Opposition Objections

Cal. Super. - 6th Dist.March 24, 2021

COBLENTZ PATCH DUFFY & BASS LLP ONE MONTGOMERY STREET, SUITE 3000, SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA 94lO4-5SOO FAX 4|5.989.|663 4|5.39|.4800 - \OWQONUIhMNH NNNNNNNNNHHHHHHHHHH WQO‘NUIhMNHOwWQQUIhMNHO 21CV381 1 1O Santa Clara - Civil SCOTT C. HALL (State Bar No. 232492) SKYE LANGS (State Bar N0. 287908) EMLYN MANDEL (State Bar No. 3 10403) COBLENTZ PATCH DUFFY & BASS LLP One Montgomery Street, Suite 3000 San Francisco, California 94104-5500 Telephone: 415.391.4800 Facsimile: 415.989.1663 Email: ef-sch@cpdb.c0m ef-sdl@cpdb.com ef-erm@coblentzlaw.com Attorneys for Plaintiffs ANNE TING, JACK TING, and NICOLE TING-YAP SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SANTA CLARA ANNE TING, an individual; JACK TING, an individual; and NICOLE TING-YAP, an individual, Plaintiffs, V. PANIDA CHINSUPAKUL, an individual; and DOES 1 through 10, Defendants. 18786.001 4836-7956-0697.4 1 M. Soru Electronically Filed by Superior Court of CA, County of Santa Clara, on 12/3/2021 9:36 AM Reviewed By: M. Sorum Case #21 CV381 1 1 0 Envelope: 7783981 Case N0. 21CV381 1 10 PLAINTIFFS’ OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO COMPEL RESPONSES TO REQUESTS FOR PRODUCTION Date: December 16, 2021 Time: 9:00 am. Dept: 7 Judge: Hon. Christopher G. Rudy Action Filed: March 24, 2021 Trial Date: None Set Case No. 21CV381 1 10 PLAINTIFFS’ OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO COMPEL RESPONSES TO REQUESTS FOR PRODUCTION m COBLENTZ PATCH DUFFY & BASS LLP ONE MONTGOMERY STREET, SUITE 3000, SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA 94lO4-5SOO FAX 4|5.989.|663 4|5.39|.48OO \OWQONUIhMNH NNNNNNNNNHHHHHHHHHH WQO‘NUIhMNHOwWQQUIhMNHO TABLE OF CONTENTS Page INTRODUCTION .............................................................................................................................. 5 BACKGROUND ................................................................................................................................ 6 LEGAL STANDARD ........................................................................................................................ 9 ARGUMENT ..................................................................................................................................... 9 I. Defendant Has Not Established Good Cause For Compelling Production. ...............9 II. Defendant’s Requests D0 Not Seek Information Concerning Plaintiffs’ Ownership Of The Stolen Documents. .................................................................... 10 III. Defendant Is Not Entitled To Plaintiff” s Documents In Order T0 Prove Her Community Property Rights ..................................................................................... 11 A. This Court Cannot Decide Defendant’s Community Property Rights. ........ 11 B. Defendant Has Not Demonstrated Her Right To The Information Sought ........................................................................................................... 12 IV. Defendant Cannot Seek Discovery Regarding A Purported Fraudulent Transfer That Is Not At Issue In This Litigation ...................................................... 12 V. The Documents Defendant Seeks Are Protected By Plaintiff s Privacy Rights. ...................................................................................................................... 13 VI. Plaintiffs Have Agreed T0 Produce Documents Responsive t0 RFPS 4 and 5 Upon Entry OfAn Appropriate Protective Order. ................................................... 15 VII. Sanctions Against Plaintiff Are Not Warranted. ...................................................... 17 CONCLUSION ................................................................................................................................ 1 8 18786.001 4836-7956-0697.4 2 Case No. 21CV381 1 10 PLAINTIFFS’ OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO COMPEL RESPONSES TO REQUESTS FOR PRODUCTION COBLENTZ PATCH DUFFY & BASS LLP ONE MONTGOMERY STREET, SUITE 3000, SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA 94lO4-5SOO FAX 4|5.989.|663 4|5.39|.4800 - \OWQONUIhMNH NNNNNNNNNHHHHHHHHHH WQO‘NUIhMNHOwWQQUIhMNHO TABLE OF AUTHORITIES Page(s) Cases Askew v. Askew (1994) 22 Ca1.App.4th 942 ......................................................................................................... 12 Britt v. Superior Court (1978) 20 Ca1.3d 844 .................................................................................................................. 15 Calcor Space Facility, Inc. v. Superior Court (1997) 53 Cal. App. 4th 216 ................................................................................................... 9, 10 Cobb v. Superior Court (1979) 99 Ca1.App.3d 543 .......................................................................................................... 14 Cly. ofLos Angeles v. Los Angeles Cly. Employee Relations Com. (2013) 56 Ca1.4th 905 ................................................................................................................. 14 Greyhound Corp. v. Superior Court (1961) 56 Ca1.2d 355 .................................................................................................................... 9 Kirkland v. Superior Court (2002) 95 Cal. App. 4th 92 ........................................................................................................... 9 Nelson v. Superior Court (1986) 184 Ca1.App.3d 444 .................................................................................................... 9, 13 Overstock.com, Inc. v. Goldman Sachs Group, Inc. (2014) 231 Ca1.App.4th 471 ....................................................................................................... 14 Panida Chinsupakul v. Julian Ting, Santa Clara Superior Court Case No. 20FL003262 ................................................................... 16 Pioneer Electronics (USA), Inc. v. Superior Court (2007) 40 Ca1.4th 360 ................................................................................................................. 