Opposition ObjectionsCal. Super. - 6th Dist.August 13, 202010 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 200V369368 Santa Clara - Civil LARS T. FULLER (No. 141270) JOYCE K. LAU (N0. 267839) THE FULLER LAW FIRM, P.C. 60 N0. Keeble Ave. San Jose, CA 95 126 Telephone: (408)295-5595 Facsimile: (408) 295-9852 HARRIS L. COHEN (No. 119600) HARRIS L. COHEN, APC 5305 Andasol Avenue Encino, CA 91316 Telephone: (818) 905-5599 Facsimile: (818) 905-5660 Attorneys for Defendant, Milestone Financial, LLC dba MERS Fund I R. Burcia Electronically Filed by Superior Court of CA, County of Santa Clara, on 8/24/2020 2:31 PM Reviewed By: R. Burciaga Case #20CV369368 Envelope: 4815592 SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA FOR THE COUNTY OF SANTA CLARA Rabindra Chakraborty; Ruma Chakraborty, Plaintiffs, V. Mortgage Lender Servicers, Inc., Milestone Financial, LLC; MERS Fund I; and Does 1-10, inclusive, Defendants. CASE N0. 20CV369368 MILESTONE FINANCIAL, LLC’S OPPOSITION TO ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE RE PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION; MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES; DECLARATIONS OF WILLIAM STUART AND HARRIS L. COHEN Date: September 3, 2020 Time: 8:30 am. Dept. 20 Defendant Milestone Financial, LLC dba MERS FUND I, opposes Plaintiffs, Rabindra Chakraborty and Ruma Chakraborty’s, request for a preliminary injunction and responds t0 the Court’s order t0 show cause Why a preliminary injunction should not be issued t0 restrain Milestone, and its employees and agents 0r any other persons acting With it 0r 0n its behalf from record a trustee’s deed upon sale against the real property at 1298 1 MILESTONE’S OPPOSITION TO ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE RE PRELIMINARY INJ U NCTION; MEMO OF P AND A; DECLARATION OF WILLIAM STUART Ja 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 Pumpkin Terrace, Sunnyvale, CA 94087 as follows: I. STATEMENT OF FACTS. 1. Milestone Financial, LLC dba MERS FUND I (“Milestone”) is a lender licensed by the California Department 0f Business Oversight, license number 6ODBO73257 since February 23, 2018. (Exhibit “1”). 2. Plaintiffs, Rabindra Chakraborty and Ruma Chakraborty, formerly owned the real property located at 1298 Pumpkin Terrace, Sunnyvale, CA 94087 (the “Property”). 3. Plaintiffs borrowed $650,000 from Milestone secured by a deed 0f trust recorded With the Santa Clara County Recorder (“SCCR”) 0n December 13, 2018 as instrument number 24081356. (EX. “A” t0 Plaintiffs’ application). 4. After the borrowers defaulted, Milestone recorded a notice 0f default and election t0 sell under deed 0f trust With the SCCR 0n August 8, 2019 as instrument number 24249897. (EX. “B” to Plaintiffs’ application). The default was stated t0 be $29,898.02 as 0fAugust 7, 2019. Plaintiffs acknowledge their financial difficulties. (Rabindra Charobarty Decl. 1] 3, Page 226-8). 5. Borrowers did not cure the $29,898.02 default, 0r any amounts due thereafter, and Milestone recorded a notice 0f trustee’s sale With the SCCR 0n November 12, 2019 as instrument number 24329504. (EX. “C” t0 Plaintiffs’ application). 6. Borrowers had until five (5) days prior t0 the foreclosure sale t0 cure the default Without paying the entire debt. Civil Code §2924c(e). However, they failed t0 d0 so. 7. With the debt not being cured 0r paid off, Milestone’s trustee conducted the 2 MILESTONE’S OPPOSITION TO ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE RE PRELIMINARY INJ U NCTION; MEMO OF P AND A; DECLARATION OF WILLIAM STUART 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 foreclosure sale 0f the Property 0n August 3, 2020. (Tony Cara declaration for Plaintiffs confirms the sale took place 0n August 3, 2020 - Cara. Decl. 1] 6, page 2: 10-12). The Property was purchased by Catamount Properties 20 1 8, LLC (“Catamount”), a third party buyer. Milestone does not own any interest in Catamount 0r have any business relationship With Catamount. Based 0n the secretary 0f State’s records the manager 0r member 0f Catamount is Wedgewood, LLC. (Exhibit “2”). 