James Huey vs. Michael Cardoza

Opposition

Cal. Super. - 4th Dist.July 20, 2017

A I T K E N ¢ A I T K E N 4 C O H N 3 M A C A R T H U R P L A C E , SU IT E 80 0 71 4- 43 4- 14 24 71 4- 43 4- 36 00 F A C S I M I L E S A N T A AN A, CA 92 70 7 €9 PRINT RECYCL OO 0 NN O N nn BA W N N D ND N N N N N N N O N N N m= o m o m p m e m p m p m p m p m RO 9 A N nn BA W N = O O N O A W N = Oo ATTICUS N. WEGMAN, ESQ. (SBN 273496) AITKEN 4+ AITKEN 4 COHN 3 MACARTHUR PLACE, SUITE 800 ELECTRONICALLY FILED P.O. BOX 2555 Superior Court of Califarnia, SANTA ANA, CA 92707-2555 Eady ef Lrange (714) 434-1424/(714) 434-3600 FAX 10/10/2018 at 03:57:00 PM Clerk of the Superior Court By & Clerk, Deputy Clerk Attorneys for Plaintiffs JAMES HUEY and KATHY HARBC ui SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA FOR THE COUNTY OF ORANGE, CENTRAL DIVISION CASE NO: 30-2017-00932914 [Hon. Walter P. Schwarm, Dept. C19] James Huey, an individual; Kathy Harbour, an individual; Flalhifs, OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO QUASH DEPOSITION SUBPOENA TO MAY TRUCKING COMPANY; REQUEST FOR SANCTIONS; DECLARATION OF ATTICUS N. WEGMAN; [PROPOSED] ORDER VS. MICHAEL CARDOZA, an individual; EXEL INCORPORATED, a business entity, form unknown; and DOES 1 to 50, inclusive; Defendants. Date: October 23,2018 Time: 1:30 p.m. Dept.: C19 RESERVATION NO. 72874188 (Plaintiffs’ Separate Statement filed concurrently herewith) Complaint Filed: July 20, 2017 Trial Date: April 19,2019 =r N r N r N r N r N r N r Na N r N a N r N r a a N a Na a a a a N a N a a a Na e a a 1 OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO QUASH DEPOSITION SUBPOENA TO MAY TRUCKING COMPANY; REQUEST FOR SANCTIONS; DECLARATION OF ATTICUS N. WEGMAN; [PROPOSED] ORDER 71 4- 43 4- 14 24 71 4- 43 4- 36 00 F A C S I M I L E A I T K E N 4 A I T K E N 4 C O H N 3 M A C A R T H U R P L A C E , SU IT E 80 0 S A N T A AN A, CA 92 70 7 €9 PRINT RECYCL O O 0 ON OO wn A W O N N N N N N N N N N N N mm o m mm p m e m e m p m p d p d pe © uN 4A nn BR A W I N D = O 0 X D R A W N = O Plaintiffs James Huey and Kathy Harbor hereby oppose Defendants’ Motion to Quash deposition subpoena to May Trucking Company. Additionally, Plaintiffs will seek an award of sanctions, attorneys’ fees, and costs in the amount of $2,160 imposed against Defendants Michael Cardoza and Exel, Inc. and Defendants’ attorney of record, Paul Shardlow, jointly and severally, pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 1987.2(a) and payable within ten (10) days of the date of the hearing of this Motion. L PLAINTIFFS’ DEPOSITION SUBPOENA SEEKS DOCUMENTS WHICH ARE RELEVANT AND ARE REASONABLY CALCULATED TO LEAD TO THE DISCOVERY OF ADMISSIBLE EVIDENCE This matter arose out of motor vehicle v. tractor-trailer collision on the 405 freeway in Costa Mesa, CA on August 24, 2016. The impact was significant and caused major damage to Plaintiff James Huey’s Nissan Leaf vehicle: - After the incident, Mr. Huey was rushed to the hospital whereby he would eventually undergo multiple back surgeries and counseling. Plaintiffs James Huey and his wife, Kathy Harbour, brought the instant lawsuit against Defendant driver Michael Cardoza and his employer Defendant Exel, Inc. This matter has been brought under a negligence theory against Defendant, Michael Cardoza, and under a respondeat superior theory against Mr. Cardoza’s employer, Exel Inc. The legal concepts of respondeat superior and vicarious liability are premised on the 2 OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO QUASH DEPOSITION SUBPOENA TO MAY TRUCKING COMPANY; REQUEST FOR SANCTIONS; DECLARATION OF ATTICUS N. WEGMAN; [PROPOSED] ORDER A I T K E N 4 A I T K E N ¢ C O H N 3 M A C A R T H U R P L A C E , SU IT E 80 0 71 4- 43 4- 14 24 71 4- 43 4- 36 00 F A C S I M I L E S A N T A AN A, CA 92 70 7 €9 PRINT RECYCL OO RX 9 O N n n BA W O N N N N N N N D N N N mm mm e m e m e k e m e m e m md KR 9 O N nn BRA W I N D = O Y N O D R E W I N D = oo "deeply rooted sentiment" in California law that a business enterprise which profits from its commercial activities ought to be financially