Felczer vs. Apple IncReply to Opposition OtherCal. Super. - 4th Dist.December 16, 2011AN nn BA W N 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 23 26 Z7 28 JEFFREY L. HOGUE (SBN 234557) TYLER J. BELONG (SBN 234543) ERIK A. DOS SANTOS (SBN 309998) ANDREW B. DORR (SBN 317546) HOGUE & BELONG 170 Laurel Street San Diego, CA 92101 Tel.: (619) 238-4720 Fax: (619) 270-9856 Attorneys for the Class SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA FOR THE COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO BRANDON FELCZER, individually, RYAN GOLDMAN, individually, RAMSEY HAWKINS, individually, and JOSEPH LANE CARCO, on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, VS. APPLE INC., a California corporation; and DOES 1 through 300, inclusive. Defendants. ELECTRONICALLY FILED Superior Court of California, County of San Diego 02/02/2018 at 06:06:00 Pi Clerk of the Superior Court By E- Filing, Deputy Clerk CASE NO.: 37-2011-00102593-CU-OE-CTL THE CLASS’ REPLY TO DEFENDANT'S OPPOSITION MOTION TO STRIKE OR TAX COSTS Judge: Hon. Eddie C. Sturgeon Dep’t: C-67 Action Filed: December 16, 2011 Trial Date: October 14, 2016 Hearing Date: February 9, 2018 Time: 9:00 a.m. Dept: C-67 Entry of Judgment: September 13, 2017 Judgment Served: September 19, 2017 THE CLASS’ OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO STRIKE OR TAX COSTS CASE NO. 37-2011-00102598-CU-OE-CTL AN nn BA W N 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 23 26 Z7 28 I. INTRODUCTION In its Opposition, Defendant tacitly concedes the Class and representatives Felczer and Goldman are the prevailing party. Yet, Defendant argues that it should be deemed a second prevailing party against Class Representatives Carco and Hawkins entitling it to an award of costs against them. Defendant’s argument is fatally flawed in that it ignores that (i) there can only be one prevailing party in a class action, and (ii) that the class is the prevailing party, even where only a subsection of the class obtains a monetary recovery. Tellingly, Defendant overlooks clear legal authority which does not permit costs to be awarded to a defendant in a class action even if only a fraction of the class and class representatives receive a monetary recovery. Here, because the Class obtained a net monetary recovery, it is the sole prevailing party, meaning Defendant is entitled to nothing in costs. Moreover, assuming arguendo, that Defendant could recover costs, the vast majority of the costs sought by Defendant are either not recoverable or are greatly exaggerated. II. LEGAL ARGUMENT A. Hawkins and Carco are Prevailing Party Because the Prevailing Party is The Class. “[A] prevailing party is entitled as a matter of right to recover costs in any action or proceeding.” (CCP § 1032(b).) “For cost awards under Code of Civil Procedure section 1032, subdivision (a)(4), there is a single prevailing party.” (Sharif v. Mehusa, Inc. (2015) 241 Cal.App.4th 185, 194. [emphasis added.].) A prevailing party is “the party with a net monetary recovery”. (CCP § 1032(a)(4).) “[A] plaintiff will be considered a prevailing party when the lawsuit yields the primary relief sought in the case.” (See Zamora v. Shell Oil Co. (1997) 55 Cal.App.4th 204, 214 [awarding costs to a class of plaintiffs because they obtained a monetary credit from the defendant despite the fact that they recovered nothing else.].) Here, the prevailing party is not each individual class representative, but the Class as a whole. (Acree v. General Motors (2001) 92 Cal.App.4th 385.) In Acree, only one of the four named class representatives prevailed against the defendant at trial. (/d. at 392.) Similarly, only 14,000 of the 116,000 class members recovered any damages at all. (Id. at 400.) The defendant 1- THE CLASS’ REPLY TO DEFENDANT’S OPPOSITION MOTION TO STRIKE OR TAX COSTS CASE NO. 37-2011-00102598-CU-OE-CTL AN nn BA W N 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 23 26 Z7 28 sought costs, but the trial court rejected defendant’s claim and awarded costs to the class as the sole prevailing party. (Id. at 392.) Upholding the trial court’s ruling, the Court of Appeal stated: In short, the trial court had it right when it commented with respect to the award of attorney fees and costs: “Contrary to [defendant’s] assertions, this case has always maintained the character of a class action lawsuit and it is entirely appropriate to look at the results obtained by the