Motion_to_strikeMotionCal. Super. - 4th Dist.February 6, 202030-202 O O 0 N N Ln BA W N = N N N N N N N N N = mm e m e m e m e m e m e m e m co NN NN Ln BR A W D = O O X N N N RE E W N = Oo Electronically Filed by Superior Court of California, County of Orange, 06/03/2020 01:46:00 PM. D-01130106-CU-PO-CJC - ROA #33 - DAVID H. YAMASAKI, Clerk of the Court By Brook Israel, Deputy Clerk. Robert E. Henke, Esq. (SBN 150736) DIEDERICH & ASSOCIATES Mailing Address: P.O. Box 64093 St. Paul, MN 55164-0093 Physical Address: 21680 Gateway Center Drive, Suite 100 Diamond Bar, CA 91765 Main (909) 612-3930; Fax (855) 260-0261 Direct (909) 612-3908 E-mail: rhenke @travelers.com Attorneys for Defendant, SUNSET VANS, INC. SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA FOR THE COUNTY OF ORANGE — CENTRAL JUSTICE CENTER DOUG SIMPSON, an individual and d.b.a Case No.: 30-2020-01130106-CU-PO-CIC SIMPSON CUSTOM WOODWORKS, Plaintiff, DEFENDANT, SUNSET VANS, INC.’S NOTICE VS. OF MOTION AND MOTION TO STRIKE PORTIONS OF PLAINTIFFS’ COMPLAINT; SUNSET VANS, INC., DALE E. FOWLER, an| MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND individual, DALE E. FOWLER, as trustee of AUTHORITIES; DECLARATION OF ROBERT DALE E. FOWLER REVOCABLE TRUST, HENKE [PROPOSED] ORDER DALE E. FOWLER REVOCABLE TRUST, FOWLER PROPERTIES; AND DOES 1 TO Assigned to Judge Glenn Salter, 50, INCLUSIVE, Dept. C22 Defendants. Complaint Filed: March 3, 2020 Trial Date: None Date: KIXXZ8 XXX 8/6/2020 Time: 1:30 p.m. Dept.: C22 Reservation No. 73310302 TO ALL PARTIES AND THEIR ATTORNEYS OF RECORD: 1 DEFENDANT SUNSET VAN’S MOTION TO STRIKE BI O O 0 N N Ln BA W N = N N N N N N N N N = mm e m e m e m e m e m e m e m co NN NN Ln BR A W D = O O X N N N RE E W N = Oo 8/6/2020 NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN THAT on XX28XX0R& at 1:30 p.m. or as soon thereafter as the matter may be heard in Department C22 of the above-entitled Court, Defendant Sunset Vans, Inc. will move the Court for an Order striking portions of Plaintiffs’ Complaint as set forth herein. This motion is made on the grounds that the Complaint fails to allege facts sufficient to warrant a claim for punitive damages and the request for punitive damages is not drawn in conformity with the laws of the State of California. Pursuant to California Code of Civil Procedure §§ 435, 436 and 437, the claim for punitive and exemplary damages and all other irrelevant and improper matter should be stricken. Pursuant to Rule 3.1324(a) of the California Rules of Court, moving party seeks to have the following portions of the Complaint stricken as they relate to SUNSET VANS, INC.: 1. Paragraph 14(a)(2) off the form Complaint. 2. The entire Exemplary Damages Attachment as it relates to Sunset Vans, Inc. This motion is further based upon this notice, the following Memorandum of Points and Authorities, and on such further evidence as may be presented at the time of hearing on this motion. DATED: June 3, 2020 DIEDERICH & ASSOCIATES a i Led Robert E. Henke, Esq., Attorneys for Defendant, SUNSET VANS, INC. 2 DEFENDANT SUNSET VAN’S MOTION TO STRIKE O O 0 N N Ln BA W N = N N N N N N N N N = mm e m e m e m e m e m e m e m co NN NN Ln BR A W D = O O X N N N RE E W N = Oo MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES I. STATEMENT OF THE CASE This lawsuit filed by SIMPSON CUSTOM WOODWORKS involves a fire that occurred on February 2, 2018 at 1345 N. Dynamics Street in Anaheim. The moving party Sunset Vans, Inc. was a tenant at the same location. The fire started within the tenant space of Sunset Vans and caused damage to the property of several other tenants including the Plaintiff herein On March 3, 2020, Plaintiff filed their Complaint for Damages based on Negligence and Premises Liability. The Complaint also includes a claim for punitive damages based on the incident. On April 17, 2020, defense counsel requested via Email that Plaintiff stipulate to dismiss punitive damages against moving party, without prejudice. A copy of the meet and confer email and correspondence are attached to the Declaration of Robert Henke. Plaintiffs’ counsel was evidently not agreeable as he provided no response. The basis for the Complaint