8. After the trustee’s sale, the trustee’s deed upon sale was recorded With the SCCR 0n August 13, 2020, as instrument number 24574702. (Exhibit “3”). 9. Five days after the TDUS was recorded and was a public record, Plaintiffs and their counsel represented to the Court that it was not recorded and sought the Court’s order t0 prevent the recording 0f a document that had already been recorded. This was a waste ofjudicial time, effort and resources and was frivolous as t0 Milestone, Which has been forced t0 respond. II. AN INJUNCTION MAY NOT BE GRANTED TO CHANGE AN EVENT THAT ALREADY OCCURRED. Here, Plaintiff seeks a preliminary injunction to prevent Milestone from recording the TDUS. The TDUS was recorded 0n August 13, 2020, as instrument number 24574702, but not by Milestone. Therefore, the act at issue before the Court is an act that already occurred. As such, it may not be enjoined prospectively as it was a completed recording prior t0 this TRO motion and order. Further, the Property was sold t0 a third party, Catamount, Which is not even a named party t0 the action. The Court may not enjoin conduct that has already occurred. Davis v. Farmers Ins. 3 MILESTONE’S OPPOSITION TO ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE RE PRELIMINARY INJ U NCTION; MEMO OF P AND A; DECLARATION OF WILLIAM STUART 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 Exchange (2016) 245 Cal. App. 4th 1302, 1326-1327. Therefore, the request for a preliminary injunction should be denied and the temporary restraining order should be dissolved. III. THE LOAN IS NOT A CONSUMER LOAN AND IS NOT SUBJECT TO THE HBOR. The loan was a business purpose loan. Plaintiffs represented this t0 Milestone in writing 0n numerous documents and thus are barred from claiming otherwise by both the doctrine 0f estoppel and by statutory law, based 0n Financial Code §22502. Pursuant t0 Civil Code §2924. 15, the loan is not subj ect t0 the HBOR because it was a business purpose loan. Civil Code §2924.15 provides, “Unless otherwise provided, paragraph (5) 0f subdivision (a) 0f Section 2924 , and Sections 2923.5 , 2923.55 , 2923.6 , 2923.7 , 2924.9, 2924.10, 2924.1 1, and 2924. 18 shall apply only t0 first lien mortgages 0r deeds 0f trust that are secured by owner-occupied residential real property containing no more than four dwelling units. For these purposes, ‘owner-occupied’ means that the property is the principal residence 0f the borrower and is security for a loan made for personal, family, 0r household purposes.” (Emphasis added). Therefore, business/commercial/investment purpose loans are not subj ect t0 the HBOR. Financial Code §22502 provides, “For purposes 0f determining Whether a loan is a commercial loan, the lender may rely 0n any written statement 0f intended purposes signed by the borrower. The statement may be a separate statement signed by the borrower 0r may be contained in a loan application 0r other document signed by the borrower. The lender shall not be required t0 ascertain that the proceeds 0f the loan are used in accordance With the statement 0f 4 MILESTONES OPPOSITION T0 ORDER T0 SHOW CAUSE RE PRELIMINARY INJI JNCTION; MEMO 0F P AND A; DECLARATION 0F WILLIAM STUART 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 intended purposes.” Therefore, in addition t0 estoppels that arise from written representations by the Plaintiffs, they are also statutorily barred from contradicting their written statements made t0 Milestone. This policy is also found in case law. “[I]t is well established that a party Who signs a document is presumed t0 have read it and to understand its contents.” Baker v. Italian Maple Holdings, LLC (2017) 13 Cal. App. 5th 1152, 1162. Promissory estoppel bars Plaintiffs from claiming the loan is subj ect t0 the HBOR as “[u]nder this doctrine a promisor is bound When he should reasonably expect a substantial change 0f position, either by act 0r forbearance, in reliance on his promise, if injustice can be avoided only by its enforcement.” Youngman v. Nevada Irrigation