14 Puerto v. Superior Court (2008) 158 Ca1.App.4th 1242 ..................................................................................................... 14 Rawnsley v. Superior Court (1986) 183 Ca1.App.3d 86 .......................................................................................................... 16 Richards v. Superior. Court (1978) 86 Ca1.App.3d 265 .......................................................................................................... 16 Schnabel v. Superior Court (1993) 5 Cal.4th 704 ................................................................................................................... 12 Valley Bank ofNevada v. Superior Court (1975) 15 Ca1.3d 652 ............................................................................................................ 14, 15 18786.001 4836-7956-0697.4 3 Case No. 21CV381 1 10 PLAINTIFFS’ OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO COMPEL RESPONSES TO REQUESTS FOR PRODUCTION COBLENTZ PATCH DUFFY & BASS LLP ONE MONTGOMERY STREET, SUITE 3000, SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA 94lO4-5SOO FAX 4|5.989.|663 4|5.39|.4800 - \OWQONUIhMNH NNNNNNNNNHHHHHHHHHH WQO‘NUIhMNHOwWQQUIhMNHO Weingarten v. Superior. Court (2002) 102 Cal.App.4th 268 ....................................................................................................... 14 Wellpoint Health Networks, Inc. v. Superior Court (1997) 59 Cal. App. 4th 110 ....................................................................................................... 13 Williams v. Superior Court (2017) 3 Cal.5th 531 ................................................................................................................... 14 Statutes & Rules Code of Civil Procedure § 2017.010 .................................................................................................................................. 13 § 2017.020, subd. (a) .................................................................................................................... 9 § 203 1 .060(b)(5) ......................................................................................................................... 16 §2031.310(b) ............................................................................................................................... 9 Other Authorities California Constitution, art. I, § 1 .................................................................................................... 14 18786.001 4836-7956-0697.4 4 Case No. 21CV381 1 10 PLAINTIFFS’ OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO COMPEL RESPONSES TO REQUESTS FOR PRODUCTION COBLENTZ PATCH DUFFY & BASS LLP ONE MONTGOMERY STREET, SUITE 3000, SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA 94lO4-5SOO FAX 4|5.989.|663 4|5.39|.48OO \OWQONUIhMNH NNNNNNNNNHHHHHHHHHH WQO‘NUIhMNHOwWQQUIhMNHO INTRODUCTION PlaintiffNicole Ting-Yap, along with her parents and co-Plaintiffs Jack Ting and Anne Ting, brought this action t0 remedy Defendant’s wrongful theft 0f their personal and confidential electronic data. This information was stored for safekeeping on the password-protected server and electronic devices of Julian Ting, their brother and son. In the fall 0f 2020, Defendant took that information Without permission - and has admitted t0 doing so - and proceeded to use it for her own benefit in her marital dissolution proceedings against Julian Ting, including in publicly filed documents in that proceeding. Plaintiffs are understandably protective 0f their privacy, and upset about the theft and disclosure 0f vast amounts of their personal and financial information. They brought this suit to vindicate their privacy rights and secure the return of the information that was wrongfully stolen from them. Plaintiffs sought a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction t0 prevent the further use and disclosure of their confidential information. On September 13, 2021, after the Court concluded that Plaintiffs had a likelihood of success on the merits of their claims, and would be harmed by the ongoing use and disclosure 0f their information, Plaintiffs obtained the interim injunctive relief they sought. Despite overwhelming evidence that Defendant wrongfully stole Plaintiffs’ private information, Defendant is now attempting to use this lawsuit - Which Plaintiffs brought t0 remedy the theft - as an opportunity to legally obtain, through discovery, the very same information she stole - and potentially more. Defendant’s obj ective is clear. She is hoping that once she lawfully obtains Plaintiffs’ information in discovery, she will then be free t0 use it, as she sees fit, in her divorce proceedings against Julian Ting, where Plaintiffs are not parties. This goal is made clear by the content of the discovery requests themselves, Defendant’s own arguments explaining their relevance, and her refiJsal t0 enter into a stipulated protective order that would disallow the use of Plaintiffs’ discovery documents in her divorce proceedings. Defendant’s attempted abuse 0f the discovery process should not be condoned. Defendant’s discovery requests seek vast amounts of information regarding the content of the information she wrongfully stole from Plaintiffs, the theft 0f which is the subject 0f this 18786.001 4836-7956-0697.4 5 Case No. 21CV381 1 10 PLAINTIFFS’ OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO COMPEL RESPONSES TO REQUESTS FOR PRODUCTION COBLENTZ PATCH DUFFY & BASS LLP ONE MONTGOMERY STREET, SUITE 3000, SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA 94lO4-5SOO FAX 4|5.989.