Charles R. Tyler, as Trustee of The Charles Robert Tyler Trust Dated September 18, 1996 vs. Farzaneh Kianfard

Opposition

Cal. Super. - 4th Dist.January 9, 2015

Pr oo 0 N N N nn R W N o N N N N m= re t e a e m e d e m pe d p d e d e m KERMIT D. MARSH (SBN 150745) THE LAW OFFICES OF KERMIT D. MARSH 9550 Warner Avenue, Suite 250 Fountain Valley, California 92708 Tel (714) 593-2321 Fax (888) 396-6272 Attorneys for Plaintiff CHARLES R. TYLER, AS TRUSTEE OF THE CHARLES ROBERT TYLER TRUST DATED SEPTEMBER 18, 1996 SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF ORANGE CENTRAL JUSTICE CENTER CHARLES R. TYLER, AS TRUSTEE OF THE CHARLES ROBERT TYLER TRUST DATED SEPTEMBER 18, 1996, Plaintiff, Vs. FARZANEH KIANFARD, dba TOWMAN TOWING SERVICE, an individual; ESMAEEL MADANI, dba TOWMAN TOWING SERVICE, an individual; TOWMAN TOWING, a.k.a. TOWMAN TOWING SERVICE, business entity of unknown form; TOWMAN TOWING INC., a California corporation; and DOES 1 through 25, inclusive, Defendants. 1 nn " 1 i I ELECTRONICALLY FILED Superior Court of California, County of Orange 06/23/2017 at 03:28:00 PM Clerk of the Superior Court By Angelina Mguyen-Do, Deputy Clerk Case No: 30-2015-00765369-CU-UD-CJC PLAINTIFF'S OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO (1) ENTER SATISFACTION OF MONEY JUDGMENT BY COURT; (2) TO COMPEL RETURN OF JUDGMENT OVERPAYMENT; AND (3) FOR ATTORNEYS' FEES [CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE SECTION 724.010 ef seq.] Date: July 7,2017 Time: 9:00 a.m. Dept: Cl4 Date Filed: January 9, 2015 PLAINTIFF'S OPPOSITION TO MOTION TO ENTER SATISFACTION OF MONEY JUDGMENT Oo 0 N N N nn R W ND N O N N N N N R N N N mm e m e s ee e be d e t em e d e m ee s RN NN AN Un hh W N = O YO 0 N N N N R W ND = © Plaintiff CHARLES R. TYLER, AS TRUSTEE OF THE CHARLES ROBERT TYLER TRUST DATED SEPTEMBER 18, 1996 (“Plaintiff” or “Landlord”) respectfully submits the following Opposition to the Motion to (1) Enter Satisfaction of Money Judgment by Court; (2) to Compel Return of Judgment Overpayment; and (3) for Attorneys’ Fees [Code of Civil Procedure Section 724.010 ef seq.] filed by Defendants FARZANEH KIANFARD, dba TOWMAN TOWING SERVICE, ESMAEEL MADANI, dba TOWMAN TOWING SERVICE, TOWMAN TOWING, a.k.a. TOWMAN TOWING SERVICE, and TOWMAN TOWING INC. (collectively, “Defendants”: MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES I. INTRODUCTION Defendants Farzaneh Kianfard, dba Towman Towing Service, Esmaeel Madani, dba Towman Towing Service, Towman Towing Service, and Towman Towing Inc. (collectively, “Defendants™) seek to minimize the amount they owe by filing their purported Motion to Enter Satisfaction of Money Judgment by Court, for damages and for Attorney fees (“Defendants’ Motion”). To such purported relief, Defendants are not entitled. Defendants’ Motion is premised upon a spurious statement of the law, coupled with a misleading and incomplete recitation of facts, which omits multiple critical prior rulings of the Court. Moreover, Defendants fail to offer admissible evidence in support of Defendants’ Motion. II. STATEMENT OF FACTS The Defendants in this lawsuit, Farzaneh Kianfard, dba Towman Towing Service, Esmaeel Madani, dba Towman Towing Service, Towman Towing, a.k.a. Towman Towing Service, and Towman Towing Inc. (collectively, “Defendants™) rented the Premises from Plaintiff. They did so pursuant to a Lease dated May 12, 2009 (“Lease”). A true and correct copy of the Lease is attached to the Declaration of Charles R. Tyler ("Tyler Decl.") as Exhibit A. The Lease provides that in an action to enforce the Lease, the prevailing party shall recover its attorneys’ fees and costs. Paragraph 31 of the Lease states: “If any party or Broker brings an action or proceeding involving the Premises whether founded in tort, contract or 1 