17 Cited authorities

Brady v. United States
397 U.S. 742 (1970) Cited 7,302 times 17 Legal Analyses
Holding that "a voluntary plea of guilty intelligently made in the light of the then applicable law does not become vulnerable because later judicial decisions indicate that the plea rested on a faulty premise"
People v. Louree
8 N.Y.3d 541 (N.Y. 2007) Cited 319 times 5 Legal Analyses
Reversing the Appellate Division for affirming the trial court's decision denying defendant's motion to withdraw his plea despite the failure to mention PRS during the allocution
People v. Greene
2009 N.Y. Slip Op. 1067 (N.Y. 2009) Cited 165 times
Distinguishing Earley because the sentencing court never imposed PRS, a substantive portion of the defendant's sentence, whereas, in Gill, the sentencing court merely failed to characterize the sentence as concurrent or consecutive
People v. Hill
2007 N.Y. Slip Op. 8782 (N.Y. 2007) Cited 165 times 2 Legal Analyses
In Hill, the new sentence consisted of a period of imprisonment less than the determinate sentence originally imposed, followed by a period of PRS that together equaled the incarceratory period of the original sentence (see Hill, 9 N.Y.3d at 192, 849 N.Y.S.2d 13, 879 N.E.2d 152).
People v. Murray
2010 N.Y. Slip Op. 5600 (N.Y. 2010) Cited 131 times
In Murray, the Judge informed the defendant that he would “probably” receive youthful offender status and a nine-month sentence if he complied with certain plea conditions set by the court.
People v. Gravino
2010 N.Y. Slip Op. 4025 (N.Y. 2010) Cited 129 times
Holding that the “fact and length of post-release supervision” are “direct consequences of a plea” to any offense, whereas “SORA registration and the terms and conditions of probation” are not
People v. Harnett
2011 N.Y. Slip Op. 744 (N.Y. 2011) Cited 99 times
In Harnett, the Court of Appeals determined that on the record before it, it could not determine "whether [the defendant's] lawyer told him about SOMTA or whether, considering the facts of defendant's situation, SOMTA would have been a significant factor in the evaluation of a plea bargain" (id. at 207–208, 920 N.Y.S.2d 246, 945 N.E.2d 439).
People v. Fuggazzatto
62 N.Y.2d 862 (N.Y. 1984) Cited 140 times 1 Legal Analyses
In People v. Fuggazzatto (62 N.Y.2d 862), two indictments were filed simultaneously and were therefore subject to identical time periods for the People to announce their readiness for trial under CPL 30.30.
Wilson v. McGinnis
413 F.3d 196 (2d Cir. 2005) Cited 74 times
Holding that the failure of the state court to advise a defendant that his sentences could run consecutively did not unreasonably apply the Supreme Court's general principle that a plea must be knowing, intelligent, and voluntary to be valid
People v. McAlpin
2011 N.Y. Slip Op. 8456 (N.Y. 2011) Cited 45 times
In McAlpin, the Court of Appeals determined that preservation was not required because the lower court did not inform the defendant that he would be subject to postrelease supervision until “moments before imposing the sentence” (id. at 938, 936 N.Y.S.2d 666, 960 N.E.2d 435).

The People, Respondent,v.Rafael L. Belliard, Appellant.

17 Cited authorities

Holding that "a voluntary plea of guilty intelligently made in the light of the then applicable law does not become vulnerable because later judicial decisions indicate that the plea rested on a faulty premise"

Reversing the Appellate Division for affirming the trial court's decision denying defendant's motion to withdraw his plea despite the failure to mention PRS during the allocution

Distinguishing Earley because the sentencing court never imposed PRS, a substantive portion of the defendant's sentence, whereas, in Gill, the sentencing court merely failed to characterize the sentence as concurrent or consecutive

In Hill, the new sentence consisted of a period of imprisonment less than the determinate sentence originally imposed, followed by a period of PRS that together equaled the incarceratory period of the original sentence (see Hill, 9 N.Y.3d at 192, 849 N.Y.S.2d 13, 879 N.E.2d 152).

In Murray, the Judge informed the defendant that he would “probably” receive youthful offender status and a nine-month sentence if he complied with certain plea conditions set by the court.

Holding that the “fact and length of post-release supervision” are “direct consequences of a plea” to any offense, whereas “SORA registration and the terms and conditions of probation” are not

In People v. Fuggazzatto (62 N.Y.2d 862), two indictments were filed simultaneously and were therefore subject to identical time periods for the People to announce their readiness for trial under CPL 30.30.

Holding that the failure of the state court to advise a defendant that his sentences could run consecutively did not unreasonably apply the Supreme Court's general principle that a plea must be knowing, intelligent, and voluntary to be valid

In McAlpin, the Court of Appeals determined that preservation was not required because the lower court did not inform the defendant that he would be subject to postrelease supervision until “moments before imposing the sentence” (id. at 938, 936 N.Y.S.2d 666, 960 N.E.2d 435).