Daniels concluded that the Deli basement into which defendant had entered could not constitute a dwelling, because it was too remote and inaccessible from the apartments above. Joseph, 124 A.D.3d at 440-42 (Manzanet-Daniels, J., dissenting). On April 21, 2015, Justice Manzanet-Daniels granted defendant’s application for leave to appeal to this Court. In this Court, defendant again claims that his two burglary convictions were not based on legally sufficient evidence.1 First, despite the clear meaning of the burglary statute and this Court’s precedent, defendant insists that the basement into which he unlawfully entered is not a dwelling. Second, he challenges the jury’s determination with respect to his intent (see generally Defendant’s Rule 500.11 Letter [“DL”]). Defendant is wrong on every score. THE EVIDENCE AT TRIAL The People’s Case During the evening of June 28, 2010, SHOROJIT ROY was working at the Greenleaf Deli, located at 518 Amsterdam Avenue in Manhattan (Roy: 322, 329-30; see also Police Officer BRADLEY GORE: 262). The Deli sold assorted items 1 In his letter, defendant also contends that the People failed to prove his intent to commit a crime for the reasons “set out more fully in [his] briefs from the Appellate Division” (DL: 10). In those briefs, defendant argued that his burglary convictions were against the weight of the evidence (see, e.g., Defendant’s Brief Before the Appellate Division at 22-29). Of course, whether the jury’s verdict was against the weight of the evidence is beyond this Court’s power to review. CPL 460.20(1), 470.05(2), 470.15; People v. Danielson, 9 N.Y.3d 342 (2007); People v. Parker, 7 N.Y.3d 907 (2006). D I S T R I C T A T T O R N E Y C O U N T Y O F N E W Y O R K 4 July 15, 2015 including fast food, soft drinks, and cigarettes; advertisements for these items adorned the front of the Deli and were visible from the sidewalk (People’s Exs. 1, 2 [photographs]). The Deli was located on the first-floor of 518 Amsterdam Avenue, and all of the six floors above contained residential apartments (Gore: 262-63; Roy: 323-34). There was only one public entrance to the Deli on Amsterdam Avenue (Roy: 324; People’s Ex. 2). Above the entrance, a fire escape and ladder hung (People’s Exs. 1, 2 [photographs]). Underneath the Deli was a basement where employees stored soft drinks and water (Roy: 326; People’s Exs. 5, 6 [photographs]). The only entrance to the basement was through two doors located on the sidewalk, beside Amsterdam Avenue and adjacent to the Deli (Gore: 269; Roy: 325-26; People’s Ex. 2). Beneath the doors, a staircase descended to the basement. Only Deli employees were allowed there (Roy: 329). The Deli had a security camera in the basement, which displayed on a monitor in front of the cash register inside the Deli (Roy: 332-34). At approximately 8:30 p.m., Roy was working at the cash register when he saw on the surveillance monitor defendant entering the open doors to the Deli basement (Roy: 332). Although the doors were normally kept closed, they had been left open after an employee had retrieved some water bottles earlier (Roy: 332, 348-49). On the screen, Roy watched defendant shine a flashlight around at shelves holding store merchandise (Roy: 332, 349; People’s Ex. 10 [surveillance video]). Roy had never before seen defendant, and he had no permission to be in the basement (Roy: 335). Roy went outside, closed the basement doors, and locked defendant in the basement (Roy: 335). In response, defendant yelled, “Open the door,” and, “It’s very hot in here”; he said nothing about a lost cellphone (Roy: 349). Roy returned to the store, and his co-worker called 911 (Roy: 335-36). A few minutes later, at about 9:00 p.m., Police Officers BRADLEY GORE and ALBERTO NATAL arrived at the Deli. Roy showed them a surveillance video of defendant in the basement, pacing back in forth with a flashlight (Gore: 261-64, 266; Natal: 302-04; People’s Exs. 8 [photograph of surveillance monitor], 10). The officers and Roy went outside and unlocked the Deli basement doors. Officers Gore and Natal saw defendant inside the basement and asked him to climb out (Gore: 269- 73, Natal: 306-08; People’s Exs. 3, 9 [photographs]). The officers next arrested defendant. Once he was handcuffed, defendant exclaimed, “I’m not going to jail” (Gore: 290-91; Natal: 315). The