PLAINTIFF'S OPPOSITION TO MOTION TO ENTER SATISFACTION OF MONEY JUDGMENT OO 0 NN n A W N = N O N N N N N N N N m m e a e m em ee em e a e d b e © NN AN n n A W N = O O N Y B R E W NN = O equity, or to declare rights hereunder, the Prevailing Party (as hereafter defined) in any such proceeding, action, or appeal thereon, shall be entitled to reasonable attorneys’ fees.” Tyler Decl., Exhibit A, Lease. The Lease also provides for Late Charges, as set forth in Paragraph 13.4 of the Lease. In addition, the Lease provides for a rent increase if the tenant holds over, as set forth in Paragraph 26 of the Lease. For years, Defendants would pay their rent late, and Plaintiff would be forced to remind them of their obligation to pay rent. By failing to pay their rent, the Defendants repeatedly incurred late charges, which ultimately exhausted all of the funds in the Security Deposit. Ultimately, tired of Defendants’ repeated failure to pay rent on time, the terrible manner in which they maintained the Premises, and the surly attitude the Defendants demonstrated whenever Plaintiff would ask them to honor their obligations under the Lease, Plaintiff decided it was time to be rid of them. Plaintiff approached Defendants, and Defendants, including both Kianfard and Madani, informed Plaintiff that they were unhappy with Plaintiff’s constant complaints about their late rent payments and stated that they wanted to move out. Pleased that they wanted to leave, Plaintiff promptly served the Defendants with a Thirty Day Notice to Quit. Not long thereafter, Defendants stated that they were not willing to vacate, probably after they discovered that alternative properties were much more expensive per square foot. They then stated that they were wealthy and wanted to purchase the entire building and property, which was larger than the Premises, from Plaintiff, which Plaintiff refused. Thereafter, one of Defendants’ drivers informed Plaintiff that Defendants were bragging that their “clever attorney” was allowing them to stay on the Premises without paying rent, and they were going to stay as long as they could without paying rent. The Defendants did not pay the rent, and they did not leave. Instead, they ran up Plaintiff's legal bills. On January 9, 2015, Plaintiff filed the Complaint in Unlawful Detainer. Despite offering no legal grounds for demurrer, Defendants filed a Demurrer to the Complaint on January 20, 20135, to create further delay and increase the Plaintiff’s legal expenses. Plaintiff undertook the expense of preparing an Opposition to the Demurrer, which was filed on March 5, 2015. On 2 PLAINTIFF'S OPPOSITION TO MOTION TO ENTER SATISFACTION OF MONEY JUDGMENT OO 0 NN NN Un B R A W N = N N N O N N N O N N N mm em e m e e e m e e e a NR 1 A N nn ph W N = O V N ND n l x W e March 18, 2015, the Court pointed out that no valid grounds had been offered by Defendants to justify the Demurrer. At the hearing, Defendants’ counsel did not even offer any oral argument to excuse Defendants’ filing of the frivolous Demurrer, and the Court noted that there were no grounds for a demurrer. The Court overruled Defendants’ Demurrer and ordered Defendants to answer Plaintiff’s Complaint within five days. Defendants filed their Answer on the last possible] day, March 23, 2016. Trial was conducted on April 20, 2015. Plaintiff and Defendants presented their evidence and arguments. Defendant Esmaeel Madani, dba Towman Towing, testified using as his translator Shima Rasouli-Madani (“Shima”). It was later discovered that Shima had filed a Fictitious Business Name Statement on April 17, 2016, only three days prior to the Trial. A true and correct copy of Shima’s Fictitious Business Name Statement is attached to the Declaration off Kermit D. Marsh ("Marsh Decl.") as Exhibit G. Neither Shima