Concluding that "[d]efendant's challenges to the population studies relied on by Lifecodes to estimate the probability of a coincidental match go not to admissibility, but to the weight of the evidence, which should be left to the trier of fact."
Holding that plaintiffs who have suffered actual injury cannot obtain compensatory damage awards from a defendant if they have already obtained an award that fully compensates them for the injury from another defendant
Holding in defamation action that an award of punitive damages requires "circumstances of aggravation or outrage, such as spite or malice, or a fraudulent or evil motive on the part of the defendant, or such a conscious and deliberate disregard of the interests of others that the conduct may be called willful or wanton"
Holding opinion of proposed expert, that complaints of residents near manufacturing plant were more probably than not related to their exposure to formaldehyde from plant, was not based on any knowledge about what amounts of wood fibers impregnated with formaldehyde involve appreciable risk of harm to human beings who breathe them, and so district court should have excluded expert's testimony
12 A.D.3d 307 (N.Y. App. Div. 2004) Cited 97 times
In Marsh (supra) the court reasoned that "in circumstances such as these, the question of whether the challenged testimony is admissible should not involve weighing the number of experts that concur in the expert's opinion against the number that do not, or independently deciding on the soundness of the competing experts' views.