11 Cited authorities

  1. People v. Kalin

    2009 N.Y. Slip Op. 2446 (N.Y. 2009)   Cited 577 times
    In People v Kalin (12 NY3d at 231-232), the Court of Appeals indicated that the factual part of an information charging criminal possession of a controlled substance in the seventh degree must "adequately [identify] the particular drug, [allege] that the accused possessed that illegal substance, [state] the officer's familiarity with and training regarding the identification of the drug, [provide] some information as to why the officer concluded that the substance was a particular type of illegal drug, and [supply] sufficient notice of the charged crime to satisfy the demands of due process and double jeopardy."
  2. People v. Alejandro

    70 N.Y.2d 133 (N.Y. 1987)   Cited 1,119 times
    In People v Alejandro (70 NY2d 133, 138 [1987]), we explained that compared with other accusatory instruments, the "distinguishing characteristic of an information" is "its use as the sole instrument upon which the defendant could be prosecuted... which prompted the Legislature to write in special restrictions applicable to informations...."
  3. People v. Dumas

    68 N.Y.2d 729 (N.Y. 1986)   Cited 725 times   1 Legal Analyses
    Noting lack of allegation that police officer was an expert in identifying marijuana or that defendant represented it as such, to support charge that defendant sold marijuana
  4. People v. Jones

    2007 N.Y. Slip Op. 9070 (N.Y. 2007)   Cited 198 times
    Dismissing an information alleging disorderly conduct because there was no indication that the defendant "when he stood in the middle of the sidewalk . . . had the intent to or recklessly created a risk of causing 'public inconvenience, annoyance or alarm'"
  5. People v. Reisman

    29 N.Y.2d 278 (N.Y. 1971)   Cited 237 times
    In People v Reisman (29 N.Y.2d 278, 285), the Court of Appeals noted that "[k]nowledge, of course, may be shown circumstantially by conduct or directly by admission" and, generally, "possession suffices to permit the inference that the possessor knows what he possesses, especially, but not exclusively, if it is in his hands, on his person, in his vehicle, or on his premises" (see also, People v Tirado, 47 A.D.2d 193, affd 38 N.Y.2d 955).
  6. People v. Suber

    2012 N.Y. Slip Op. 3573 (N.Y. 2012)   Cited 38 times
    In People v. Suber, 19 NY3d 247, 252, 946 N.Y.S.2d 552 (2012), the Court of Appeals held that “CPL Sec. 100.40(1) does not mandate corroboration of an admission in an information.
  7. People v. Mizell

    72 N.Y.2d 651 (N.Y. 1988)   Cited 41 times
    In Mizell the New York Court of Appeals found that Penal Law § 220.03 applies even to unusable quantities of drug residue because that application would serve the statute's purpose of reducing illegal drug use.
  8. State v. Baker

    912 S.W.2d 541 (Mo. Ct. App. 1996)   Cited 16 times
    In Baker, unlike here, the State conceded that "there was no visible or measurable unused or unburnt cocaine in... the pipe" -- only "burnt residue left from past use of the pipe to smoke cocaine[.
  9. People v. Aguilar

    223 Cal.App.2d 119 (Cal. Ct. App. 1963)   Cited 35 times
    In Aguilar itself, the defendant admitted that he was currently using heroin and acknowledged that the objects which bore the residue were part of his "outfit."
  10. People v. Mason

    136 Misc. 2d 968 (N.Y. Crim. Ct. 1987)   Cited 7 times

    September 9, 1987 Caesar D. Cirigliano and Beth Levy for defendant. Mario Merola, District Attorney (Frank Veith of counsel), for plaintiff. MARCY L. KAHN, J. Defendant Riley Mason was arrested on April 29, 1987 and charged with criminal possession of a controlled substance in the seventh degree (Penal Law § 220.03), criminally using drug paraphernalia in the second degree (Penal Law § 220.50), loitering in the first degree (Penal Law § 240.36), resisting arrest (Penal Law § 205.30) and disorderly