police escorted defendant to their police car, but when Gore attempted to put defendant inside, defendant tried to “bolt[ ] on” Gore, running away and declaring that he was “not going to jail” (Gore: 274-76, 279; Natal: D I S T R I C T A T T O R N E Y C O U N T Y O F N E W Y O R K 5 July 15, 2015 310-11). Defendant dragged Gore the distance of about two car lengths, and then defendant and Gore fell to the street (Gore: 276-81; Natal: 311-13). On the ground, defendant continued to fight Gore, kicking and wrestling with a “lot of energy [ ] in the middle of a six-lane highway with traffic” (Gore: 279; Natal: 314). Gore sprayed defendant with “Mace” to subdue him (Gore: 279). From the struggle, Gore suffered from “banged up” and “sore” knees “for like a week”; defendant fractured his arm (Gore: 280). After defendant was secured, Gore searched him but did not recover a flashlight or property from the Greenleaf Deli. Gore did, however, recover from defendant a cellphone (Gore: 289-93, 296, 298-99).2 A few days later, Gore returned to the Deli and searched the basement, where he located a blue flashlight inside a carton (Gore: 282-83, 286, 288-89, 299; Roy: 344-45; People’s Ex. 11 [flashlight]). The Greenleaf Deli did not sell that model of flashlight (Roy: 344). The Defense Case During the evening of June 28, 2010, defendant RONEL JOSEPH was walking on the sidewalk next to the Greenleaf Deli. As defendant walked by, he happened to take his cellphone out of his pocket, but the phone “by some chance just fell” into the open basement doors next to the Greenleaf Deli (Joseph: 360-62, 369-75, 381). Although he later admitted at trial that he should have gone inside the Deli first, defendant immediately walked down the stairs into the basement to look for his phone. The basement was dark, so defendant turned on the flashlight he had on his keychain and started looking around the floor (Joseph: 362, 375-77). Defendant “didn’t really look at the shelves” or the store merchandise. He searched for several minutes, but was never able to find his phone (Joseph: 363, 377, 379).3 After about three or four minutes, defendant heard the basement doors being shut and locked. As he walked to the doors, a man asked him, “What are you doing down there?” Defendant replied that he was looking for his phone. After the man locked defendant inside, defendant looked for another exit, but was unable to find one (Joseph: 361-64, 378-81). Eventually, the doors were opened, and two police officers arrested and handcuffed defendant (Joseph: 364, 383-83). As they walked to 2 Although Officer Gore recalled that he recovered the cellphone from defendant, he did not write on a property voucher from where he recovered the phone (Gore: 289-93, 298-99). 3 At trial, defendant denied that the flashlight Officer Gore recovered from the basement was his (Joseph: 377). D I S T R I C T A T T O R N E Y C O U N T Y O F N E W Y O R K 6 July 15, 2015 the police car, defendant tried to explain his innocent reason for entering the basement. In response, defendant and one of the officers “got into a little argument.” The officer punched defendant in the face twice and then “pepper-sprayed” and “tackled” him. On the ground, the officer “twist[ed]” defendant’s “arm up . . . towards [his] neck” (Joseph: 365-67, 384-85, 387-89).4 POINT I CONTRARY TO DEFENDANT’S CLAIMS, HE WAS PROPERLY CONVICTED OF SECOND-DEGREE BURGLARY (Answering DL, Point I). At trial, the jury convicted defendant of second-degree burglary for trespassing in a dwelling with the intent to commit a crime therein. On appeal, defendant asserts that the basement of the Greenleaf Deli that he entered “was not a ‘dwelling’” under this Court’s McCray and Quinn decisions, because there was a “lack of access” between the basement and the apartments above, and because his entrance posed no danger to the residents just two stories above him. In addition, he contends that the Appellate Division misconstrued this Court’s precedent in concluding that because the building at issue was not “large,” the exception to the general rule for a burglary of a dwelling should not apply here (see DL at 1-2, 5-9). In fact, it is defendant who misconstrues this Court’s precedent. Indeed, as this Court has repeatedly held, “[g]enerally, if a building contains a dwelling, a burglary committed