Statement Case Management Conference

Cal. Super. - 6th Dist.November 23, 2020

200V373939 Santa Clara - Civil R. Fleming PATRICK WILLIAM DOYLE, SBN 317791 E'ec"°"'°a"y F"°d 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 PATRICKW DOYLE Atornery at Law by SUPEV'" CW” 0f CA, 522 Utah St., San Francisco, California 941 10 county 0f santa Clara: Phone: 415 926 9885 0n 3/1 7/2022 9:12 PM Email: 1aw@patrickwdoyle.com Reviewed By: R. Fleming . _ Case #20CV373939 Attorney for Plalntlff Envelope: 8539531 CRISTINA GONZALEZ et a1 DANIEL A. MENENDEZ, SBN 260822 LAW OFFICE OF DANIEL A MENENDEZ 1261 Lincoln Avenue, Suite 208 San Jose, CA 95125 Tel.: (408) 479-4969 daniel@siliconvalleylegal.com Attorneys for Defendants LUONG PHAM QUYNH NGUYEN GILROY GAS & MINI-MART, INC. BRIAN S. FONG (SBN 262846) SHEPPARD MULLIN RICHTER & HAMPTON LLP Four Embarcadero Center, 17th Floor San Francisco, CA 941 11 Tel.: (415) 434-9100 bfong@sheppardmullin.com Attorney for Defendants CHEVRON CORPORATION EXTRAMILE CONVENIENCE STORES, LLC SUPERIOR COURT IN THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF SANTA CLARA (UNLIMITED JURISDICTION) CRISTINA GONZALEZ, an individual Case N0. 20CV373939 COMPLEX Plaintiff, JOINT CASE MANAGEMENT VS. CONFERENCE STATEMENT Date: March 24, 2022 LUONG PHAM, an individual; QUYNH Time: 2:30 p.m. NGUYEN, an individual; GILROY GAS & Judge: Hon. Sunil R. Kulkarni MINI-MART, 1NC., a California corporation Dept.: 01 Defendants. Action Filed: November 23, 2020 1 JOINT CASE MANAGEMENT CONFERENCE STATEMENT 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 Plaintiff CRISTINA GONZALEZ (“Plaintiff”); Defendants LUONG PHAM, QUYNH NGUYEN, GILROY GAS & MINI-MART, INC. (collectively “Gilroy Gas Defendants”); and CHEVRON U.S.A., INC. (erroneously sued as CHEVRON CORPORATION), EXTRAMILE CONVENIENCE STORES, LLC (collectively “Chevron Defendants”); by and through their respective counsel, hereby submit the following Joint Case Management Statement in advance of the Case Management Conference (“CMC”) currently set for March 24, 2022. The Gilroy Gas Defendants and Chevron Defendants are collectively referred to herein as “Defendants”. This joint statement is made in accordance With Santa Clara County Superior Court Complex Civil Guidelines, Section VIII(3). A. BRIEF OBJECTIVE SUMMARY OF THE CASE Plaintiff’s Position CRISTINA GONZALEZ was employed at GILROY GAS & MINI-MART, INC. (hereafter GILROY GAS) by LUONG PHAM in approximately July 2005 through the termination of her at Will employment 0n January 14, 2020. Throughout her employment LUONG PHAM solely directed the operations of GILROY GAS. Workers including the plaintiff were expected to eat during their work shift rather than during an uninterrupted meal period off the clock. Similarly, workers were not permitted a ten-minute uninterrupted rest period 0n the clock. Pay periods for workers at GILROY GAS were bimonthly, consisting 0f either fifteen or sixteen days. Each pay period plaintiff received a handwritten pay record that did not list the employer’s name, the employee’s name, the inclusive dates 0f the pay period, 0r the double time rate 0f pay in effect during that pay period. GILROY GAS did not pay time and a half after 40 hours 0f work in a seven-day work week but instead after work exceeding 88 0r 96 hours depending 0n Whether the pay period consisted of fifteen 0r sixteen days respectively and did not pay double time regardless of a worker’s hours during that pay period. In August 2018 plaintiff was ‘promoted’ to a position as a ‘supervisor’ by PHAM and paid a salary Which did not exempt her from overtime protections. She understood her ‘promotion’ to be due t0 her predecessor promoting workers taken ten-minute uninterrupted rest periods so she expressly did not provide opportunities for workers to take an uninterrupted rest period. Plaintiff 2 JOINT CASE MANAGEMENT CONFERENCE STATEMENT 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 completed a work shift schedule for all workers according to a template provided by PHAM that specified each work shift ended eight hours after the shift began rather than after eight and one-half hours t0 accommodate an uninterrupted off the clock meal