Pelletier v. Weyerhaeuser Company et al

RESPONSE to 87 MOTION to Strike MOTION for Sanctions

S.D. Tex.January 23, 2018

Page 1 of 12 4841-0883-9002 v2 2901149-000047 IN UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS VICTORIA DIVISION GAETAN PELLETIER § Plaintiff, § § vs. § Civil Action No. 6:17-cv-00027 § WEYERHAEUSER COMPANY, ET AL., § Defendants. § ________________________________________________________________________ DEFENDANT, WEYERHAEUSER NR COMPANY'S RESPONSE TO PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO STRIKE DEFENDANT'S PLEADINGS AND MOTION FOR SANCTIONS AGAINST KIMBERLY A. CHOJNACKI ________________________________________________________________________ Although Plaintiff, Gaetan Pelletier, regrettably is correct that Mrs. Chojnacki failed to serve Defendant, Weyerhaeuser NR Company's Motion to Dismiss and Verified Specific Denials concurrent with (or shortly after) filing and included a certificate of conference for one that never occurred, such does not warrant sanctions. First, by filing his motion for sanctions four days after serving it, Mr. Pelletier violated the twenty-one day safe harbor provision of Rule 11(c)(2). Even so, Mr. Pelletier has presented no evidence of bad faith, which is far short of the clear and convincing evidence that is a prerequisite for imposing sanctions. Moreover, Weyerhaeuser NR presents evidence refuting Mr. Pelletier's bare allegations of bad faith. Finally, Mr. Pelletier seeks sanctions for the same conduct he has engaged in throughout this case. Put simply, sanctions are unwarranted and unjustified. Mr. Pelletier's motion should be denied. Mr. Pelletier's motion to strike—based entirely on the late filing of Weyerhaeuser NR's responsive pleading—also must be denied because Weyerhaeuser NR had the absolute right to file a responsive pleading (even to do so late) to defeat any default judgment Mr. Pelletier sought. Case 6:17-cv-00027 Document 89 Filed in TXSD on 01/23/18 Page 1 of 12 Page 2 of 12 4841-0883-9002 v2 2901149-000047 PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 1. Mr. Pelletier filed suit against Weyerhaeuser NR on May 4, 2017.1 Weyerhaeuser NR was served with process on June 28, 2017.2 Weyerhaeuser NR filed its Motion to Dismiss and Specific Verified Denials on December 5, 2017, inclusive of a certificate of service and certificate of conference. 3 2. At 5:53 p.m. on January 12, 2018, Mr. Pelletier emailed Weyerhaeuser NR's counsel purporting to confer regarding their position on a request for entry of default and motion for entry of default judgment against Weyerhaeuser NR for failure to answer.4 Within minutes, counsel indicated their opposition on account of Weyerhaeuser NR having answered and, within two hours, forwarded a copy of Weyerhaeuser NR's responsive pleading.5 3. Mr. Pelletier did not respond. Likely because Mr. Pelletier had already mailed his pleadings to the Court: his Request for Entry of Default and Motion for Entry of Default Judgment against Weyerhaeuser NR are hand-stamped by the clerk as received on January 12, 20186, meaning Mr. Pelletier had already mailed and, upon receipt by Mr. Bradley, filed his pleading by the time he reached out to Mrs. Chojnacki and Mr. Chambers.7 4. Thereafter, Mr. Pelletier served his Motion to Strike and Motion for Sanctions on January 18, 2018,8 and filed it with the Court on January 22, 20189. Weyerhaeuser NR filed and 1 Pl.'s O. Complaint, Dkt. No. 1. 2 Return of Service, Dkt. No. 6. 3 Def.'s Mtn. to Dis'm and Specific Verified Denials, Dkt. No. 67, Dec. 5, 2017. 4 Exhibit A, Emails between Pelletier, B. Chambers, and K. Chojnacki, Jan. 12, 2018. 5 Exhibit A, Emails between Pelletier, B. Chambers, and K. Chojnacki, Jan. 12, 2018. 6 See Req. for Entry of Default, Dkt. No. 78 (hand-stamped as received January 12, 2018, and ECF notice stamped January 12, 2018, at 2:55 p.m. CST); Mtn. for Entry of Default J., Dkt. No. 79 (hand-stamped as received January 12, 2018, and ECF notice stamped January 12, 2018, at 2:58 p.m. CST). 