Dewar vs. Boone

Motion to Strike

Cal. Super. - 4th Dist.April 12, 2018

© 0 0 d N o o u r B A O w N D R N O N N N N N D N N N M N N F P F FP F FR , FP , F P R , P R E c o ~ N O o o u l B A W w W O N F P O O V U 0 0 N O U U B A W w W N H o O o Matthew M. Mahoney, Esq. (211184) Susan F. Dent, Esq. (292900) WITHAM MAHONEY & ABBOTT, LLP 401 B Street, Suite 2220 San Diego, California 92101 Telephone (619) 407-0505 E-Mail: mahoney@ wmalawfirm.com Specially Appearing for Rebecca Lynn Boone, individually and As Trustee of the Boone Revocable Trust SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO AMBER DEWAR CASE NO. 37-2018-00018233-CU-BT-CTL Plaintiff, NOTICE OF MOTION AND SPECIAL MOTION TO STRIKE PURSUANT TO C.C.P. VS. 425.16 (ANTI-SLAPP); MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT; REBECCA LYNN BOONE, an individual, DECLARATION OF SUSAN F. DENT REBECCA LYNN BOONE AS TRUSTEE OF THE BOONE REVOCABLE TRUST, and Does 1 through 10, inclusive, DATE: August 3, 2018 TIME: 1:30P.M. Defendants. DEPT... C-72 JUDGE: Taylor TO ALL PARTIES AND THEIR ATTORNEYS OF RECORD: PLEASE TAKE NOTE THAT on August 2, 2018, at 1:30 P.M. in Department C-72 of the above-referenced Court, located at 330 W. Broadway, San Diego, CA 92101, Defendant Rebecca Lynn Boone, individually and in her capacity as trustee of the Boone Revocable Trust does and will hereby move this Court for an Order Striking Plaintiff’s entire complaint pursuant to California Code of Civil Procedure 425.16 (anti-SLA PP). This Motion is being brought on the grounds that (1) the allegations against Ms. Boone relate entirely to the protected activity of free speech and (2) Plaintiff’s causes of action are fatally flawed and 1 NOTICE OF MOTION AND SPECIAL MOTION TO STRIKE PURSUANT TO C.C.P. 425.16 (ANTI-SLAPP);MEMORANDUM OF POINTSAND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT; DECLARATION OF SUSAN F. DENT © 0 0 d N o o u r B A O w N D R N O N N N N N D N N N M N N F P F FP F FR , FP , F P R , P R E c o ~ N O o o u l B A W w W O N F P O O V U 0 0 N O U U B A W w W N H o O o she cannot be successful on the merits. This Motion is based on this Notice of Motion, the Memorandum of Points and Authorities included herein, the Declaration of Susan F. Dent, Esq., and such other pleadings and documentation provided to this Court. Wherefore, Ms. Boone respectfully requests that (1) Plaintiff’s Complaint be stricken in its entirety and (2) that M's. Boone be awarded costs and fees in the amount of $3,312.50. Dated: June 4, 2018 WITHAM MAHONEY & ABBOTT LLP Susan F. Dent, Esq. Matthew M. Mahoney, Esq. Attorneys for Rebecca Lynn Boone, individually and in her capacity as Trustee of the Boone Revocable Trust 2 NOTICE OF MOTION AND SPECIAL MOTION TO STRIKE PURSUANT TO C.C.P. 425.16 (ANTI-SLAPP);MEMORANDUM OF POINTSAND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT; DECLARATION OF SUSAN F. DENT © 0 0 d N o o u r B A O w N D R N O N N N N N D N N N M N N F P F FP F FR , FP , F P R , P R E c o ~ N O o o u l B A W w W O N F P O O V U 0 0 N O U U B A W w W N H o O o MEMORANDUM OF POINTSAND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF MOTIONTO STRIKE I.INTRODUCTION Plaintiff AMBER DEWAR (“Plaintiff”) initiated this law suit initiating five (5) causes of action for so called (1) Intentional Interference with Prospective Economic Relations; (2) Intentional Interference with Contractual Relations; (3) Defamation per se; (4) Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress; and (5) Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress. Plaintiff’s claims violate the constitutional protections afforded to Defendant Rebecca Lynn Boone, in both an individual and a Trustee capacity. They are further subject to a special Motion to Strike under Code of Civil Procedure Section 425.16 (Strategic Lawsuit Against Public Participation or “Anti-SLAPP” statute). Under the Anti-SLAPP statute a cause of action arising from petitioning activity is subject to a special motion to strike