Ruiz Fajardo Ingenieros Asociados S.A.S. v. Flow International CorporationRESPONSEW.D. Wash.March 6, 2019PLAINTIFF RUIZ FAJARDO’S OPPOSITION TO FLOW’S MOTION TO QUASH AND FOR PROTECTIVE ORDER (2:16-CV-01902-RAJ) - 1 - Betts Patterson Mines One Convention Place Suite 1400 701 Pike Street Seattle, Washington 98101-3927 (206) 292-9988 1375624/030619 1437/8404-0001 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 HONORABLE RICHARD A. JONES UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON AT SEATTLE RUIZ FAJARDO INGENIEROS ASOCIADOS S.A.S., a foreign corporation, Plaintiff, vs. FLOW INTERNATIONAL CORPORATION, a Delaware corporation, Defendant. NO. 2:16-CV-01902-RAJ PLAINTIFF RUIZ FAJARDO’S OPPOSITION TO FLOW’S MOTION TO QUASH AND FOR PROTECTIVE ORDER I. INTRODUCTION Plaintiff Ruiz Fajardo Ingenieros Asociados S.A.S. (“Ruiz Fajardo”) respectfully asks this Court to deny Defendant Flow International Corporation’s (“Flow”) motion to quash and for a protective order. Flow has already filed a brief in opposition to Ruiz Fajardo’s motion for attorneys’ fees and costs. (Dkt. 93.) Ruiz Fajardo anticipated this challenge and, accordingly, asked Flow and its counsel, DLA Piper, to provide Ruiz Fajardo with the billing records associated with this matter immediately following trial. These records constitute the best evidence of the reasonableness of the attorneys’ fees and costs incurred by Ruiz Fajardo throughout this litigation because it allows the Court to compare all of the hours spent by all attorneys on all Case 2:16-cv-01902-RAJ Document 95 Filed 03/06/19 Page 1 of 12 PLAINTIFF RUIZ FAJARDO’S OPPOSITION TO FLOW’S MOTION TO QUASH AND FOR PROTECTIVE ORDER (2:16-CV-01902-RAJ) - 2 - Betts Patterson Mines One Convention Place Suite 1400 701 Pike Street Seattle, Washington 98101-3927 (206) 292-9988 1375624/030619 1437/8404-0001 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 issues throughout the lifespan of this matter. Nevertheless, Flow has refused to provide this evidence to the Court. It is no secret why Flow is adamant that the Court not have access to its billing records— it would be much harder for Flow to dispute the reasonableness of the fees and costs incurred by Ruiz Fajardo if Flow has to disclose what is likely true—that it incurred significantly more fees and costs. Understandably, Flow has decided not to challenge the hourly rate of Ruiz Fajardo’s attorneys. (Dkt. 91 at 2.) However, Flow is challenging the total hours spent by Ruiz Fajardo’s attorneys on certain tasks. Without any record of how much time Flow’s own attorneys spent on this litigation, however, the Court and Ruiz Fajardo are expected to simply accept Flow’s blanket statements about the unreasonableness of Ruiz Fajardo’s hours. The Court should reject this approach. Flow’s tactics, if endorsed by this Court, will result in a playing field weighted in Flow’s favor. First, it will be impossible to know whether the conclusory statements that Flow has presented to the Court accurately capture the amount of time that its attorneys spent on an issue because the Court will not have access to those records. Second, such an approach allows Flow to single out tasks that Ruiz Fajardo, the party with the burden of proof, would have necessarily spent more time on than Flow—all while excluding the records that would give the Court a full and accurate picture.1 Flow is thus permitted to present unbalanced and self-serving evidence to 1 For example, Flow complains that Ruiz Fajardo spent too long editing the deposition videos that were played for the jury and suggests that Flow could have done it for cheaper. (Dkt. 93 at 9-10.) But Flow does not disclose that it hired an outside company to format the videos on its behalf, how much money Flow spent retaining this outside company, or that it did not offer to share these still full-length videos until less than two weeks before trial, after Ruiz Fajardo had invested significant time and effort into editing the videos that were ultimately relied on by both parties. Less than two weeks before trial Flow had not even begun editing its videos down to the agreed content. Flow does not disclose that it did not want these videos to be used unless Ruiz Fajardo agreed to cover half of the unknown cost (meaning that Ruiz Fajardo would have paid to edit all of the videos and paid Flow to use its version). (J. Nelson Decl.) Flow expects the Court to simply accept its allegation that Ruiz Fajardo spent too much money on this task while providing no