7 See McIntosh v. Antonino, 71 F.3d 29, 36 (1st Cir. 1995) (document filed by mail is considered filed when the clerk receives it). 8 Exhibit B, Email from G. Pelletier, Jan. 18, 2018. 9 Pl.'s Mtn. to Strike and for Sanctions, Dkt. No. 87, Jan. 22, 2018. Case 6:17-cv-00027 Document 89 Filed in TXSD on 01/23/18 Page 2 of 12 Page 3 of 12 4841-0883-9002 v2 2901149-000047 served its Amended Motion to Dismiss and Verified Specific Denials—correcting the certificate of service and removing the certificate of conference10—in the interim on January 19, 2018.11 ARGUMENT AND AUTHORITIES 5. Mr. Pelletier identifies three issues for the Court's consideration: (1) whether Weyerhaeuser NR's late-filed responsive pleading defeats his Request for Entry of Default and Motion for Entry of Default Judgment; (2) whether Mrs. Chojnacki should be permitted to make misrepresentations to the Court; and (3) whether Mr. Pelletier is entitled to sanctions for Mrs. Chojnacki's "willful misrepresentations". 6. The answers to those issues are (1) yes, (2) no, and (3) no. It is well-settled law that a responsive pleading—even if filed late—precludes the entry of a default judgment. Weyerhaeuser's admitted failure to serve Mr. Pelletier with the pleading at the time of filing does not change this conclusion. The accuracy of the second answer goes without saying. Finally, Mr. Pelletier is not entitled to sanctions because he violated the twenty-one day safe harbor rule, he has not presented clear and convincing evidence of bad faith, and because he has engaged in the very conduct for which he now seeks sanctions. Mr. Pelletier's motions should be denied. A. The filing of a responsive—even if defective—pleading precludes entry of a default judgment. 7. Although late-filed and late-served, Weyerhaeuser NR's responsive pleading nevertheless prevents entry of a default judgment against it. As the Fifth Circuit has consistently held, "[a] party is not entitled to a default judgment as a matter of right, even when the defendant is technically in default."12 Rather, a default judgment "is a drastic measure that should be 10 Indeed, per Local Rule 7.1(D), a certificate of conference was not required for Weyerhaeuser NR's pleading as it was filed under Rule 12(b). 11 Weyerhaeuser NR's Am. Mtn. to Dis'm and Verified Specific Denials, Dkt. No. 85, Jan. 19, 2018; Exhibit C, Email to G. Pelletier, Jan. 19, 2018. 12 Lewis v. Lynn, 236 F.3d 766, 767 (5th Cir. 2001). Case 6:17-cv-00027 Document 89 Filed in TXSD on 01/23/18 Page 3 of 12 Page 4 of 12 4841-0883-9002 v2 2901149-000047 employed only as a last resort."13 Moreover, a court cannot enter a default judgment when a party has filed an answer, even if that answer is defective.14 8. In other words, Mr. Pelletier would be entitled to a default judgment only if Weyerhaeuser NR never filed a responsive pleading.15 However, Weyerhaeuser NR did file a responsive pleading—before Mr. Pelletier filed his request for entry of default and motion for entry of default judgment—precluding entry of a default judgment against it.16 Weyerhaeuser NR's failure to serve the pleading timely does not change this conclusion: striking Weyerhaeuser NR's pleading and entering a default judgment against it would serve as mere "punishment for [Weyerhaeuser NR's] failure to serve [Mr. Pelletier] with a copy of the answer", which is precluded by Fifth Circuit precedent.17 9. Mr. Pelletier claims that Weyerhaeuser NR "is claiming a right nearly five months [after its deadline to file its responsive pleadings], a right that would place them above the law that many others are not privileged to break the rules and get a pass."18 On the one hand, Mr. Pelletier is correct that Weyerhaeuser NR is claiming a right to file its responsive pleading after its deadline to do so. However, Weyerhaeuser NR did so because such is its right under the law: so long as a default has yet to be taken, a defendant is permitted to file a responsive pleading or otherwise defend against the suit.19 In other words, doing so does not place Weyerhaeuser NR 13 United States v. Shipco Gen., Inc., 814 F.2d 1011, 1014 (5th Cir. 1987). 