Opposition Plaintiff Eddie Prices Opposition To Defendants Motion To Compel Arbitration And Dismiss Or Stay ActionMotionCal. Super. - 2nd Dist.December 10, 2019Electronically FILE DJ B L N Oo 0 9 O N Wn 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 bE; 24 25 26 27 28 y Superior Court of California, County of Los Angeles on 07/22/2020 03:38 PM Sherri R. Carter, Executive Officer/Clerk of Court, by J . Lara,Deputy Cle SEROP AGADZHANY AN (SBN 315066) THE AGADZHANYAN FIRM, P.C. 450 N. Brand Blvd., 6" Floor Glendale, California 91203 Telephone: (213) 295-5555 Facsimile: (323) 297-4811 RODNEY MESRIANI (SBN 184875) BRANDON CHANG (SBN 316197) MESRIANI LAW GROUP A PROFESSIONAL LAW CORPORATION 5723 Melrose Avenue, Los Angeles, CA 90038 Tel: (310) 826-6300 Fax: (310) 820-1258 Attorneys for Plaintiff EDDIE PRICE, SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA FOR THE COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES EDDIE PRICE, an Individual, Plaintiff, V. MILLION AIR NORTH, INC, a California Corporation; EMPLOYERS RESOURCE, a California Corporation; JOMMEL LIMIAC, an Individual; and DOES 1 through 25, Inclusive, Defendants. CASE NO.: 19STCV44360 PLAINTIFF EDDIE PRICE’S OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO COMPEL ARBITRATION AND DISMISS OR STAY ACTION [Filed Concurrently with Declaration of Serop Agadzhanyan; Declaration of Eddie Price] Date: August 4, 2020 Time: 8:30 a.m. Dept: 56 1 == PLAINTIFF EDDIE PRICE’S OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO COMPEL ARBITRATION AND DISMISS OR STAY ACTION B L N Oo 0 9 O N Wn 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 bE; 24 25 26 27 28 TO ALL PARTIES HEREIN AND TO THEIR ATTORNEYS OF RECORD: COMES NOW Plaintiff, EDDIE PRICE, and hereby submits the following Opposition to Defendants’ Motion to Compel Arbitration and to Dismiss or Stay Court Proceedings. This opposition is made and based on the accompanying Memorandum of Points and Authorities, the Declaration of Eddie Price, the pleadings on file with the court, and all other matters that may be presented to the Court at the hearing of this motion. DATED: July 22, 2020 THE AGADZHANYAN FIRM, P.C. By: - SEROP AGADZHANYAN, ESQ. Attorneys for Plaintiff, EDDIE PRICE 2 PLAINTIFF EDDIE PRICE’S OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO COMPEL ARBITRATION AND DISMISS OR STAY ACTION B L N Oo 0 9 O N Wn 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 bE; 24 25 26 27 28 MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES I. INTRODUCTION This is a case about a former employee who brought this action against his former employer, individuals and managing agents of his former employer for damages arising out of his wrongful termination, retaliation, discrimination, violation of meal/rest breaks and other actionable conduct by the Defendants. Defendants’ Motion is an unfortunate example of a heavy-handed attempt to impose an unlawful and unconscionable arbitration agreement on an employee for the sole purpose of discouraging the employee from enforcing his rights and gaining unfair strategic advantage. What is most remarkable is that the Defendants' Motion ignores many legal defects in the agreement and pretends that nothing is wrong. II. STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS Plaintiff, Eddie Mendez was hired at Million Air North, Inc. (“MANI”) on or about December 2005 as an auto detailer/washer. (Price Decl. § 4) Throughout his approximately 13- year employment, Plaintiff performed his duties diligently and responsibly whereas he was promoted to a supervisor. During the course of Plaintiff’s employment, neither Defendant MANI nor Employers Resource (“ER”) provided him with any explanation or guidance regarding Defendant, ER’s Employment Agreement. (Price Decl. § 6- 7) Neither Defendant, MANI nor ER, ever disseminated any handouts informing Plaintiff of what rights he had, or what rights he was giving up by signing the document titled “Employment Agreement (California).” (Price Decl. 9 10) The Employment Agreement which included an arbitration clause at the end of the Employment Agreement in one large paragraph comprised of intricate legal language was presented in a “take-it or leave-it” manner by Defendant, MANTI’s office secretary, Timothy Bird, (Price Decl. § 5) Plaintiff never had the opportunity to review or ask questions regarding the Employment Agreement. (Price Decl. § 7) 1 PLAINTIFF EDDIE PRICE’S OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO COMPEL ARBITRATION AND DISMISS OR STAY ACTION B L N Oo 0 9 O N Wn 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 bE; 24 25 26 27 28 Plaintiff was not provided with a copy of the Employment Agreement nor a copy of any Arbitration rules Plaintiff was to follow. (Price Decl. q 10) Plaintiff was never explained that Civ Code