and immediate dismissal unless the plaintiff meets her burden to show a probability of success on the merits with substantial evidence. Here, all the claims against Ms. Boone arise from her exercise of their constitutional right to free speech, and Plaintiff cannot establish a probability of prevailing on the merits of her claims against Ms. Boone in order to overcome this Anti-SLA PP motion. II. STATEMENT OF FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY On April 12, 2018, Plaintiff initiated this case asserting five purported causes of action against Defendant Ms. Boone, in her individual capacity, as well as in her capacity as Trustee of the Boone Revocable Trust (“Trust”). For purposes of this Special Motion to Strike, Ms. Boone sets forth the facts alleged in Plaintiffs Complaint without admitting either the truth of the allegations or any wrongdoing alleged in the Complaint. The Complaint includes the following allegations against Ms. Boone: Plaintiff alleges that she was previously employed by Susana Corrigan (“Ms. Corrigan”) of the Corrigan Group as a real estate assistant and escrow manager (Plaintiff’s Complaint, 9 11.) Plaintiff further alleged that she had been in discussions with M's. Boone regarding a rental property owned by Ms. Boone? but “determined the house was notsuitable to their needs and decided to lease another property.” (Complaint, q 15.) Plaintiff alleges that approximately one month after “deciding to lease another property”, on or about March 9, 2018, 1 Itis unclear why Plaintiff has cited M s. Boone in her capacity as Trustee of the Boone Revocable Trust, as the Trust has nothing to do with any of the allegations within the Complaint, including but not limited to ownership of the subject rental property at issue. 2 Again, this property in no way is owned by The Boone Revocable Trust, and the Trust has no connection to said property other than Ms. Boone being the Trustee of the Trust and also happening to own the rental property at issue in her individual capacity. 3 NOTICE OF MOTION AND SPECIAL MOTION TO STRIKE PURSUANT TO C.C.P. 425.16 (ANTI-SLAPP);MEMORANDUM OF POINTSAND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT; DECLARATION OF SUSAN F. DENT © 0 0 N N o o u r B A O w N D R N O N N N N N D N N N M N N F P F FP F FP , FP F F P FR , F P P c o ~ N o o u i A W w W N N F P O O V 0 0 N N o o u l B A W N O- -, o O o she received a hostile voice message wherein Ms. Boone indicated she had spoken with Plaintiff's employer (whom she had previously spoken to in order to obtain a reference for the property), and called Plaintiff a “liar and a sneak” and that Plaintiff’s employer “should think twice about employing a person” like Plaintiff. (Complaint, 117.) Approximately three weekslater, on or about M arch 29, 2018, Plaintiff alleges that her employer forwarded to her wherein Ms. Boone “disparaged” Plaintiff's “honesty and professional integrity.” (Complaint, 918.) Plaintiff alleges that after discussing this voicemail with her on March 30, 2018, Ms. Corrigan fired Plaintiff. (Complaint, 9 19.) Plaintiff’s causes of action all convene around the same theme: due to Ms. Boone contacting her employer, Ms. Corrigan, and expressing disparagements, Plaintiff’s employment was terminated. Plaintiff attempts to justify an award of punitive damages by alleging such statements made by Ms. Boone were “committed recklessly, fraudulently, and oppressively, with the wrongful intention of injury to Plaintiff, for an improper and evil motive amount to malice.” (Complaint, § 27.) On or about April 12, 2018, Plaintiff filed the instant suit against M s. Boone, seeking a money judgment for “loss of employability,” general, presumed, special, and punitive damages, attorney’s fees, and, apparently, a preliminary and permanent injunction, although itis unclear from the Prayer for Relief as to what that injunction would apply. (Complaint, p. 13.) I1I.LEGAL ARGUMENT To ensure that speech made in connection with a public issue is not chilled through abuse of the judicial process, California's Anti-SLAPP statute authorizes a party to file a special motion to strike against any claim that arises from protected speech. (See Equilon Enter v. Consumer Cause, Inc. (2009) 29 Cal. 4th 53, 58-59.) Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16 provides in relevant part: A cause of action against a person arising from any act of that person in furtherance of the person's right of petition or free speech under the United States or California Constitution in connection with a public issueshall be subject a special motion to strike, unless the court determines that the plaintiff has established that there is a probability that the plaintiff will prevail on the claim.” (Code Civ. Proc. § 425.16, subd. (b)(1).) (Emphasis added). The special motion to strike is a summary procedure that allows defendants to dispose of lawsuits which violate the Anti-SLAPP statute at the pleading stage and avoid lengthy and expensive litigation. 4 NOTICE OF MOTION AND SPECIAL MOTION TO STRIKE PURSUANT TO C.C.P. 425.16 (ANTI-SLAPP);MEMORANDUM OF POINTSAND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT; DECLARATION OF SUSAN F.DENT © 0 0 N N o o u r B A O w N D R N O N N N N N D N N N M N N F P F FP F FP , FP F F P FR , F P P c o ~ N o o u i A W w W N N F P O O V 0 0 N N o o u l B A W N O- -, o O o “[T]he point of the Anti-SLAPP statute is that you have a right not to be dragged through the courts because you exercised your constitutional rights.” (Varian Med. Systems, Inc. v. Delfino (2005) 35 Cal. 4th 180, 193) (emphasis in original; internal quotes omitted). As such, the Legislature expressly mandated that the A nti-SLAPP statute “shall be construed broadly.” Code Civ. Proc. § 425.16(a). In ruling on a special motion to strike made under Section 425.16(b)(1), the court must engage in a two-step analysis. (Equilon, 29 Cal.4th at 67.) First, the defendant has the initial burden to make a threshold showing that the challenged cause of action arises from a protected activity. (/d.) Second,if the court finds defendant has made a threshold showing that the challenged cause of action arises from a protected activity, the burden shifts to plaintiff to “demonstrate[] a probability of prevailing on the claim.” (/d.) The first step requires only that a defendant make a threshold showing that the challenged cause of action arose from activity protected by the Anti-SLAPP statute-- A defendant does not have to demonstrate that the challenged cause of action was brought with the intent to chill defendant's exercise of constitutional rights, or make more than a threshold showing that the cause of action arises from protected activity. (Id. at 67-68.) Indeed, the defendant need only show at a minimum that the record does not establish that, as a matter of law, the claim did not arise from protected activity. (Birkner v. Lam (2007) 156 Cal. App. 4th 275, 280.) As defined in the statute, protected activity is that made “in furtherance ofthe [defendant's right of petition or free speech under the U nited States or California Constitution in connection with a public issue.” (Code Civ. Proc. § 425.16, subd. (b)(1).) The Anti-SLAPP statute thus protects a broad range of actions. (See Feldman v. 1100 Park Lane Associates (2008) 160 Cal. App. 4th 1467, 1480.) The second step requires the plaintiff to “demonstrate that the complaint is both legally sufficient and supported by a sufficient prima facie showing of facts to sustain a favorable judgment.” (Premier Med. Mgmt. Systems, Inc. v. California Ins. Guar. Ass'n (2006) 136 Cal. App, 4th 464, 476.) T he plaintiffs “burden as to the second prong of the Anti-SLAPP test is akin to that of a party opposing a motion for summary judgment.” (Navellier, 106 Cal. App. 4th at 768.) Thus, the plaintiff must present admissible evidence to establish the elementsof his claim and allow a reasonable trier of fact to find in his favor, and also