13 Cited authorities

  1. Collier v. Zambito

    1 N.Y.3d 444 (N.Y. 2004)   Cited 253 times
    Affirming grant of summary judgment when there “was no evidence that the dog's behavior was ever threatening or menacing” but rather, “the dog's actions—barking and running around—[were] consistent with normal canine behavior. Barking and running around are what dogs do.”
  2. Bard v. Jahnke

    2006 N.Y. Slip Op. 3440 (N.Y. 2006)   Cited 181 times
    In Bard v. Jahnke, 6 N.Y.3d 592, 815 N.Y.S.2d 16, 848 N.E.2d 463 (2006), we expounded upon the relationship between ordinary negligence principles and the strict liability cause of action permitted by Collier and other prior decisions, concluding that strict liability's traditional status as the predominant theory of recovery for injuries caused by a domestic animal logically forecloses recovery under a theory of negligence.
  3. Petrone v. Fernandez

    2009 N.Y. Slip Op. 4694 (N.Y. 2009)   Cited 115 times
    In Petrone, the plaintiff mail carrier saw that there was no fence around the yard in front of the defendant's house, and the defendant's Rottweiler was lying unrestrained in the yard (see id. at 547–548, 883 N.Y.S.2d 164, 910 N.E.2d 993). Fearful of the dog, the plaintiff started walking away to her car, and when she turned around, she saw the dog running after her (see id.).
  4. Bernstein v. Penny

    2008 N.Y. Slip Op. 2463 (N.Y. 2008)   Cited 36 times
    In Bernstein, we held that the Appellate Division correctly disallowed the plaintiff's claim against the dog's owner and a toy store operated by the dog's owner "[s]ince there [was] no evidence... that the dog's owner had any knowledge of its vicious propensities" (Bernstein, 10 N.Y.3d at 788, 856 N.Y.S.2d 532, 886 N.E.2d 154).
  5. Smith v. Reilly

    957 N.E.2d 1149 (N.Y. 2011)   Cited 11 times

    2011-10-25 John F. SMITH and Lisa Smith, Respondents, v. Marijane REILLY, Appellant. Bond Schoeneck & King, PLLC, Syracuse (Adam P. Mastroleo of counsel), for appellant. Brindisi, Murad, Brindisi, Pearlman, Julian & Pertz, Utica (Stephanie A. Palmer of counsel), for respondents. Chief Judge LIPPMAN and Judges CIPARICK Bond Schoeneck & King, PLLC, Syracuse (Adam P. Mastroleo of counsel), for appellant. Brindisi, Murad, Brindisi, Pearlman, Julian & Pertz, Utica (Stephanie A. Palmer of counsel), for

  6. Bernstein v. Toys

    40 A.D.3d 224 (N.Y. App. Div. 2007)   Cited 15 times
    In Bernstein v. Penny Whistle Toys, Inc., 40 A.D.3d 224, 224, 834 N.Y.S.2d 173 (2007), affd 10 N.Y.3d 787, 856 N.Y.S.2d 532, 886 N.E.2d 154 (2008), a case where an infant was bitten by a dog in a toy store, the First Department affirmed the dismissal of the entire complaint and held that the plaintiff therein was limited to a strict liability claim against the defendant dog owner and the defendant toy store.
  7. Petrone v. Fernande

    53 A.D.3d 221 (N.Y. App. Div. 2008)   Cited 10 times
    In Petrone, supra, the Court of Appeals in reversing, held that liability of an owner is determined solely by application of the above rule, and emphasized that the cause of action is not based on a theory of negligence but on a rule of strict liability.
  8. Smith v. Marijane Reilly

    83 A.D.3d 1492 (N.Y. App. Div. 2011)   Cited 2 times

    April 29, 2011. Appeal from an order of the Supreme Court, Onondaga County (John C. Cherundolo, A.J.), entered July 6, 2010 in a personal injury action. The order denied the motion of defendant for summary judgment dismissing the complaint. Present — Scudder, P.J., Smith, Peradotto, Lindley and Green, JJ. It is hereby ordered that the order so appealed from is affirmed with costs. Memorandum: Plaintiffs commenced this action seeking damages for injuries sustained by John F. Smith (plaintiff) when

  9. Young v. Wyman

    76 N.Y.2d 1009 (N.Y. 1990)   Cited 20 times

    Argued November 16, 1990 Decided December 27, 1990 Appeal from the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court in the Third Judicial Department, Jan H. Plumadore, J. Betsy R. Ruslander for appellants. Michael J. Longstreet and William C. Foster for respondent. Order affirmed, with costs. We agree with so much of the memorandum at the Appellate Division ( 159 A.D.2d 792) as held that the mere presence of an unrestrained dog on the street does not give rise to a presumption of negligence on the part of

  10. Young v. Wyman

    159 A.D.2d 792 (N.Y. App. Div. 1990)   Cited 17 times
    In Young v. Wyman (159 A.D.2d 792, affd 76 N.Y.2d 1009, supra), neither the majority of this Court nor the five-Judge majority at the Court of Appeals gave any consideration to the effect of the existing animal control ordinance (see, Nilsen v. Johnson, 191 A.D.2d 930, 931, supra), and the Court of Appeals, carefully limited its holding to the proposition that "the mere presence of an unrestrained dog on the street does not give rise to a presumption of negligence on the part of its owner" (Young v. Wyman, 76 N.Y.2d 1009, 1010, supra).