Proc. Section 1280 et seq, incorporated in the arbitration clause within the Employment Agreement requires him to split the arbitration fees should he ever decide to protect his rights against the Defendants. Plaintiff was never explained the process in which to initiate arbitration proceedings or the selection of a retired California Superior Court judge as the arbitration clause necessitates. Plaintiff never new at the time of signing the Employment Agreement that he was giving up his constitutional right to a jury trial because it was never explained to him. (Price Decl. 9 10 Nor was it written anywhere in the Employment Agreement that he is giving up his right to a jury] trial by signing. Plaintiff, having only a high school education, did not (and does not) understand what arbitration was at the time of signing the Employment Agreement nor did he understand any of the legal language that was built-in the arbitration clause. (Price Decl. § 3,6) III. LEGAL STANDARD A. Courts Have Discretion to Invalidate Unconscionable Arbitration Provisions Under Federal and California Law Arbitration agreements are contracts. See Cal. Civ. Proc. Code (“C.C.P.”) § 1281 (“Al written agreement to submit to arbitration an existing controversy or a controversy thereafter arising is valid, enforceable and irrevocable, save upon such grounds as exist for the revocation of any contract.””’) When grounds “exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract,” courts may decline to enforce such agreements. (See Doctor’s Assocs., Inc. v. Casarotto (1996) 517 U.S] 681, 683; Ferguson v. Countrywide Credit Indus., Inc. (9th Cir. 2002) 298 F.3d 778, 782.) Under California law, “[i]f the court as a matter of law finds the contract or any clause of the contract to have been unconscionable at the time it was made the court may refuse to enforce the contract, or it may enforce the remainder of the contract without the unconscionable clause, or it may so limit the application of any unconscionable clause as to avoid any unconscionable result.” C.C.P. § 1670.5(a). Even under federal law, because arbitration agreements under the Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”) are contracts, they are subject to the same defenses as any other contract 2 PLAINTIFF EDDIE PRICE’S OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO COMPEL ARBITRATION AND DISMISS OR STAY ACTION B L N Oo 0 9 O N Wn 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 bE; 24 25 26 27 28 which include fraud, duress, unconscionability, or other general contract law defenses. (See AT&] Mobility LLC v. Concepcion (2011) 131 S.Ct. 1740, 1745-46 (“Concepcion™).) The Concepcion Court simply addressed the narrow issue of whether consumer class action arbitration agreements were valid. In fact, the U.S. Supreme Court in Concepcion stated explicitly] that “[t]he final phrase of § 2 [of the FAA] however, permits arbitration agreements to be declared unenforceable ‘upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract.’ This saving clause permits agreements to arbitrate to be invalidated by ‘generally acceptable contract defenses, such as fraud, duress, or unconscionability.”” (Concepcion, 131 S.Ct. at p. 1746.) IV. ARGUMENT A. The Federal Arbitration Act Does Not Govern The Arbitration Agreement In This] Case The Defendants cite to Circuit City Stores v Adams and Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos Dobson in an attempt to establish that the Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”) governs the arbitration] agreement at hand. Granted, the FAA does apply to employment agreements as explained by the Court in Circuity City, despite the language of the exemption written within the code. However, the interpretation of the language of 9 U.S.C §2 by the Supreme Court in Dobson distinguishes this case from those arbitration agreements that are subject to FAA rules as discussed below. Title 9 of U.S.C §2 provides in pertinent part that “[a] written provision in any . . . contract evidencing a transaction involving commerce to settle by arbitration a controversy thereafter arising out of such contract or transaction . . . shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable[.]” 