to overcome any privilege or defense to the claim that defendant raised in his special motion to strike. (Flatley, 39 Cal. 4th at 32.) Plaintiff cannot rely solely on the allegations of the complaint. (Roberts v. 5 NOTICE OF MOTION AND SPECIAL MOTION TO STRIKE PURSUANT TO C.C.P. 425.16 (ANTI-SLAPP);MEMORANDUM OF POINTSAND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT; DECLARATION OF SUSAN F.DENT © 0 0 N N o o u r B A O w N D R N O N N N N N D N N N M N N F P F FP F FP , FP F F P FR , F P P c o ~ N o o u i A W w W N N F P O O V 0 0 N N o o u l B A W N O- -, o O o Los Angeles County Bar Ass ‘n (2003) 105 Cal. App. 4th 604, 613-14.) As such,itis not the defendant's burden to establish that the challenged cause of action is constitutionally protected as a matter of law. Once the defendant shows that the cause of action arose from acts done in furtherance [of] an exercise of free speech, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to demonstrate that the acts are not protected by the First Amendment. (Sylmar Air Conditioning v Pueblo Contracting Serv, Inc (2004) 122 Cal. App. 4th 1049, 1058.) If the court finds that the defendant has made a threshold showing that the causes of action arise from protected activity, and that plaintiff has not shown a probability that he will prevail, it must grant the special motion to strike. W hether the complaint could be amended to state a valid claim is irrelevant. If the motion is granted, the court may not grant leave to amend. (/d.) Here, Ms. Boone’s Special Motion to Strike under the Anti-SLAPP statute must be granted because (1) Plaintiff’s causes of action clearly arise from the protected activities of Ms. Boone, and (2) regardless, Plaintiff cannot demonstrate a probability of success on any of her purported causes of action. A. Plaintiff’s Causes of Action Arise from Protected Activities The anti-SLAPP statute also protects statements and writings “made in a place open to the public or a public forum in connection with an issue ofpublic interest.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 425.16, subd. (e)(3).) “Public forum” is construed broadly to include settings and contexts beyond those protected by the First Amendment. (Seelig v. Infinity Broadcasting Corp. (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 798, 807.) The anti-SLAPP statute also protects “any other conduct in furtherance of the exercise of the constitutional right of petition or the constitutional right of free speech in connection with a public issue or an issue of public interest.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 425.16, subd. (e)(4).) This provision applies to private communications concerning issues of public interest; no public forum is required. (Hailstone v. Martinez (2008) 169 Cal.A pp.4th 728, 736.) An issue may be of “public interest” without being of public importance or significance. (Colyear v. Rolling Hills Comm. Ass'n ofRancho Palos Verdes (2017) 9 Cal.App.5™ 119, 130-133.) Anti-SLAPP applies in cases involving widely published statements or private communications to a single person: “Regardless of the scope ofpublication, protection under the anti-SLA PP statute turns on whether the activity of the defendant involves the right of petition or free speech in connection with a public issue.” (Dyer v. Childress (2007) 147 Cal.A pp. 4th 1273, 1282.) 6 NOTICE OF MOTION AND SPECIAL MOTION TO STRIKE PURSUANT TO C.C.P. 425.16 (ANTI-SLAPP);MEMORANDUM OF POINTSAND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT; DECLARATION OF SUSAN F.DENT © 0 0 N N o o u r B A O w N D R N O N N N N N D N N N M N N F P F FP F FP , FP F F P FR , F P P c o ~ N o o u i A W w W N N F P O O V 0 0 N N o o u l B A W N O- -, o O o Here, Ms. Boone's statements clearly fall within the purview of protected activities covered by Anti-SLAPP statutes. They are an exercise of free speech impacting a specific issue of public interest, and, as such, Ms. Boone is entitled to the protections afforded by these statutes. B. Plaintiff Cannot Demonstrate a Probability of Success on Any of Her Purported Causes of Action. 