seeking punitive damages against Defendant is that Defendant had flammable gas tanks on the property and did not have sprinklers. Plaintiffs seek punitive damages where they have alleged nothing more than a straight forward negligence and/or premises liability case as to Sunset Vans. Plaintiffs have not pled facts, even if true, that are sufficient to establish malice, fraud or oppression and entitlement to punitive damages against the moving party. The language of the Complaint is completely conclusory and devoid of any statement of fact sufficient to constitute elements of conscious disregard, willful oppression or malicious behavior. For the reasons stated below, Defendant, Sunset Vans, Inc. respectfully requests that the Court strike the punitive damages attachment of the Complaint. II. THIS COURT HAS AUTHORITY TO STRIKE PORTIONS OF PLAINTIFFS’ COMPLAINT Plaintiffs’ Complaint is deficient and contains improperly pled matter. The Court is authorized to strike out any improper matter contained in a pleading or any part of a pleading not drawn in conformity with the law. California Code of Civil Procedure § 436, authorizes the Court, upon motion or at any time in its discretion, to: 3 DEFENDANT SUNSET VAN’S MOTION TO STRIKE O O 0 N N Ln BA W N = N N N N N N N N N = mm e m e m e m e m e m e m e m co NN NN Ln BR A W D = O O X N N N RE E W N = Oo (a) Strike out any irrelevant, false, or improper matter inserted in any pleading. (b) Strike out all or any part of any pleading not drawn or filed in conformity with the laws of this state, a court rule, or an order of the court. California Code of Civil Procedure § 4377(a) requires that the grounds for the motion to strike appear on the face of the challenged pleading or upon any matter which the court is required to take judicial notice. In this case, the grounds for the instant motion to strike appear on the face of the challenged pleading within the exemplary damages attachment. None of Plaintiffs allegations contain facts general or specific, in support of fraud, oppression or malice, which is required pursuant to California Civil Code §3294. Plaintiffs Complaint states facts only in support of negligence and premises liability as to Defendants. A motion to strike is the proper procedural device to eliminate from a complaint substantive defects that appear on the face of the complaint but that are not subject to demurrer. California Code of Civil Procedure §§435(b) and 437(a); PH II, Inc. v. Superior Court (1995) 33 Cal. App.4th 1680, 1682- 1683. This includes portions of a cause of action, such as a demand for a form of relief that is not available. Id; Grieves v. Superior Court (1984) 157 Cal.App.3d 159, 164. This motion may also be used to eliminate any “irrelevant”, “false” or “improper matters”. California Code of Civil Procedure §4369a); Alta-Dena Dairy v. County of San Diego (1969) 271 Cal. App.2d 66, 77-78. Defendant also move to strike all references, wherever they appear, which attempt to establish a foundation for alleging punitive damages, including the following portions of Plaintiff s Complaint: I. Paragraph 14(a)(2) off the form Complaint. 2. The entire Exemplary Damages Attachment as it relates to Sunset Vans, Inc. III. THE COMPLAINT FAILS TO ALLEGE THE NECESSARY FACTS TO SUPPORT AN ALLEGATION FOR PUNITIVE DAMAGES In Smithson v. Sparber (1932) 123 Cal.App.225, 232, the Court stated: “Whatever words are found in the pleadings (such, for instance as ‘carelessly, negligently, willfully, wrongfully and in fraud of the rights of these plaintiffs), going to state the pleader’s conclusions, may be disregarded. A motion to strike out would be the proper way to seek their elimination. . . “ [Emphasis added.] This precisely is 4 DEFENDANT SUNSET VAN’S MOTION TO STRIKE O O 0 N N Ln BA W N = N N N N N N N N N = mm e m e m e m e m e m e m e m co NN NN Ln BR A W D = O O X N N N RE E W N = Oo the type of language used by Plaintiff in his 2" Amendment to the Complaint and it should be disregarded. In Waco-Porter Corporation v. Superior Court (1963) 211 Cal.App.2d 559, 567, the Court provided the test for determining whether an allegation is fact or conclusion of law. The Court states: “The basic