|663 4|5.39|.48OO \OWQONUIhMNH NNNNNNNNNHHHHHHHHHH WQO‘NUIhMNHOwWQQUIhMNHO lawsuit. But the details she seeks are largely irrelevant t0 the claims and defenses in this case. Here, the primary issues in dispute concern whether Plaintiffs owned 0r had the right t0 possess the stolen information, Whether they expected the information would remain private, Whether Defendant took that information Without permission, and Whether Defendant overrode the protections 0f secure computer systems in order to obtain the information. Defendant should not be permitted t0 use discovery in this case t0 further intrude into Plaintiffs’ privacy, and lawfully obtain even more information about the documents she stole. To the extent Defendant’s requests are relevant to the actual claims and defenses at issue, Plaintiff has agreed t0 produce documents subject t0 an appropriate protective order that would protect against further disclosure of their confidential information. However, Defendant has been unwilling t0 agree to a standard term - one that appears in this Court’s own model protective order - that would prevent Defendant from using confidential information obtained through discovery for any purpose other than litigating this case. Specifically, Defendant would not be able to use Plaintiffs’ confidential information in support of her claims in the family law proceedings. Her refiJsal to agree t0 this terms makes clear that she is seeking discovery from Plaintiffs not t0 litigate this case, but t0 use in an unrelated proceeding, resulting in further improper disclosure and misuse of Plaintiffs’ confidential information. If Defendant wants to use information in her separate marital dissolution proceeding, she must seek such information through the discovery procedures in the family law court. Defendant’s position regarding the scope 0f discovery in this matter, and the protections that should be afforded t0 Plaintiffs’ discoverable information, is untenable, and would only result in further Violations to the rights Plaintiffs are seeking t0 protect. Defendant’s motion t0 compel should be denied in its entirety. BACKGROUND After discovering that Defendant had wrongfully obtained Plaintiffs’ private information without their consent, Plaintiffs filed the above-captioned action. Plaintiffs’ Complaint alleges six causes of action: conversion (First Cause of Action), intrusion into private affairs (Second Cause of Action), Violation 0f the right t0 privacy (Third Cause 0f Action), Violation 0f the 18786.001 4836-7956-0697.4 6 Case No. 21CV381 1 10 PLAINTIFFS’ OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO COMPEL RESPONSES TO REQUESTS FOR PRODUCTION COBLENTZ PATCH DUFFY & BASS LLP ONE MONTGOMERY STREET, SUITE 3000, SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA 94lO4-5SOO FAX 4|5.989.|663 4|5.39|.48OO \OWQONUIhMNH NNNNNNNNNHHHHHHHHHH WQO‘NUIhMNHOwWQQUIhMNHO Comprehensive Computer Data and Access Fraud Act (Fourth Cause 0f Action), misappropriation 0f trade secrets (Fifth Cause of Action), and intentional infliction of emotional distress (Sixth Cause 0f Action). On June 3, 2021, the Court issued a Temporary Restraining Order enjoining Defendant from “using, in any manner” the information she obtained from Plaintiffs Without their permission. On September 13, 2021, after further briefing and hearings 0n the issue, the Court issued a preliminary injunction granting Plaintiffs’ requested injunctive relief in full. (Declaration 0f Skye Langs (“Langs Decl.”), EX. C (September 13, 2021 Order for Preliminary Injunction (“Preliminary Injunction”).) The Court found that Plaintiffs are likely to succeed on the merits 0f their claims, and that the balance of equities weigh in their favor. (Id. at p. 2) As a result, Defendant was enjoined from “using, Viewing, copying, photographing, dissemination, accessing, 0r otherwise using, in any manner, any of Plaintiffs’ private information” that she obtained from Julian Ting’s server and electronic devices. (Id., fl 1.) In addition, she was instructed to return 0r destroy all 0f Plaintiffs’ information, and all information derived from it.1 On May 28, 2021, While the application for injunctive relief was pending, Defendant served Requests for Production 0f documents (“RFPS”) on Plaintiff Ting-Yap. The Requests seek detailed financial and tax information that belongs t0 Plaintiff Ting-Yap, and relates t0 entities for Which Plaintiff is 0r was an owner and shareholder. (See Langs Decl., EX. A (discovery requests); Declaration of Nicole Ting-Yap (“Ting-Yap Decl.,” W 3, 5.) A11 0r most 0f this information was previously obtained by Defendant, illegally, when she took Plaintiffs’ documents without their permission. (Ting-Yap Decl., 11 5.) Specifically, among other things, the Requests seek: 1 Defendant has appealed the Preliminary Injunction, and is taking the position (which Plaintiffs disagree with) that most of its provisions are stayed pending the appeal. Consequently, Defendants have not complied With certain provisions of the injunction, including the requirement that they certify they have returned 0r destroyed all the stolen information. Nor has Defendant taken all the steps necessary to fully effectuate the order within five days of its entry. In fact, some 0f Defendant’s briefing in support of this Motion use 0r are derived from stolen information, and should be sealed and stricken from the records. Because Defendant has failed t0 do so, in Violation of provisions 0f the injunction that have not been stayed by the appeal, Plaintiffs Will be filing additional motions t0 address these issues. 18786.001 4836-7956-0697.4 7 Case No. 21CV381 1 10 PLAINTIFFS’ OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO COMPEL RESPONSES TO REQUESTS FOR PRODUCTION COBLENTZ PATCH DUFFY & BASS LLP ONE MONTGOMERY STREET, SUITE 3000, SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA 94lO4-5SOO FAX 4|5.989.|663 4|5.39|.48OO \OWQONUIhMNH NNNNNNNNNHHHHHHHHHH WQO‘NUIhMNHOwWQQUIhMNHO o Documents regarding the transfer of shares held by Plaintiff Ting-Yap and her brother, Julian Ting, in two corporate entities - Setima Sdn Bhd (“Setima”) and JCT Holdings Sdh Bhd (“JCT Holdings”) - in Which Plaintiff Ting-Yap is a shareholder. (See Langs Decl., EX. A, RFPs 1, 2.) 