1. Intentional Interference with Prospective E conomic Relations (“IIPER”) The elements for an I[IPER claim are (1) an economic relationship likely to benefit Plaintiff; (2) Defendant’s knowledge of the relationship; (3) intent to interference with that relationship; (4) independent wrongfulness; (5) actual disruption of relationship; (6) causation; and (7) harm. (Youst v. Longo (1987) 43 Cal.3d 64, 71.) Plaintiff cannot establish that any action by Ms. Boone, regardless of intent or independent “wrongfulness,” proximately caused any economic harm to her. Notwithstanding this fact, free speech is a recognized defense and bar to claims for [IPER (Blatty v. New York Times Co. (1986) 42 Cal.3d 1033, 1039-1039, 1042-1043, 1046-1047.) 2. Intentional Interference with Contractual Relations (“ICR”) The Elements for an [ICR claim are (1) a valid contract between Plaintiff and a third party; (2) Defendant not being a party to said contract; (3) defendant’s knowledge of contract; (4) intent to interfere with contract; (4) breach of said contract; (5) causation; and (6) harm. (Asahi Kasei Pharma Corp. v. Actelion Ltd. (2013) 222 Cal.App.4th 945, 958.) As with the above cause of action, free speech is a recognized defense and bar to claims for IICR. Moreover, Plaintiff has not established that a singular statement made to her employer, expressed by Ms. Boone as a frustrated landlord, relating to her personal opinion of Plaintiff, is in any way connected to Plaintiff’s abilities as a real estate broker, or cause for terminating her employmentrelationship. This cannot be established, and, upon information and belief, testimony from Plaintiff's former employer will establish the opposite ofthis fact. 3. Defamation per se Negligence per se requires (1) a statement made to a person other than plaintiff that; (2) the third person reasonably understood that the statements were about Plaintiff; (3) that the third party reasonably understood what the statements were to mean and that (4) Defendant failed to use reasonable care to determine the truth or falsity of such statements. (Judicial Council of California Civil Jury Instructions, 1702.) 7 NOTICE OF MOTION AND SPECIAL MOTION TO STRIKE PURSUANT TO C.C.P. 425.16 (ANTI-SLAPP);MEMORANDUM OF POINTSAND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT; DECLARATION OF SUSAN F.DENT © 0 0 N N o o u r B A O w N D R N O N N N N N D N N N M N N F P F FP F FP , FP F F P FR , F P P c o ~ N o o u i A W w W N N F P O O V 0 0 N N o o u l B A W N O- -, o O o Here, Plaintiff cannot prove these elements. Ms. Boone’s statements were those of non-actionable opinion, not fact. California courts have developed a ‘totality of the circumstances’ test to determine whether an alleged defamatory statement is one of fact or of opinion. First, the language of the statement is examined. For words to be defamatory, they must be understood in a defamatory sense. W here the language of the statementis ‘cautiously phrased in terms of apparency,’ the statement is less likely to be reasonably understood as a statement offact rather than opinion.” (Baker v. Los Angeles Herald Examiner (1986) 42 Cal.3d 254, 260.) Similarly, overly vague statements, and ¢ “generalized” comments ... “lack[ing] any specificity as to the time or place of” alleged conduct may be a “further signalto the reader there is no factual basis for the accusations.” (ZL Technologies, Inc. v. Does 1-7 (2017) 13 Cal.A pp.5th 603, 624.) Expressing an opinion of an individual being a “liar” is a generalized comment based on personal opinion. Such a statement is non-actionable and causes Plaintiff’s cause of action to fail in its entirety. 