class as a collective group." (Id. at 402 (emphasis added).) The Court went on to state: Keeping with its previous theme, [defendant] contends that it prevailed against most of the class members (those who did not recover any damages) and three of the four named plaintiffs, and should recover costs against those plaintiffs on an individual basis... We reject this argument ... [because of] the nature of a class action. (Id. at 405. [emphasis added.].) Here, at all times, the named Class Representatives brought this class action on behalf of themselves and all other similarly situated: All current, former, or prospective non-exempt employees in the State of California who have worked for Apple from December 16, 2007 up to and including the time of trial for this matter without receiving compensation for missed or late meal periods in violation of the California Labor Code and applicable wage orders. ("Plaintiff Class.") (Register of Actions (“ROA”) No. 332- Fourth Amended Complaint at paragraph 34. [emphasis added]; see also ROA No. 442- Order Certifying this Class composed of several subclasses.) Here, like in Acree, Carco and Hawkins are representatives of the Class which prevailed because not only did a large portion of the Class receive a net monetary recovery of $2,000,000.00, but this action also caused Defendant to completely overhaul its break policies, and started a national conversation about the importance of breaks. (Exs. “U”, “VV”, “W”, “X”.) Therefore, the Class, inclusive of Felczer, Goldman, Hawkins and Carco, are the prevailing parties because the action resulted in a $2,000,000.00 recovery on behalf of the Class and positive change regarding the primary relief sought. There is no case more directly on point than Acree, and Defendant has not offered any case authority supporting Defendant’s position. Instead, Defendant attempts unsuccessfully to 3 THE CLASS’ REPLY TO DEFENDANT’S OPPOSITION MOTION TO STRIKE OR TAX COSTS CASE NO. 37-2011-00102598-CU-OE-CTL AN nn BA W N 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 23 26 Z7 28 distinguish a case that supports the Class’ position. (Opposition at 2:7-14.) Defendant concedes that the Class and representatives Goldman and Felczer were the “prevailing party,” but somehow claims that there can also be a “second” “prevailing party,” even though Defendant clearly lost this case, to the tune of $2,000,000.00. Contrary to Defendant’s claim, at most, the Court must identify Defendant’s claim for costs as a “situation other than specified,” in which case, the Court should follow the Acree decision (the only case on point) and discretionarily deny Defendant’s request for costs.' Thus, because there can be only one prevailing party in any lawsuit/action, and in the context of a class action, so long as any subsection of the class obtains a monetary recovery, the class 1s the prevailing party. B. Alternatively, Defendant’s Alleged Costs are Not Recoverable for a Variety of Reasons. Setting aside the case authority and analysis in the preceding section (section IL.A, supra), most of Defendant’s alleged costs are not recoverable. 1. Defendant Cannot Offset Any Costs Related to the Prosecution of Felczer and Goldman’s Claims. Even discarding Acree, Defendant can never recover costs related to its defense of the claims brought by the class on behalf of retail class members - who Defendant concedes were the prevailing party by virtue of the $2,000,000 judgment. “The successful plaintiff is entitled to recover the whole of his or her costs, despite a limited victory. The defendant is not entitled to an offset, even though the defendant prevailed to some (lesser) extent.” (Michell v. Olick (1996) 49 Cal. App.4th 1194, 1196 [emphasis added.].) “An opposing party is not entitled to an : While Acree was decided under section 1717, the court in Acre made clear the analysis for a defendant’s cost claim was the same as under 1032 in the class action context where some of the class members and class recovered nothing (Acree, at fn 14, citing Sears v. Baccaglio, (1998) 60 Cal. App. 4th 1136, 1157-58, “Both statutes reserve to the court the final determination of who prevailed. Civil Code section 1717's definition of prevailing party depends upon an equitable determination . . .. Code of Civil Procedure section 1032 requires a prevailing party to be identified but also allows the court, in its discretion, to determine how the section