period. Ms. GONZALEZ notified the California Labor and Workforce Development Agency and GILROY GAS Via certified mail August 10, 2020 pursuant t0 Labor Code §2699.3 (c ) (1) (A). September 11, 2020 GILROY GAS filed 403 documents With the LWDA Which purport t0 cure Violations of Labor Code §226 paragraphs 6 and 8 and also sent 60 documents Via certified mail t0 the plaintiff” s representative. However, §2699 (d) specifies in its second sentence that “a Violation of paragraph (6) or (8) of subdivision (a) 0f Section 226 shall only be considered cured upon a showing that the employer has provided a fully compliant, itemized wage statement to each aggrieved employee for each pay period for the three-year period prior to the date 0f the written notice []’ Which GILROY GAS did not do Via certified mail t0 the plaintiff. Labor Code §2699.3 (c)(2)(A) provides that the employer must cure Within 33 days and that if the employer does not d0 so the employee may commence a civil action pursuant t0 Labor Code §2699. The plaintiff commenced a civil suit pursuant t0 §2699.3 (c ) (2) (A) because the documents GILROY GAS sent Via certified mail did not cure as defined in §2699 (d). GILROY GAS subsequently filed 79 documents February 16, 2022 With the LWDA Which demonstrate the filing made September 11, 2020 did not meet the definition of ‘cured’ When it was made t0 the LWDA. The plaintiff and GILROY GAS do not dispute that the plaintiff was not exempt from overtime in the pay periods she was paid a salary. However, GILROY GAS has not provided evidence 0f the actual hours worked by the plaintiff during those pay periods despite Labor Code §1 174 (d) specifying GILROY GAS retain records of the hours each employee works each work shift for the previous three years so the plaintiff believes GILROY GAS cannot evidence the hours the plaintiff or any other aggrieved worker actually worked because the required records are not retained. GILROY GAS asserts that the electronic point 0f sale system (hereafter EPOS) satisfies Labor Code §1 174 (d) requirements for records of workers hours t0 Which the plaintiff responds that GILROY GAS should provide the records related t0 the hours the plaintiff herself was logged in to the EPOS s0 that she is paid appropriately. 3 JOINT CASE MANAGEMENT CONFERENCE STATEMENT 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 GILROY GAS operates the EPOS system and underground petroleum storage tanks pursuant to an agreement With CHEVRON so that consumers pump gas into vehicles in exchange for funds accounted for through that EPOS. The plaintiff is informed and believes that the EPOS agreement between CHEVRON and GILROY GAS includes the right for CHEVRON t0 audit the business records 0f GILROY GAS because CHEVRON litigated agreements with other parties similarly situated t0 GILROY GAS based on evidence obtained in an audit. Therefore, CHEVRON is liable as a joint employer because they either audited GILROY GAS so that CHEVRON actually knew GILROY GAS did not keep records 0f the hours each worker worked each work shift and acquiesced to the practice by GILROY GAS or failed t0 hinder GILROY GAS from Violating §1 174 (d) with the power t0 do so by conducting an audit. In Martinez v Combs the California Supreme Court considered how the definition 0f employer in the wage order of ‘engage, suffer or permit’ establishes joint liability for a party that either suffers 0r permits the employment 0f any person is thereby liable; the present facts are distinct from the facts in Martinez because the Petroleum Marketing Practices Act 0f 1978 is based 0n an explicit finding by Congress that petroleum distributors like CHEVRON and marketers like EXTRAMILE have greater control over the operations of franchisees than other types 0f franchisors While in Martinez the Court found that grocers did not have sufficient control over farmers t0 be liable to farmworkers for Violations 0f the wage order and Labor Code. Alternately, the definition 0f “employer” in the wage order as “engage or control of wages 0r hours 0r working conditions” is sufficient to find liability for EXTRAMILE based on the agreements between EXTRAMILE and GILROY GAS specifying the rights. In Medina v Equilon