21 Cited authorities

Breed v. Ins. Co. of N. Amer
46 N.Y.2d 351 (N.Y. 1978) Cited 911 times 1 Legal Analyses
Holding that no ambiguity exists where language has "definite and precise meaning, unattended by danger of misconception in the purport of the policy itself, and concerning which there is no reasonable basis for a difference of opinion"
Thompson v. Grumman Corp.
78 N.Y.2d 553 (N.Y. 1991) Cited 521 times
Holding employee to be “special employee” where general employer loaned employee to special employer who “exerted comprehensive control over every facet of his work” notwithstanding fact that general employer provided paychecks and Workers Compensation coverage
Hartford Acc. Ind. v. Wesolowski
33 N.Y.2d 169 (N.Y. 1973) Cited 488 times 1 Legal Analyses
Holding there was one "occurrence" under the event test when the insured vehicle struck one oncoming vehicle, ricocheted off, and struck a second vehicle more than 100 feet away and noting that there was "no intervening agent" and "in common understanding and parlance there was ... a single, inseparable ‘three-car accident’ "
State v. Home Indemnity Company
66 N.Y.2d 669 (N.Y. 1985) Cited 315 times
Holding that the term-of-art affidavit in that case "did not supply the evidentiary facts needed to present an issue for the jury"
Abatement v. National Union Fire Insu. Com
33 A.D.3d 570 (N.Y. App. Div. 2006) Cited 87 times
Granting summary judgment when the written contract is "reasonably susceptible to only one meaning, leaving no occasion to consider parol evidence of the parties' course of conduct."
Newin Corporation v. Hartford Accident and Indem. Co.
62 N.Y.2d 916 (N.Y. 1984) Cited 129 times
Argued May 2, 1984 Decided June 14, 1984 Appeal from the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court in the First Judicial Department, Norman C. Ryp, J. Charles L. Stewart, Anthony A. Dean, Craig P. Murphy and James E. Patterson for appellants. William P. Sullivan, Jr., Alfred J. Morgan, Jr., and Peter I. Broeman for respondents. MEMORANDUM. The order of the Appellate Division should be reversed, with costs, and the motion for partial summary judgment by defendants Hartford Accident Indemnity Co. and
Essex Insurance v. Pingley
41 A.D.3d 774 (N.Y. App. Div. 2007) Cited 24 times
No. 2006-05251. June 26, 2007. In an action for a judgment declaring that the plaintiff, Essex Insurance Company, is not obligated to defend and indemnify the defendants Brim Recyclers, Inc., and William Burnett in an underlying action entitled Pingley v Brim Recyclers, Inc., pending in the Supreme Court, Orange County, under index No. 6042/04, the defendants Brim Recyclers, Inc., and William Burnett appeal from an order of the Supreme Court, Orange County (Owen, J.), dated April 24, 2006, which
Harjes v. Parisio
1 A.D.3d 680 (N.Y. App. Div. 2003) Cited 25 times
93764 Decided and Entered: November 6, 2003. Appeal from that part of an order of the Supreme Court (Bradley, J.), entered June 20, 2002 in Ulster County, which granted a motion by defendant Carpet Store and Warehouse for summary judgment dismissing the complaint against it. Barraco Schonberg P.C., Highland (Anthony M. Barraco of counsel), for appellant. Law Office of Craig P. Curcio, Middletown (Tony Semidey of counsel), for respondent. Before: Cardona, P.J., Crew III, Peters, Carpinello and, Mugglin
Gfeller v. Russo
45 A.D.3d 1301 (N.Y. App. Div. 2007) Cited 15 times
In Gfeller, the Appellate Division found that an automobile repossession company was not liable as a matter of law for the actions of its driver, Russo, where the repossession company "presented evidence establishing that it had no control over the method or means by which Russo performed his work... ; that Russo was paid an agreed-upon price per vehicle that was repossessed; and that [the repossession company] did not withhold Social Security or other taxes from Russo's payments."
Matter of Morton
284 N.Y. 167 (N.Y. 1940) Cited 144 times
Applying the "general concept" that the distinction between an employee and an independent contractor turns on "the right of control over the [worker] in respect of the manner in which his work is to be done"

Dryden Mutual Insurance Company, Appellant,v.Stanley Goessl, et al., Defendants, AP Daino & Plumbing, Inc. et al., Respondents.

21 Cited authorities

Holding that no ambiguity exists where language has "definite and precise meaning, unattended by danger of misconception in the purport of the policy itself, and concerning which there is no reasonable basis for a difference of opinion"

Holding employee to be “special employee” where general employer loaned employee to special employer who “exerted comprehensive control over every facet of his work” notwithstanding fact that general employer provided paychecks and Workers Compensation coverage

Holding that the term-of-art affidavit in that case "did not supply the evidentiary facts needed to present an issue for the jury"

Granting summary judgment when the written contract is "reasonably susceptible to only one meaning, leaving no occasion to consider parol evidence of the parties' course of conduct."

Applying the "general concept" that the distinction between an employee and an independent contractor turns on "the right of control over the [worker] in respect of the manner in which his work is to be done"