nor the Defendants ever disclosed this fact to either the Court or to Plaintiff. The Court rejected Defendants’ arguments and awarded a Judgment for Plaintiff and against Defendants. The Judgment included: “The Court also finds that Plaintiff is the prevailing party and is entitled to its attorneys’ fees against all Defendants and shall submit a Motion for Attorneys’ Fees and Memorandum of Costs to establish those amounts.” The Judgment left blanks for additional amounts to be awarded to Plaintiff, including attorneys’ fees and costs. A true and correct copy of the Judgment is attached as Exhibit C to the Marsh Decl. On June 10, 2015, the Court issued an Order for Writ of Possession (“Order”). As set forth in the Order, the reasonable value of daily rent for occupation of the Premises is three hundred fifty-two dollars and thirty-eight cents ($352.38) per day. A true and correct copy of the Order is attached as Exhibit B to the Tyler Decl. From April 20, 2015 through June 30, 2015, when Defendants begrudgingly vacated a couple of hours before the Sheriff's arrival, Defendants occupied the Premises for an additional seventy-one (71) days, which amounts to twenty-five thousand eighteen dollars and ninety-eight cents ($25,018.98). In addition, the Lease provides for late charges. Because Defendants unlawfully held over and failed to pay for their occupation of the Premises, Defendants also 3 PLAINTIFF'S OPPOSITION TO MOTION TO ENTER SATISFACTION OF MONEY JUDGMENT NO 00 N N Un he W ND N O N N O N N N O N O N N m mm o m e m t e m mm p m p m b e m e w WwW N y BA W N = O O e N N N R W = O incurred late charges in April, May and June 2015. Each late charge was $704.75, pursuant to the Lease, which totals another $2,114.25. Also between April 20, 2015 and June 30, 2015, Defendants ran up unpaid electrical charges as follows: April $295.20; May $315.36; June $401.00, plus $200.00 in electrical charges for the remainder of June 2015. This totals another $1,211.56. Also during the period between April 20, 2015 and June 30, 2015, Defendants ran up trash charges totaling $143.88. In addition, Defendants left the Premises in a deplorable condition. Plaintiff incurred substantial clean-up costs in its effort to undo the damage caused by Defendants. The clean-up costs total $3,203.75. The Court awarded attorneys’ fees for Plaintiff's attorneys’ expenses through Trial, and also costs through Trial in the amounts of $21,327.00 and $800.00, respectively. On June 17, 2015, the Court issued a Writ of Possession (“Writ of Possession”), in order to allow the Orange County Sheriff's Department to evict Defendants from the Premises. A true and correct copy of the Writ of Possession is attached as Exhibit D to the Marsh Decl. and is incorporated by this reference. Yet, despite the Trial, the Judgment, the Order, and the Writ of Possession, Defendants still refused to vacate until June 30, 2015, the day the Sheriffs arrived. On September 9, 2015, the Court heard oral argument on Plaintiff’s Motion for Attorneys’ Fees. Rejecting Defendants’ attack against the Motion for Attorneys’ Fees, the Court on September 10, 2016 awarded Plaintiff attorneys’ fees in the amount of twenty-one thousand three hundred twenty-seven dollars ($21,327.00). A true and correct copy of the Minute Order of September 10, 2015 is attached as Exhibit E to the Marsh Decl. The Court also awarded the costs set forth in Plaintiff's Memorandum of Costs (which Defendants did not oppose) in the amount of eight hundred dollars ($800.00). A true and correct copy of the unopposed Memorandum of Costs is attached as Exhibit F to the Marsh Decl. In order to collect on the Judgment, Plaintiff was forced to undertake significant legal expenses, including multiple Court appearances before Judge Stafford and a Judgment