in any part of that building is the burglary of a dwelling.” McCray, 23 N.Y.3d at 624 (emphasis added); Quinn, 71 N.Y. at 573; accord People v. Quattlebaum, 91 N.Y.2d 744, 747 (1998) (“a ground floor commercial space ‘under the same roof’ of a building otherwise used for residences [is], in fact, a dwelling”). This is true even when there is no “internal communication” between the location burglarized and the residential areas of the building, because, in places “in close congruity” to places of repose, the risk of “midnight terror” can arise even if there is no instant access between them. Quinn, 71 N.Y.at 573; see also McCray, 23 N.Y.3d at 627 (dangers created by burglary can be present even if “the place of the burglary and the sleeping quarters are not instantly accessible to each other”). Likewise, the relevant burglary statute provides that a “dwelling” is any building 4 Defendant later received treatment for his arm at Roosevelt Hospital. Defendant’s phone was picked up for him by “Nicholas Furse” at the police station; Officer Gore “said he found it behind the stairs” (Joseph: 367-68, 390). D I S T R I C T A T T O R N E Y C O U N T Y O F N E W Y O R K 7 July 15, 2015 “which is usually occupied by a person lodging therein at night,” and that “[w]here a building consists of two or more units separately secured or occupied, each unit shall be deemed both a separate building in itself and a part of the main building.” Penal Law §§ 140.00(2), (3). To be sure, this Court has recognized an exception to that general rule. “[W]here the building is large and the crime is committed in a place so remote and inaccessible from the living quarters that the special dangers inherent in the burglary of a dwelling do not exist[,]” it is not proper to find that the defendant burglarized a dwelling. McCray, 23 N.Y.3d at 624 (emphasis added); see also Quinn, 71 N.Y. 573-74 (discussing how, “in a large building,” dwelling-houses might become “so severed” from the rest of the building that a defendant’s entry into the commercial space might not constitute burglary of a dwelling). Applying these principles here, it is clear that the Deli basement was a dwelling. It is undisputed that the stories above the Deli contained residential apartments. Thus, because the basement was under the same roof and within the same four walls as those dwellings, the basement too was a dwelling for purposes of the second- degree burglary statute. See Penal Law §§ 140.00(2), (3); McCray, 23 N.Y. at 624; Quinn, 571 N.Y. at 573. On appeal, defendant argues that the exception to the general rule must apply, and that the Appellate Division erred by holding that the exception only applies to “large” buildings. According to him, “[n]either McCray nor its predecessor, Quinn, support a finding that only ‘large’ buildings may be exempted from the reach of the second-degree burglary statute” (see DL: 6-7, 8-9). To the contrary, in decisions separated by more than a century, that is precisely what this Court has held in discussing materially similar definitions of a dwelling in Quinn and McCray. In Quinn, this Court confronted the question of whether the defendant burglarized a dwelling when he broke into a store on the lower level of a building that had residences on the upper levels. Quinn, 71 N.Y. at 564-65. There was “no internal communication” between the store and the residences on the upper floors, and to get from the store to the residences, it was necessary to go outside into a yard and then up an external set of stairs. Id. Notwithstanding the lack of access to the residences from the store, the Court held that the store was a dwelling. Id. at 573. In that case, the Court was interpreting the crime of first-degree burglary under the Revised Statutes, but noted that “the definition of the crime of burglary in the first D I S T R I C T A T T O R N E Y C O U N T Y O F N E W Y O R K 8 July 15, 2015 degree, given by the Revised Statutes” did not “materially differ” from the common- law definition of the crime. Quinn, 71 N.Y. 563, 565. When reviewing the relevant case law from England, New York, and other states, the Court found numerous cases in which, despite a lack of communication between a shop and dwelling under the same roof, entry into the shop was held to be burglary of a dwelling. Id. at 566-73. In