Dist, (1969), 70 Cal. 2d at 240, 249. “‘The Vital principle is that he Who by his language 0r conduct leads another t0 d0 What he would not otherwise have done shall not subj ect such ’99 person t0 loss 0r injury by disappointing the expectations upon Which he acted. Wilson v. Bailey (1937) 8 Cal.2d 416, 423. Here, Plaintiffs executed at least three such documents and Milestone changed its position by making the loan. Plaintiffs executed a promissory note in Which they represented t0 Milestone that: “MAKER REPRESENTS AND WARRANTS THAT THE PROCEEDS OF THE LOAN EVIDENCED BY THIS NOTE(A) ARE STRICTLY FOR BUSINESS, COMMERCIAL, OR INVESTMENT PURPOSES ONLY, AND (B) WILL NOT BE USED PRIMARILY FOR AGRICULTURAL, FARMING, PERSONAL, FAMILY, HOUSEHOLD OR OTHER CONSUMER PURPOSES . . .” (Emphasis in original). Plaintiffs executed an Affidavit Regarding Business/C0mmercial/Investment Loan 5 MILESTONE’S OPPOSITION TO ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE RE PRELIMINARY INJ U NCTION; MEMO OF P AND A; DECLARATION OF WILLIAM STUART 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 Purpose in Which they represented to Milestone that: “1. The Loan shall be secured by that real property commonly known as 1298 Pumpkin Terrace, Sunnyvale, CA 94087, Santa Clara County APNs: 202-44-034 (the “Collateral”) The Collateral is comprised of a Single Family Residential Property which is held for investment purposes and is not currently 0r intended t0 be occupied by Borrower. However, if Borrower previously occupied the Collateral, Borrower warrants and represents t0 Broker and Lender that Borrower has already vacated the Collateral 0f the date first written above, and now uses the Collateral solely and exclusively for business, commercial and/or investment purposes and not for Borrower’s primary residence. 2. The proceeds of the Loan is or shall be for either business, commercial 0r investment purposes;” (Emphasis in original). Plaintiffs executed a Lender-Broker-Borrower Release and Arbitration Agreement in which they represented t0 Milestone that: “7. Borrower warrants and represents t0 Lender and agrees t0 use the Loan proceeds solelv and strictlv for business, commercial 0r investment purposes. Borrower understands that this is a critical representation and that Without this representation Lender would decline to loan funds t0 Borrower. Borrower and Broker understand that Lender does not make consumer residential loans, and is solely willing to loan funds for business/investment purposes by Borrower.” (Emphasis in original). Plaintiffs were operating at daycare business at the Property as “Ruma’s Family Daycare.” (See business search results attached t0 Stuart Declaration - EX. 7). Since the loan was for a business purpose and Milestone was permitted t0 rely 0n 6 MILESTONE’S OPPOSITION TO ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE RE PRELIMINARY INJ U NCTION; MEMO OF P AND A; DECLARATION OF WILLIAM STUART 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 plaintiffs’ numerous written representations, the HBOR does not apply t0 the loan. IV. PLAINTIFFS USED A BRIEF FROM ANOTHER CASE AND ARE ADDRESSING OTHER BANK’S ISSUES, NOT PRIVATE LENDER, MILESTONE. Plaintiffs argue that Milestone, “remains the county’s number one and wealthiest bank by market capitalization.” (Plaintiffs’ brief, Page 825-6). Clearly this is a cut and paste brief from another case as Milestone is not a bank, Milestone is not publicly traded, and Milestone does not have a market capitalization. The Court has also read Plaintiffs’ diatribe about the great recession and government bailout 0f banks that are forcing plaintiffs out 0f the Property. Id. at Page 8: 14-21. Again, this merely shows Plaintiffs are confusing private lender Milestone With giant institutions such as Wells Fargo and Bank 0f America. This cut-and-paste method 0f lawyering should be addressed by the Court. V. PLAINTIFFS’ COUNSEL KNEW THIS FIRM REPRESENTS MILESTONE FROM ANOTHER CASE THEY HAD TOGETHER IN JUNE 2020, BUT DID NOT NOTIFY THIS FIRM OF THE TRO HEARING WHICH WOULD HAVE ELIMINATED THE TRO AND CONTINUED HEARING. Plaintiffs’ counsel and counsel for Milestone had another case Where CDLG, PC represented the plaintiff in that case and Harris Cohen, Esq. represented Milestone. This was as recent as two months ago. (Cohen Decl. Exhibit “8”). Despite this knowledge, CDLG chose not t0 notify counsel for Milestone 0r provide any 0f the temporary restraining order (“TRO”) papers t0 counsel prior to the TRO hearing. This prevented Milestone from informing the Court that a TRO was not proper since the TDUS had already been recorded prior t0 the hearing. 