26 Cited authorities

Huddleston v. United States
485 U.S. 681 (1988) Cited 2,347 times 4 Legal Analyses
Holding that under Rule 104(b), the "court simply examines all the evidence in the case and decides whether the jury could reasonably find the conditional fact . . . by a preponderance of the evidence"
Dowling v. United States
493 U.S. 342 (1990) Cited 2,117 times 5 Legal Analyses
Holding that admission of evidence must be fundamentally unfair to constitute a due process violation
Ashe v. Swenson
397 U.S. 436 (1970) Cited 3,523 times 12 Legal Analyses
Holding that the Double Jeopardy Clause prevents a defendant acquitted of robbing one participant at a poker game from being prosecuted for robbing any of the other participants at the same game
Yeager v. United States
557 U.S. 110 (2009) Cited 405 times 6 Legal Analyses
Holding that a jury's failure to reach a verdict on some counts is a "nonevent" that cannot, by negative implication, inform the double jeopardy inquiry
Schiro v. Farley
510 U.S. 222 (1994) Cited 556 times 3 Legal Analyses
Holding that an initial sentencing proceeding is not a successive prosecution and does not violate the Double Jeopardy Clause where defendant argued he could not be sentenced to death based on the intentional murder aggravating circumstance, because the sentencing proceeding amounted to a successive prosecution for intentional murder
People v. Tucker
55 N.Y.2d 1 (N.Y. 1981) Cited 598 times 3 Legal Analyses
In Tucker, we observed that, where a repugnant verdict was the result, not of irrationality, but mercy, courts "should not... undermine the jury's role and participation by setting aside the verdict" (55 NY2d at 7).
People v. Berkowitz
50 N.Y.2d 333 (N.Y. 1980) Cited 557 times
Holding that a conspiracy defendant whose sole alleged co-conspirator had been previously acquitted of the conspiracy charge could not utilize the doctrine of collateral estoppel as a bar to his own prosecution because that there will often be significant disparities in the proof available against each of two separately tried defendants and a verdict of acquittal is not necessarily a determination of innocence
Sealfon v. United States
332 U.S. 575 (1948) Cited 441 times
Holding in a prosecution for conspiracy to defraud the United States, where the jury acquitted petitioner after finding that he had not written a letter to a certain Greenberg "pursuant to an agreement with Greenberg to defraud," the government could not thereafter prosecute him for aiding and abetting Greenberg's false invoices with the same letter
United States v. Oppenheimer
242 U.S. 85 (1916) Cited 333 times
Holding that a judgment dismissing an indictment because it was barred by the statute of limitations is a bar to a second prosecution for the same offense under a new indictment
People v. Plevy
52 N.Y.2d 58 (N.Y. 1980) Cited 120 times 1 Legal Analyses
In People v Plevy (52 N.Y.2d, at 65) we recognized that defendant's testimony at a suppression hearing is important proof that may well alter the result, especially when police testimony is not otherwise contradicted.

The People of the State of New York, Appellant,v.Donald O'Toole, Respondent.

26 Cited authorities

Holding that under Rule 104(b), the "court simply examines all the evidence in the case and decides whether the jury could reasonably find the conditional fact . . . by a preponderance of the evidence"

Holding that admission of evidence must be fundamentally unfair to constitute a due process violation

Holding that the Double Jeopardy Clause prevents a defendant acquitted of robbing one participant at a poker game from being prosecuted for robbing any of the other participants at the same game

Holding that a jury's failure to reach a verdict on some counts is a "nonevent" that cannot, by negative implication, inform the double jeopardy inquiry

In Tucker, we observed that, where a repugnant verdict was the result, not of irrationality, but mercy, courts "should not... undermine the jury's role and participation by setting aside the verdict" (55 NY2d at 7).

Holding that a judgment dismissing an indictment because it was barred by the statute of limitations is a bar to a second prosecution for the same offense under a new indictment

In People v Plevy (52 N.Y.2d, at 65) we recognized that defendant's testimony at a suppression hearing is important proof that may well alter the result, especially when police testimony is not otherwise contradicted.