fact, the Court found “no decision” in which “the room or building entered, was under the same roof and within the same four walls” where “it was not held to be a part of the dwelling-house within the statutory or common-law definition of burglary.” Id. at 573. The Court further concluded that, in enacting the burglary provision, the legislature “did not mean” to exclude from the provision’s purview “a room, or part of the same structure with the dwelling house, within the same four outer walls, and beneath the same roof, through which there was no internal communication between the room entered and the room of the sleeper.” Id. at 571- 72. In fact, in the Revised Statutes, the legislature created different degrees of the crime of burglary and “sought to class them according to their atrocity.” Id. at 569. While the common-law definition of burglary extended to “uninhabited out-houses” such as barns on the same property as the dwelling, the enactors of the Revised Statutes sought to limit the crime of first-degree burglary to the same structure or building that contained a dwelling. Id. at 569-72. Thus, under this well-settled law, the Court concluded that the store into which the defendant broke was a dwelling, because it was “under the same roof and within the same four walls as the “dwelling-house” above. Id. at 568, 573. Indeed, because the store was “a part” of “a whole building in other parts of which there were persons dwelling,” this made the store a “dwelling-house” too, even though the store was not “connected with the rest of a building by an internal, [e]nclosed, or covered communication.” Id. at 573; see also McCray, 23 N.Y.3d at 626-27 (citing Quinn for the principle that the dangers posed by burglary of a dwelling “are created in significant degree when the crime is committed ‘in close contiguity’ with a ‘place of repose’ even though the place of the burglary and the sleeping quarters are not instantly accessible to each other”). As alluded to above and discussed more fully below, the applicable second- degree burglary statute in the Penal Law essentially embodies the common-law definition interpreted in Quinn, and thus, Quinn remains binding precedent with respect to the definition of burglary of a dwelling. And, Quinn involved a straight- forward application of the general rule—i.e., that burglary of any part of a building containing a dwelling constitutes a burglary of a dwelling. See Quinn, 71 N.Y. at 573; D I S T R I C T A T T O R N E Y C O U N T Y O F N E W Y O R K 9 July 15, 2015 see also McCray, 23 N.Y.3d at 626 (in Quinn, this Court “held the shop to be part of the ‘dwelling-house,’ despite the absence of internal communication with the place where people slept, because it was ‘within the same four outer walls, and under the same roof’”) (quoting Quinn, 71 N.Y. at 565). The holding in Quinn did not, as defendant contends (DL: 8-9), turn on the issue of whether the residents in the dwelling-house above the store were at greater risk because they could have confronted the defendant in their yard or on the staircase leading from the yard to the residences above, or whether the defendant had “access[ ]” to the residents above. See Quinn, 71 N.Y. at 573. Indeed, the Court did not even consider the defendant’s access to the residences above, and instead repeatedly acknowledged that there was “no internal communication between the store and their rooms.” Id. Nevertheless, because the store was “within the same outer walls and under the same roof” as the dwellings above, it was a dwelling. Id. Of course, the Court in Quinn also recognized that situations may arise in which it would make no sense to apply the general rule. As the Court explained, it could envision how, “in a large building,” “a part of a dwelling-house may be so severed from the rest of it, . . . as to be no longer a place in which burglary” of a dwelling “can be committed.” Id. at 573-74. But, the Court saw no cause to apply such an exception to the building at issue in Quinn. See id. As mentioned, burglary of a dwelling under the applicable Penal Law provision is defined essentially the same way as common-law burglary was defined and as explained in Quinn. Thus, prior to McCray, this Court in People v. Quattlebaum reaffirmed the holding in Quinn and cited with approval other decisions that