responsible for any damage that the enterprise creates. Since the inception of this case, Defendant Michael Cardoza and Defendant Exel, Inc. have disputed liability and allege the cause of this incident was due to Plaintiff James Huey’s fault. Defendants’ position is contrary to the police investigation, which found Defendant Cardoza at fault for making an unsafe lane change, and Plaintiffs own recollection of this incident. As such, Plaintiff must procure evidence to meets it burden of proof, which only he carries, regarding negligence against Defendants. Defendants have no burden and could simply not utilize any discovery procedures and still win their case. To do so, Plaintiffs have subpoenaed simple and non-privileged records to understand the nature of Defendant Michael Cardoza’s background, training, experience, and qualifications to operate the 18-wheeler tractor- trailer he was operating on the day of the incident. Defendant has already admitted, under oath, the driving such a vehicle subject him to a higher standard of care than a regular Class C license holder. He relied on his training at the subject trucking school and employment at May Trucking Company to ensure he could operate his vehicle safely. We have reason to believe his background, training, experience, and qualifications are far from adequate. We believe, if he did, this collision never would have happened, and Plaintiff’s back would not have been subject to two (2) major surgeries under general anesthesia, among countless sessions of psychotherapy. Pursuant to the liberally construed discovery laws, Plaintiff James Huey is allowed to vet, scrutinize, confirm and understand Defendant Michael Cardoza’s ability to operate the tractor- trailer he was operating on the day of the incident. One’s driving background, training, experience, and qualifications would certainly be relevant to the instant big rig versus automobile} collision that is the subject of this incident. This is also analogous to situations whereby a plaintiff in a personal injury case complains of injuries. The defendant in such a case has a right subpoena pre-existing medical records to determine if they are related to the injuries being claimed. 3 OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO QUASH DEPOSITION SUBPOENA TO MAY TRUCKING COMPANY; REQUEST FOR SANCTIONS; DECLARATION OF ATTICUS N. WEGMAN; [PROPOSED] ORDER 71 4- 43 4- 14 24 71 4- 43 4- 36 00 F A C S I M I L E A I T K E N 4 A I T K E N 4 C O H N 3 M A C A R T H U R P L A C E , SU IT E 80 0 S A N T A AN A, CA 92 70 7 €9 PRINT RECYCL Oo 0 9 O N Dn BA W O N = N N ND N N N N N O N = o m e m e m p m e m e m p m p d 0 9 O N nn BA W N = O 0 N O O N RE W N = o The Court should also be aware that is must apply a different standard when assessing whether information is “discoverable” versus “admissible.” Here, Plaintiff is seeking the “discovery” of information. Though Plaintiff believes the information in response to the subject subpoenas will be both discoverable and admissible, especially since Defendant Michal Cardoza admitted under oath he has impeccable driving credentials, the Court’s analysis is much easier. The information sought in discovery such as this must only be “reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.” Code of Civil Procedure section 2017.010. As such, and at least at the present time, the information in response to the subject subpoena is not subject to the higher “admissibility” standard, which can be made by the trial court at a later date. “Unless otherwise limited by order of the court in accordance with this title, any party may obtain discovery regarding any matter, not privileged, that is relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending action or to the determination of any motion made in that action, if the matter either is itself admissible in evidence or appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. Code of Civil Procedure section 2017.010. Discovery may relate to the claim or defense of the party seeking discovery or of any other party to the action.” Code of Civil