test of whether an allegation is a statement of fact or a conclusion lies in the answer to the question: Does it usurp the province of the Court to draw from it all legal inferences or conclusions which are determinative of the issues. . . As a general rule, if it does, it is a conclusion; if it does not, it is a statement of fact.” To plead a claim for punitive damages, the Plaintiff must plead the ultimate facts from which it can reasonably be inferred that the Defendant acted with malice, oppression, or fraud against the Plaintiff. Cyrus v. Haveson (1976) 65 Cal. App.3d 306, 316-317. Punitive damages require both an intent to act and malice defined as an intent to vex, injure or annoy, or as criminal indifference toward an obligation owed another. Mere negligence and recklessness will not suffice. Johns-Manville Sales Corporation Private Carriage v. Worker’s Compensation Appeals Board (1979) 96 Cal.App.3d 923, 930. 4 Witkin, Summary of California Law (8th ed.) Torts, Section 850, states “The general rule which is followed in California requires a showing of malice in fact or actual malice, either by direct evidence of bad motive, or evidence furnished by the nature of the act done.” There is no factual evidence from which the court can reasonably infer that plaintiff would be entitled to the relief sought by the pleading. Other than plaintiff's conclusory statements, there are no facts alleged to support a claim for punitive damages against defendant. Oppression, malice and fraud must be shown by clear and convincing evidence. Code of Civil Procedure § 3294. To be liable for punitive damages “a defendant must act with intent to vex, injure or annoy or with conscious disregard of plaintiff’s rights.” Colonial Life & Accident Insurance Company v. Superior Court (1979) 96 Cal.App.3d 923, 930. Punitive damages are proper only when defendant’s acts are reprehensible, fraudulent or in blatant violation of law or policy; punitive damages are proper only when tortuous conduct rises to levels of extreme indifference in plaintiff's rights which decent citizens should not have to tolerate. In Re: Butcher Bankruptcy, C.D. 1996 200 B.R. 675. A tort committed by mistake without wrong intention does not warrant punitive damages. Roth v. Shell (1960) 5 DEFENDANT SUNSET VAN’S MOTION TO STRIKE O O 0 N N Ln BA W N = N N N N N N N N N = mm e m e m e m e m e m e m e m co NN NN Ln BR A W D = O O X N N N RE E W N = Oo 185 Cal.App.2d 676,682. Plaintiff fails to allege facts demonstrating that the defendant specifically intended to cause injury to plaintiff, or that they acted consciously and without any regard to the rights and safety of others. In Brousseau v. Jarrett (1977) 73 Cal.App.3d 864, 869, plaintiff sought punitive damages based upon the theories of malice, oppression and fraud, alleging that: “Defendant engaged in the conduct described in the second count ‘intentionally, willfully, fraudulently, and with a wanton, reckless disregard for the possible injuries [sic] consequences . . . and as a result of. . . said intentional, willful, wanton, reckless, oppressive and fraudulent conduct,plaintiff is entitled to exemplary damages. . . The Court in Brousseau held that plaintiff’s conclusory characterizations of defendant’s conduct was a “patently insufficient statement of oppression, fraud, malice, express or implied”, within the meaning of Section 3294. (73 Cal.App.3d at 872.) The case of McDonell v. American Trust (1955) 130 Cal.App.2d 296 is instructive. In McDonell, plaintiff tenant sued defendant landlord for injuries sustained when the tenant slipped and fell on water that had entered her store due to defects in the roof and roof drains. The landlord knew of the problems with the roof and roof drains and that the problems could cause injury to plaintiff's person and/or property, but did not remedy the conditions, despite plaintiff’s requests that such repairs take place. The tenant sued landlord and alleged several counts, including an allegation of intentional tort and for punitive damages. The trial court sustained demurrers to the complaint without leave to amend and entered judgment for the landlord. The tenant appealed. The Court of Appeal