4. Intentional Infliction of E motional Distress The tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress is comprised of three elements: (1) extreme and outrageous conduct by the defendant with the intention of causing, or reckless disregard of the probability of causing, emotional distress; (2) the plaintiff suffered severe or extreme emotional distress; and (3) the plaintiff's injuries were actually and proximately caused by the defendant's outrageous conduct. (KOVR-TV, Inc. v. Superior Court (1995) 31 Cal.App.4th 1023, 1028.) Resolution of this matter turns on the first element-whether or not the conduct alleged was sufficiently extreme and outrageous. In order to meet the first requirement of the tort, the alleged conduct “must be so extreme as to exceed all bounds of that usually tolerated in a civilized community. . . Generally, conduct will be found to be actionable where the ‘recitation of the facts to an average member of the community would arouse his resentment against the actor, and lead him to exclaim, “Outrageous!” (KOVR-TV, supra, 31 Cal.A pp.4th at p. 1028.) In evaluating whether the defendant's conduct was outrageous,it is “not enough that the defendant has acted with an intent which is tortious or even criminal, or that he has intended to inflict emotional distress, or even that his conduct has been characterized by ‘malice,’ or a degree of aggravation which would entitle the plaintiff to punitive damages for another tort. Liability has been found only where the conduct has been so outrageous in character, and so extreme in degree, as to go beyond all possible bounds 8 NOTICE OF MOTION AND SPECIAL MOTION TO STRIKE PURSUANT TO C.C.P. 425.16 (ANTI-SLAPP);MEMORANDUM OF POINTSAND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT; DECLARATION OF SUSAN F.DENT © 0 0 N N o o u r B A O w N D R N O N N N N N D N N N M N N F P F FP F FP , FP F F P FR , F P P c o ~ N o o u i A W w W N N F P O O V 0 0 N N o o u l B A W N O- -, o O o of decency, and to be regarded as atrocious, and utterly intolerable in a civilized community.” (Rest.2d Torts, § 46, com. d.) Further, the tort does not extend to “mere insults, indignities, threats, annoyances, petty oppressions, or other trivialities. The rough edges of our society are still in need of a good deal of filing down, and in the meantime plaintiffs must necessarily be expected and required to be hardened to a certain amount of rough language, and to occasional acts that are definitely inconsiderate and unkind. There is no occasion for the law to intervene in every case where some one's feelings are hurt. There muststill be freedom to express an unflattering opinion, and some safety valve must be left through which irascible tempers may blow off relatively harmless steam.... ” (Rest.2d Torts, § 46, com. d, italics added; Cochran v. Cochran (1998) 65 Cal.A pp.4™ 488, 496.) The expression of an opinion that one is a “liar,” at best, comprises a “mere insult” or “unflattering opinion” - it does not shock the conscience or go “beyond all bounds of decency.” Plaintiff in no way can meet the burden established by this cause of action, and as such, fails to state a claim. 5. Negligent Infliction of E motional Distress An action based on the negligent infliction of emotional distress is not an independenttort, but rather itis the tort of negligence. The traditional elements of duty, breach of duty, causation and damages apply. (Burgess v. Superior Court (1992) 2 Cal. 4th 1064.) There are two very limited circumstances under which negligent infliction of emotional distress can be separately pleaded. First, a cause of action for negligent infliction of emotional distress may be stated by a bystander who actually witnessed an injury-causing incident to a close family member and is aware that itis causing injury to the victim. (Thing v. La Chusa (1989) 48 Cal. 3d 644.) Second, the cause of action arises in a limited class of cases where the plaintiff is a direct victim of a defendant's negligent conduct. (Burgess, supra.) Neither apply here. As such, Plaintiff’s allegations again fail to state a cause of action. C. Ms. Boone is Entitled to, and Requests, Attorney’s Fees and Costs Both the law and basic principles of fairness mandate that the Court award Ms. Boone her costs and fees incurred in bringing this Motion. (City of Los Angeles v. Animal Defense League (2006) 135 Cal. App. 4th 606, 627.) The Anti-SLAPP statute provides for a mandatory award of attorney's fees when a defendant prevails on a special motion to strike. (Code Civ. Proc. §425.16, subd. (¢) (“a prevailing defendant on a special motion to strike shall be entitled to recover his or her attorney's fees and costs”). 