Procedure section 2017.010. In accordance with Code of Civil Procedure section 2017.010, Defendant Cardoza’s employment records at May Trucking Company are reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. Defendants argue the subpoenaed records are not relevant or inadmissible. As the Court can see from above, the standard to apply is not whether the records are relevant or admissible (which Plaintiffs strongly believe they will be), but whether they are reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. There is a big difference. Litigants, such as Plaintiffs in the instant case, are not required to take the other party’s word, nor can an opposing litigant control how a party must prove its case. If litigants were able to dictate how much discoverable information opposing parties could discover, parties would be regularly denied access to justice and the ability to right wrongs. 4 OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO QUASH DEPOSITION SUBPOENA TO MAY TRUCKING COMPANY; REQUEST FOR SANCTIONS; DECLARATION OF ATTICUS N. WEGMAN; [PROPOSED] ORDER A I T K E N 4 A I T K E N 4¢ C O H N 3 M A C A R T H U R P L A C E , SU IT E 80 0 71 4- 43 4- 14 24 71 4- 43 4- 36 00 F A C S I M I L E S A N T A A N A , C A 92 70 7 €9 PRINT RECYCL Oo 0 9 A n n BA W O N N N NN N N N N N N N N N N o m e m md p m p d p d p m e m p e RX J A Ln BA W N = ) © VU © NO O N E W N = o o Defendants also argue that the subject subpoena requests documents that are “inadmissible and therefore not discoverable.” See Defendant Motion pg. 10, para. 2. This does not make any sense. The issue of admissibility is not before the Court. The case is set for trial in April 2019, and the Court has not made any rulings on the admissibility of evidence. Defendants are trying to preemptively and unfairly characterize these records as being inadmissible when no records have even been produced. Further, Defendants cite Evidence Code section 1101(a) for the proposition that such records are already inadmissible character evidence. Again, the issue of admissibility is not before the Court. Further, we do not know the extent of the information because nothing has been produced. Said information could be used as strong impeachment evidence and to call into question the Defendants’ veracity. See People v. Avelar (1961) 193 Cal.App.2d 631, 634 (holding that counsel is afforded wide latitude in developing facts that show bias, prejudice, or interest on the party of a witness that would affect the witness’ credibility). However, none of these issues are before the Court and can only be addressed through motions in limine or during trial. Here, the nature of Defendant Michael Cardoza’s background, training, experience, and qualifications relating to his employment and use of an 18-wheeler tractor-trailer is certainly discoverable. Plaintiffs, and eventually the jury, must be able to hear evidence that sits squarely on the issue of whether Defendant Michael Cardoza was acting as a reasonable tractor-trailer operator on the day of the incident. Attached as Exhibit A, please find the traffic collision report in this matter. Defendant is not the judge or jury in this matter and is attempting to unduly limit and prejudice Plaintiffs ability to meet its burden of proof. As such, Defendant Cardoza’s prior employment records are clearly discoverable. II. THE DOCUMENTS SOUGHT IN PLAINTIFF’S DEPOSITION SUBPOENA DO NOT VIOLATE DEFENDANT CARDOZA'’S PRIVACY RIGHTS AS THE PUBLIC INTEREST IN SEEKING THE TRUTH CLEARLY OUTWEIGHS ANY NEGLIGBLE PRIVACY CONCERNS BY DEFENDANT 5 OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO QUASH DEPOSITION SUBPOENA TO MAY TRUCKING COMPANY; REQUEST FOR SANCTIONS; DECLARATION OF ATTICUS N. WEGMAN; [PROPOSED] ORDER 71 4- 43 4- 14 24 71 4- 43 4- 36 00 F A C S I M I L E A I T K E N 4 A I T K E N ¢ C O H N 3 M A C A R T H U R P L A C E , SU IT E 80 0 S A N T A AN A, CA 92 70 7 9 PRINT RECYCL S OO XX uN O N wn BRA W N = N S N D N N N N N N N N NN O N = o m mm e m md md p d p d p d p m RX 9 O N Un BA W N = O O N O D N N R A W “[A]lthough privacy [is] clearly