14 Davis v. Parkhill-Goodloe Co., 302 F.2d 489, 495 (5th Cir. 1962). 15 FED. R. CIV. P. 55(a). 16 See, e.g., Mason & Hanger-Silas Mason Co. v. Metal Trades Council, 726 F.2d 166, 168 (5th Cir. 1984) (court denied motion for default judgment after defendant filed an answer); Sun Bank v. Pelican Homestead & Sav. Ass'n, 874 F.2d 274, 277 (5th Cir. 1989) (motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)). 17 Jackson v. Texas Workforce Comm'n, 2008 WL 397848, at *2 (N.D. Dallas Feb. 13, 2008) (citing Shipco Gen., Inc., 814 F.2d at 1014; Davis, 302 F.2d at 495). 18 Pl.'s Mtn. to Strike and for Sanctions, Dkt. No. 87, p. 3. 19 Shipco Gen., Inc., 814 F.2d at 1014; Davis, 302 F.2d at 495. See, e.g., Mason & Hanger-Silas, 726 F.2d at 168 (court denied motion for default judgment after defendant filed an answer); Pelican Homestead, 874 F.2d at 277 (motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)). Case 6:17-cv-00027 Document 89 Filed in TXSD on 01/23/18 Page 4 of 12 Page 5 of 12 4841-0883-9002 v2 2901149-000047 "above the law". Indeed, Mr. Pelletier's protestations that Weyerhaeuser NR should not be permitted to late-file its responsive pleading and "get a pass" have no basis in the law. 10. Weyerhaeuser NR cut off the availability of a default judgment by filing its Motion to Dismiss and Specific Verified Denials, whether or not that pleading was timely filed or timely served on Mr. Pelletier. Mr. Pelletier's motion to strike Weyerhaeuser NR's pleading, therefore, should be denied. B. Mr. Pelletier is not entitled to sanctions because he violated the 21-day safe harbor provision. 11. Rule 11(c)(2) gives litigants and their attorneys a twenty-one day window within which to correct or withdraw a pleading complained of by a motion for sanctions. Procedurally, that means the movant presents the motion for sanctions by serving it on the offending party, but the movant then must wait at least twenty-one days to file it with the Court. If the "challenged paper . . . is withdrawn or appropriately corrected within 21 days after service", the motion for sanctions "must not be filed or be presented to the court."20 This requirement formalizes procedural due process considerations by requiring notice to the accused party and providing that party with sufficient time to correct the matter.21 12. Mr. Pelletier violated this procedural requirement. Mr. Pelletier served his motion for sanctions by email on January 18, 2018.22 Mr. Pelletier then proceeded to file the motion with the Court four days later, as evidenced by the Clerk's hand-stamped date of January 22, 2018.23 As is evident, Mr. Pelletier failed to abide by the twenty-one day safe harbor provision 20 FED. R. CIV. P. 11(c)(2). See also Star Mark Mgmt. v. Koon Chun Hing Kee Soy & Sauce Factory, Ltd., 682 F.3d 170, 175 (2d Cir. 2012) ("The safe-harbor provision is a strict procedural requirement."). 21 Roth v. Green, 466 F.3d 1179, 1192 (10th Cir. 2006); In re Pennie & Edmonds LLP, 323 F.3d 86, 89 & n.2 (2d Cir. 2003). 22 Exhibit B, Email from G. Pelletier, Jan. 18, 2018. 23 Pl.'s Mtn. to Strike and for Sanctions, Dkt. No. 87. Case 6:17-cv-00027 Document 89 Filed in TXSD on 01/23/18 Page 5 of 12 Page 6 of 12 4841-0883-9002 v2 2901149-000047 of Rule 11(c)(2): he filed his motion a mere four days after service. Mr. Pelletier's failure to abide by this procedure requires his motion for sanctions be denied. C. Mr. Pelletier presents no evidence that Mrs. Chojnacki acted in bad faith. 