Debtor Examination of Defendant Farzaneh Kianfard with a court reporter. Those expenses were identified in the Memorandum of Costs ($11,212.24) filed and served on October 6, 2016, which 4 PLAINTIFF'S OPPOSITION TO MOTION TO ENTER SATISFACTION OF MONEY JUDGMENT OO 0 N N N nn BR W N N N N O N D N D N N N ND =m = e e e s e d ee e s e s ee 0 N N BRA WLW = O D N Y E W N e o Defendants never moved to tax. Defendants never made any challenge to the Memorandum. III. LEGAL ARGUMENT A. What Defendants Owe: The amounts owed to Plaintiff by Defendants are significantly greater than what Defendants claim. The following chart sets forth each item: Total Amount Owed Items undisputed by Defendants $80,141.51 Memorandum of Costs of October 6, 2016 $11,212.24 Occupation of Premises April 20, 2015 through June 30, $25,018.98 2015 ($352.38 per day x 71 days) Late Charges for April, May, June 2015 ($704.75 each) $2,114.25 Unpaid Electrical Charges - March-April 2015 $295.20 April-May 2015 $315.36 May-June 2015 $401.00 End of June 2015 $200.00 Trash Charges $143.88 Cost of Cleanup of Premises $3,203.75 Total Owed $123,046.17 B. What Plaintiff Has Received: The amounts received by Plaintiff are as follows: Total Amount Received Cash Payment from Defendant Farzaneh Kianfard at $40.00 Judgment Debtor Examination Payment from Chase Bank $18,457.72 Cashier's Check Payments from Defendants $45,000.00 Payment from Auto Club $13,535.97 Payment from Auto Club $14,987.52 5 PLAINTIFF'S OPPOSITION TO MOTION TO ENTER SATISFACTION OF MONEY JUDGMENT OO 0 N N Wn R A W N N N O N O N N N O N O N O N ND o m o e m mm p m mt mm p m p m e m 0 NN O N Ln kh W N = O DO N N R W ND = O Payment from Auto Club $15,563.43 Total Received $107,584.64 Total Owed: $123,046.17 - Total Received: $107,584.64 Difference Still Owed by Defendants: $15,461.53 C. Plaintiff is Entitled to Recover for Unpaid Occupation of Premises. Defendants’ reliance on Hudec v. Robertson (1989) 210 Cal.App.3d 1156 is misplaced. In Hudec, the landlord filed a complaint in unlawful detainer for possession only, with no request for rent. The landlord in Hudec lost the unlawful detainer trial, but the trial court nonetheless took the unusual step of awarding a judgment for rent in favor of the losing litigant, the landlord, and against the winning litigant, the tenant, on equitable grounds. The Court of Appeal reversed, pointing out that although the landlord might be able to bring an independent action to recover rents owed, the landlord could not recover damages in an unlawful detainer action where rent damages were not part of the complaint (which sought possession only) and could not recover damages in an unlawful detainer action as the losing party. Hudec, supra, 210 Cal.App.3d at 1166. Unlike the landlord in Hudec, here Plaintiff sought both possession and damages, and Plaintiff won the unlawful detainer trial. Consequently, Hudec does not apply. California law does not provide that a tenant can hold over on the property after forfeiture of the lease for free. On the contrary, a landlord may recover the reasonable rental value of property from any occupant of the premises. Once the tenant’s right to possession is terminated, the tenant becomes a tenant at sufferance, who is chargeable for the entire reasonable value of the use of the premises during the holdover period. Colyear v. Tobriner (1936) 7 Cal.2d 735, 742; Aviel v. Ng (2008) 161 Cal. App.4™ 809, 820; Karz v. Mecham (1981) 120 Cal.App.3d Supp. 1, 4. Thus, Defendants were not entitled to “stay for free” during their unlawful post-trial occupation of the Premises from April 20, 2015 through and including June 30, 2015. That is why the Court previously determined at trial the daily rental value, which the Court set forth in the Order as $352.38 per day. 6 PLAINTIFF'S