7 MILESTONE’S OPPOSITION TO ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE RE PRELIMINARY INJ U NCTION; MEMO OF P AND A; DECLARATION OF WILLIAM STUART 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 VI. THE SUBMISSION OF DEE WILLIAMS’ DECLARATION GIVES THE IMPROPER APPEARANCE OF AN IMPARTIAL PARTY SEEKING TO VINDICATE RIGHTS. HOWEVER, A REVIEW SHOWS IT IS MERELY A CLIENT REFERRAL SOURCE OPERATED BY PLAINTIFF’S COUNSEL Plaintiffs submitted the declaration 0fDee Williams, Who claims t0 be a representative 0f a non-profit entity named “Alliance 0f Consumer Advocates” (“ACA”) and a non-profit advocate. Ms. Williams’ declaration merely states that she wants t0 help Plaintiff’ s modify their loan. She generally requests that the Court issue the restraining order Without any factual basis. Her declaration does not contain any relevant facts that would support the issuance 0f a temporary restraining order or preliminary injunction. A simple review 0fACA’S website shows that Plaintiff’ s counsel, Peter Nisson, Esq. 0f CDLG, PC, is also the Sr. Director 0f Legal Services for ACA. (Cohen Declaration Exhibit “9”). The Court should not be misguided by this ruse t0 make ACA appear t0 be independent, When it appears t0 just be a funnel 0f cases t0 the lawfirm in this case, CDLG. VI. VII. IF AN INJUNCTION IS GRANTED THE COURT MUST REQUIRE A BOND TO PROTECT DEFENDANT FROM ALL DAMAGES THAT MAY BE SUFFERED WHICH AMOUNT IS AT LEAST $864,000.01. “The conditioning 0f the issuance 0f a preliminary injunction upon the posting 0f an undertaking is statutorily required: “On granting an injunction, the court 0r judge must require an undertaking 0n the part 0f the applicant...” (Code CiV.Proc.,2 § 529, subd. (a); emphasis added.) That duty is mandatory, not discretionary. (Neumann v. Moretti (1905) 8 MILESTONE’S OPPOSITION TO ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE RE PRELIMINARY INJ U NCTION; MEMO OF P AND A; DECLARATION OF WILLIAM STUART 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 146 Cal. 3 1, 33, 79 P. 5 12.) Nothing in the statute conditions the trial court's obligation t0 require such an undertaking upon a request from the parties. T0 the contrary, an injunction does not become effective until an undertaking is required and furnished (Grififin v. Lima (1954) 124 Cal.App.2d 697, 699, 269 P.2d 191), and must be dissolved if an undertaking is not filed Within the time allowed by statute (§ 529, subd. (a)).” Abba Rubber C0. v. Seaquist (1991) 235 Cal. App. 3d 1, 10. “Furthermore, the defendants are entitled, not merely t0 any undertaking, but t0 an undertaking in an amount sufficient to pay the defendants “such damages as [they] may sustain by reason 0f the injunction, if the court finally decides that the applicant was not entitled t0 the injunction.” (§ 529, subd. (a).)” Id. at 11. “The sole limit imposed by the statute is that the harm must have been proximately caused by the wrongfully issued injunction. (§ 529, subd. (a).) Case law adds only the limitation that the damages be reasonably foreseeable. (Rice V. Cook (1891) 92 Cal. 144, 148, 28 P. 219 [not “ ‘remote’ ”]; Handy v. Samaha (1931) 117 Cal.App. 286, 290, 3 P.2d 602 [“ ‘reasonably anticipated’ ”].).” Id. at 14. The amount 0f the bond must also include all attorneys’ fees t0 be incurred by defendant in defending against the main action t0 show the injunction should not have been issued. “If the preliminary injunction is valid and regular 0n its face, requiring the