9 NOTICE OF MOTION AND SPECIAL MOTION TO STRIKE PURSUANT TO C.C.P. 425.16 (ANTI-SLAPP);MEMORANDUM OF POINTSAND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT; DECLARATION OF SUSAN F.DENT © 0 0 N N o o u r B A O w N D R N O N N N N N D N N N M N N F P F FP F FP , FP F F P FR , F P P c o ~ N o o u i A W w W N N F P O O V 0 0 N N o o u l B A W N O- -, o O o Accordingly, Ms. Boone asks the Court to award her the reasonable fees and costs incurred in making this Motion,as set forth in the Declaration of Susan F. Dent filed herewith. IV.CONCLUSION Plaintiff’s Complaint seeks to chill Ms. Boones First Amendment rights by attacking statements she made based on her own personal experience and firsthand knowledge of Plaintiff. Such allegations fall squarely within the scope of California’s Anti-SLA PP statute, and Plaintiff cannot show a probability of prevailing. Accordingly, Ms. Boone requests that the Court Strike Plaintiff’s causes of action in their entirety, and dismiss Ms. Boone, both individually and in her capacity as Trustee of the Boone Revocable Trust, from this action, with prejudice. WITHAM MAHONEY & ABBOTT LLP Awldade. Matthew M. Mahoney, Esq. Susan F. Dent, Esq. Attorneys for Rebecca Boone, individually and in her capacity as Trustee of the Boone Revocable Trust 10 NOTICE OF MOTION AND SPECIAL MOTION TO STRIKE PURSUANT TO C.C.P. 425.16 (ANTI-SLAPP);MEMORANDUM OF POINTSAND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT; DECLARATION OF SUSAN F.DENT © 0 0 d N o o u r B A O w N D R N O N N N N N D N N N M N N F P F FP F FR , FP , F P R , P R E c o ~ N O o o u l B A W w W O N F P O O V U 0 0 N O U U B A W w W N H o O o DECLARATION OF SUSAN F. DENT IN SUPPORT OF ATTORNEYS FEES AND COSTS [, Susan F. Dent, declare: 1. | am an attorney licensed to practice law before all Courts of the State of California. | am an associate at WITHAM MAHONEY & ABBOTT LLP, the attorneys of record for Defendant REBECCA BOONE (“Ms. Boone”) both in her individual capacity and in her capacity as Trustee of the Boone Revocable Trust. The following is true of my own personal knowledge, and, if called upon to testify, | could and would testify thereto. 2. | am familiar with the billing customs and practices in San Diego County and believe the practices of this firm are in accordance with those practices. My billing rate on this matter is $265.00 per hour. 3. | spent approximately 6.5 hours preparing for and drafting the instant Motion to Strike, including attempts to reach opposing counsel to discuss, legal research, preparation of a memorandum of points and authorities, review of all relevant facts and evidence in support and in opposition to the facts alleged within the Complaint, as well as final drafting and cite checking of authorities. 4. 1 also anticipate the following time to be expended in preparing a Reply (2.5 hours), as well as preparing for and arguing the instant motion before this court (3.5 hours) 5. The above attorney fees that have been incurred and will be incurred on litigating the instant motion, at my hourly rate of $265.00, will total $3,312.50 | declare, under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California, that the foregoing is true and correct. Executed this 4th day of June, 2018, at San Diego, CA. Susan F. Dent, Esq. 11 NOTICE OF MOTION AND SPECIAL MOTION TO STRIKE PURSUANT TO C.C.P. 425.16 (ANTI-SLAPP);MEMORANDUM OF POINTSAND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT; DECLARATION OF SUSAN F. DENT