OPPOSITION TO MOTION TO ENTER SATISFACTION OF MONEY JUDGMENT NO 0 N N R W N = N O N RN N N N O N N N mm mm e m e m e d h m e m pe d pe t pe e 0 N N N Wn pbk W N = D O N N N W N Oo D. Plaintiff is Entitled to Recover Attorneys' Fees Incurred to Collect. Similarly, the law does not preclude the recovery of attorneys’ fees for collection on a judgment. Where a judgment is obtained for breach of a contract which provides for prevailing party attorneys’ fees, attorneys’ fees incurred in the collection of that judgment are also recoverable. The Court in York v. Strong held that "the final sentence of section 685.040 explicitly provides for the recovery of attorney fees incurred to enforce a judgment in which such| fees were awarded as costs pursuant to a contract." York v. Strong (2015) 234 Cal. App.4th 1471, 1475. Moreover, Code of Civil Procedure, Section 1033.5 (a)(10) expressly allows recovery of “Attorney’s fees, when authorized by any of the following: (A) contract.” As is undisputed, the Lease expressly provides for prevailing party attorneys’ fees. Attorney time spent collecting contractual attorneys' fee awards is compensable. California Code of Civil Procedure, Section 685.040 provides that "[t]he judgment creditor is entitled to the reasonable and necessary costs of enforcing a judgment. Attorney's fees incurred in enforcing a judgment are not included in costs collectible under this title unless otherwise provided by law. Attorney's fees incurred in enforcing a judgment are included as costs collectible under this title if the underlying judgment includes an award of attorney's fees to the judgment creditor." Therefore, attorneys’ fees incurred in enforcing a judgment are included as compensable costs if the underlying fee award was based on a contract. Plaintiff properly requested the fees and costs incurred from collection in the Memorandum of Costs ($11,212.24), which was filed and served on October 6, 2016. Any challenge by Defendants to the Memorandum of Costs was due within fifteen (15) days after service of the Memorandum. Far longer than fifteen (15) days have passed, and Defendants have therefore waived any challenge to the Memorandum of Costs. California Rules of Court, Rule 3.1700; Rule 3.2000. If a party to an action against whom costs is awarded neglects within the time specified in the code to apply to the Court to have the same taxed, he is deemed to have assented to the correctness and lawfulness of the items as claimed in the verified memorandum of costs as filed. Jimenez v. City of Oxnard (1982) 134 Cal.App.3d 856, 859. By not filing a motion to challenge the costs claimed within the period specified in the code, the 7 PLAINTIFF'S OPPOSITION TO MOTION TO ENTER SATISFACTION OF MONEY JUDGMENT OO 0 N N N Wn B R A W N NN N N N N O N N N N O N m = m m e m p m h m p m e m p m e d C0 NN O N Wn A W N = O N D e e N N R W ND = O opposing party waives the right to object to the costs claimed. Oak Grove School District v. City Title Insurance Company (1963) 217 Cal.App.2d 678, 698; Jiminez, supra, 134 Cal.App.3d at 859. Thus, Defendants must also pay Plaintiff the $11,212.24 set forth in the Memorandum of Costs. E. The Exhausted Security Deposit. Defendants cannot assert a security deposit that was long ago exhausted. As established above, the security deposit was absorbed by Defendants’ repeated late charges for failure to pay rent on time long before this litigation commenced. Moreover, had there been any remaining funds in the security deposit, Defendants should have asserted that as an offset at the Trial. Defendants did not do so because they knew the security deposit was absorbed by repeated late charges. F. Checks Received from the Auto Club. Plaintiff has received and deposited a total of three (3) checks from the Auto Club, in