may apply and, even in those "situations other than as specified" (id. subd. (a)(4)) to fix the amount of costs to be received or apportioned between the parties. Thus, section 1032 does not supplant or conflict with section 1717, but rather provides complementary discretion for the award of statutory costs, including fees where they may properly be considered as costs.; See also, section 1033.5 - permitting as recoverable costs under section 1032 those fees awarded under section 1717.) A THE CLASS’ REPLY TO DEFENDANT’S OPPOSITION MOTION TO STRIKE OR TAX COSTS CASE NO. 37-2011-00102598-CU-OE-CTL AN nn BA W N 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 23 26 Z7 28 offset, even if the prevailing party's net monetary gain reflected a partial or limited recovery.” (Ling v. P.F. Chang's, supra, at 1254.) Thus, contrary to Defendant’s assertions, it cannot offset costs related to the class claims advanced by Felczer and Goldman, which encompasses all retail class claims. (See also Motion at 10:22-11:5, 14:12-20.) 2. Defendant’s Court Transcript Costs Are Not Recoverable. Defendant argues that it is entitled to recover the costs for ordering transcripts because they were helpful to the Court and the parties. Interestingly, Defendant concedes these transcript costs are not recoverable, but contends that because it waived its objection to the Class’ request for such costs, Defendant ought to be permitted to recover them. (Oppo. at 3:5-10.) The Class cannot be held accountable for Defendant’s waiver of this objection in its motion to tax and strike the Class’ costs. (See Ex. “T”-Defendant’s Motion to Tax Costs.) The law is clear: (b) The following items are not allowable as costs, except when expressly authorized by law: (5) Transcripts of court proceedings not ordered by the court (Code Civ. Proc., § 1033.5. [emphasis added].) Here, unlike Defendant, the Class has timely objected to and opposed Defendant’s attempt to recover such costs. Defendant seeks $134,529.42 in costs for court and trial transcripts that were not ordered by the Court. They are not allowable, period. Additionally, even if this were not the case, Defendant’s $134,529.42 in transcript costs is unreasonable and highly suspect. A closer examination of Defendant's Attachment 9, detailing its claimed expenses for court ordered transcripts, reveals that it is rife with duplicative, unnecessary, or exorbitantly expensive line-items. (See, e.g., Ex. “C” at pp. 47-55- Defendant attempts to claim costs for multiple transcripts of the same hearing on no less than 17 occasions.) Second, Defendant appears to have spent approximately $1200 each day of trial. By way of comparison, the Class spent only approximately $24,000 in total trial transcripts - only $667 per day. Also, Defendant ordered expedited transcripts on numerous occasions, which unnecessarily raised their costs. (See Id. at September 9, 2013, December 26, 2013, and January 4- THE CLASS’ REPLY TO DEFENDANT’S OPPOSITION MOTION TO STRIKE OR TAX COSTS CASE NO. 37-2011-00102598-CU-OE-CTL AN nn BA W N 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 23 26 Z7 28 23,2014.) There is simply no reason for the Defendant’s transcript costs to have more than doubled the Class’. 3. Defendant’s Deposition Costs Should Be Stricken or Taxed. As stated above, Defendant is not entitled to recover the $154,152.59 that they claim in deposition costs because these costs were incurred in connection with claims on which the Class prevailed. While the individuals listed in Exhibit Q may have answered deposition questions about the Class’ rest break theory, they were also deposed at length regarding late meal periods - a claim on which the class prevailed. It is immaterial that the Class did not prevail on every cause of action about which these deponents were questioned. (Michell, supra at 1199 [The “defendant is not entitled to an offset, even though the defendant prevailed to some (lesser) extent.”].) Defendant invents a new test based on whether these expenses were “reasonably related to Apple’s prevailing party status.” (Oppo. at 5:11-12.) Defendants do not cite any law to support that this showing would entitle them to costs where the Class prevailed, and indeed there is none. Defendant cites Duicong Management, Inc. v. Superior Court (2015) 234 Cal.App.4th 306, for the proposition that it can recover costs for depositions during which topics other than late meal periods were addressed. (Oppo. at 4:20-23.) In Duicong, the Defendant initially won a non- suit against two plaintiffs, but the judgment was later reversed as to one of them. (Id.; at 309.) The court held that a single un-apportioned award of costs against both plaintiffs was improper because one of them could still prevail at trial. (Id. at 316-17.) In fact, Duicong supports the Class’ proposition that Defendant cannot recover any costs against a prevailing party, including the retail meal period class members. 