evidence whatsoever. Case 2:16-cv-01902-RAJ Document 95 Filed 03/06/19 Page 2 of 12 PLAINTIFF RUIZ FAJARDO’S OPPOSITION TO FLOW’S MOTION TO QUASH AND FOR PROTECTIVE ORDER (2:16-CV-01902-RAJ) - 3 - Betts Patterson Mines One Convention Place Suite 1400 701 Pike Street Seattle, Washington 98101-3927 (206) 292-9988 1375624/030619 1437/8404-0001 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 the Court, with no mechanism for either the Court or Ruiz Fajardo to ensure accuracy or dispute Flow’s evidence. The Court should deny Flow’s motion to quash and for a protective order. II. BACKGROUND Following a jury trial, this Court entered judgment in favor of Ruiz Fajardo for $437,830.00 on February 7, 2019. Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure (“Fed. R. Civ. P.”) 54(d)(2)(B)(i), Ruiz Fajardo had until February 21, 2019 to file its motion for attorneys’ fees and costs. Accordingly, Ruiz Fajardo reached out to Andrew Escobar, Flow’s lead attorney, on the Monday immediately following the entry of judgment. Ruiz Fajardo asked DLA Piper to (1) voluntarily produce all of its billing records in connection with this matter; (2) agree to an extension of time to file the motion for fees and costs if DLA Piper could not produce its records in a timely fashion; or, alternatively, (3) agree not to oppose Ruiz Fajardo’s petition. (James Nelson Declaration (“J. Nelson Decl.”) Ex. 1.) DLA Piper did not respond to Ruiz Fajardo’s request. Given the impending deadline, Ruiz Fajardo formally served DLA Piper with a subpoena for its billing records on February 13, 2019.2 (J. Nelson Decl. Ex. 2.) Ruiz Fajardo gave DLA Piper until February 19 to produce its records, redacted for privilege. (J. Nelson Decl. Ex. 3.) The parties met telephonically two days later and Mr. Escobar confirmed that Flow intended to challenge Ruiz Fajardo’s motion for attorneys’ fees and costs.3 Mr. Escobar also confirmed that Flow was considering both a post- trial motion and an appeal, warning that Flow would seek to recover its attorneys’ fees if it prevails.4 The parties were not able to reach a consensus regarding the need for DLA Piper’s 2 DLA Piper received an electronic version of the subpoena and the requests for production on February 12. (J. Nelson Decl. Ex. 5.) 3 Mr. Escobar stated that Flow may agree that Ruiz Fajardo is entitled to an award of attorneys’ fees and costs amounting to only $20,000. (J. Nelson Decl.) 4 Although the Court may not receive DLA Piper’s billing records before ruling on Ruiz Fajardo’s motion for fees, Ruiz Fajardo anticipates that more fee petitions will follow. Case 2:16-cv-01902-RAJ Document 95 Filed 03/06/19 Page 3 of 12 PLAINTIFF RUIZ FAJARDO’S OPPOSITION TO FLOW’S MOTION TO QUASH AND FOR PROTECTIVE ORDER (2:16-CV-01902-RAJ) - 4 - Betts Patterson Mines One Convention Place Suite 1400 701 Pike Street Seattle, Washington 98101-3927 (206) 292-9988 1375624/030619 1437/8404-0001 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 billing records. On February 18, 2019, DLA Piper formally objected to the subpoena and the request for production. (J. Nelson Decl. Ex. 4.) III. ARGUMENT A. Ruiz Fajardo’s Subpoena and Requests for Production Were Made During the Only Relevant Time Frame and Flow Has Not Established a Basis to Quash. In its motion to quash and for a protective order, Flow spills much ink arguing that Ruiz Fajardo should have requested Flow’s billing records during the pre-trial discovery period or, alternatively, petitioned the Court to reopen discovery before making such a request. But neither method proposed by Flow could have possibly resulted in Ruiz Fajardo obtaining those records. First, DLA Piper’s billing records would not have been relevant during the pre-trial discovery period because Ruiz Fajardo had not yet prevailed in this litigation. Thus, they were not discoverable material. Second, petitioning the Court to reopen discovery would not have led to the timely production of these records because Ruiz Fajardo had only 14 days to file its motion for fees and costs. There was simply no way to reopen discovery and obtain those documents before Ruiz Fajardo’s motion was due.5 Ruiz Fajardo sent its requests for production and subpoena during the only time frame in which such a request could have been made and only after asking that Flow’s counsel produce its records voluntarily. If Flow is correct that these records are not obtainable after the entry of judgment but before the prevailing party’s motion for fees and costs is due to the Court, then such records would never be discoverable. In any event, Flow’s motion entirely fails to establish any basis to quash the subpoena under Rule 45. Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 45(d)(3)(A), a court must quash or modify a subpoena that “(i) fails to allow a reasonable time to comply; (ii) requires a person to comply 5 A party has 30 days to respond to a request for production. Fed. R. Civ. P. 32(b)(2)(A). Thus, even assuming that discovery was somehow reopened immediately following the entry of judgment, Flow would not have produced the requested materials until long after Ruiz Fajardo’s motion was due to the Court. Case 2:16-cv-01902-RAJ Document 95 Filed 03/06/19 Page 4 of 12 PLAINTIFF RUIZ FAJARDO’S OPPOSITION TO FLOW’S MOTION TO QUASH AND FOR PROTECTIVE ORDER (2:16-CV-01902-RAJ) - 5 - Betts Patterson Mines One Convention Place Suite 1400 701 Pike Street Seattle, Washington 98101-3927 (206) 292-9988 1375624/030619 1437/8404-0001 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 beyond the geographical limits specified in Rule 45(c); (iii) requires disclosure of privileged or other protected matter, if no exception or waiver applies; or (iv) subjects a person to undue burden.” A court may quash or modify a subpoena if it requires “(i) disclosing a trade secret or other confidential research, development, or commercial information; or (ii) disclosing an unretained expert’s opinion or information that does not describe specific occurrences in dispute and results from the expert’s study that was not requested by a party.” (Fed. R. Civ. P. 45(d)(3)(B).) The only bases asserted by Flow for quashing the subpoena are that it is unduly burdensome and that it requires the disclosure of privileged matter. As discussed further below, neither is true. The subpoena seeks the exact information that Ruiz Fajardo produced in a matter of hours, redacted for privilege. Flow asserts no other basis for quashing the subpoena under Rule 45 and, accordingly, its motion to quash should be denied. Ruiz Fajardo sent its subpoena during the only time frame that was appropriate, and did so only after requesting that Flow and DLA Piper produce their billing records voluntarily. Accordingly, the Court should deny Flow’s motion to quash. B. Ruiz Fajardo’s Requests for Production and Subpoena Are Appropriate Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Flow argues that Ruiz Fajardo’s requests for production and subpoena are inappropriate under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Specifically, Flow contends that the requests and subpoena are an attempt to execute on the judgment in violation of the automatic stay provision in Rule 62(a). Flow’s argument mischaracterizes the nature of the requests and should be rejected.6 6 Flow’s sudden concern for strictly following the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is surprising given that Flow refused to abide by these rules throughout this litigation. Flow failed to provide its responses to Ruiz Fajardo’s First Interrogatories and Requests for Production on the date they were due (instead providing them months later) and unilaterally canceled all depositions in this matter, refusing to make its representatives available to testify on the date the depositions were noted. (Dkt. 21.) Case 2:16-cv-01902-RAJ Document 95 Filed 03/06/19 Page 5 of 12 PLAINTIFF RUIZ FAJARDO’S OPPOSITION TO FLOW’S MOTION TO QUASH AND FOR PROTECTIVE ORDER (2:16-CV-01902-RAJ) - 6 - Betts Patterson Mines One Convention Place Suite 1400 701 Pike Street Seattle, Washington 98101-3927 (206) 292-9988 1375624/030619 1437/8404-0001 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 Ruiz Fajardo has already obtained one judgment, entered on February 7, 2019 for $437,800.000 (the “Principal Judgment”). Ruiz Fajardo is also entitled to an award of attorneys’ fees and costs, which will eventually result in a second judgment (the “Supplemental Judgment”). Ruiz Fajardo served its subpoena and requests for production pursuant to Rule 69(a), “[i]n aid of the judgment” (not execution), and Rule 34. The requests and subpoena are plainly not contrary to Rule 62(a), which provides that “execution on a judgment and proceedings to enforce it are stayed for 30 days after its entry.” (Fed. R. Civ. P. 62(a) (emphasis added).) Ruiz Fajardo’s requests and subpoena do not execute or enforce either the Principal Judgment or the Supplemental Judgment (which has not yet been entered.) Neither are the requests and subpoena