0 Financial statements, reports, and board minutes and resolutions for Setima and JCT Holdings. (See Langs Decl., EX. A, RFPS 3, 6, 8.) o Tax returns for Setima and JCT Holdings. (See Langs Decl., EX. A, RFP 7.) These requests are overbroad, not likely to lead to the discovery 0f admissible information, and not relevant to the present dispute. Additionally, the information sought intrudes 0n Plaintiffs’ financial privacy by seeking information related to closely held, non-public entities that Plaintiff owns. Defendant’s discovery requests are a blatant ploy by Defendant to bypass the protections 0f the Preliminary Injunction, and to obtain, through legal means, the information she previously stole and is now prevented from using. This information has n0 relevance to the claims 0r defenses in this case. Defendant’s only purpose for stealing this information in the first place, and for seeking it through discovery now, is for use in her marital dissolution proceeding, t0 Which Plaintiffs are not a party. Plaintiff Ting-Yap served responses and obj ections t0 Defendant’s Requests for Production 0n June 29, 2021. In her response, Plaintiff Ting-Yap agreed t0 produce documents sufficient to show that Julian Ting had not owned shares in Setima 0r JCT Holdings since November 30, 2000, and has since produced those documents. (See Langs, EX. B (responses to discovery requests), RFPS 1, 2.) Plaintiff objected to producing further documents in response t0 RFPS 1, 2, 3, 6, 7, and 8 on the grounds that the requests seek information neither relevant to the subj ect matter of the action nor reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence, and 0n the grounds that the requests seek private and confidential financial information and Violate her constitutional right 0f privacy. (See Langs Decl., EX. B.) Plaintiff agreed t0 produce documents in response t0 RFPS 4 and 5 subject t0 a suitable protective order, because the documents that Plaintiff intends to produce are confidential. (Langs Decl. 1] 5.) However, Defendant has refused t0 enter into a stipulated protective order that would 18786.001 4836-7956-0697.4 8 Case No. 21CV381 1 10 PLAINTIFFS’ OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO COMPEL RESPONSES TO REQUESTS FOR PRODUCTION COBLENTZ PATCH DUFFY & BASS LLP ONE MONTGOMERY STREET, SUITE 3000, SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA 94lO4-5SOO FAX 4|5.989.|663 4|5.39|.48OO \OWQONUIhMNH NNNNNNNNNHHHHHHHHHH WQO‘NUIhMNHOwWQQUIhMNHO expressly prevent her from using the confidential discovery obtained in this case in the marital dissolution proceedings. (Langs Decl., 1] 8.) Accordingly, the parties have not been able to agree 0n the terms of a protective order. LEGAL STANDARD On a motion to compel, the party seeking discovery has the burden to “provide evidence from Which the court may determine” that the information sought is “itself admissible in evidence or appears reasonably calculated t0 lead t0 the discovery 0f admissible evidence.” (Calcor Space Facility, Inc. v. Superior Court (1997) 53 Cal. App. 4th 216, 223-24.) When a party seeks t0 compel production 0f documents, the party seeking to compel such production must “set forth specific facts showing good cause justifying the discovery sought by the demand.” (Id.; see also CiV. Proc. Code, § 2031.3 10(b) (same).) The factual evidence t0 support a discovery motion “is supplied to the court by way of declarations,” Which must themselves contain “specific facts relating to each category 0f materials sought to be produced.” (Calcor, 53 Cal. App. 4th at 224 (rej ecting motion where “the justifications offered for the production are mere generalities”).) Only after the requesting party sets forth specific facts showing good cause does the burden shift t0 the responding party t0 justify its objection. (Kirkland v. Superior Court, (2002) 95 Cal. App. 4th 92, 98.) “Although the scope 0f civil discovery is broad, it is not limitless.” (Calcor, 53 Ca1.App.4th at 223.) Courts limit the scope of discovery in the face 0f unreasonable “burden, expense, 0r intrusiveness” to the producing party, and also have wide discretion to “prevent abuse” 0f discovery processes. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2017.020, subd. (a); Greyhound Corp. v. Superior Court (1961) 56 Cal.2d 355, 383.) “In the exercise of its discretion the court should weigh the relative importance of the information sought against the hardship Which its production might entail[.]” (Id. at pp. 383-84.) ARGUMENT I. Defendant Has Not Established Good Cause For Compelling Production. As an initial matter, Defendant has not established good cause for compelling production, nor has she provided specific facts t0 justify her requests. (See, e.g., Nelson v. Superior Court, 18786.001 4836-7956-0697.4 9 Case No. 21CV381 1 10 PLAINTIFFS’ OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO COMPEL RESPONSES TO REQUESTS FOR PRODUCTION COBLENTZ PATCH DUFFY & BASS LLP ONE MONTGOMERY STREET, SUITE 3000, SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA 94lO4-5SOO FAX 4|5.989.|663 4|5.39|.48OO \OWQONUIhMNH NNNNNNNNNHHHHHHHHHH WQO‘NUIhMNHOwWQQUIhMNHO (1986) 184 Cal.App.3d 444, 450, 452 (good cause for compelling production 0f documents not found where individual had not established that the documents were reasonably calculated t0 lead t0 discovery of admissible evidence); Calcor, 53 Cal. App. 4th at 224 (rejecting motion Where “the justifications offered for the production are mere generalities”).) Instead, Defendant’s support for her motion consists only of generalized statements and arguments, none of which address the particular requests at issue. (See Defendant’s Separate Statement (repeating verbatim the factual and legal reasons for compelling further responses t0 request numbers 1, 2, and 3, and same for request numbers 6, 7, and 8). Such generalized statements are insufficient to support a Motion t0 Compel, or t0 shift the burden t0 Plaintiffs t0 justify their obj ections. II. Defendant’s Requests D0 Not Seek Information Concerning Plaintiffs’ Ownership Of The Stolen Documents. Through RFPS 1, 2, 3, 6, 7, and 8, Defendant seeks discovery about Plaintiff Ting-Yap’s and Julian Ting’s sale and transfer of shares; payments made to Julian Ting; and financial statements, reports, board minutes, resolutions, and tax returns for entities that Plaintiff Ting-Yap owns. These requests are overbroad, intrude upon Plaintiffs’ privacy, and have n0 reasonable relevance to the present dispute. Nonetheless, Defendant argues that the information she seeks is relevant t0 proving that Plaintiffs were not the owners or lawful possessors 0f the information Defendant stole from Julian Ting’s server and devices. She also believes the