held that the facts did not support an intentional tort or conduct so recklessly disregardful of the rights of others as to show malice so the punitive damages were stricken as well. As the Court stated in McDonell, “Calling this a “willful” failure to repair was not the same as saying defendant acted with a wrongful personal intent to injure or in reckless disregard of the rights of others.” (Id. at 300.) The court did find that the facts stated could be read to allege negligence. Specifically, the court stated: “[ T]he first part of the count (that which deals with actual damages) is that defendant, aware of the defective condition of the roof 6 DEFENDANT SUNSET VAN’S MOTION TO STRIKE O O 0 N N Ln BA W N = N N N N N N N N N = mm e m e m e m e m e m e m e m co NN NN Ln BR A W D = O O X N N N RE E W N = Oo and drains and knowing they could cause damage, refused to repair them. Those facts do not spell an intentional tort (a conscious, deliberate intent to injure the plaintiffs) or conduct so recklessly disregardful of the rights of others (sometimes characterized as wanton or willful misconduct) as would show the ‘malice’ in fact which the statute requires as a predicate for punitive in addition to actual damages.” (Id. at 299.) * * * “We conclude that the portion of the second count which deals with actual damages falls short of pleading a basis for punitive damages. At the very most, it sounds in negligence. []]] The latter part of the second count pleads no additional facts. It merely refers to certain of the allegations of the first part and characterizes defendant's conduct as ‘willful misconduct,” ‘willful and wanton negligence,” and ‘conscious disregard’ of the safety, health, rights and property of the plaintiffs. Those, in their context, are mere labels pinned on by the pleader.” (Id at 300.)” As in the Brousseau and McDonell cases, Plaintiff’s allegations in the instant action are mere conclusions without any supporting facts which would justify the claim for punitive damages. Sunset Vans, Inc. does not deny a fire started within its tenant space. But the facts of the Complaint describe negligent conduct, not conduct that rises to the level of punitive damages. There was no intent to damage the property of Plaintiff. There is no authority for the proposition that any negligence which occurs while working around flammable materials or occupying a building without sprinklers creates a basis for punitive damages. For that reason, the motion to strike should be granted. IV. CONCLUSION Accordingly, Defendant respectfully request that the Court strikes the exemplary damages attachment and any claim for punitive damages against the moving party. DATED: June 3, 2020 DIEDERICH & ASSOCIATES Robert E. Henke, Esq., Attorneys for Defendant, SUNSET VANS, INC. 7 DEFENDANT SUNSET VAN’S MOTION TO STRIKE O O 0 N N Ln BA W N = N N N N N N N N N = mm e m e m e m e m e m e m e m co NN NN Ln BR A W D = O O X N N N RE E W N = Oo DECLARATION OF ROBERT E. HENKE IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO STRIKE PORTIONS OF PLAINTIFF’S COMPLAINT I, Robert E. Henke, declare: I am an attorney duly licensed to practice law before the courts in the State of California. I am an associate of Diederich & Associates, counsel of record for defendants in this matter and have primary responsibility for this matter in our office. The following facts are within my personal knowledge and I could and would testify competently as follows if called upon to do so: 1. On April 17, 2020, after reviewing a copy of the summons and complaint on behalf of my client, I wrote a letter to plaintiff’s counsel regarding defendant’s filing of a motion to strike. A true and correct copy of the email is attached as Exhibit A and the letter as Exhibit B. 2. I received no response. Therefore on June 3, 2020, Sunset Vans, Inc. reserved a hearing date for a Motion to Strike (Reservation No. 73310302) with a hearing date of July 23, 2020. I declare under penalty of perjury pursuant to the laws of the state of California that the foregoing is true and correct. Executed this 3rd day of June 2020, at Diamond Bar, California. a 1 Leal, Robert E. Henke 8 DEFENDANT SUNSET VAN’S MOTION TO