contrary to the purpose of Rule 62(a), which is “to give a party time to prepare for an appeal or to determine what course of action to take, while at the same time prohibiting the victorious party from racing out and executing the judgment on property owned by the loser.” California Bank & Trust, LLC v. Shilo Inn, Moses Lake, Inc., 2015 WL 12867067 (E.D. Wash.); see also Great American Ins. Co. v. Gen. Contractors & Const. Mgmt., Inc., 2008 WL 2940665 (S.D. Florida) (“[t]he purpose of Rule 62(a) is to stay execution of judgment for [14] days to afford litigants an ample period of time to consider whether to appeal, to file a motion for new trial, and/or to seek a stay of execution of judgment.”) (citing McKenzie v. Kennickell, 669 F. Supp. 529 (D.D.C. 1997)). Ruiz Fajardo’s requests and subpoena are not contrary to the purpose or plain language of Rule 62(a). Flow’s objection to Ruiz Fajardo’s alleged failure to serve its subpoena on DLA Piper prior to the pretrial discovery cutoff— a time when such evidence would have been irrelevant—is another example of Flow’s strategy to rely on the Rules only when they best suit Flow’s goals. Case 2:16-cv-01902-RAJ Document 95 Filed 03/06/19 Page 6 of 12 PLAINTIFF RUIZ FAJARDO’S OPPOSITION TO FLOW’S MOTION TO QUASH AND FOR PROTECTIVE ORDER (2:16-CV-01902-RAJ) - 7 - Betts Patterson Mines One Convention Place Suite 1400 701 Pike Street Seattle, Washington 98101-3927 (206) 292-9988 1375624/030619 1437/8404-0001 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 C. Flow’s Billing Records Are the Best Evidence of the Reasonableness of Ruiz Fajardo’s Hours. In preparing its motion for attorneys’ fees and costs, Ruiz Fajardo’s counsel organized, redacted, and removed or discounted time entries from all of its invoices from 2016 through February 2019. Ruiz Fajardo’s counsel spent roughly half of one day producing, redacting, and discounting these billing invoices. Flow’s counsel would have necessarily done the same if Flow had prevailed in this litigation. Nevertheless, Flow now asserts that the production of its billing invoices, redacted for privilege, is “extraordinarily burdensome,” overbroad, and irrelevant. (Dkt. 91 at 6.) Flow goes even further and complains that Ruiz Fajardo is seeking a “second major litigation” by requesting Flow’s billing records. (Id.) In truth, there is nothing burdensome about producing the same sort of billing records that Ruiz Fajardo has produced in support of its motion. DLA Piper had approximately 11 days to produce these records from the time that Ruiz Fajardo first sent its request to Mr. Escobar until the date the motion was due. DLA Piper had six days to produce its records from the time that Ruiz Fajardo’s subpoena was served. Nevertheless, DLA Piper waited until the day before the records were due before responding to the subpoena—and falsely stated that it was given only two days to produce the records from the time that it was served. (J. Nelson Decl. Ex. 2, 4.) There is no reason why DLA Piper could not have produced these records, redacted for privilege, in the time provided. Neither are Ruiz Fajardo’s requests nearly as broad and expansive as Flow makes them out to be. Ruiz Fajardo is simply seeking the billing records related to this matter for attorneys and expert witnesses—the same records that Ruiz Fajardo has produced. Ruiz Fajardo used a variety of terms to describe these records (e.g. “billing worksheet, invoice, draft invoice,” etc.) to avoid ambiguity. Ruiz Fajardo specifically requested that the records be redacted for privilege— Case 2:16-cv-01902-RAJ Document 95 Filed 03/06/19 Page 7 of 12 PLAINTIFF RUIZ FAJARDO’S OPPOSITION TO FLOW’S MOTION TO QUASH AND FOR PROTECTIVE ORDER (2:16-CV-01902-RAJ) - 8 - Betts Patterson Mines One Convention Place Suite 1400 701 Pike Street Seattle, Washington 98101-3927 (206) 292-9988 1375624/030619 1437/8404-0001 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 rendering irrelevant Flow’s assertion that its billing records contain “highly sensitive attorney- client privileged and work product information.” (Dkt. 91 at 6.) The billing records are clearly relevant—especially in light of Flow’s opposition motion to Ruiz Fajardo’s fee petition, in which Flow disputes the reasonableness of the hours spent by Ruiz Fajardo’s attorneys. Flow should not be permitted to dispute the reasonableness of Ruiz Fajardo’s hours while withholding its own billing records, which likely show that the attorneys’ fees and costs incurred by Flow