information Will prove that Julian Ting (a non- party) had possession 0f information concerning Setima and JCT Holdings because he was secretly a part-owner 0f these entities. These arguments are nonsensical. If Defendant’s true purpose is t0 determine Plaintiffs’ rightful possession 0f the information she stole, her requests are both underinclusive and overbroad, suggesting that this is a post hoc attempt to rationalize the discovery requests. Defendant only seeks information concerning two entities, Setima and JCT Holdings, even though the information Defendant wrongfully stole includes much more than that. For example, the stolen information includes Plaintiff Ting-Yap’s counseling records and passport information, as well as documents relating t0 at least 10 other entities that Plaintiff Ting-Yap owns. (Ting-Yap Decl., 1] 3.) However, 18786.001 4836-7956-0697.4 10 Case No. 21CV381 1 10 PLAINTIFFS’ OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO COMPEL RESPONSES TO REQUESTS FOR PRODUCTION COBLENTZ PATCH DUFFY & BASS LLP ONE MONTGOMERY STREET, SUITE 3000, SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA 94lO4-5SOO FAX 4|5.989.|663 4|5.39|.48OO \OWQONUIhMNH NNNNNNNNNHHHHHHHHHH WQO‘NUIhMNHOwWQQUIhMNHO Defendant is uninterested in seeking discovery t0 prove Plaintiff s ownership or right t0 possess any 0f that information, presumably because it would be 0f no use to Defendant in her divorce proceedings. Moreover, if Defendant’s true purpose is to establish Plaintiff s ownership of the stolen information, or Julian Ting’s right to access information about JCT Holdings and Setima, that cannot be determined from share transfers, financial statements, records of loans 0r cash payments, 0r tax returns. These types 0f records d0 not demonstrate, either positively or negatively, Plaintiff s ownership of the information taken from her, or Julian Ting’s right to access information about JCT Holdings or Setima. In fact, Julian Ting is a Director 0f both JCT Holdings and Setima, and has a right to access information regarding those entities 0n that basis, even though he is not an owner. (Ting-Yap Dec1., fl 4.) In short, Defendant’s requests have nothing to d0 With proving or disproving Plaintiffs’ claims that they were the owners 0r lawful possessors of the stolen information, and are not relevant to this dispute. III. Defendant Is Not Entitled T0 Plaintiff’s Documents In Order T0 Prove Her Community Propertv Rights. A. This Court Cannot Decide Defendant’s Communitv Propertv Rights. Defendant also argues that the she is entitled to detailed information related to Setima and JCT Holdings because she believes this will show that she had a community property interest in these entities. (Mot. to Compel at 5-6). As an initial matter, in response to Defendant’s discovery requests, Plaintiff has already produced documents sufficient t0 show that Julian Ting currently owns n0 shares of JCT Holdings or Setima, and has not since November 30, 2000. (See Langs Decl., EX. B, RFPs 1, 2.) No other information is necessary t0 disprove Defendant’s claim 0f community property rights in these entities. More t0 the point, this Court has no jurisdiction t0 determine Defendant’s community property rights. That issue must be decided by the family law court. As a result, questions about Whether Julian Ting has any beneficial interest in JCT Holdings or Setima, and What he was paid in exchange for his shares, is decidedly irrelevant t0 the present proceeding. Those 18786.001 4836-7956-0697.4 1 1 Case No. 21CV381 1 10 PLAINTIFFS’ OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO COMPEL RESPONSES TO REQUESTS FOR PRODUCTION COBLENTZ PATCH DUFFY & BASS LLP ONE MONTGOMERY STREET, SUITE 3000, SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA 94lO4-5SOO FAX 4|5.989.|663 4|5.39|.48OO \OWQONUIhMNH NNNNNNNNNHHHHHHHHHH WQO‘NUIhMNHOwWQQUIhMNHO determinations, which relate to Defendant’s purported community property rights, falls Within the exclusive purview 0f the family law court, and discovery sought for the purposes 0f proving a community property interest must be conducted through the marital dissolution proceedings between Defendant and Julian Ting, and not through this lawsuit. (Askew v. Askew (1994) 22 Cal.App.4th 942, 961-62 (family law court reserves jurisdiction t0 divide community property and characterize specific assets).) Moreover, even if Defendant is found to have a community property interest in JCT Holdings 0r Setima, that would not be a defense to her theft of information from Plaintiff Ting-Yap. The stolen information belonged t0 Plaintiff, was stored 0n her private, password- protected partition of Julian Ting’s server, and was taken without her permission. (Ting-Yap Decl., 11 2.) The fact that Defendant might have an independent right t0 some portion 0f information she stole does not excuse her theft 0f that information, and other information Which she plainly had no right t0, Without permission. B. Defendant Has Not Demonstrated Her Right T0 The Information Sought. Defendant’s alleged community property interest JCT Holdings and Setima, even if proven, still would not give her the right to all the information she seeks from Plaintiff Ting-Yap. As held by the California Supreme Court in Schnabel v. Superior Court (1993) 5 Cal.4th 704, 714, a spouse’s right to the financial information regarding an entity in Which she has an undisputed community property interest must be balanced against third party rights to financial privacy. The spouse does not have “unfettered access to corporate confidences and secrets.” (Id. at 716.) This limitation is even more salient in this case, where Defendant’s community property rights in JCT Holdings and Setima are denied and disputed, and where the information she seeks intrudes upon the financial privacy of third parties, such as other individuals Who have an ownership interest in JCT Holdings or Setima 0r who have sold or purchased shares in those entities. IV. Defendant Cannot Seek Discoverv Regarding A Purported Fraudulent Transfer That Is Not At Issue In This Litigation. Defendant also argues that the transfer 0f Julian Ting’s shares in Setima t0 Plaintiff Ting-Yap in November 2000 (before his marriage t0 Defendant) was a fraudulent transfer made in 18786.001 4836-7956-0697.4 12 Case No. 21CV381 1 10 PLAINTIFFS’ OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO COMPEL RESPONSES TO REQUESTS FOR PRODUCTION COBLENTZ PATCH DUFFY & BASS LLP ONE MONTGOMERY STREET, SUITE 3000, SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA 94lO4-5SOO FAX 4|5.989.