the amounts of $13,535.97, $14,987.52 and $15,563.43, respectively. These three checks total $44,086.92. All of those checks were received in 2015. Defendants claim a fourth payment in the amount of $14,785.85, but Plaintiff has never received any check in that amount. Nor do Defendants offer any evidence of any check in that amount ever being paid to Plaintiff or its counsel. Out of the blue, in November 2016, Plaintiff's counsel received a check from the Auto Club in the amount of $13,927.59, but Plaintiff declined to deposit the check, which appeared to have been sent by the Auto Club at the behest of Defendants’ counsel for tactical purposes. Plaintiff is prepared to place that check in the Court's custody, if the Court so instructs. The total funds in Plaintiff's possession from the Auto Club is only $44,086.92, as demonstrated above. G. Defendants’ Purported Attorneys’ Fees. Defendants are not entitled to recover attorneys’ fees as Plaintiff is the prevailing party and Defendants still owe more than the amounts collected to date by Plaintiff. Moreover, even if’ 8 PLAINTIFF'S OPPOSITION TO MOTION TO ENTER SATISFACTION OF MONEY JUDGMENT NO 0 N N N B R A W N N N O N N N N N N N = e e e m e e ee e d e s e e WW N N BA W N = O Y N B E N D oO Defendants were entitled to such recovery, the attorneys’ fees sought are excessive. Defendants seek attorneys’ fees at the rate of $675.00 per hour. This contradicts Defendants’ prior position. Arguing against Plaintiff’s successful Motion for Attorneys’ Fees, Defendants previously complained that Plaintiff's counsel’s discounted hourly rate of $375.00 per hour, which the Court deemed reasonable, was too high. If Defendants believed $375.00 was excessive, then Defendants’ counsel's charge of $675.00 per hour is, by Defendants’ own admission, very excessive. If the Court were to award attorneys’ fees to Defendants, those fees should be limited to $375.00 per hour, the same rate previously applied to Plaintiff. Defendants’ counsel represents that his time on this motion will total twelve (12) hours, including reply brief and hearing. As fellow professionals, Plaintiff's counsel takes Defendants’ counsel at his word that twelve (12) hours is a true and accurate statement of time incurred. H. Much of Defendants’ Evidence is Inadmissible. As set forth in detail in Plaintiff's Objections to Evidence, filed concurrently with this Opposition, much of Defendants’ purported evidence is inadmissible. The evidence offered by Defendant Madani regarding what payments were made by the Auto Club, what payments were received from the Auto Club by Plaintiff or its counsel, and regarding what transpired at the Judgment Debtor Examination of Defendant Farzaneh Kianfard, which Defendant Esmaeel Madani did not attend, is precluded as being outside Defendant Madani's personal knowledge. As the moving parties, Defendants bear the burden. In the absence of admissible evidence, Defendants cannot prevail. I. Plaintiff Has Additional Recoverable Damages. As set forth above, Plaintiff has significant additional damages. Those additional damages include: unpaid occupation from April 20, 2015 through June 30, 2015 ($25,018.98); unpaid late charges for April, May and June 2015 ($2,114.25); unpaid electrical charges for April, May and June 2015 ($1,211.56); unpaid trash charges for April, May and June 2015 ($143.88); clean-up of the Premises ($3,203.75). In addition, Plaintiff is entitled to recover the attorneys’ fees and costs incurred in collection efforts on the Judgment, which were the subject of the Memorandum of Costs ($11,212.24) filed and served on October 6, 2016. 