are significantly higher than the fees and costs requested by Ruiz Fajardo. Indeed, “there is one particularly good indicator of how much time is necessary . . . and that is how much time the other side’s lawyer spent.” Democratic Party of Washington State v. Reed, 388 F.3d 1281, 1287 (9th Cir. 2004). While ‘[c]omparison of the hours spent in particular tasks by the attorney for the party seeking fees and by the attorney for the opposing party . . . does not necessarily indicate whether the hours expended by the party seeking fees were excessive’ because numerous factors can cause the prevailing party to have spent more time than the losing party, such a comparison is a useful guide in evaluating the appropriateness of time claimed. If the time claimed by the prevailing party is of a substantially greater magnitude than what the other side spent, that often indicates that too much time is claimed. Litigation has something of the tennis game, something of war, to it; if one side hits the ball, or shoots heavy artillery, the other side necessarily spend time hitting the ball or shooting heavy artillery back.” Id. (footnote omitted) (citing Ferland v. Conrad Corp., 244 F.3d 1145, 1151 (9th Cir. 2001) (emphasis added). Flow recognizes that it cannot reasonably dispute the hours that Ruiz Fajardo’s counsel spent on any particular task without providing the Court with evidence of Flow’s own billing records. (Dkt. 91 at 8.) Nevertheless, that is exactly what Flow has done. (See Dkt. 93.) Flow’s approach is entirely self-serving. First, it is impossible to know whether Flow’s representations regarding the time and money it spent during litigation are accurate because only Flow has access to that information. Second, Flow’s approach does not help the Court determine the reasonableness of the hours spent because plaintiffs are expected to expend more hours on Case 2:16-cv-01902-RAJ Document 95 Filed 03/06/19 Page 8 of 12 PLAINTIFF RUIZ FAJARDO’S OPPOSITION TO FLOW’S MOTION TO QUASH AND FOR PROTECTIVE ORDER (2:16-CV-01902-RAJ) - 9 - Betts Patterson Mines One Convention Place Suite 1400 701 Pike Street Seattle, Washington 98101-3927 (206) 292-9988 1375624/030619 1437/8404-0001 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 certain matters than a defendant would. See Cmty Ass’n for Restoration of the Env’t, Inc. v. Cow Palace, LLC, 2016 WL 3582754 (E.D. Wash.) (“a plaintiff, having to gather and assemble the blocks to build a case, can often reasonably spend more time than a defendant who need only knock down a few blocks to defeat its opponent.”). It would not be appropriate for the Court to consider Flow’s challenges without a full accounting of the hours spent by Flow’s own counsel throughout the duration of this matter. See Miller v. Schmitz, 654 Fed. Appx. 261, 263 (9th Cir. 2016) (Remanding and questioning the district court’s decision to “disregard the billable hours of defense counsel,” while noting that “[a]lthough the district court has discretion not to rely on opposing counsel’s billing records, its rationale for concluding such records had limited relevance here is not persuasive.”) (internal citations omitted).7 Finally, Ruiz Fajardo’s request for Flow’s billing records does not constitute an attempt at a “second major litigation,” as Flow suggests. (Dkt. 91 at 6.) Ruiz Fajardo asked DLA Piper to provide these records voluntarily or, alternatively, to not oppose Ruiz Fajardo’s motion for attorneys’ fees and costs. Ruiz Fajardo served DLA Piper with a subpoena and Flow with requests for production after receiving no response. Mr. Escobar then confirmed that Flow would be opposing Ruiz Fajardo’s motion and refused to provide any billing records. As discussed above, producing its billing records would not be an unduly burdensome task for Flow. Flow undoubtedly spent more time on this motion then it would have producing and redacting its billing records. Flow has fought Ruiz Fajardo at every turn since it first received a demand letter, driving up the cost of litigation as a result. Flow is now responsible for those costs. See Cow Palace, 2016 WL 3582754 at *16 (“As was their right, Defendants fought Plaintiffs at every turn; 7 Flow cites to a hodgepodge of cases from around the country in support of its argument that the billing records of opposing counsel are not relevant. Not a single citation is to a Washington district court or to the Ninth Circuit. Flow’s failure to cite to case authority from this state or circuit likely derives from the fact