13. A court has inherent power to sanction a person for certain bad-faith conduct.24 However, given the "very potency" of that power, courts are to exercise it "with restraint and discretion."25 In order to obtain sanctions pursuant to a court's inherent powers, the Fifth Circuit has held that a showing of "bad faith or willful abuse of the judicial process" is required.26 Such a showing "of bad faith must be supported by clear and convincing proof."27 14. As has become his habit, Mr. Pelletier lobs extraordinary accusations regarding Mrs. Chojnacki's intentions, motives, and actions, presumably in an attempt to demonstrate the required bad faith. In particular, Mr. Pelletier alleges Mrs. Chojnacki was "purposeful" and "deliberate" and had "planned . . . avoiding giving [him] a forewarning via conferring."28 Mr. Pelletier goes on to claim Mrs. Chojnacki "fully intended to deprive" him of notice of Weyerhaeuser NR's responsive pleading.29 Mr. Pelletier also alleges Mrs. Chojnacki engaged in "intentional miss-conduct [sic]", "pushing the envelope with knowledge she will get away with any infractions and a trained sense for obstructions", by "purposefully with a self-serving agenda . . . deliberately not serving [him] . . . and not conferring."30 Mr. Pelletier concludes with the allegation that Mrs. Chojnacki's omissions were "premeditated and planned with knowledge 24 Mr. Pelletier's motion for sanction is unclear as to the legal authority or basis for the imposition of sanctions. Because the complained of conduct—failure to confer and serve pleadings—does not fall within one of the categories of Rule 11(b), Weyerhaeuser NR assumes Mr. Pelletier is urging the Court to impose sanctions pursuant to its inherent power to do so. See FED. R. CIV. P. 11(c)(3). 25 Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 44 (1991); In re First City Bancorporation, 282 F.3d 864, 867 (5th Cir. 2002). 26 In re Moore, 739 F.3d 724, 729 (5th Cir. 2014; Maguire Oil Co. v. City of Houston, 143 F.3d 205, 209 (5th Cir. 1998) ); Gonzalez v. Trinity Marine Grp., Inc., 117 F.3d 894, 898 (5th Cir. 1997). 27 In re Moore, 739 F.3d at 730 (quoting Crowe v. Smith, 261 F.3d 558, 563 (5th Cir. 2001)). 28 Pl.'s Mtn. to Strike and for Sanctions, Dkt. No. 87, p. 2. 29 Pl.'s Mtn. to Strike and for Sanctions, Dkt. No. 87, p. 3. 30 Pl.'s Mtn. to Strike and for Sanctions, Dkt. No. 87, p. 4. Case 6:17-cv-00027 Document 89 Filed in TXSD on 01/23/18 Page 6 of 12 Page 7 of 12 4841-0883-9002 v2 2901149-000047 and malicious intent."31 Mr. Pelletier filed no supporting affidavits and submitted no other evidence to substantiate these claims. 15. Mr. Pelletier submits no evidence to support the allegations because there is none. Rather, while the failure to serve Mr. Pelletier was unfortunate and embarrassing, it nevertheless was inadvertent.32 Moreover, the inclusion of a certificate of conference also was inadvertent as one is not required for a motion of this ilk and, therefore, a conference did not occur.33 16. The failure to serve Mr. Pelletier—who does not receive electronic service from the CM/ECF system upon filing—was unintentional. Mrs. Chojnacki requested her secretary— Linda Kramb—to handle the filing and service of the pleading.34 In all prior instances, Mrs. Kramb properly and timely served Mr. Pelletier with every pleading filed with the Court.35 In fact, Mrs. Kramb worked extensively with Mr. Pelletier to correct an issue with serving him by facsimile.36 In this instance, she simply forgot to do so and Mrs. Chojnacki failed to realize the service by email to Mr. Pelletier had not been sent.37 17. Once Mr. Pelletier emailed Mrs. Chojnacki and Mr. Chambers on January 12, 2018, regarding a default judgment against Weyerhaeuser NR, Mrs. Chojnacki was perplexed.38 If Mr. Pelletier had received the responsive pleading, surely he would not be seeking a default judgment.39 Accordingly, she worked with Mrs. Kramb to determine whether Mr. Pelletier had 31 Pl.'s Mtn. to Strike and for Sanctions, Dkt. No. 87, p. 5. 