defendant t0 defend against the main action in order t0 demonstrate that the injunction was wrongfully issued, the prevailing defendant may recover that portion 0f his attorney's fees attributable t0 defending against those causes 0f action on which the issuance 0f the preliminary injunction had been based. (Id., at pp. 85- 86, 88-89, 29 Cal.Rptr. 346.).” Id. at 16 citing Russell v. United Pacific Ins. C0. (1963) 214 Cal. App. 2d 78, 85-86, 88-89. Here, the Plaintiffs have sought an injunction based 0n all the claims in the complaint. Thus all attorneys’ fees in the case are required t0 be bonded against. Abba Rubber C0. v. Seaquist (1991) 235 Cal. App. 3d 1, 16. The trial has not been set and it Will likely not occur until mid-2021. There has not been any discovery as the case is only days 01d. Defendants Will take the depositions 0f both Plaintiffs, their broker, and others. At 9 MILESTONE’S OPPOSITION TO ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE RE PRELIMINARY INJ U NCTION; MEMO OF P AND A; DECLARATION OF WILLIAM STUART IQ \Ow‘QQM-bw this time, the total attorneys’ fees through trial are expected t0 be in the range of $35,000 - $50,000 and $15,000 in costs in this action, which sum t0 $65,000. The purchase price at the foreclosure sale was $799,000.01, if this interferes with the sale Milestone Will be out $799,000.01 of the sale price. Thus, at a minimum the bond should be $864,000.01 ($65,000 attomeys’ fees and costs + 799,000.01 sale price). Dated: August ”zi, 2020 Dated: August 24, 2020 The Fuller Lgaw Firm, RC. / 97/; Joyce K Lau, Esq Atto ey fox Defendant M estone Financial LLC dba MERS Fund I By: HarrisL Cohen, AProfM/CorpWW AAAAwflwBy:/ fl HanisL Cohen, Esq. Attorney for Defendant Milestone Financial, LLC dba MERS Fund I 10 MILESTONE’S OPPOSITION TO ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE RE PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION; MEMO OF P m» ' AND A; DECLARATION OF WILLIAM STUART 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 DECLARATION OF WILLIAM STUART I, William R. Stuart, hereby declare and state: I am over the age 0f 18 and have personal knowledge as t0 all facts set forth herein and if called upon t0 testify thereto I could and would competently d0 so. 1. I am the current managing member ofMilestone Financial, LLC (“Milestone”). Milestone is not a bank and is not publicly traded. 2. Milestone is licensed by the California Department 0fBusiness Oversight since February 23, 2018 and holds license number 60DBO-73257. A true and correct copy 0f the DBO website showing Milestone’s active status and license number since February 23, 2018, is attached hereto as Exhibit “1.” Milestone only makes business/commercial/investment purpose loans and does not make consumer loans. Milestone relies 0n the documents provided t0 it by borrowers, such as Rabindra Chakraborty and Ruma Chakraborty and would not make a loan if a borrower sought a consumer loan. 3. Plaintiffs, Rabindra Chakraborty and Ruma Chakraborty, formerly owned the real property located at 1298 Pumpkin Terrace, Sunnyvale, CA 94087 (the “Property”). 4. Plaintiffs borrowed $650,000 from Milestone secured by a deed 0f trust recorded with the Santa Clara County Recorder (“SCCR”) 0n December 13, 2018 as instrument number 24081356. (EX. “A” t0 Plaintiffs’ application). 5. After the borrowers defaulted, Milestone recorded a notice 0f default and election t0 sell under deed 0f trust with the SCCR 0n August 8, 2019 as instrument number 24249897. (EX. “B” to Plaintiffs’ application). The default was stated t0 be $29,898.02 as 0f August 7, 2019. Plaintiffs acknowledge their financial difficulties. 1 1 MILESTONE’S OPPOSITION TO ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE RE PRELIMINARY INJ U NCTION; MEMO OF P AND A; DECLARATION OF WILLIAM STUART 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 6. Borrowers did not cure the $29,898.02 default, 0r any amounts due thereafter, and Milestone recorded a notice 0f trustee’s sale with the SCCR 0n November 12, 2019 as instrument number 24329504. (EX. “C” t0 Plaintiffs’ application). 