9 PLAINTIFF'S OPPOSITION TO MOTION TO ENTER SATISFACTION OF MONEY JUDGMENT OO 0 N N N Wn RAR W N ~~ N O N N N N N O N N N m m e m e m e m p t e d pe d pe ed e b WwW N N N nn B R O W N = DO OY N O N E W N = O IV. CONCLUSION For the reasons set forth above, Plaintiff respectfully requests that this Honorable Court deny Defendants’ Motion to Enter Satisfaction of Money Judgment, to Compel Return of Purported Judgment Overpayment and for Attorneys’ Fees. Respectfully submitted. DATED: June 23, 2017 LAW OFFICES OF KERMIT D. MARSH Ln FL Mad KERMIT D. MARSH Attorneys for Plaintiff, CHARLES R. TYLER, AS TRUSTEE OF THE CHARLES ROBERT TYLER TRUST DATED SEPTEMBER 18, 1996 10 PLAINTIFF'S OPPOSITION TO MOTION TO ENTER SATISFACTION OF MONEY JUDGMENT j - vO 0 N N N nn W N 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 PROOF OF SERVICE I declare that I am over the age of eighteen (18) and not a party to this action. My business address is 9550 Warner Avenue, Suite 250, Fountain Valley, CA 92708. On June 23, 2017, I served the following document(s): 1. PLAINTIFF'S OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO (1) ENTER SATISFACTION OF MONEY JUDGMENT BY COURT; (2) TO COMPEL RETURN OF JUDGMENT OVERPAYMENT; AND (3) FOR ATTORNEYS' FEES [CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE SECTION 724.010 et seq.; DECLARATION OF CHARLES R. TYLER IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFF'S OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO (1) ENTER SATISFACTION OF MONEY JUDGMENT BY COURT; (2) TO COMPEL RETURN OF JUDGMENT OVERPAYMENT; AND (3) FOR ATTORNEYS' FEES [CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE SECTION 724.010 et seq.]; DECLARATION OF KERMIT D. MARSH IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFF'S OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO (1) ENTER SATISFACTION OF MONEY JUDGMENT BY COURT; (2) TO COMPEL RETURN OF JUDGMENT OVERPAYMENT; AND (3) FOR ATTORNEYS' FEES [CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE SECTION 724.010 et seq.]; and PLAINTIFF'S OBJECTIONS TO EVIDENCE SUBMITTED BY DEFENDANTS IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO (1) ENTER SATISFACTION OF MONEY JUDGMENT BY COURT; (2) TO COMPEL RETURN OF JUDGMENT OVERPAYMENT; AND (3) FOR ATTORNEYS' FEES [CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE SECTION 724.010 et seq.] on the interested parties in this action by placing a true and correct copy of such document, enclosed in a sealed envelope, addressed as follows: Jeffrey S. Benice, Esq. Law Offices of Jeffrey S. Benice 3080 Bristol Street, 6th Floor, Suite 630 Costa Mesa, CA 92626 () (xx) I am readily familiar with the business’ practice for collection and processing of correspondence for mailing with the United States Postal Service. I know that the correspondence was deposited with the United States Postal Service on the same day this declaration was executed in the ordinary course of business. I know that the envelope was sealed and, with postage thereon fully prepaid, placed for collection and mailing on this date in the United States mail at Fountain Valley, California. By overnight courier, I caused the above-referenced document(s) to be deposited in a box or other facility regularly maintained by the overnight courier, or I delivered the above-referenced document(s) to an overnight courier service, for delivery to the above addressee(s). 11 PLAINTIFF'S OPPOSITION TO MOTION TO ENTER SATISFACTION OF MONEY JUDGMENT Oo 0 N N N nn B A W N = N N N N N N N N N e e e m e m ee e e e e e e 0 N A Un Bs W N = o D O N D Y R w N = Oo (xx) () Executed on June 23, 2017, at Fountain Valley, California. (State) I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California that the above is true and correct. (Federal) I declare that I am employed in the office of a member of the bar of this court at whose direction the service was made. JING G 12 PLAINTIFF'S OPPOSITION TO MOTION TO ENTER SATISFACTION OF MONEY JUDGMENT