|663 4|5.39|.48OO \OWQONUIhMNH NNNNNNNNNHHHHHHHHHH WQO‘NUIhMNHOwWQQUIhMNHO an attempt t0 deprive Defendant 0f community property interest in those entities. (Mot. to Compel at 4-5). Defendant claims that if she finds evidence that the transfer was fraudulent, she can bring an action t0 set aside the transfer or impose a constructive trust. (Id. at 5-6.) Even if such a claim were proper in this action - where Julian Ting is not a party, and the Court has n0 jurisdiction to decide community property issues - n0 such cross-claim currently exists, and a hypothetical unpled cross-claim is an entirely unjustified reason for seeking discovery in an ongoing action. Defendant has not yet answered Plaintiffs’ Complaint, asserted any affirmative defenses, 0r brought any cross-claims. Discovery is not permitted 0n unpled claims. (See Civ. Proc. Code § 2017.010 (“Discovery may relate t0 the claim 0r defense 0f the party seeking discovery, 0r of any other party t0 the action”) (emphasis added); Wellpoint Health Networks, Inc. v. Superior Court (1997) 59 Cal. App. 4th 110, 129 (reversing discovery order Where there was n0 Viable claim 0n file).) Defendant cannot abuse discovery in an existing action t0 explore potential cross-claims she may or may not bring, and to gain access t0 material to Which she is not otherwise entitled, and Which she intends t0 use in her divorce proceedings. Defendant’s attempt t0 muddy the discovery waters with hypothetical causes 0f action serves n0 legitimate purpose and is not reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery 0f admissible evidence in this dispute. (See Nelson, 184 Cal. App. 3d at 452-53 (denying motion t0 compel Where plaintiffmade n0 showing Whatever 0f any use for the reports other than his speculation that after examining the reports he might be able to formulate some Viable theory 0f liability and plaintiff s purpose in requesting the reports was precisely the type 0f “fishing expedition” not authorized).) V. The Documents Defendant Seeks Are Protected BV Plaintiff’s Privacv Rights. Defendant’s Motion focuses on the relevance 0f the information she seeks. (Mot. to Compel at 3). However, Defendant ignores that Plaintiff also objected t0 production 0n the grounds that the information sought is private. As a result, even if the information sought is relevant t0 the present dispute (which it is not), Defendant’s right t0 obtain this information must be balanced against Plaintiff’ s right t0 privacy. Protection of informational privacy is a constitutional right under the California 18786.001 4836-7956-0697.4 13 Case No. 21CV381 1 10 PLAINTIFFS’ OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO COMPEL RESPONSES TO REQUESTS FOR PRODUCTION COBLENTZ PATCH DUFFY & BASS LLP ONE MONTGOMERY STREET, SUITE 3000, SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA 94lO4-5SOO FAX 4|5.989.|663 4|5.39|.48OO \OWQONUIhMNH NNNNNNNNNHHHHHHHHHH WQO‘NUIhMNHOwWQQUIhMNHO Constitution. (Cal. C0nst., art. I, § 1; Williams v. Superior Court, (2017) 3 Ca1.5th 531, 552.) “[T]he right 0f privacy extends t0 one’s confidential financial affairs as well as t0 the details 0f one’s personal life.” (Valley Bank ofNevada v. Superior Court, (1975) 15 Cal.3d 652, 656; see also Overstock.com, Inc. v. Goldman Sachs Group, Inc. (2014) 231 Cal.App.4th 471, 503 (the right t0 privacy under the state constitution extends to one’s confidential financial affairs, and embraces confidential financial information in Whatever form it takes, whether that form be tax returns, checks, statements, 0r other account information); Pioneer Electronics (USA), Inc. v. Superior Court, (2007) 40 Ca1.4th 360, 372 (recognizing financial information is particularly sensitive).) “Legally recognized privacy interests include ‘interests in precluding the dissemination or misuse of sensitive and confidential information[.]’” (Cly. ofLos Angeles v. L05 Angeles Cty. Employee Relations C0m., (2013) 56 Ca1.4th 905, 927 (internal citation 0mitted).) Where requested discovery material implicates the constitutional right 0f privacy, the ordinary yardstick for discoverability, i.e., that the information sought may lead to relevant evidence, is inapplicable. (See Williams, 3 Cal.5th at 556.) The requesting party must overcome the right 0f privacy in order to obtain the otherwise relevant information, and if there is a reasonable expectation 0f privacy and the invasion of privacy is serious, then the court must balance the privacy interest at stake against the interest 0f the requesting party, fairness to the litigants in conducting the litigation, and the consequences of granting 0r restricting access t0 the information. (Puerto v. Superior Court (2008) 158 Cal.App.4th 1242, 1251; see also Williams, 3 Cal.5th at 552; Cobb v. Superior Court (1979) 99 Cal.App.3d 543, 550 (court limited discovery 0f defendants’ non-public financial information as there was no showing 0f necessity and questions dealing with assets, liabilities, property ownership, and cash constituted unnecessary harassment).) In particular, tax returns and tax related documents, Which Defendant sought in RFP 7 (see Langs Decl., EX. A, RFP 7), are considered privileged under California law. (Weingarten v. Superior. Court (2002) 102 Cal.App.4th 268, 274.) Defendant does not grapple with the heightened standards for seeking material protected by the constitutional right t0 privacy. She seeks documents that disclose Plaintiff s private and confidential information, With a particular focus 0n financial transactions Plaintiffwas involved 18786.001 4836-7956-0697.4 14 Case No. 21CV381 1 10 PLAINTIFFS’ OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO COMPEL RESPONSES TO REQUESTS FOR PRODUCTION COBLENTZ PATCH DUFFY & BASS LLP ONE MONTGOMERY STREET, SUITE 3000, SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA 94lO4-5SOO FAX 4|5.989.