were in line with Quinn’s holding. Cf. Quattlebaum, 91 N.Y.2d at 747-49 (where the defendant trespassed on the ground floor of a seven-story school that had on the fifth floor an office with a bed that was used “‘rarely’” overnight by staff and guests, the question of whether the school was a dwelling turned entirely on the question of whether the bed was “‘usually occupied’”); see also id. at 747 (citing People v. Rohena, 186 A.D.2d 509, 511 (1st Dept. 1992), lv denied, 81 N.Y.2d 794 (1993), which held that a non- occupied doctor’s office in an apartment building was a dwelling; and People v. Johnson, 162 A.D.2d 267, 268 (1st Dept. 1990), lv denied, 76 N.Y.2d 894 (1990), which held that a music shop on the bottom of a residential building was a dwelling). In McCray, as noted, this Court began its decision by “reaffirm[ing]” Quinn’s “general rule” for burglary of a dwelling, as well as the exception for “large” buildings. McCray, 23 N.Y.3d 624, 629. But, in McCray, and unlike in Quinn, this Court was D I S T R I C T A T T O R N E Y C O U N T Y O F N E W Y O R K 10 July 15, 2015 confronted with a very large building—a midtown Manhattan building standing more than seventeen stories and containing numerous businesses, including a Hilton hotel and Madame Tussaud’s Wax Museum. McCray, 23 N.Y.3d at 624. The defendant in that case had broken into two commercial spaces: a locker room in the Hilton and the wax museum, both of which were several stories removed from the guest room floors. See id. at 624-25. In fact, while the guest rooms were on the seventeenth floor and above, the locker room was on the mezzanine “a few steps” above the fourteenth floor, and the wax museum was no higher than the fourteenth floor. Id. Accordingly, in the case of this “large” building, the Court was tasked with considering whether it would “make sense” to apply the general rule for burglary of a dwelling, or the exception to that rule. See id. at 629-30. Applying these principles, the Court concluded that, notwithstanding the great size of the building at issue, the commercial spaces into which defendant had broken constituted dwellings. McCray, 23 N.Y.3d at 629-30. In reaching this determination, the Court noted that, despite the distance between the rooms where hotel guests slept and the commercial spaces into which defendant had entered, there were internal staircases connecting both of the commercial spaces with the guest room floors. Id. at 630. With respect to the locker room, an internal staircase connected that room to “all floors of the hotel. Id. In addition, “[t]hough the burglary” of the wax museum “was not physically close to the guest rooms,” the rooms were “eas[y] to access” from the wax museum via the internal staircase. Id. Thus, even though the building at issue in McCray was exactly the type of very large building envisioned by this Court in Quinn—i.e., one so large that a burglary of one part “may create virtually no risk” to the residents in other parts—this Court nevertheless concluded that defendant’s entry into the locker room and wax museum constituted burglaries of a dwelling, because there were internal staircases connecting those areas with the hotel guest rooms above. See McCray, 23 N.Y.3d at 627, 629-30. The Court readily acknowledged that, as in Quinn, there need not be “internal connection” or instant accessibility between the residence and the space burglarized for the space burglarized to be considered a dwelling. Id. at 626-27. But in McCray, because the building was so large that it might not otherwise have made sense to apply the general rule for burglary of a dwelling, the Court was required to consider the accessibility of the guest rooms from the places defendant burglarized. See id. at 629-30. And after finding that they were indeed accessible, this Court determined that it did make sense to conclude that defendant had burglarized a dwelling. See id. D I S T R I C T A T T O R N E Y C O U N T Y O F N E W Y O R K 11 July 15, 2015 Here, by contrast, and as the Appellate Division concluded, the building at issue was quite simply not “large.” See Joseph, 124 A.D.3d at 440. Rather, it was a seven-story residential apartment building that had one commercial unit on the first floor, the Greenleaf Deli, and six stories of residential apartments above (see Gore: 