Enterprises the fourth district Court 0f Appeal expressly overruled their earlier decision in Curry v Euilon Enterprises t0 hold the petroleum marketer and distributor Shell liable as the employer because the Multi Site Operating Agreement between Shell and its franchisee provided sufficient control over the working conditions 0f that franchisee of Shell. The plaintiff believes that the agreement between EXTRAMILE and GILROY GAS is similar t0 the agreement considered in Medina so EXTRAMILE is liable as the employer t0 aggrieved workers 0n that basis. The facts show that the issues in this case are not ‘small’ other than considering the three 4 JOINT CASE MANAGEMENT CONFERENCE STATEMENT 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 years 0f liability given at least fourteen years and six months GILROY GAS operated in Violation of the wage order and Labor Code . A11 pay records for the three years preceding the notice were not sent Via certified mail to the plaintiff or her representative within 33 days. As a result, each pay record is subject t0 a $250 payment per Violation per paycheck for Violations 0f paragraphs 6, 7, 8 and 9 as well as a payment per PAGA 0f $2500 per employee per Violation. In addition t0 the liability for inaccurate pay records, GILROY GAS denied meal and rest periods t0 each employee each work shift which are compensated With an additional hour 0f pay for each pay record. Moreover, the failure to pay overtime after 40 hours in a seven day work week is a significant issue that should be resolved by records kept t0 comply with Labor Code §1 174 but GILROY GAS does not evidence that in fact they keep these records which is a Violation 0f § 1 175 and a misdemeanor. Defendants’s Position This is a small PAGA case involving less than 10 purportedly aggrieved employees by a former gas station convenience store clerk against her employer. Plaintiff is attempting t0 collect compensatory damages on behalf 0f purportedly aggrieved employees for a variety of alleged Labor Code and IWC Wage Order Violations through her PAGA action as opposed t0 just the penalties prescribed by PAGA. In addition to suing her eX-employer, Plaintiff has named her supervisor (Luong Pham) and an officer 0f her eX-employer (Quynh Nguyen) as parties, as well as Chevron U.S.A., Inc. (erroneously sued as Chevron Corporation) and ExtraMile Convenience Stores, LLC. Plaintiff’s theory of liability as to Ms. Nguyen and the Chevron Defendants appears t0 be those parties had the ability to learn 0f the alleged Violations and their alleged failure t0 investigate or otherwise independently inform themselves 0f the alleged Violations means they are liable under PAGA as either individual or alter ego (Ms. Nguyen) or joint employers (Chevron Defendants). On July 15, 2021, the Court ordered the parties to a Rule 4 neutral evaluation. On February 18, 2022, the parties participated in said neutral evaluation with Stephen M. Vernon. The parties were unable t0 resolve this matter. It is Defendants’s position the Court should take up some dispositive pleadings to narrow the relevant issues in this case before removing its stay 0n discovery. The Chevron Defendants 5 JOINT CASE MANAGEMENT CONFERENCE STATEMENT 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 anticipate filing a demurrer to remove them from this case on the bases that Plaintiff failed t0 exhaust the requisite administrative remedies, her statutes 0f limitations has run making amendment impossible, and that even if Plaintiff could surmount her procedural issues, the Chevron Defendants were not her employers, joint 0r otherwise. The Gilroy Gas Defendants anticipate filing a demurrer 0n behalf 0f Ms. Nguyen, a motion t0 strike 0n behalf 0f Gilroy Gas based 0n Plaintiff‘s failure t0 exhaust requisite administrative remedies and seeking 0f improper remedies, and a cross-claim t0 recover the balance 0f unpaid loans on behalf 0f Gilroy Gas. Defendants believe resolving the issues related to the demurrers and motion t0 strike will aid in efficient disposition 0f this case and/or productive future settlement negotiations. B. SUMMARY OF ANY ORDERS FROM PRIOR CASE MANAGEMENT CONFERENCES AND THE PROGRESS OF THE PARTIES’ COMPLAINCE WITH SAID ORDERS The Court ordered discovery stayed Via its December 8, 2020 Order Deeming Case Complex and Staying Discovery and Responsive Pleadings Deadline. N0 formal discovery has taken place t0 date. On July 15, 2021, the Court ordered the parties to a Rule 4 neutral evaluation. The parties completed the neutral evaluation 0n February 18, 2022 With Stephen M. Vernon but were unsuccessful in reaching resolution of this matter. The Court has made n0 other orders specifically related to this case. C. SIGNIFICANT PROCEDURAL AND PRACTICAL PROBLEMS THAT MAY LIKELY BE ENCOUNTERED Plaintiff’s Position The plaintiff and GILROY GAS have a legal issue regarding the basis aggrieved worker’s receive appropriate pay. The plaintiff relies on the definition 0f ‘cure’ in Labor Code section 1174 (d) as to abate, comply and make Whole as the statutory basis aggrieved workers receive appropriate pay from their employer When the Labor code is violated. GILROY GAS contends that the definition 0f ‘cure’ in the Labor Code is not a basis t0 pay aggrieved workers appropriately. The plaintiff understands GILROY GAS’S position to be recovery 0f appropriate 6 JOINT CASE MANAGEMENT CONFERENCE STATEMENT 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 pay relies 0n either a contract 0r tort damages theory and seeks evidence entitling the plaintiff t0 either a contract 0r tort remedy. The plaintiff believes that a related dispute with GILROY GAS regarding the representative nature 0f a PAGA action has been resolved because GILROY GAS apprehends that a PAGA claim is an administrative action Which is brought by the LWDA 0n the behalf 0f the plaintiff and aggrieved workers rather than the plaintiff‘s personal capacity. However, GILROY GAS can’t reconcile itself t0 a PAGA action being an administrative action when considering the statute itself, rather than a contract 0r tort theory, is the reason workers are paid appropriately according to the wage order and the Labor Code. The parties have a factual dispute regarding the exhaustion 0f administrative remedies prior t0 the plaintiff bringing this action. On September 11, 2021 GILROY GAS filed a document at the LWDA purporting t0 be a ‘cure’ notice but did not provide that complete filing Via certified mail within 33 days of the plaintiff’s notice t0 the plaintiff, as required by Labor Code section 2699.3. Instead, GILROY GAS sent a letter Via certified mail to plaintiff explaining that only documents the plaintiff already had in her possession were provided in response t0 the plaintiff” s notice but the contents 0f the filing with the LWDA. The plaintiff filed suit after not receiving a cure notice that met the requirement in §2699 (d) Which specifies in the second sentence that: “A Violation 0f paragraph (6) or (8) of subdivision (a) 0f Section 226 shall only be considered cured upon a showing that the employer has provided a fully compliant, itemized wage statement t0 each aggrieved employee for each pay period for the three-year period prior t0 the date 0f the written notice sent pursuant t0 paragraph (1) of subdivision (c) of Section 2699.3.” Critically Labor Code §2699.3 (c)(2) (A) states “The employer may cure the alleged Violation within 33 calendar days 0f the postmark date 0f the notice sent by the aggrieved employee or representative. The employer shall give written notice within that period of time by certified mail t0 the aggrieved employee 0r representative and by online filing With the agency if the alleged Violation is cured, including a description of actions taken, and n0 civil action pursuant to Section 2699 may commence. If the alleged Violation is not cured within the 33-day period, the 7 JOINT CASE MANAGEMENT CONFERENCE STATEMENT 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 employee may commence a civil action pursuant to Section 2699.” The word cure is used in §2699.3 as defined in §2699 (d). The second sentence of §2699 (d) specifies that Violations 0f Labor Code §226 paragraphs (6) and (8) shall only be considered cured upon a showing that the employer provided a fully compliant, itemized wage statement t0 each aggrieved employee for each pay period for the three-year period prior