STRIKE EXHIBIT A From: Henke, Robert E Sent: Friday, April 17, 2020 12:53 PM To: ‘kris@lawrussell.com’; Sanchez, Sharon R; Lowy, Sheri A Subject: Simpson v. Sunset Vans--meet and confer Attachments: Correspondence to counsel re punitive damages_041720-134746.pdf Attached is a meet and confer related to the request for punitive damages. | also would like to discuss resolution of the case with you. Robert E. Henke | Attorney at Law Diederich & Associates Diamond Bar, California Direct: 909-612-3908 Office: 909-612-3930 Mobile: 909-264-6844 Fax: 855-260-0261 Email: rhenke@travelers.com Please address all correspondence sent by mail to: P.O. Box 64093 St. Paul, MN 55164-0093 Not a Partnership or Professional Corporation All attorneys are Employees of The Travelers Indemnity Company and its Property Casualty Affiliates During this time we will continue to serve our clients, customers, and partners without interruption. All phone numbers will continue to reach me just as they previously have. | ask that you provide an email copy of all correspondence and pleadings and direct anything that cannot be sent electronically to: P.O. Box 64093 St. Paul, MN 55164-0093 EXHIBIT B DIEDERICH & ASSOCIATES Robert E. Henke MAILING ADDRESS: Writer's Email Address: Attorney at Law rhenke@travelers.com P.O. BOX 64093 ST. PAUL, MN 55164-0093 Direct Dial: (909) 612-3908 TELEPHONE (909) 612-3930 FACSIMILE (855) 260-0261 Not a Partnership or Professional Corporation All Attorneys are Employees of The Travelers Indemnity Company and their property casualty affiliates April 17,2020 Kristopher O’Connell Russell & Lazarus 1401 Dove Street, Ste. 310 Newport Beach. CA 92660 kris@lawrussell.com Re: Doug Simpson v. Sunset Vans, Inc. Claim No.: 603 LR EZB0364 A Date of Loss: February 12, 2018 Our File No.: 2019090121 Dear Mr. O’Connell: Our office will be representing Sunset Vans in the above-captioned case. This correspondence is intended as a meet and confer on the claim for punitive damages against my client. The allegations related to sprinklers required in the structure would seem to be limited to the landlord. The allegations against Sunset Vans relate solely to the storage of flammable gas tanks. Your theories against them are entirely premised on negligence. Negligence generally does not provide a basis for punitive damages and there seems to be no reason why it would here. We would ask you agree to strike the punitive damages without prejudice so we can start moving forward with the case. Even if there were facts alleged in support of a cause of action for gross negligence that would not be enough as courts have ruled that “...even gross negligence is not sufficient to justify an award of punitive damages.” Ebaugh v. Rabkin (1972) 22 Cal. App.3d 891, 894. In California, the basis upon which punitive damages may be awarded is governed by Civil Code section 3294(a), which allows recovery only if plaintiff proves, by clear and convincing evidence, “that the defendant has been guilty of oppression, fraud, or malice.” Additionally, it is a Office Locations 21680 Gateway Center Dr., Suite 100, Diamond Bar, CA 91765 | 655 North Central Ave., Suite 2000, Glendale, CA 91203 1901 Orange Tree Lane, Suite 100, Redlands, CA 92374 | 9325 Sky Park Ct., Suite 230, San Diego, CA 92123 April 17,2020 Page 2 universally-recognized principle that [t]he law does not favor punitive damages and they should be granted with the greatest caution.” (Dyna-Med, Inc. v. Fair Employment & Housing Commission (1987) 43 Cal.3d 1379, 1392.) California courts require that specific facts be pled in support of punitive damage allegations; mere conclusions are not enough. (Hilliard v. A.H. Robbins (1983) 148 Cal.App.3d 374, 391; Perkins v. Superior Court (1981) 117 Cal.App.3d 1, 6-7; Grieves v. Superior Court, supra, 157 Cal.App.3d at 166.) Broad allegations that a defendant acted maliciously and willfully are not enough; specific facts must be alleged. (Austin v. Regents of University of California (1979) 89 Cal.App.3d 354 disapproved on other grounds by Ochoa v. Superior Court (1985) 39 Cal.3d 159; Brousseau v. Jarrett (1977) 73 Cal.App.3d 864.) Your Complaint to state specific facts which show that