262-63; Roy: 323-24; People’s Ex. 1 [photograph]). Indeed, the building at issue was the quintessential multiuse building; like countless other such buildings, it contained several stories of apartments and one business on the first floor. Additionally, in contrast to the seventeen-plus-story, multiuse building in McCray, and the even larger skyscrapers found in Manhattan, the building at issue here was relatively small, and almost completely residential. Thus, if the “exception” were applied to this building, the exception would swallow the “general” rule for burglary of a dwelling, as few multiuse, multistory buildings would be small enough to qualify for the “general” rule. But, as stated, that is not what this Court held in Quinn in McCray. Instead, this Court emphasized that the “general” rule applies, and an exception exists only in cases with “large” buildings without internal connections between the commercial space trespassed upon and the residential portions of the building. McCray, 23 N.Y.3d at 624; Quinn, 71 N.Y. at 573-74. Moreover, the building at issue here is almost identical to the building at issue in Quinn, to which this Court unhesitatingly applied the general rule for burglary of a dwelling. See Quinn, 71 N.Y. at 573. Both buildings contained commercial spaces on the lower levels, and residential apartments on the stories above. Id. at 564-65. Additionally, in both buildings, there “was no internal communication between the commercial units below and the apartments above. Id. at 564, 573. Nevertheless, the Court applied the general rule and held that, because the store defendant burglarized was under the same roof and within the same four walls as the residences above, the defendant had burglarized a dwelling. Id. at 573. If the Court saw no cause to apply the exception for large buildings to the building in Quinn, surely there is no reason for it to apply it to the almost identical building at issue here. Thus, under McCray and Quinn, the Appellate Division and trial court both correctly concluded that the Deli basement was a “dwelling” for purposes of the second-degree burglary statute. Put simply, the building at issue in this case was not “large,” and so the exception to the general rule for burglary of a dwelling does not apply. See McCray, 22 N.Y.3d at 624; Quinn, 71 N.Y. at 573-74. And, under the well- settled general rule, because the basement was “within the same outer walls and under the same roof” as the residential apartments above it, it constituted a dwelling. See id.; see also Penal Law §§ 140.00(2), (3). Further, contrary to defendant’s claims (DL: 5, 7- 8), and just as in Quinn, that there was no internal communication between the D I S T R I C T A T T O R N E Y C O U N T Y O F N E W Y O R K 12 July 15, 2015 basement and the residences above is simply of no moment. Once again, this Court has repeatedly recognized that there need not be “instant access” between the residences and the space burglarized for there to be burglary of a dwelling under the general rule. See McCray, 23 N.Y.3d at 627; Quinn, 71 N.Y. at 573. Indeed, in contrast to McCray, the building at issue was not so large that the lack of internal connectivity is even relevant, let alone dispositive. See McCray, 23 N.Y.3d at 629-30. Lastly, defendant argues that his actions did not constitute a burglary of a dwelling because those actions “did not create any ‘enhanced danger’ to the residents” just two stories above him (DL: 7). He is incorrect. After all, the burglary statute at issue here does not require the People to prove that defendant in a particular case actually caused harm to or excited terror in the residents of the building into which he entered. Rather, to constitute burglary of a dwelling, it is enough that the “midnight terror” to which the statute is directed “may arise” given the “close congruity” of the place burglarized with the place of repose, “even though the former has no relation to the latter by reason of domestic use or adaptation.” Quinn, 71 N.Y. at 567 (emphasis added); see also McCray, 23 N.Y.3d at 627 (burglary of building containing a dwelling is “more likely to end in violence” even if the place of repose is not instantly accessible from the place burglarized). Thus, the exception to the general rule applies only when the building is so “large” and