t0 the date of the written notice sent by the plaintiff. GILROY GAS plainly did not provide the plaintiff With the filing made to the LWDA Via certified mail and §2699.3 (c)(2)(A) states that if the alleged Violation is not cured Within the 33-day period, the employee may commence a civil action pursuant t0 §2699. The plaintiff never received a notice that evidence a “cure” as defined in §2699 (d) because the plaintiff did not receive fully compliant, itemized wage statements for each pay period for the three-year period prior t0 the plaintiff s written notice. Moreover, 0n February 16, 2022 GILROY GAS made a spontaneous filing of approximately 79 documents that were identified to be related t0 the cure notice GILROY GAS filed September 11, 2020. The filing has no administrative purpose as it is made more than 33 days after the notice it responds to but the late filing tacitly acknowledges that the filing made September 11,2020 did not satisfy the definition of ‘cure’ in Labor Code §2699 (d)’s second sentence so it was appropriate for the plaintiff t0 commence a civil action at the time she did so because more than 33 days passed Without the alleged Violation being cured. The parties have a factual dispute about GILROY GAS complying with Labor Code section 1174, specifically subsection (d) that specifies an employer retain records for three years of the hours each employee worked each day. The plaintiffs apprehension is that GILROY GAS did not utilize features in the EPOS that allowed that system t0 meet the requirements 0f §1174 because she suggested that those features be activated to LUONG PHAM and he expressly did not d0 s0. Now GILROY GAS asserts that they comply with §1 174 based on the EPOS system operating as a time clock although Ms. GONZALEZ sought to implement this feature and PHAM opted not to d0 so. The plaintiff disputes that records kept in the EPOS meet the requirements 0f §1174 because (A) the records are not retained, and (B) the records reflect only the time workers conduct 8 JOINT CASE MANAGEMENT CONFERENCE STATEMENT 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 transactions with customers but not time spent performing other work duties like stocking, cleaning, and any other duties that don’t require the exchange of funds. The parties have a factual dispute regarding Whether aggrieved workers received uninterrupted off the clock meal periods and uninterrupted 0n the clock rest periods. Ms. GONZALEZ in her role as the supervisor was responsible for scheduling all work shifts. Further, she was designated a ‘supervisor’ and paid a salary after another person with that title left the employ 0fGILROY GAS Who was responsible for scheduling workers. Her understanding 0f the reasons for her predecessor’s departure was that person implemented a practice 0f uninterrupted 0n the clock rest periods and so LUONG PHAM fired her predecessor. As a result 0f her predecessor’s firing, Ms. GONZALEZ expressly did not permit workers rest 0r meal periods as specified in the wage order and Labor Code. In support of her personal knowledge, Ms. GONZALEZ evidences exhibits 0f template schedules with work-shifts of eight hours rather than eight and a half which the plaintiff finds raises a rebuttable presumption that workers did not receive an uninterrupted meal period off the clock during their eight-hour shift Chevron Defendants’s Position Plaintiff” s claim for PAGA penalties against the Chevron Defendants fails for multiple reasons, namely that she failed to adequately allege (1) she exhausted her mandatory PAGA administrative remedies as to the Chevron Defendants, and (2) the Chevron Defendants were her employers. Plaintiff’ s failure t0 sufficiently allege these two essential elements are fatal t0 her claims against the Chevron Defendants, and thus the Chevron Defendants are not properly parties to this matter. For the Court’s reference, the Chevron Defendants intend to file a demurrer as set forth summarily below as soon as the stay 0n responsive pleadings are lifted: Plaintiff” s claims against the Chevron Defendants are contingent upon her exhausting her mandatory PAGA administrative remedies. Plaintiff has not and cannot exhaust her