identified as an interest worthy of some legal protection, courts generally [do] not give privacy a privileged place or undue weight in the balancing process.” Moreover, “privacy concerns are not absolute, they must be balanced against other important interests . . . [n]ot every act which has some impact on personal privacy invokes the protections of our Constitution... A court should not play the trump card of unconstitutionality to protect absolutely every assertion of individual privacy.” Hill v. National Collegiate Athletic Assn. (1994) 26 Cal.Rptr.2d 834, 857. Assuming Defendant has a privacy right in such records, which Plaintiff strongly disagrees, the right to privacy may give way if necessary to accommodate compelling public interest, such as the ascertainment of truth in judicial proceedings and obtaining just results in litigation. See Hooser v. Superior Court (2000) 84 12 Cal.App.4th 997, 1004. Where discovery is sought of information subject to a person right to privacy a balancing must be done against its need for disclosure: In determining whether disclosure is required, the court must indulge in a "careful balancing" of the right of a civil litigant to discover relevant facts, on the one hand, and the right of the third parties to maintain reasonable privacy regarding their sensitive personal affairs, on the other. (citation omitted). The court must consider the purpose of the information sought, the effect that disclosure will have on the affected persons and parties, the nature of the objections urged by the party resisting disclosure and availability of alternative, less intrusive means for obtaining the requested information. (citation omitted). Based on an application of these factors, the more sensitive the nature of the personal information that is sought to be discovered, the more substantial the showing of the need for the discovery that will be required before disclosure will be permitted. (citations omitted). Hooser, supra at 1004. The subject subpoena requests past employment records. Plaintiff is unsure how Defendant can conceivably argue this information is “private” or the disclosure of which would be “harmful” or reveal “sensitive” information. Plaintiff is not requesting Defendant’s financial earnings or anything else that might typically be considered “private” “harmful” and “sensitive.” As established above, Defendant Cardoza’s prior employment records are highly discoverable in this matter. Such reasonably calculated discovery undoubtedly outweighs 6 OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO QUASH DEPOSITION SUBPOENA TO MAY TRUCKING COMPANY; REQUEST FOR SANCTIONS; DECLARATION OF ATTICUS N. WEGMAN; [PROPOSED] ORDER A I T K E N 4 A I T K E N 4+ C O H N 3 M A C A R T H U R P L A C E , SU IT E 80 0 71 4- 43 4- 14 24 71 4- 43 4- 36 00 F A C S I M I L E S A N T A AN A, CA 92 70 7 €9 PRINT RECYCL OO © 9 O N wn BA W O N = N N N D ND N N N N N N N N N N = em p m md p m p d p m a p m p a RX Nd AN L r A W N = O O VU X N ON D AEA W N = o Defendants’ right to maintain reasonable privacy because no such right exists. Defendants have refused to admit fault and as such Plaintiff now has the burden to prove negligence. Defendant Cardoza’s reasonable privacy in no way outweighs Plaintiff’s legal right to obtain all records that will lead to admissible evidence to show Defendant’s background, training, experience, and qualifications to operate the tractor and frieghliner trailer he was operating the day of the incident. Defendant has failed to provide any convincing argument that it will be prejudiced by such disclosure. Even if Defendant could make such an argument (which Plaintiff finds doubtful) the parties could simply stipulate to enter in a protective order, so any specific documents are not revealed. However, Defendant has not specifically identified which documents it feels are especially “private” “harmful” and “sensitive.” III. PLAINTIFFS’ DEPOSITION SUBPOENA IS NOT DEFECTIVE AS MEMBERS OF THE STATE BAR CAN ACT AS A DEPOSITION OFFICER Defendants posit that Plaintiffs’ subpoenas are defective