7. Borrowers had until five (5) days prior t0 the foreclosure sale t0 cure the default without paying the entire debt. However, they failed t0 d0 so. 8. With the debt not being cured 0r paid off, Milestone’s trustee conducted the foreclosure sale 0f the Property 0n August 3, 2020. The Property was purchased by Catamount Properties 2018, LLC (“Catamount”), a third party buyer. Milestone does not own any interest in Catamount 0r have any business relationship with Catamount. Based 0n the secretary 0f State’s records the manager 0r member 0f Catamount is Wedgewood, LLC. A true and correct copy 0f the Secretary 0f State’s website printout for Catamount is attached hereto as Exhibit “2.” 9. After the trustee’s sale, the trustee’s deed upon sale was recorded with the SCCR 0n August 13, 2020, as instrument number 24574702 (the “TDUS”). A true and correct copy 0f the TDUS for the sale 0f the Property is attached hereto as Exhibit “3.” 10. In connection with the loan, Plaintiffs executed an Affidavit Regarding Loan Purpose (“ARLP”) representing t0 Milestone that the loan was a business/commercial/investment purpose loan. A true and correct copy 0f the ARLP for the sale 0f the Property is attached hereto as Exhibit “4.” 11. In connection with the loan, Plaintiffs executed a promissory note. A true and correct copy 0f the promissory note is attached hereto as Exhibit “5.” 12. In connection with the loan, Plaintiffs executed a Lender-Broker-Borrower Release and Arbitration Agreement (the “LBB Agreement”). A true and correct copy 0f the LBB Agreement is attached hereto as Exhibit “6.” 13. Attached hereto as Exhibit “7” is a true and correct copy 0f the former listing of 12 MILESTONE’S OPPOSITION TO ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE RE PRELIMINARY INJ U NCTION; MEMO OF P AND A; DECLARATION OF WILLIAM STUART \DOOQON 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 Ruma’s Family Daycare business that plaintiffs operated at the Property. I visited the Property prior to the loan funding and saw the daycare business that was being operated there. I also saw the daycare business on Friday, February 21, 2020 with Realtor Carleigh Miller Fager. I declare under penalty ofperjury under the laws ofthe State of California that the foregoing is true and correct. Executed at Los Altos, CA. Dated: August 24, 2020 m Wilham R. uart \ 13 MILESTONE’S OPPOSITION TO ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE RE PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION; MEMO OF P AND A; DECLARATION OF WILLIAM STUART 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 DECLARATION OF HARRIS L. COHEN I, Harris L. Cohen, hereby declare and state: I am over the age of 18 and have personal knowledge as t0 all facts set forth herein and if called upon t0 testify thereto I could and would competently do so. 1. I am an attorney for Milestone Financial, LLC (“Milestone”). 2. Ihad another case with Plaintiffs’ counsel, CDLG, PC as recently as June 29, 2020 0n behalf 0f Milestone. Ms. Ruiz who serves the documents for CDLG in this case and that case as well as the head 0f the firm Tony Cara, Esq. and Frank Leone, Esq. know that I represent Milestone. A true and correct copy 0f the email from me t0 the members 0f CDLG, PC in the other case 0n June 29, 2020, is attached hereto as Exhibit “8.” 3. Upon reviewing Dee Williams’ declaration in support of Plaintiffs’ motion I reviewed Alliance 0f Consumer Advocates’ website and discovered that Plaintiffs’ counsel, Peter Nisson, Esq. 0fCDLG, PC is listed 0n the website as the “Sr. Director 0f Legal Services.” A true and correct copy 0f the website printed 0n August 21, 2020, is attached hereto as Exhibit “9.” I declare under penalty 0fperjury under the laws 0f the State 0f California that the foregoing is true and correct. Executed at Encino, CA. Dated: August 24, 2020 Pfiffisfli. Cohen 14 MILESTONE’S OPPOSITION TO ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE RE PRELIMINARY INJU NCTION; MEMO OF P AND A; DECLARATION OF WILLIAM STUART