administrative remedies, because her time to do so has already elapsed. Plaintiff alleges she was terminated from her employment With defendant Gilroy Gas in January 14, 2020. Plaintiff alleges she exhausted her administrative remedies as t0 Gilroy Gas on August 10, 2020, Plaintiff then brought a PAGA suit against Gilroy Gas and two related individual defendants 0n November 23, 2020. Without 9 JOINT CASE MANAGEMENT CONFERENCE STATEMENT 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 attempting to exhaust her administrative remedies as to Chevron and ExtraMile, Plaintiff filed her verified FAC on July 27, 2021, adding the Chevron Defendants as parties 0n the theory that Chevron and ExtraMile were her joint employers. Plaintiff” s verified FAC does not allege she ever exhausted her administrative remedies as to Chevron and ExtraMile prior to filing the FAC. Nor can she make such an allegation because Plaintiff did not file a relevant LWDA letter as to Chevron and ExtraMile until July 30, 2021, three days after she filed her FAC. Plaintiff cannot cure her failure to exhaust administrative remedies because her statutory deadline to d0 so has passed. Even factoring in the 178 day tolling of the statute of limitations under Emergency Rule 9, Plaintiff had until July 10, 2020 (365 days + 178extra days = 543 days after January 14, 2020) t0 submit the requisite notices as t0 Chevron and ExtraMile. Moreover, Plaintiff has not and cannot allege the most rudimentary element of a PAGA cause of action-that Chevron and/or ExtraMile were her employers. In support of her claims against Chevron and ExtraMile, Plaintiff only alleges each retained a purported right t0 audit their franchisee Gilroy Gas’s business records. Without the existence 0f an employment relationship, Chevron and/or ExtraMile cannot be held responsible for California wage and hour Violations under any theory of liability. Plaintiff” s claim fails because Gilroy Gas, not Chevron and ExtraMile, was her employer. GilroV Gas Defendants’s Position Plaintiff and the Gilroy Gas Defendants have fundamental disagreements over a number 0f legal issues. They include: (1) Whether Plaintiff has standing to recover PAGA penalties for cured Labor Code Violations due a failure to exhaust administrative remedies in disputing a cure, per Labor Code section 2699.3(c)(3) and all other applicable authority; (2) Whether Plaintiff has standing to recover PAGA penalties 0n behalf 0f Gilroy Gas employees for claims where Plaintiff did not notice the LWDA 0r Gilroy Gas 0f Violations relating to those employees, per Khan v. Dunn-Edwards Corp. (2018) 19 Ca1.App.5th 804 and all other applicable authority; 10 JOINT CASE MANAGEMENT CONFERENCE STATEMENT 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 (3) Whether Plaintiff can enforce or otherwise collect penalties related t0 purported Violations 0f the applicable IWC Wage Order through her PAGA action, per Thurman v. Bayshore Transit Management, Inc. (2012) 203 Cal.App.4th 1112 and all other applicable authority; (4) Whether Plaintiff can recover her pled request 0f compensatory damages for Plaintiff and other purportedly aggrieved employees through a PAGA action, per ZB, N.A. v. Superior Court (2019) 8 Cal.5th 175 and all other applicable authority; and (5) Whether Plaintiff” s current operative verified complaint supports the inclusion 0f defendant Quynh Nguyen as a defendant in her action. Counsel for the Gilroy Gas Defendants has attempted to meet and confer with Plaintiff about these issues t0 n0 avail, most recently Via a detailed analysis 0f the applicable authority outlined above 0n March 16, 2022. Plaintiff appears t0 have no interest in good faith attempted resolution 0f these issues. D. SUGGESTIONS FOR EFFICENT MANAGEMENT, INCLUDING A PROPOSED TIMELINE OF KEY EVENTS Plaintiff’s Position The plaintiff prefers that discovery be conducted in phases limited t0 specific forms of evidence. First, interrogatories and requests for admission, including the request for admissions regarding the genuineness 0f the plaintiff” s exhibits, should be exchanged. Second, a phase of discovery limited to documents should be conducted because the plaintiff s specific allegations of of