4. Defendant’s Deposition Costs Were Not Reasonable. a. Defendant’s Failure to Stipulate Per Code Resulted in Unnecessary Costs. Defendant argues that instructing a Court Reporter to provide a transcript per Code does not make its deposition fees unreasonable and that the Class itself has requested matters to be conducted per Code. (Oppo. at 6:10-17.) The Class’ choice to file motions pursuant to Code is immaterial to this instant motion. Defendant does not even dispute that its failure to agree to split deposition costs broke with industry standards in San Diego and unnecessarily drove up the costs _5- THE CLASS’ REPLY TO DEFENDANT’S OPPOSITION MOTION TO STRIKE OR TAX COSTS CASE NO. 37-2011-00102598-CU-OE-CTL AN nn BA W N 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 23 26 Z7 28 of this case for both parties. (Mot. at 6:12-7:4.) Because these costs are unreasonable, and were only incurred as a result of Defendant’s choice, they should be stricken or taxed accordingly. b. Defendant's Precertification Depositions Are Not Recoverable. Defendant argues that its pre-certification depositions were necessary because testimony from some of the putative class members it deposed was used at trial. (Oppo. at 6:25-28.) But Defendant’s precertification depositions were unnecessary. (Moreno v. City of King (2005) 127 Cal. App.4th 17, 30 “[Deposition costs are recoverable by a prevailing party as a matter of right if they were “necessary depositions.”].) Here, before the class was certified, Defendant had access to contact information for all putative class members, most of whom were current employees. Thus, Defendant could walk into whatever location at which the putative class member worked, interview that particular person, and obtain a declaration. Likewise, Defendant could have called any putative class member and obtain a declaration. But, Defendant instead chose to take numerous class member depositions prior to Plaintiffs’ certification motion as another means to unnecessarily drive up costs for the parties. Defendant’s precertification deposition costs were unnecessary and should be stricken. c. Defendant’s counsel confirmed that class member depositions were not “reasonably necessary.” First, Defendant falsely argues that the Class’ decision to offer class member testimony was not made “until the motion in limine hearing at the start of trial.” (Oppo. at 7:25-26.) This is misleading, the Class had never represented that it would not offer class member testimony, as class member testimony had always been a part of the trial plan (See, e.g., Class Certification Motion, including nearly 100 declarations of anticipated putative class member testimony.) And, contrary to Defendant’s assertions, the admonition and limitation on class member testimony at trial was solely at the demand of Defendant’s counsel. Second, in Defendant’s own motion in limine, Defendant actually contends the class member testimony and depositions were not necessary. (See Mot. at 8:5-28.) Thus, these costs should be stricken or taxed accordingly. 1" -6- THE CLASS’ REPLY TO DEFENDANT’S OPPOSITION MOTION TO STRIKE OR TAX COSTS CASE NO. 37-2011-00102598-CU-OE-CTL AN nn BA W N 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 23 26 Z7 28 5. Defendant is Not Entitled to Recover Its Filing and Motion Costs. Defendant seeks filing fees of $12,810.21. (Opposition at 8:17-9:9.) Contrary to Defendant’s assertions, it is impossible to discern the purpose of any of Defendant’s filing fees, or even what document was filed, from the face of Defendant’s memorandum of costs. (See Ex. “C” generally at pp 7-19, showing costs for “ONE LEGAL, INC. E-filing POS”.) Thus, these costs should be stricken or taxed accordingly. 