in that they include a member of the State Bar as the deposition officer. Defendants cite Code of Civil Procedure sections 1985.3(a)(4), 1985.6(a)(1) and 2020.420. Code of Civil Procedure sections 1985.3(a)(4) and 1985.6(a)(1) provide that a “Deposition officer’ means a person who meets the qualifications specified in Section 2020.420.” Code of Civil Procedure section 2020.420 provides: “The officer for a deposition seeking discovery only of business records for copying under this article shall be a professional photocopier registered under Chapter 20 (commencing with Section 22450) of Division 8 of the Business and Professions Code, or a person exempted from the registration requirements of that chapter under Section 22451 of the Business and Professions Code. This deposition officer shall not be financially interested in the action, or a relative or employee of any attorney of the parties. Any objection to the qualifications of the deposition officer is waived unless made before the date of production or as soon thereafter as the ground for that objection becomes known or could be discovered by reasonable diligence.” (emphasis added). 7 OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO QUASH DEPOSITION SUBPOENA TO MAY TRUCKING COMPANY; REQUEST FOR SANCTIONS; DECLARATION OF ATTICUS N. WEGMAN; [PROPOSED] ORDER A I T K E N 4 A I T K E N 4 C O H N 3 M A C A R T H U R P L A C E , SU IT E 80 0 71 4- 43 4- 14 24 71 4- 43 4- 36 00 F A C S I M I L E S A N T A AN A, CA 92 70 7 €9 PRINT RECYCL Oo 0 9 O N n n A W N N N D N D N N N N N N N N N N O - em e m e m p a p m p m e m p m p m RR Nd A N n n BA WLW = O Y O N O O N A W N = © As referenced above, Business and Professions Code section 22451(b) provides “[T]his chapter does not apply to any of the following: (b) A member of the State Bar or his or her employees, agents, or independent contractors.” As such, an attorney is exempt from the registration requirements and can properly act as a deposition officer. In accordance with the above referenced code sections, Atticus Wegman, as an active member of the State Bar of California, is exempt from the requirements of section 2020.402 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Additionally, Mr. Wegman is not financially interested in the matter, only his client is financially interested. Further, the policy behind the exemption for attorneys makes sense since all attorneys licensed in California must take an oath to uphold the Constitution of the United States and the California Constitution. Therefore, Plaintiff’s Deposition Subpoena is not defective. IV. PLAINTIFFS NOT BE SANCTIONED FOR PURSUING DISCOVERABLE DOCUMENTS Plaintiffs have opposed the instant motion to quash with substantial justification. Clearly, the information sought is highly relevant to this matter. Plaintiffs have sought the production of the instant documents to meet its burden of proof. Monetary sanctions in this matter against Plaintiffs and their counsel would be wholly unjust and immediately appealable after final judgment in this action. See Code of Civil Procedure section 904.1(a)(11), (12), (b). Courts have held substantial justification includes whether a party has reasonable grounds for their position. See Foothill Properties v. Lyon/Copley Corona Assoc. (1996) 46 Cal. App.4™ 1542. Further, the Code of Civil Procedure provides that the court “may in its discretion award the amount of the reasonable expense incurred in making or opposing the motion [to quash], including reasonable attorney’s fees, if the court finds the motion was made or opposed in bad faith or without substantial justification. ” Code of Civil Procedure section 1987.2(a). For this Court to award Defendants sanctions, the Court must first exercise its discretionary powers and only after the Court has determined that Plaintiffs opposed the instant motion in bad faith or without substantial justification. Only after the Court has made these determinations, can 8 OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO QUASH DEPOSITION SUBPOENA TO MAY TRUCKING COMPANY; REQUEST FOR