Violations 0f the Labor Code are related t0 records employers are already required to keep per Labor Code §1 174. If the documents are not provided GILROY GAS either needs to specify that documents don’t exist or the basis that the documents are withheld so that the plaintiff can agree or contest that the documents are discoverable through the appropriate motion. Third, after completing discovery 0f documents, testimonial evidence in the form of 11 JOINT CASE MANAGEMENT CONFERENCE STATEMENT 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 depositions could then be conducted. Without documents Ms. GONZALEZ’S personal knowledge is certainly relevant to each cause of action and material facts in dispute. Chevron Defendants’s Position The Chevron Defendants intend t0 file their demurrer outlined above as soon as the Court lifts the stay 0n responsive pleadings. Accordingly Chevron Defendants urge the Court to set a hearing on their demurrer, as well as the pleadings motions proposed by the Gilroy Gas Defendants expeditiously. Gilrov Gas Defendants’s Position The Gilroy Gas Defendants believe that, unless the Court takes the above issues up 0n its own motion, they must demurrer and move t0 strike these issues t0 move forward. The Gilroy Gas Defendants also contemplate possibly filing a sanctions motion under Code 0f Civil Procedure Section 128.7 t0 dispose of these issues and recover fees/costs incurred over frivolous filing 0f components 0f Plaintiffs case. The parties cannot agree over legal issues for which Plaintiff cannot provide any legal support and outright dismisses all contrary authority. It unfortunately appears only the Court can assist in narrowing the relevant issues to facilitate efficient management of this action. Without doing so, the Gilroy Gas Defendants have grave concerns the parties Will be unable t0 set realistic expectations 0f the ultimate remedy available t0 Plaintiff and this may become a fees-driven case Where the bulk 0f time invested by Plaintiff is irrelevant to the action. The Gilroy Gas Defendants are open to an informal discussion with Plaintiff and the Court t0 discuss these issues -akin t0 an informal discovery conference- in an effort to limit time invested by the parties and the Court in litigating these issues. E. ANY OTHER SPECIAL CONSIDERATION TO ASSIST THE COURT IN DETERMINING AN EFFECTIVE CASE MANAGEMENT PLAN Plaintiff’s Position The plaintiff must make a recommendation the LWDA t0 approve an settlement that results from the resolution of the issues in this action. As a result, the plaintiff requires evidence that the Violations in each cause of action are cured - that GILROY GAS abates Violations, is complying With the wage order and the statutes, and that aggrieved workers are made whole. Moreover, the 12 JOINT CASE MANAGEMENT CONFERENCE STATEMENT 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 representations by counsel regarding What documents GILROY GAS filed with the LWDA differing from the documents provided t0 the plaintiff as well as What was actually filed at the agency underscore the need for obj ective evidence that Violations are cured so that this matter can be resolved. Defendants’s Position The Defendants request the Court keep the current discovery stay in place While the parties resolve the issues surrounding demurrer and motions to strike. Opening discovery now would guarantee long battles over the scope and relevance of numerous discovery requests from Plaintiff given Plaintiff s position as t0 what issues are relevant t0 her verified PAGA action. Unless the Court has an informal procedure for resolving these issues it Wishes t0 implement first, Defendants request the Court keep the stay in place and grant leave t0 file a demurrer as t0 Ms. Nguyen, the above-described motions to strike, and a cross-claim against Plaintiff for her unpaid debts. Dated: March 17, 2022 By: Dated: March 17, 2022 By: Dated: March 17, 2022 By: Respectfully submitted, ls/ Patrick William Doyle Patrick William Doyle Attorneys for Plaintiff WM Daniel/A. Mépendez Attorneys forépGilroy GaVs Defendants ls/ Brian S. Fong Brian S. Fong Attorneys for Chevron Defendants 13 JOINT CASE MANAGEMENT CONFERENCE STATEMENT