32 Mr. Pelletier's reasoning also is weak. If Weyerhaeuser NR intended to avoid a default judgment (or the time and expense of responding to and defending against one), it would be in its best interest to serve Mr. Pelletier with its responsive pleading at the time of filing. Put another way, Weyerhaeuser NR had nothing to gain by secretly filing and not serving its responsive pleading. Instead, the mistake has caused Weyerhaeuser NR to incur more expense in responding to Mr. Pelletier's Request for Entry of Default and Motion for Entry of Default Judgment, as well as the Motion to Strike and Motion for Sanctions. 33 Local Rule 7.1(D) (excepting Rule 12(b) motions from the requirement to confer). 34 Exhibit D, Affidavit of K. Chojnacki, ¶ 5; Exhibit E, Affidavit of L. Kramb, ¶ 4. 35 Exhibit D, Affidavit of K. Chojnacki, ¶ 4; Exhibit E, Affidavit of L. Kramb, ¶ 3. 36 Exhibit E, Affidavit of L. Kramb, ¶ 3. 37 Exhibit D, Affidavit of K. Chojnacki, ¶ 7; Exhibit E, Affidavit of L. Kramb, ¶¶ 4–5. 38 Exhibit D, Affidavit of K. Chojnacki, ¶ 6. 39 Exhibit D, Affidavit of K. Chojnacki, ¶ 6. Case 6:17-cv-00027 Document 89 Filed in TXSD on 01/23/18 Page 7 of 12 Page 8 of 12 4841-0883-9002 v2 2901149-000047 been served.40 After her own investigation, Mrs. Kramb confirmed the task had fallen through the cracks.41 She did not fashion an excuse or feign an explanation; it was an honest and unintentional mistake.42 18. Moreover, once the mistake was realized, Weyerhaeuser NR filed its Amended Motion to Dismiss and Verified Specific Denials with the Court to reflect the true date of service on Mr. Pelletier and remove the certificate of conference.43 19. In other words, contrary to Mr. Pelletier's bold accusations as to the malicious intentions of Mrs. Chojnacki and—by extension—her support staff, there was no bad faith in the failure to serve him with the pleading in December. It was a simple and regrettable mistake. Mr. Pelletier presents no evidence—to speak nothing of clear and convincing evidence—to the contrary. 20. In the absence of any evidence demonstrating bad faith (or refuting Mrs. Chojnacki and Mrs. Kramb's sworn testimony on the matter), Mr. Pelletier has not shown by "clear and convincing proof" the requisite bad faith. His motion for sanctions must be denied. D. Sanctions are unjustified. 21. There are some instances in which sanctions are not justified, including when both sides are equally guilty.44 As the Second Circuit aptly put it, parties "who live in glass pleadings ought not to throw Rule 11 stones."45 This is one of those instances. 22. Mr. Pelletier complains that Weyerhaeuser NR's Motion to Dismiss and Verified Specific Denials was filed without conference and went unserved, justifying sanctions against 40 Exhibit D, Affidavit of K. Chojnacki, ¶¶ 6–7; Exhibit E, Affidavit of L. Kramb, ¶ 5. 41 Exhibit D, Affidavit of K. Chojnacki, ¶ 7; Exhibit E, Affidavit of L. Kramb, ¶ 5. 42 Exhibit D, Affidavit of K. Chojnacki, ¶ 7; Exhibit E, Affidavit of L. Kramb, ¶ 5. 43 Weyerhaeuser NR's Am. Mtn. to Dis'm and Verified Specific Denials, Dkt. No. 85, Jan. 19, 2018. 44 Associated Indem. Corp. v. Fairchild Indus., 961 F.2d 32, 36 (2d Cir. 1992). 45 Id. Case 6:17-cv-00027 Document 89 Filed in TXSD on 01/23/18 Page 8 of 12 Page 9 of 12 4841-0883-9002 v2 2901149-000047 Mrs. Chojnacki. Yet Mr. Pelletier has engaged in the same conduct throughout this case and, in fact, regarding his Request for Entry of Default and Motion for Entry of Default Judgment. 23. Defense counsel in this case have on numerous occasions had to confer amongst themselves as to whether Mr. Pelletier served all (or even just the pertinent) counsel of record with pleadings or discovery papers. The frustration arising from the issue became so untenable that Mr. Chambers provided Mr. Pelletier with the verbatim text of Rule 5 and a list of all persons (and their contact information) who should be served with every order, pleading, discovery paper, written motions, notices, and the like.46 24. As but another example, Mr. Pelletier's own Request for Entry of Default and Motion for Entry of Default Judgment fails even to include a certificate of conference, despite Local Rule 7.1(D) requiring it.47 And even if the pleading did include a certificate of conference, it would have been a misrepresentation to the Court given that Mr. Pelletier already had mailed his default judgment pleadings to the Court by the time he attempted to confer with Weyerhaeuser NR's counsel.48 In other words, Mr. Pelletier has repeatedly failed to comply with Rule 5 regarding service and Local Rule 7.1(D) by conferring with counsel concurrent with or only after filing his pleadings with the Court, those being the same complaints he has of Mrs. Chojnacki. 