the places of repose are so “remote and inaccessible” that the burglary poses “virtually no risk” to the residents. McCray, 24 N.Y.3d at 627. Here, as the Appellate Division observed, because the seven-story residential apartment building at issue was not “large” within the meaning of McCray, “it cannot be said that there was ‘virtually no risk’ that the people living in the apartments would not ‘even be conscious’” of defendant’s presence. Joseph, 124 A.D.3d at 440 (quoting McCray, 23 N.Y.3d at 627). Indeed, in contrast to the “large” buildings with “remote and inaccessible” residences envisioned by this Court when discussing the exception to the general rule, see McCray, 23 N.Y.3d at 627, the building at issue in this case is small enough that it is entirely conceivable that unlawful entry to the Deli basement would pose danger to the residents above. In fact, the entrance to the Deli basement was adjacent to the front of the building, just one story below the residential apartments. Under this Court’s well-settled precedent, the instant defendant, with requisite intent, entered the basement stairway—while still just a floor away from the residents above—he completed the burglary. See People v. King, 61 N.Y.2d 550, 555 (1984) (the entry element of burglary is satisfied “when a person intrudes within a building, no matter how slightly, with any part of his [ ] body”); People v. McFarland, D I S T R I C T A T T O R N E Y C O U N T Y O F N E W Y O R K 13 July 15, 2015 106 A.D.3d 1129 (3d Dept. 2013) (affirming conviction for burglary of a dwelling when defendant kicked in the window to an apartment building). Given the close proximity between the basement and the residences above, there was more than a slight risk that a burglar’s entry into the basement would excite “midnight terror” in the residences above, notwithstanding the lack of connection between the basement and the apartments. See Quinn, 71 N.Y. at 567. As defendant himself acknowledges, it is possible that a resident of the building could encounter a burglar on the sidewalk. According to him, however, this was not a sufficient danger to the residents above, because here, a burglar could only encounter a resident on the public sidewalk. Indeed, defendant seeks to contrast the danger in this case with the danger in Quinn by arguing that the residents in Quinn were at greater danger because they could have encountered that burglar in the yard (see DL: 8). To the contrary, defendant’s entrance into a basement in close proximity to apartments represented a “frightening intrusion” that might foreseeably “end in violence.” Whether that violence played out in a private yard or on a public street is irrelevant. See McCray, 23 N.Y.3d at 627; Joseph, 124 A.D.3d at 440. In sum, because the basement that defendant burglarized was “within the same outer walls and under the same roof” as the apartments above, it was a dwelling under this Court’s well-settled precedent. Moreover, the exception for “large buildings” first recognized in Quinn is inapplicable to the seven-story residential apartment building in this case. Quinn, 71 N.Y. at 573; see also McCray, 23 N.Y.3d at 624; see Penal Law §§ 140.00, 140.25(2). POINT II THE EVIDENCE AT TRIAL OVERWHELMINGLY DEMONSTRATED DEFENDANT’S INTENT TO COMMIT A CRIME IN THE DELI BASEMENT (Answering DL, Point II). Defendant further contends that the People failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he intended to commit a crime when he entered the Deli basement (DL: 9-10). He is incorrect. First, it is well established that “a verdict is legally sufficient if there is any valid line of reasoning and permissible inferences that could lead a rational person to conclude that every element of the charged crime has been proven beyond a D I S T R I C T A T T O R N E Y C O U N T Y O F N E W Y O R K 14 July 15, 2015 reasonable doubt.” People v. Gordon, 23 N.Y.3d 643, 649 (2014) (internal citations, quotation marks, and alterations omitted). Thus, a reviewing court must “marshal competent facts most favorable to the People,” People v. Danielson, 9 N.Y.3d 342, 349 (2007), and draw all reasonable inferences in their favor. People v. Kennedy, 47 N.Y.2d 196, 203 (1979). Further, whether a defendant possesses the requisite criminal intent is a classic issue for the jury to