6. Defendant’s Exhibit Costs Should Either Be Stricken or Taxed. In its Opposition Defendant seeks $22,643.96 in Models, blowups, and photocopies of exhibits. (Oppo. at 9:18-20.) Defendant ignores precedent and instead argues that Ladas v. California State Auto Assn. (1993) 19 Cal. App.4th 761 is not controlling because the case did not go to trial. (Oppo. at 9:15-18.) This argument misses the mark because, “[o]n its face [CCP section 1033.5] excludes as a permissible item of costs exhibits not used at trial, which obviously could not have assisted the trier of fact.” (Seever v. Copley Press, Inc. (2006) 141 Cal.App.4th 1550, 1557.) Defendant does not provide any line items for exhibit costs or any other way to find that such costs were necessary to assist the trier of fact. Because Defendant simply lumps its exhibit fees into one undifferentiated category any claimed costs should be stricken. 7. The Court Should Strike or Tax Defendant’s Costs for Service of Process. Defendant asserts that its messenger fees to Class Counsel and to the Court were necessary and reasonable to the Court because “Plaintiffs” decision to use a staff member... does not mean it was unreasonable for Apple to use a messenger service.” (Oppo. at 11:3-4.) Defendant, whose counsel is represented by the “largest employment and labor practice” firm in the U.S. fails to address or even acknowledge that its office is located just 1.4 miles away from Class Counsel, and just one block away from the Court. (See Exs. “N” and “O”.) Defendant cannot realistically dispute that it would have been more cost effective to have a staff member deliver courtesy copies to the Court. Rather, Defendant, one of the largest corporations in the world, seeks to pass on its “convenience” costs to the Class for tasks that would have taken 15 minutes or less to complete. (See Ex “N”.) As aresult, these costs are extremely unreasonable, the Court should either strike or tax them in their entirety. (See Nelson v. Anderson (1999) 72 Cal. App.4th 111, 132 [Messenger 7- THE CLASS’ REPLY TO DEFENDANT’S OPPOSITION MOTION TO STRIKE OR TAX COSTS CASE NO. 37-2011-00102598-CU-OE-CTL AN nn BA W N 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 23 26 Z7 28 fees are “unreasonable on their face, when compared to the probable cost of alternatives such as mail, Federal Express, or personal filing, in view of the size of the very large firm representing [defendant].”) 8. The Court Should Strike Defendant’s Paralegal Fees in Their Entirety. Defendant brazenly seeks $107,008.20 in fees for its paralegal. (Oppo. at 11:21-13:7; Ex. “C”- Det.’s Memo. of Costs at 13(III), pp. 62-66.) In arguing for an award of these fees, Defendant relies on Green v. County of Riverside. But, Green does not help Defendant. As stated in Green, paralegal fees “are neither specifically allowable under Code of Civil Procedure section 1033.5, subdivision (a) nor prohibited by subdivision.”.) Thus, under Defendant’s own case, its paralegal fees are not contemplated as recoverable costs. Importantly, Defendant ignores and fails to address relevant legal authority, confirming that where a party is not entitled to attorneys’ fees, it is likewise unable to recover paralegal fees. (See Guinn v. Dotson (1994) 23 Cal. App.4th 262, 270 [noting “awards of attorney fees for paralegal time have become commonplace in California” as part of awarding attorney fees]; Sundance v. Municipal Court (1987) 192 Cal. App.3d 268, 275.) Paralegal “fees” simply are not “costs”. Here, Defendant is not entitled to fees of any kind, and never moved for fees of any kind. Additionally, even if Defendant could recover these fees, Defendant’s paralegal fees are clearly excessive and unreasonable. Defendant provided no evidence indicating its paralegal’s hourly rate, qualifications, nor how much time was spent presenting evidence per day. (See Ex. “C” at pp. 62-66.) In fact, on its face, Defendant’s paralegal’s billing is impermissible block billing for entire days with time that is clearly not compensable for the presentation of electronic evidence. And, it contains entries that are facially ambiguous. (See Ex. “C” at p. 64 at 11/11/16- [“Prepare for upcoming week of trial.””]; Id. at p. 64 at 11/8/2016 [“Prepare for and attend trial for testimony of Mr. Felczer and hearing regarding expert Mr. O'Brien and prepare for next day of trial including assist with Ms. Fehr's preparation.”]; see also Mountjoy v. Bank of America, N.A. (2016) 245 Cal.App.4th 266, 279. [“Block billing occurs when ‘a block of time [is 299 assigned] to multiple tasks rather than itemizing the time spent on each task.’”]; In re