9 Cited authorities

  1. Collier v. Zambito

    1 N.Y.3d 444 (N.Y. 2004)   Cited 252 times
    Affirming grant of summary judgment when there “was no evidence that the dog's behavior was ever threatening or menacing” but rather, “the dog's actions—barking and running around—[were] consistent with normal canine behavior. Barking and running around are what dogs do.”
  2. Bard v. Jahnke

    2006 N.Y. Slip Op. 3440 (N.Y. 2006)   Cited 179 times
    In Bard v. Jahnke, 6 N.Y.3d 592, 815 N.Y.S.2d 16, 848 N.E.2d 463 (2006), we expounded upon the relationship between ordinary negligence principles and the strict liability cause of action permitted by Collier and other prior decisions, concluding that strict liability's traditional status as the predominant theory of recovery for injuries caused by a domestic animal logically forecloses recovery under a theory of negligence.
  3. Petrone v. Fernandez

    2009 N.Y. Slip Op. 4694 (N.Y. 2009)   Cited 116 times
    In Petrone, the plaintiff mail carrier saw that there was no fence around the yard in front of the defendant's house, and the defendant's Rottweiler was lying unrestrained in the yard (see id. at 547–548, 883 N.Y.S.2d 164, 910 N.E.2d 993). Fearful of the dog, the plaintiff started walking away to her car, and when she turned around, she saw the dog running after her (see id.).
  4. Smith v. Reilly

    957 N.E.2d 1149 (N.Y. 2011)   Cited 11 times

    2011-10-25 John F. SMITH and Lisa Smith, Respondents, v. Marijane REILLY, Appellant. Bond Schoeneck & King, PLLC, Syracuse (Adam P. Mastroleo of counsel), for appellant. Brindisi, Murad, Brindisi, Pearlman, Julian & Pertz, Utica (Stephanie A. Palmer of counsel), for respondents. Chief Judge LIPPMAN and Judges CIPARICK Bond Schoeneck & King, PLLC, Syracuse (Adam P. Mastroleo of counsel), for appellant. Brindisi, Murad, Brindisi, Pearlman, Julian & Pertz, Utica (Stephanie A. Palmer of counsel), for

  5. Hosmer v. Carney

    228 N.Y. 73 (N.Y. 1920)   Cited 23 times

    Argued December 4, 1919 Decided February 24, 1920 Carlos C. Alden and Don Vroman for appellants. Hamilton Ward and Irving W. Cole for respondent. McLAUGHLIN, J. This action was brought to recover damages for the death of plaintiff's intestate alleged to have been caused by the kick of a vicious horse. The complaint alleged that the defendants' testator purchased the horse "as a kicker * * *, knew that the said horse was a violent kicker and vicious in his habits and that he utterly failed and neglected

  6. Dickson v. McCoy

    39 N.Y. 400 (N.Y. 1868)   Cited 72 times
    In Dickson, decided in 1868, the defendant's horse, which was allowed to roam on a public street, kicked a 10–year–old child in the face.
  7. Moynahan v. Wheeler

    22 N.E. 702 (N.Y. 1889)   Cited 10 times

    Argued October 18, 1889 Decided November 26, 1889 William Parken for appellants. Charles J. Patterson for respondent. DANFORTH, J. It is not lawful for any cow to run at large in any street or public place in this state (Laws of 1872, chap. 776), and it was assumed by the parties that the original complaint stated a good cause of action by alleging that on the 1st of April, 1885, a cow, owned by the defendants, was carelessly permitted to run at large and unrestrained upon a public highway in the

  8. Haines v. Keahon

    46 App. Div. 164 (N.Y. App. Div. 1899)

    December Term, 1899. Robert Thorne, for the appellant. Edward L. Godfrey, for the respondent. INGRAHAM, J.: The plaintiff was injured by a horse belonging to the defendant. It appeared from the evidence that the plaintiff was a vendor of vegetables, and on the morning of June 26, 1897, went to Gansevoort market to make purchases; that while standing on the street engaged in loading his cart, two horses belonging to the defendant came along Gansevoort street going toward Greenwich street, the one

  9. Hazman v. Hoboken Land and Imp'ment Co.

    50 N.Y. 53 (N.Y. 1872)   Cited 5 times

    Argued June 5, 1872 Decided June 20, 1872 John K. Porter for the appellant. D. Pratt for the respondent. CHURCH, Ch. J. The plaintiff was injured while a passenger on the defendant's ferry boat, to be carried from New York to Hoboken, and the jury have found that the injury was occasioned by the defendant's negligence; and that the plaintiff was guilty of no negligence which contributed to it; and the General Term of the Common Pleas, who had power to review the facts as well as the law, has affirmed