|663 4|5.39|.48OO \OWQONUIhMNH NNNNNNNNNHHHHHHHHHH WQO‘NUIhMNHOwWQQUIhMNHO in, and that relate t0 companies that Plaintiff owns and in which she has a significant financial stake. (See Ting-Yap Decl., 1] 5.) For example, Defendant seeks information about shares in private, closely held companies Which were sold 0r purchased by Plaintiff Ting-Yap, and the amount Plaintiff received or paid for those shares. (See Langs Decl., EX. A, RFPs 1, 2.) She also seeks detailed financial information, including tax returns, for JCT Holdings and Setima. (See id., RFPs 3, 7.) Given Plaintiff Ting-Yap’s substantial interest in these entities, this is tantamount t0 asking for her personal financial records and tax returns, which would plainly Violate her financial privacy. (See Ting-Yap Decl., 1] 5.) The disclosure of this type of private financial information invades Plaintiff’ s privacy, and the harm caused by that intrusion far outweighs any potential use Defendant may have for this information in these proceedings, Which is negligible at best. (See, e.g., Valley Bank ofNevada, 15 Cal.3d at 656.) Indeed, it is Defendant’s theft 0f this financial information in the first instance that led to Plaintiff” s lawsuit for invasion 0f privacy, among other claims. (Ting-Yap Decl., W 2, 3, 5.) T0 allow discovery into such information would reward Defendant for her theft and punish Plaintiffs for attempting t0 vindicate their privacy rights. The details 0f Plaintiffs’ financial affairs are not at issue in this litigation, and will not enable Defendant t0 mount a defense of the claims against her. Plaintiff” s privacy should be protected, especially given that no prejudice Will befall Defendant as a result. (See Britt v. Superior Court, (1978) 20 Cal.3d 844, 861-62 (discovery order compelling disclosure 0f plaintiffs’ private association affiliations and activities went far beyond What party’s legitimate litigation interests might justify and worked infringement 0f plaintiffs’ right 0f privacy).) In sum, the Motion t0 Compel should be denied because the documents that Defendant seeks are both irrelevant t0 this litigation and protected by Plaintiff’ s Constitutional right t0 privacy. VI. Plaintiffs Have Agreed T0 Produce Documents Responsive t0 RFPs 4 and 5 Upon Entrv OfAn Appropriate Protective Order. In her responses to RFPs 4 and 5, Plaintiff agreed t0 produce responsive documents subject t0 an appropriate protective order. The documents that Plaintiff intends t0 produce include contractual documents which, by their terms, require that they be kept confidential. (Langs Decl. 18786.001 4836-7956-0697.4 1 5 Case No. 21CV381 1 10 PLAINTIFFS’ OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO COMPEL RESPONSES TO REQUESTS FOR PRODUCTION COBLENTZ PATCH DUFFY & BASS LLP ONE MONTGOMERY STREET, SUITE 3000, SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA 94lO4-5SOO FAX 4|5.989.|663 4|5.39|.48OO \OWQONUIhMNH NNNNNNNNNHHHHHHHHHH WQO‘NUIhMNHOwWQQUIhMNHO 1] 5.) Additionally, as discovery proceeds in this matter, Plaintiffs anticipate that there Will be other sensitive discovery documents that will need protection t0 ensure their continued confidentiality. (1d,) However, Defendant refused to enter into a protective order that would adequately protect Plaintiffs’ confidential information, and filed the instant Motion instead. (Id. , 1] 8.) As a result, Plaintiff has not yet produced the confidential discovery documents responsive t0 Defendant’s requests. Documents produced in discovery may be kept confidential if there is good cause t0 d0 so. (Code Civ. Proc. § 203 1 .060(b)(5).) Confidential information produced in discovery, including non-public financial information, is presumptively entitled t0 a protective order prohibiting its use outside of the litigation for which it was produced. (Richards v. Superior. Court (1978) 86 Cal.App.3d 265, 272; Rawnsley v. Superior Court (1986) 183 Cal.App.3d 86, 9O (When a party seeks to discover information about “his adversary’s financial status,” courts should use “protective orders limiting the dissemination and use 0f such financial information”).) As a result, most protective orders include provisions prohibiting the use 0f confidential discovery outside of the proceeding where it was produced, and limit a party’s ability t0 share the information with attorneys other than those responsible for litigating the case. These protections prevent a litigant from abusing their broad discovery rights, and using confidential information obtained in discovery for impermissible purposes outside of the current litigation. For example, Santa Clara Superior Court’s own model protective order provides that confidential information exchanged during discover may be used “solely for the purposes of this case,” and prohibits the sharing 0f confidential information With attorneys Who are not “counsel for the respective parties t0 this litigation.” (Langs Decl., EX. E, W 3, 4(a) (Santa Clara Superior Court Model Protective Order) (emphasis added).) Here, the parties have agreed t0 the terms of a stipulated protective order, With one exception: Plaintiffs maintain that any confidential information they produce in this litigation should not be used by Defendant for other purposes, including in her divorce proceeding against Julian Ting. Consequently, the protective order proposed by Plaintiffs provides that confidential materials “may not be used 0r disclosed in the divorce proceeding, Panida Chinsupakul v. Julian 18786.001 4836-7956-0697.4 16 Case No. 21CV381 1 10 PLAINTIFFS’ OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO COMPEL RESPONSES TO REQUESTS FOR PRODUCTION COBLENTZ PATCH DUFFY & BASS LLP ONE MONTGOMERY STREET, SUITE 3000, SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA 94lO4-5SOO FAX 4|5.989.|663 4|5.39|.48OO \OWQONUIhMNH NNNNNNNNNHHHHHHHHHH WQO‘NUIhMNHOwWQQUIhMNHO Ting, Santa Clara Superior Court Case N0. 