408 U.S. 471 (1972) Cited 10,670 times 5 Legal Analyses
Holding that parolees "must have an opportunity to be heard and to show . . . that circumstances in mitigation suggest that the violation does not warrant revocation"
2011 N.Y. Slip Op. 3308 (N.Y. 2011) Cited 480 times
Holding that a defendant's right to appeal after a resentencing is "limited to the correction of errors or the abuse of discretion at the resentencing proceeding"
Holding that, by imposing PRS terms, DOCS usurped the judicial function as defined by New York law; only the sentencing court has the authority to impose the PRS component of the sentence and must do so at the time of sentencing
Holding that “after release from prison, a legitimate expectation in the finality of a sentence arises and the Double Jeopardy Clause prevents reformation to attach a PRS component to the original completed sentence”
Holding that inmates had a protectable liberty interest because the electronic surveillance program at issue, “unlike institutional confinement of any kind, allowed the appellees to live with their loved ones, form relationships with neighbors, lay down roots in their community, and reside in a dwelling of their own choosing (albeit subject to certain limitations) rather than in a cell designated by the government”
Finding that the closure of the court including the exclusion of defendant's family during the testimony of an accomplice cooperating witness violated defendant's right to a public trial, given that the witness had previously testified in front of defendant's parents, had testified that he did not fear defendant's family, and defendant had a greater interest in having her family present because of a language barrier
2009 N.Y. Slip Op. 9311 (N.Y. 2009) Cited 70 times
In Konstantinides, a witness specifically claimed that a defense lawyer asked her to lie (14 N.Y.3d at 6, 896 N.Y.S.2d 284, 923 N.E.2d 567); in Fulton, a witness had told prosecutors “that he had once imported heroin for Pulton's trial counsel” (5 F.3d at 606).