defendants acted with malice or intent to oppress the plaintiff. To establish malice, a plaintiff must demonstrate that the defendant acted not just with a conscious disregard of the rights or safety of others, but also that the defendant willfully engaged in despicable conduct. (Civil Code section 3294(c)(1); College Hospital, Inc., supra, 8 Cal.4th at p. 713.) As the Supreme Court noted in College Hospital, the reference to “despicable” conduct is a substantive limitation on punitive damage awards because the term refers to circumstances which are base, vile or contemptible. (8 Cal.4th at p. 725.) Likewise, oppression requires “despicable conduct that subjects a person to cruel and unjust hardship in conscious disregard” of another's rights. (Civil Code, section 3294(c)(2).) In other words, the bar for recovery of punitive damages under Civil Code section 3294 is quite high. Punitive damages are appropriate if the defendant's acts are reprehensible, fraudulent or in blatant violation of law or policy. “‘The mere carelessness or ignorance of the defendant does not justify the imposition of punitive damages.... Punitive damages are proper only the tortious conduct rises to levels of extreme indifference to the plaintiffs rights, a level which decent citizens should not have to tolerate.”” (Tomaselli v. Transamerica Ins. Co. (1994) 25 Cal.App.4th 1269, 1287 [citation omitted]; see also Lackner v. North (2006) 135 Cal.App.4th 1188, 1210.) Stated another way, despicable conduct is that which is “‘so vile, base, contemptible, miserable, wretched or loathsome that it would be looked down upon and despised by ordinary decent people.” (Mock v. Michigan Millers Mutual Ins. Co. (1992) 4 Cal.App.4th 306, 331, quoting BAJI 14.72 (1989 rev.).) Even before Civil Code section 3294 was amended, a plaintiff was required to allege facts establishing malice or oppression, not just legal conclusions that defendant's acts were “wrongful” or “willful” or “wanton.” (Cohen v. Groman Mortuary, Inc. (1964) 231 Cal.App.2d 1, 8-9, disapproved on other grounds by Christensen v. Superior Court (1991) 54 Cal.3d 868.) “Punitive or exemplary damages are remedies available to a party who can plead and prove the facts and circumstances set forth in Civil Code section 3294, the cases interpreting this code section, or by other statutory authority.” (Hilliard v. A.H. Robbins (1983) 148 Cal. App.3d 374, 391, emphasis added, footnotes omitted.) The case of McDonell v. American Trust (1955) 130 Cal. App.2d 296 is instructive. In McDonell, plaintiff tenant sued defendant landlord for injuries sustained when the tenant slipped and fell on water that had entered her store due to defects in the roof and roof drains. The landlord knew of April 17,2020 Page 3 the problems with the roof and roof drains and that the problems could cause injury to plaintiff's person and/or property, but did not remedy the conditions, despite plaintiffs requests that such repairs take place. The tenant sued landlord and alleged several counts, including an allegation of intentional tort and for punitive damages. The trial court sustained demurrers to the complaint without leave to amend and entered judgment for the landlord. The tenant appealed. The Court of Appeal held that the facts did not support an intentional tort or conduct so recklessly disregardful of the rights of others as to show malice so the punitive damages were stricken as well. As the Court stated in McDonell, “Calling this a “wilful” failure to repair was not the same as saying defendant acted with a wrongful personal intent to injure or in reckless disregard of the rights of others.” (Id. at 300.) The court did find that the facts stated could be read to allege negligence. Specifically the court stated: “[ T]he first part of the count (that which deals with actual damages) is that defendant, aware of the defective condition of the roof and drains and knowing they could cause damage, refused to repair them. Those facts do not spell an intentional tort (a conscious, deliberate intent to injure the plaintiffs) or conduct so recklessly disregardful of the rights of others (sometimes characterized as wanton or willful misconduct) as would show