resolve. See, e.g., People v. Cabey, 85 N.Y.2d 417, 421-22 (1995). As always, intent may be established by defendant’s conduct as well as by the surrounding circumstances. People v. Bracey, 41 N.Y.2d 296, 301-02 (1977). Moreover, on issues of intent, “[c]ompeting inferences . . . if not unreasonable, are within the exclusive domain of the finders of fact.” People v. Barnes, 50 N.Y.2d 375, 381 (1980). Thus, whenever a jury has drawn a reasonable inference that a defendant acted with the requisite intent—in this case, an intent to commit a crime within the basement— that factual finding should not be second-guessed on appeal. See Barnes, 50 N.Y.2d at 381; accord People v. Bueno, 18 N.Y.3d 160, 169 (2011). Here, viewing the evidence “in a manner most favorable to the prosecution and indulging in all reasonable inferences in the People’s favor,” it is clear that the jury rationally concluded that defendant entered the basement with intent to commit a crime there. See Bueno, 18 N.Y.3d at 169. To begin, the evidence at trial established that the basement was off-limits to the general public; defendant himself admitted at trial that he should not have just entered the basement without getting permission from a store employee to do so (Roy: 329; Joseph: 376). Further, the front of the store was also adorned with colorful advertisements about the items for sale (see People’s Exs. 1 & 2 [photographs], and so the jury could reasonably conclude that defendant, seeing the advertisements next to the Deli, decided to enter the Deli’s basement to see what merchandise he could steal. See People v. Mackey, 49 N.Y.2d 274, 279-80 (1980) (“intent necessary for burglary can be inferred from the circumstances of the entry itself”). Critically, defendant’s later claim that he had entered the basement to look for his lost cellphone was conclusively disproven by the People’s evidence. Indeed, on the Deli surveillance video shown to the jury, defendant was seen walking around the basement and looking around at the shelves containing merchandise (see People’s Ex. 8). If, as defendant later claimed, he was there to find his errant cellphone, he should have been scouring the floor, too, not just standing straight up and looking at the shelves. Additionally, defendant demonstrated his consciousness of guilt. Indeed, D I S T R I C T A T T O R N E Y C O U N T Y O F N E W Y O R K 15 July 15, 2015 when the police opened the entrance to the basement, defendant secreted his flashlight in a basement carton, from which Officer Gore later recovered it. Defendant also resisted arrest and attempted to escape when handcuffed. See People v. Kims, 24 N.Y.3d 422, 439 (2014) (“[e]vidence of defendant’s escape was probative of consciousness of guilt”); see also Cabey, 85 N.Y.2d at 421-22 (jury’s finding with respect to defendant’s intent was supported by evidence including defendant’s “consciousness of guilt”). Moreover, contrary to defendant’s claims that no evidence “refuted” his innocent explanation for being in the basement (DL: 10), defendant’s story for being in the basement—looking for his cellphone—was entirely discredited by the fact that Officer Gore recovered defendant’s cellphone from him when Gore arrested defendant (Gore: 290). On appeal, defendant asserts that this Court should overturn his conviction because he did not attempt to take anything from the basement (DL: 9). Of course, defendant was caught and locked in the basement within minutes of entering, so he did not have much time to steal or commit any other crimes there. In any event, as this Court has recognized, although the People must prove that a defendant entered a space with the intent to commit a crime, “[t]here is no requirement that the People allege or establish what particular crime was intended, or that the intended crime actually be committed.” People v. Mahboubian, 74 N.Y.2d 174, 193 (1989). Thus, as the jury correctly concluded, defendant’s failure to actually steal anything from the basement is simply not dispositive in regards to his intent to commit a crime. In sum, when viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the People, is it clear the jury’s determination that defendant entered the basement with intent to commit a crime there was a rational one. Accordingly, it should not be disturbed on appeal. See Bueno, 18 N.Y.3d at 169.