25. Yet Mr. Pelletier demands Mrs. Chojnacki be sanctioned for a demonstrated inadvertent mistake of failing to serve him with a pleading. As Mr. Pelletier is guilty of the very 46 Exhibit F, Email to G. Pelletier, Jan. 8, 2018. 47 Req. for Entry of Default, Dkt. No. 78; Mtn. for Entry of Default J., Dkt. No. 79 . 48 See Req. for Entry of Default, Dkt. No. 78 (hand-stamped as received January 12, 2018, and ECF notice stamped January 12, 2018, at 2:55 p.m. CST); Mtn. for Entry of Default J., Dkt. No. 79 (hand-stamped as received January 12, 2018, and ECF notice stamped January 12, 2018, at 2:58 p.m. CST); Exhibit A, Emails between Pelletier, B. Chambers, and K. Chojnacki, Jan. 12, 2018 (Pelletier's conference with Mr. Chambers and Mrs. Chojnacki). Case 6:17-cv-00027 Document 89 Filed in TXSD on 01/23/18 Page 9 of 12 Page 10 of 12 4841-0883-9002 v2 2901149-000047 same omissions he now cites as grounds for sanctions, sanctions are unjustified. For that reason alone, Mr. Pelletier's motion should be denied. CONCLUSION AND PRAYER For these reasons, Plaintiff, GAETAN PELLETIER's Motion to Strike Defendant, WEYERHAEUSER NR COMPANY's Motion to Dismiss and Specific Verified Denials and Motion for Sanctions against Kimberly A. Chojnacki (Dkt. No. 87) must be denied. Moreover, for the reasons stated in Defendant's Amended Motion to Dismiss and Verified Specific Denials, Plaintiff, GAETAN PELLETIER's Complaint should be dismissed in its entirety with prejudice. Defendant, WEYERHAEUSER NR COMPANY, therefore, requests that this Court deny Plaintiff, GAETAN PELLETIER's Motion to Strike Defendant, WEYERHAEUSER NR COMPANY's Motion to Dismiss and Specific Verified Denials and Motion for Sanctions against Kimberly A. Chojnacki (Dkt. No. 87); dismiss Plaintiff, GAETAN PELLETIER's lawsuit against Defendant, WEYERHAEUSER NR COMPANY, in its entirety and with prejudice; and grant Defendant, WEYERHAEUSER NR COMPANY, all relief, including costs and attorney's fees, as it may be entitled to at law or in equity. Case 6:17-cv-00027 Document 89 Filed in TXSD on 01/23/18 Page 10 of 12 Page 11 of 12 4841-0883-9002 v2 2901149-000047 Respectfully submitted, BAKER, DONELSON, BEARMAN, CALDWELL & BERKOWITZ A Professional Corporation By: /s/ Kimberly A. Chojnacki Bradley E. Chambers Texas Bar No. 24001860 bchambers@bakerdonelson.com Kimberly A. Chojnacki Texas Bar No. 24068696 kchojnacki@bakerdonelson.com 1301 McKinney, Suite 3700 Houston, Texas 77010 Tel. (713) 650-9700 Fax (713) 650-9701 Attorneys for Defendant, Weyerhaeuser NR Company Case 6:17-cv-00027 Document 89 Filed in TXSD on 01/23/18 Page 11 of 12 Page 12 of 12 4841-0883-9002 v2 2901149-000047 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing document has been served upon all counsel and parties of record listed below as indicated on this the 23rd day of January 2018, pursuant to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Gaetan Pelletier, pro se 1601 Robinhood Road Vista, California 92084 gaetan2000@aol.com VIA CMRRR AND EMAIL Plaintiff James L. Sowder Thompson Coe 700 North Pearl Street, 25th Floor Dallas, Texas 75201 jsowder@thompsoncoe.com Defendant, APA Wood Engineer Association VIA CM/ECF FILING AND EMAIL J. Robin Lindley Laura Gleen Buck Keenan 2229 San Felipe, Suite 1000 Houston, Texas 77019 lindley@buckkeenan.com lgleen@buckkeenan.com Defendants, Ronnie Hickman and Tri-State Trusses, Inc. VIA CM/ECF FILING AND EMAIL /s/ Kimberly A. Chojnacki Kimberly A. Chojnacki Case 6:17-cv-00027 Document 89 Filed in TXSD on 01/23/18 Page 12 of 12