20FL003262.” (Langs Decl., EX. D, 1] 3.) Defendant has refused t0 agree t0 this term, and insists that she should be allowed t0 share Plaintiffs’ confidential information With her divorce attorneys (Who are not her counsel 0f record in this proceeding), and that she be able to use those confidential documents in her family law case. (Langs Decl., 11 8.)2 This should not be allowed. Plaintiffs’ confidential information should not be shown t0 attorneys Who are not Defendant’s counsel 0f record, and who are not litigating this dispute. Nor should Plaintiffs’ confidential information be used in other proceedings, in which Plaintiffs are not a party, and which involve different claims and factual issues. Any protective order to the contrary would not be sufficiently protective of Plaintiffs’ confidential information. Moreover, Defendant’s refusal t0 agree t0 a stipulated protective order limiting her use of Plaintiffs’ confidential information only serves t0 highlight the fact that the discovery Defendant is seeking in this case is not actually relevant to the claims and defenses at issue here, but rather, are intended for use in a separate legal proceeding. If Defendant believes she is entitled t0 use Plaintiffs’ confidential information in her divorce proceedings, she must attempt to obtain that discovery through the family law proceedings, not here. She may not side-step the limitations 0f third party discovery merely because Plaintiffs have brought this suit to protect their rights, which Defendant has already infringed. Plaintiffs respectfully request that they not be ordered to produce confidential documents until a suitable protective order is in place, and that Defendant be encouraged t0 voluntarily agree t0 the protective order proposed by Plaintiffs, Which would limit the use 0f confidential discovery t0 this proceeding. VII. Sanctions Against Plaintiff Are Not Warranted. The Court should rej ect Defendant’s request for sanctions. Plaintiff Ting-Yap has 2 Defendant has asserted that Plaintiffs” counsel is sharing information With Julian Ting’s attorney in the divorce proceedings, such as the outcome of a hearing for a preliminary injunction. However, this information is public, and not confidential, and therefore would not be covered by the proposed protective order. 18786.001 4836-7956-0697.4 17 Case No. 21CV381 1 10 PLAINTIFFS’ OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO COMPEL RESPONSES TO REQUESTS FOR PRODUCTION COBLENTZ PATCH DUFFY & BASS LLP ONE MONTGOMERY STREET, SUITE 3000, SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA 94lO4-5500 FAX 4|5.989.|663 4|5.39|.48OO \DWQCNUIhDJNH NNNNNNNNNHHHHHHHHHH WQONUI£MNHOWWQQUI£MNHO established substantial justification for her opposition to Defendant’s Request for Production. Plaintiff refused t0 produce any documents responsive t0 requests numbers 3, 6, and 7, and limited documents in response to requests number 1 and 2, because the requests are overbroad, the documents sought are irrelevant and not reasonably calculated t0 lead to the discovery of admissible evidence, and their production would Violate Plaintiff” s right to privacy. It would be unjust t0 impose sanctions upon a party Who seeks t0 protect herself from unwarranted and unnecessary intrusion into private financial matters, particularly When she brought this action to remedy the theft of similar information in the first place, and where the information sought is plainly intended for use in an unrelated lawsuit. Plaintiff also acted With substantial justification With respect to request numbers 4 and 5. Plaintiff agreed to produce confidential documents responsive t0 request numbers 4 and 5 once a stipulated protective order is in place. However, Defendant has been unwilling to agree to a reasonable stipulated protective order that protects against the further disclosure of Plaintiffs’ confidential information, and prevents her using the information obtained through this lawsuit in support of a separate and unrelated proceeding. Plaintiff is justified in refusing to produce confidential documents without a protective order in place. CONCLUSION Plaintiff Ting-Yap respectfully requests that the Court deny Defendant’s motion t0 compel and request for sanctions in full. DATED: December 3, 2021 COBLENTZ PATCH DUFFY & BASS LLP SKYE Attorneys for Plaintiffs ANNE TING, JACK TING, and NICOLE TING-YAP By: jms QANGS Q 18786.001 4836-7956-0697.4 18 Case No. 21CV381 1 10 PLAINTIFFS’ OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO COMPEL RESPONSES TO REQUESTS FOR PRODUCTION COBLENTZ PATCH DUFFY & BASS LLP ONE MONTGOMERY STREET, SUITE 3000, SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA 94lO4-5500 FAX 4|5.989.|663 4|5.39|.4800 - \DWQONUIhDJNH NNNNNNNNNHHHHHHHHHH WQONUI£MNHG©WQQUI£MNHO PROOF OF SERVICE Anne Ting, Jack Ting, and Nicole Ting-Yap vs. Panida Chinsupakul STATE OF CALIFORNIA, COUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCO At the time 0f service, I was over 18 years 0f age and not a party t0 this action. I am employed in the County of San Francisco, State of California. My business address is One Montgomery Street, Suite 3000, San Francisco, CA 94104-5500. On December 3, 2021 I served true copies of the following document(s) described as PLAINTIFFS’ OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO COMPEL RESPONSES TO REQUESTS FOR PRODUCTION 0n the interested parties in this action as follows: Attorney for Defendant Panida Chinsupakul: Michael G. Ackerman, Esq. The Law Offices of Michael G. Ackerman 2391 The Alameda, Suite 100 Santa Clara, California 95050 Telephone: 408.261.5800 Facsimile: 408.261.5900 E-Mail: mga@mgackermanlaw.com sls@m2ackermanlaw.com BY E-MAIL OR ELECTRONIC TRANSMISSION: I caused a copy 0f the document(s) t0 be sent from e-mail address dcampos@coblentzlaw.com t0 the persons at the e- mail addresses listed in the Service List. I did not receive, Within a reasonable time after the transmission, any electronic message 0r other indication that the transmission was unsuccessful. I declare under penalty 0f perjury under the laws of the State 0f California that the foregoing is true and correct. Executed on December 3, 2021, at Pacifica, California. flaw» flM/QE- Diana Campos 18786.001 4836-7956-0697.4 19 Case No. 21CV381 1 10 PLAINTIFFS’ OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO COMPEL RESPONSES TO REQUESTS FOR PRODUCTION