21 Cited authorities

  1. Motor Vehicle Accident Indemnification Corp. v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co.

    89 N.Y.2d 214 (N.Y. 1996)   Cited 345 times
    Holding that CPLR § 214 applies to a cause of action to recover payments of first-party benefits by the Motor Vehicle Accident Indemnification Corporation, a statutorily created body, against the insurer of a vehicle who denied no-fault coverage
  2. Aetna Life & Casualty Co. v. Nelson

    67 N.Y.2d 169 (N.Y. 1986)   Cited 185 times
    Holding that a claim accrues when "all of the facts necessary to the cause of action have occurred so that the party would be entitled to obtain relief in court"
  3. Frank v. Travelers

    37 A.D.3d 775 (N.Y. App. Div. 2007)   Cited 41 times
    Applying the six-year statute of limitation for contractual obligations instead of the three-year statute of limitations for liabilities imposed by statute because "the inclusion of terms in an insurance contract, which might be mandated by various statutes or regulations, does not necessarily alter the fundamentally contractual nature of the dispute"
  4. Hartnett v. New York City Transit Authority

    657 N.E.2d 773 (N.Y. 1995)   Cited 54 times
    In Hartnett, 86 N.Y.2d at 446-47, the New York Court of Appeals held that case law interpreting OSHA is "not binding" in construing PESHA because, unlike OSHA, PESHA applies to State public sector employers.
  5. Bulova Watch v. Celotex Corp.

    46 N.Y.2d 606 (N.Y. 1979)   Cited 80 times   1 Legal Analyses
    Holding that the six-year statute of limitations period began anew with each new leak of a roof where contractor had made 20–year guarantee to repair roof
  6. Matter of Allstate Insurance Company v. Shaw

    52 N.Y.2d 818 (N.Y. 1980)   Cited 69 times
    In Allstate Ins. Co. v Shaw (52 NY2d 818 [1980]), this Court resolved the question whether self-insured entities were required to provide uninsured motorist benefits.
  7. Contact Chiropractic, P.C. v. N.Y. Transit Auth.

    42 Misc. 3d 60 (N.Y. App. Div. 2013)   Cited 7 times

    2013-12-3 CONTACT CHIROPRACTIC, P.C. as Assignee of Girtha Butler, Respondent, v. NEW YORK CITY TRANSIT AUTHORITY, Appellant. Jones Jones LLC, New York City (Ryan F. Blackmer of counsel), for appellant. Law Office of Cohen & Jaffe, LLP, Lake Success (Aaron J. Perretta of counsel), for respondent. Jones Jones LLC, New York City (Ryan F. Blackmer of counsel), for appellant. Law Office of Cohen & Jaffe, LLP, Lake Success (Aaron J. Perretta of counsel), for respondent. PRESENT: PESCE, P.J., WESTON and

  8. N.Y.C. Transit Auth. v. Hill

    107 A.D.3d 897 (N.Y. App. Div. 2013)   Cited 7 times

    2013-06-19 In the Matter of NEW YORK CITY TRANSIT AUTHORITY, appellant, v. Kenneth HILL, respondent. Jones Jones, LLC, New York, N.Y. (Ryan F. Blackmer of counsel), for appellant. Sim & Record, LLP, Bayside, N.Y. (Sang J. Sim of counsel), for respondent. MARK C. DILLON Jones Jones, LLC, New York, N.Y. (Ryan F. Blackmer of counsel), for appellant. Sim & Record, LLP, Bayside, N.Y. (Sang J. Sim of counsel), for respondent. MARK C. DILLON, J.P., DANIEL D. ANGIOLILLO, CHERYL E. CHAMBERS, and SYLVIA HINDS–RADIX

  9. In re Elrac, Inc.

    38 A.D.3d 544 (N.Y. App. Div. 2007)   Cited 12 times
    In Elrac, Inc., we interpreted the Workers' Compensation Law and determined that the phrase "any other liability whatsoever" could not be interpreted literally to bar an employee from recovering uninsured motorist benefits from an employer (id. at 328, 938 N.Y.S.2d 252, 961 N.E.2d 643). Our reasoning did not address, and does not bind us in, the context of interpreting the no-fault law or CPLR 214(2).
  10. In re the Arbitration between De Luca & Motor Vehicle Accident Indemnification Corp.

    215 N.E.2d 482 (N.Y. 1966)   Cited 72 times
    In De Luca v. Motor Vehicle Accident Indemnification Corp., 17 N.Y.2d 76, 268 N.Y.S.2d 289, 215 N.E.2d 482 (1966) and Sahloff v. Western Casualty and Surety Co., 45 Wis.2d 60, 171 N.W.2d 914 (1969), it was held that although the uninsured motorist, in an action against him, could have availed himself of a defense, based upon the statute of limitations, that defense was not available to his insurer.