Marriage of Nassimiin Re Marriage of Nassimi (2016) 3 Cal.App.5th 667, 695 [“The party seeking fees and _8- THE CLASS’ REPLY TO DEFENDANT’S OPPOSITION MOTION TO STRIKE OR TAX COSTS CASE NO. 37-2011-00102598-CU-OE-CTL AN nn BA W N 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 23 26 Z7 28 costs bears the burden of establishing entitlement to an award and documenting the appropriate hours expended and hourly rates”].) Here, even if Defendant could be awarded paralegal fees, it has failed to meet its burden to prove their reasonableness as it has failed to furnish adequate information. Therefore, the Court should strike these costs in its entirety. Furthermore, when compared to the Class’ costs for presentation of electronic evidence at trial, Defendant’s paralegal fees are severely unreasonable. (Compare to Class’ Memorandum of Cost, which was only for $40,943.25 for its electronic presentation of trial exhibits, compared to the $107,008.20 Defendant seeks.) Additionally, Defendant seeks recovery of fees for preparing for Mr. Felczer and Goldman’s testimony, who it concedes are prevailing parties. (Ex. “C’ at p. 64.) Therefore, the Court should completely strike these costs in their entirety. 9. Defendant’s Out of Town Counsel’s Travel Expenses and Court Call Costs Must Be Stricken In Their Entirety. Defendant admits that it seeks $49,582.61 for its Northern California counsel’s travel, hotel, and meal expenses both to and from trial, ex partes and motion hearings. (Oppo. at 13:16- 24.) Defendant argues that these costs are necessary because it was necessary for Defendant to “retain a law firm with a state-wide presence.” (Oppo. at 13:16-24.) The ability of a party, especially like Defendant, a Fortune 500 company, to have state-wide counsel is a conyenience; not a necessity. Defendant’s counsel’s primary office is located one block away from the Court, at 501 W. Broadway, and has 29 employment law attorneys that work at that location. (See Exs. “N” and “O”.) Clearly, Defendant’s San Diego counsel could have undertook this entire case. Thus, these amounts were not “necessary to the conduct of the litigation rather than merely convenient or beneficial to its preparation” nor “reasonable in their amount”. Furthermore, Defendant seeks to distinguish Ladas because it excluded “local travel expenses.” (Oppo. at 14:6-13.) But, this is exactly what Defendant seeks. Defendant asks for costs associated with its counsel’s local stay in San Diego. Defendant next argues that it is entitled to costs for the approximate 50 appearances via Court Call. (See Ex. “C” at pp. 59-61.) As stated above, it was not necessary for lawyers in other cities to participate in all Court hearings in this case, especially when Defendant had several attorneys physically present at every hearing. 9. THE CLASS’ REPLY TO DEFENDANT’S OPPOSITION MOTION TO STRIKE OR TAX COSTS CASE NO. 37-2011-00102598-CU-OE-CTL AN nn BA W N 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 23 26 Z7 28 10. Defendant’s Meal Costs Must Be Stricken. Defendant argues that its meal costs are allowable because they were necessary. Defendant provides no authority, and only distinguishes Ladas on the basis that it involved local meal costs. (Opposition at 15:12-16.) Irrespective of meals being local or not. The Ladas court stated: [A]ttorneys have to eat, whether they are conducting litigation or not. At best, these expenses are ''merely convenient or beneficial" to preparation for litigation... They should have been stricken. (Ladas v. California State Auto. Assn. (1993) 19 Cal.App.4th 761, 774-775. [emphasis added].) Regardless of whether these costs were for local or out of town depositions, they were merely a convenience and not reasonably necessary to Defendant. Accordingly, they should be stricken in their entirety. III. CONCLUSION For all of the foregoing reasons, the Class respectfully requests that the Court award Defendant nothing in costs because it is not a prevailing party. Alternatively, to the extent the Court disagrees with the above cited authority, the Class respectfully requests that the Court heavily strike or tax Defendant’s costs accordingly. Dated: February 2, 2018 HOGUE & BELONG By: [sy Trik A. Doy Santos JEFFREY L. HOGUE TYLER J. BELONG ERIK A. DOS SANTOS ANDREW B. DORR Attorneys for the Class -10- THE CLASS’ REPLY TO DEFENDANT’S OPPOSITION MOTION TO STRIKE OR TAX COSTS CASE NO. 37-2011-00102598-CU-OE-CTL