SANCTIONS; DECLARATION OF ATTICUS N. WEGMAN; [PROPOSED] ORDER A I T K E N 4 A I T K E N 4 C O H N 3 M A C A R T H U R P L A C E , SU IT E 80 0 71 4- 43 4- 14 24 71 4- 43 4- 36 00 F A C S I M I L E S A N T A AN A, CA 92 70 7 $9 PRINT RECYCL O O © 9 O&O wn A W O N BN N N N D N N N N N N N = o e m mt p m p d p d p d p m p m RR 9 AN Un A W N = O VO X N O N D W N ~~, Oo the Court elects to sanction Plaintiffs and their attorneys. Of course, this would be appealed upon final judgment in this case for the many reasons cited above and below. Here, Defendants have not provided any facts that would indicated Plaintiff opposes the instant motions in bad faith or without substantial justification. As the Court will see below, it is Plaintiffs that feel sanctions should be imposed on Defendants. Defendants have filed this motion arbitrarily with faulty arguments. It is clear that the importance of the information requested within the subject subpoenas is great and outweighs any concerns of Defendants including privacy. The standard to determine the discoverability of information in a civil ligation case as this is quite broad and the Court must liberally construe. As Defendant has refused to admit fault, and information regarding Defendants training, background, experience, and qualifications is of utmost importance to Plaintiffs, as the burden of establishing negligence lies with Plaintiffs. Additionally, Defendants’ argument regarding the alleged defective nature of the subpoena is failed understanding of the Code of Civil Procedure section 220.420. Code of Civil Procedure section 220.420 does not apply to active members of the State Bar. Plaintiffs’ attorney is an active member of the California State Bar and as such this code section is not applicable. Accordingly, the Defendants request for sanctions should be denied.’ V. PLAINTIFFS’ REQUEST SANCTIONS AGAINST DEFENDANTS Defendants have filed this motion arbitrarily with faulty arguments. It is clear that the importance of the information requested within the subject subpoenas is great and outweighs any concerns of Defendants including privacy. The standard to determine the discoverability of information in a civil ligation case as this is quite broad and the Court must liberally construe. As Defendant has refused to admit fault, information regarding Defendants prior driving record, "1t should also be noted that Defendants’ request for sanctions is defective and cannot be awarded as Defendants failed to include the name of the parties it seeks to obtain sanctions. See Code of Civil Procedure section 2023.040. Specifically, Defendants’ notice only states “Plaintiffs” and does not include Plaintiffs’ names James Huey and Kathy Harbour. 9 OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO QUASH DEPOSITION SUBPOENA TO MAY TRUCKING COMPANY; REQUEST FOR SANCTIONS; DECLARATION OF ATTICUS N. WEGMAN; [PROPOSED] ORDER 71 4- 43 4- 14 24 71 4- 43 4- 36 00 F A C S I M I L E A I T K E N 4 A I T K E N 4 C O H N 3 M A C A R T H U R P L A C E , SU IT E 80 0 S A N T A AN A, CA 92 70 7 €9 PRINT RECYCL O O 0 NON O N Un RA W O N N D N N N N D N N N N m m oe m e m em o e m o e m o e m e m ® N N L A W N = O V0 ® N O N D R A W N = o training, background, experience, and qualifications is of utmost importance to Plaintiff, as the burden of establishing negligence lies with Plaintiff. Additionally, Defendants’ argument regarding the alleged defective nature of the subpoena is failed understanding of the Code of Civil Procedure section 2020.420. Code of Civil Procedure section 2020.420 does not apply to active members of the State Bar. Plaintiffs’ attorney is an active member of the California State Bar and as such this code section is not applicable. Accordingly, the Defendants request for sanctions should be denied. It should also be noted that Defendants’ request for sanctions is defective and cannot be awarded as Defendants failed to include the name of the parties it seeks to obtain sanctions. See Code of Civil Procedure section 2023.040. Specifically, Defendants’ notice only states “Plaintiffs” and does not include