that both the Ninth Circuit and Washington district courts have held that such evidence is relevant and helpful. See, e.g., Miller, 654 Fed. Appx. at 263 (9th Cir. 2016); Reed, 388 F.3d at 1287 (9th Cir. 2004); Cow Palace, 2016 WL 3582754 (E.D. Wash.). Case 2:16-cv-01902-RAJ Document 95 Filed 03/06/19 Page 9 of 12 PLAINTIFF RUIZ FAJARDO’S OPPOSITION TO FLOW’S MOTION TO QUASH AND FOR PROTECTIVE ORDER (2:16-CV-01902-RAJ) - 10 - Betts Patterson Mines One Convention Place Suite 1400 701 Pike Street Seattle, Washington 98101-3927 (206) 292-9988 1375624/030619 1437/8404-0001 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 however, they cannot now label unreasonable the amount of time Plaintiffs’ counsel expended in order to respond to the vigorous defense put on by Defendants’ counsel.”) (citing Reed, 388 F.3d at 1287). Flow has confirmed that it is considering both post-trial motions and an appeal, meaning that additional motions for attorneys’ fees and costs will likely be filed in the future. Flow’s billing records will thus continue to be a relevant consideration for this Court and for the appellate court. Flow’s billing records are the best evidence available to establish the reasonableness of Ruiz Fajardo’s hours and fees. These records would have been made available to the Court, in full, had Flow prevailed in this litigation. Flow should not be permitted to now withhold this information from the Court and dispute the reasonableness of Ruiz Fajardo’s hours while using hand-picked examples from its own records to support its opposition. Flow’s motion should be denied. IV. CONCLUSION Flow’s billing records are highly relevant in light of its opposition to Ruiz Fajardo’s fee petition. But Flow’s position allows it to attack Ruiz Fajardo’s motion for attorneys’ fees and costs with impunity, requiring the Court and Ruiz Fajardo to trust that Flow’s representation of the case is accurate. Now that Flow has filed its opposition to Ruiz Fajardo’s fee petition, it is clear that Flow has presented a wildly inaccurate picture to the Court, while conveniently withholding its own records. Neither do Flow’s reasons for moving to quash the subpoena hold water. Flow would have produced all of its billing records were it the prevailing party in this litigation, and it likely would have done so without complaining that it was too burdensome to do so. Ruiz Fajardo has produced its billing records, and it did so in a matter of hours—redacted for privilege. There is simply no reason why Flow cannot do the same. The Court should deny Flow’s motion to quash and for a protective order. Case 2:16-cv-01902-RAJ Document 95 Filed 03/06/19 Page 10 of 12 PLAINTIFF RUIZ FAJARDO’S OPPOSITION TO FLOW’S MOTION TO QUASH AND FOR PROTECTIVE ORDER (2:16-CV-01902-RAJ) - 11 - Betts Patterson Mines One Convention Place Suite 1400 701 Pike Street Seattle, Washington 98101-3927 (206) 292-9988 1375624/030619 1437/8404-0001 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 DATED this 6th day of March, 2019. BETTS, PATTERSON & MINES, P.S. By /s James D. Nelson By /s Shaina R. Johnson By /s Jesse L. Taylor James D. Nelson, WSBA #11134 Shaina R. Johnson, WSBA #46079 Jesse L. Taylor, WSBA #51603 Betts, Patterson & Mines, P.S. One Convention Place, Suite 1400 701 Pike Street Seattle WA 98101-3927 Telephone: (206) 292-9988 Facsimile: (206) 343-7053 E-mail: jnelson@bpmlaw.com E-mail: sjohnson@bpmlaw.com E-mail: jtaylor@bpmlaw.com Attorneys for Plaintiff Ruiz Fajardo Case 2:16-cv-01902-RAJ Document 95 Filed 03/06/19 Page 11 of 12 PLAINTIFF RUIZ FAJARDO’S OPPOSITION TO FLOW’S MOTION TO QUASH AND FOR PROTECTIVE ORDER (2:16-CV-01902-RAJ) - 12 - Betts Patterson Mines One Convention Place Suite 1400 701 Pike Street Seattle, Washington 98101-3927 (206) 292-9988 1375624/030619 1437/8404-0001 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I, Karen L. Pritchard, hereby certify that on March 6, 2019, I electronically filed the following: Plaintiff Ruiz Fajardo’s Response to Flow’s Motion to Quash and for Protective Order; and Certificate of Service with the Court using the CM/ECF system which will send notification of such filing to the following: Counsel for Defendant Flow International Corporation Andrew Escobar Jeffrey DeGroot Alexandria Walker DLA Piper LLP 701 Fifth Avenue, Suite 7000 Seattle, WA 98104-7044 DATED this 6th day of March, 2019. BETTS, PATTERSON & MINES P.S. s/ Karen L. Pritchard Karen L. Pritchard, Legal Assistant Case 2:16-cv-01902-RAJ Document 95 Filed 03/06/19 Page 12 of 12