the ‘malice’ in fact which the statute requires as a predicate for punitive in addition to actual damages.” (Id. at 299.) * * * “We conclude that the portion of the second count which deals with actual damages falls short of pleading a basis for punitive damages. At the very most, it sounds in negligence. [q] The latter part of the second count pleads no additional facts. It merely refers to certain of the allegations of the first part and characterizes defendant's conduct as ‘willful misconduct,” ‘willful and wanton negligence,” and ‘conscious disregard’ of the safety, health, rights and property of the plaintiffs. Those, in their context, are mere labels pinned on by the pleader.” (Id at 300.)” While the Complaint does have enough facts to allege negligence and premises liability there are not enough facts alleged to show malice or oppression as necessary to support a claim of punitive damages against defendant. If the McDonell court denied a right to punitive damages even when the defendant was put on notice of the danger by Plaintiffs and failed to do anything, the allegations here are never going to be sufficient. Please contact me if you would like to discuss the matter further. Very truly yours, rR, Robert E. Henke Attorney at Law O O 0 N N Ln BA W N = N N N N N N N N N = mm e m e m e m e m e m e m e m co NN NN Ln BR A W D = O O X N N N RE E W N = Oo PROOF OF SERVICE STATE OF CALIFORNIA, COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES I am employed in the County of Los Angeles, State of California, I am over the age of 18 and not a party to the within action; my business address is: 21680 Gateway Center Drive, Suite 100, Diamond Bar, CA 91765. On June 3, 2020, I served the foregoing document described as: DEFENDANT, SUNSET VANS, INC.’S NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION TO STRIKE PORTIONS OF PLAINTIFFS’ COMPLAINT; MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES; DECLARATION OF ROBERT HENKE [PROPOSED] ORDER on all interested parties in this action by placing true copies thereof enclosed in a sealed envelope addressed as follows: SEE ATTACHED SERVICE LIST I am "readily familiar" with this firm's practice of collection and processing correspondence for mailing. It is deposited with the United States Postal Service on that same day in the ordinary course of business. I am aware that on motion of parties served, service is presumed invalid if postal cancellation date or postage meter date is more than one day after date of deposit for mailing in affidavit. [CCP §1013a] ] BY MAIL: I caused such envelopes with postage thereon fully prepaid, to be placed in the United States mail at Diamond Bar, California. BY PERSONAL SERVICE: I caused such envelope to be delivered by hand to the offices of the addressees as listed on the service list. [] ] BY OVERNIGHT MAIL: I arranged for such envelope to be delivered via Federal Express- Priority Overnight to the addressees as listed on the service list. [] BY FACSIMILE: In addition to regular mail, I sent this document via facsimile to the numbers as listed on the following service list and pursuant to CCP §1013(e). Such transmissions were complete with no errors reported. X BY ELECTRONIC SERVICE: Pursuant to CCP §1010.6(C)(2) and California Rules of Court, Rule 2.250, I also caused such documents to be served electronically at the e-mail addresses stated on the attached service list. Such e-mail transmissions were complete with no errors reported. I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California that the foregoing is true and correct. Executed on June 3, 2020, at Diamond Bar, California. Sharon Sanchez 9 DEFENDANT SUNSET VAN’S MOTION TO STRIKE O O 0 N N Ln BA W N = N N N N N N N N N = mm e m e m e m e m e m e m e m co NN NN Ln BR A W D = O O X N N N RE E W N = Oo Simpson Custom Woodworks Suite F v. Sunset Vans, Inc. SERVICE LIST Kristopher O'Connell, Esq. Russell & Lazarus Case No.: 30-2020-01130106-CU-PO-CJC 1401 Dove Street, Suite 310 Newport Beach, CA 92660 (949) 851-0222; Fax (949) 851-2422 kris@lawrussell.com Attorneys for Plaintiff DOUG SIMPSON, an individual and d.b.a SIMPSON CUSTOM WOODWORKS 10 DEFENDANT SUNSET VAN’S MOTION TO STRIKE