Plaintiffs’ names James Huey and Kathy Harbour. Accordingly, Plaintiffs respectfully request that sanctions be awarded against Defendants Michael Cardoza and Exel, Inc. and Defendants’ attorney of record, Paul Shardlow, jointly and severally, pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 1987.2(a) and payable within ten (10) days of the date of the hearing of this Motion in the amount of $2,160.00. Plaintiffs’ counsel’s hourly rate is $300 per hour. Declaration of Atticus N. Wegman. Plaintiffs’ counsel has spent five (5) hours opposing this motion and anticipates spending another two (2) hours preparing for argument and orally arguing this motion. Declaration of Atticus N. Wegman. Further, Plaintiff has incurred $60.00 in filing fees. Declaration of Atticus N. Wegman. VI. CONCLUSION For the reasons stated above, Plaintiffs Deposition Subpoena should not be quashed. This Court should not impose any sanctions against Plaintiff or his attorney of record, but rather sanctions should be imposed against Michael Cardoza and Exel, Inc. and Defendants’ attorney of] record, Paul Shardlow, jointly and severally. Dated: October, 2018 AITKEN ¢ AITKEN 4 COHN - By: ATTICUS N. WEGMAN, ESQ. Attorneys for Plai 10 OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO QUASH DEPOSITION SUBPOENA TO MAY TRUCKING COMPANY; REQUEST FOR SANCTIONS; DECLARATION OF ATTICUS N. WEGMAN; [PROPOSED] ORDER P k 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 2 13 oa Sop 14 55% TO Ed“ g * 2 18 ’ 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 £9 PRINTED ON RECYCLED PAPER PROOF OF SERVICE STATE OF CALIFORNIA, COUNTY OF ORANGE [ am employed in the County of Orange, State of California. I am over the age of 18 and| not a party to the within action; my business address is 3 MacArthur Place, Suite 800, Santa Ana, California, 92707. On October 10, 2018 I served the foregoing documents described as OPPOSITION TO) DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO QUASH DEPOSITION SUBPOENA TO MAY] TRUCKING COMPANY; REQUEST FOR SANCTIONS; DECLARATION OF ATTICUS N. WEGMAN; [PROPOSED] ORDER on the parties herein in this action by] placing ( ) the original (x) a true copy thereof in a sealed envelope addressed as indicated on the attached service list. () BY MAIL 0) As follows: Iam "readily familiar" with the firm's practice of collection and processing correspondence for mailing. Under that practice it would be deposited with U.S. postal service on that same day with postage thereon fully prepaid at Santa Ana, California in the ordinary course of business. I am aware that on motion of the party served, service is presumed invalid if postal cancellation date ar Sesipge meter date is more than one day after date of deposit for mailing an affidavit. ( ) By Personal Service: I caused the above-referenced the document(s) to be delivered by hand to the attached addressees. ( X) By Overnight Courier: I caused the above-referenced document(s) to be delivered to an overnight courier service for delivery to the above address(es). ( ) By Facsimile Machine: I caused the above-referenced document(s) to be transmitted to the above-named persons at the following telephone number(s) see attached Proof of Service list. (X) By Email Transmission: I caused the above-referenced document(s) to be transmitted to the persons listed in the attached Proof of Service lists. Executed on October 10, 2018 at Santa Ana, California. (X) (State) I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California that the above is true and correct. 1 PROOF OF SERVICE A I T K E N ¢ A I T K E N 4 C O H N 3 M A C A R T H U R P L A C E , SU IT E 80 0 Oo 0 9 O N wn BA W N - = e d e d e d p d A A Ln A W N = O 71 4- 43 4- 14 24 71 4- 43 4- 36 00 F A C S I M I L E S A N T A A N A , C A 92 70 7 N N NS ) \) No N N ND = = -_ ~N ON WD » H O W - OO OO o® RY nN oo £9 PRINTED ON RECYCLED PAPER HUEY, et al. v. CARDOZA, et al. SERVICE LIST Paul Shardlow, Esq. WESTON HERZOG LLP 550 North Brand Blvd., Suite 1990 Glendale, CA 91203 (818) 755-8555 (818) 755-8542-fax Attorneys for Defendants 2 PROOF OF SERVICE