9 U.S.C §2 (emphasis added). In Terminix v. Dobson, the Supreme Court had the opportunity to interpret this language. In so doing, the Supreme Court adopted a “commerce in fact’ interpretation, holding the “Act’s language as insisting that the ‘transaction’ in fact ‘involve’ interstate commerce. In that case, the transaction in question was between the multistate fumigation company Terminix and the Dobsons, who had inherited a lifetime agreement to 3 PLAINTIFF EDDIE PRICE’S OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO COMPEL ARBITRATION AND DISMISS OR STAY ACTION B L N Oo 0 9 O N Wn 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 bE; 24 25 26 27 28 fumigate their home. Although the contract wholly took place in the state of Alabama, the Court nevertheless found that interstate commerce was a factor in the contract because such a transaction would require Terminix to engage in interstate commerce by purchasing goods out of state in order to keep its end of the bargain. Similar to Dobson, here, the contract was executed within one state, to wit, California. However, unlike the transaction in Dobson, here, the agreement did not in fact involve interstate commerce. Applying the “commerce in fact” interpretation adopted by the Supreme Court, it iS clearly evident that Plaintiff never conducted any transaction that involved “commerce”, as defined by 9 U.S.C §2. Plaintiff’s only duty was to wash and detail cars. Defendant points out the fact that degreasers and soap purchased outside of California allow for the application of the FAA, however, that is a separate transaction independent of the one entered into with Plaintiff. By that logic, if Defendants’ argument is said to be valid, then a janitor who uses a broom purchased by his/her employer from out of state would be said to have engaged in interstate commerce. Such an argument would go beyond what the legislature intended when the FAA was enacted. Accordingly, the contract in the present case does not involve “commerce in fact” and, thus, the FAA does not apply to the arbitration clause. B. The Arbitration Agreement Is Procedurally and Substantively Unconscionable It is well established that an arbitration agreement, like any other contract, is unenforceable where it is unconscionable. (See, e.g. Calif. Code Civil Procedure § 1670.5 (court may refuse to enforce a contract which is unconscionable); Doctor's Associates v. Casarotto, 517 U.S., 681, 687 (1996); Armendariz v. Foundation Health Psychcare Services, Inc., 24 Cal.4th 83 (2000).) Ag with any contract, the unconscionability inquiry requires a court to examine the totality of the agreement’s substantive terms as well as the circumstances of its formation to determine whether the overall bargain was unreasonably one-sided. (OTO, L.L.C. v. Kho, 8 Cal. 5th 111 (2019). ce [Glenerally applicable contract defenses, such as . . . unconscionability, may be applied to 4 PLAINTIFF EDDIE PRICE’S OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO COMPEL ARBITRATION AND DISMISS OR STAY ACTION B L N Oo 0 9 O N Wn 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 bE; 24 25 26 27 28 invalidate arbitration agreements without contravening’ the FAA” or California law. (Pinnacle Museum Tower Assn. v. Pinnacle Market Development (US), LLC (2012) 55 Cal.4th 223, 246. The overarching unconscionability question is whether an agreement is imposed in such an unfair fashion and so unfairly one-sided that it should not be enforced. (OTO, L.L.C., supra at p. 124.) As Defendants correctly point out, the California Supreme Court identified “minimum requirements” for arbitration of claims under the Fair Employment and Housing Act (“FEHA”), Cal. Gov. Code § 12900, et seq., and determined that arbitration agreements must not bg procedurally or substantively unconscionable. The Armendariz Court, in emphasizing its goal to “ensure that such agreements are not used as a means of effectively curtailing an employee’s FEHA rights,” held that: [Ulunconscionability has both a ‘procedural’ and a ‘substantive’ element, the former focusing on ‘oppression’ or ‘surprise’ due to unequal bargaining power, the latter on ‘overly harsh’ or ‘one-sided’ results. The prevailing view is that [procedural and] substantive unconscionability] must both be present in order for a court to exercise its discretion to refuse to enforce a contract or clause under the doctrine of unconscionability, But they need not be present in the same degree. Essentially a sliding scale is invoked which disregards the regularity of the procedural process of the contract formation, that creates the terms, in proportion to the greater harshness or unreasonableness of the substantive terms themselves. In other words, the more substantively oppressive the contract term, the less evidence of procedural unconscionability is required to come to the conclusion that the term is unenforceable, and vice versa. (Armendariz, supra, 24 Cal.4th at p. 114 (citations omitted).) Procedural and substantive unconscionability need not be present in the same degree. (See Mercuro v. Sup.Ct. (Countrywide Secur. Corp.) (2002) 96 Cal. App.4th 167, 174-75 (given employer’s highly oppressive conduct in| obtaining employee’s consent to arbitration agreement, employee was required to make only minimal showing of substantive unconscionability).) Here, there is substantial evidence of both procedural and substantive unconscionability in connection with Defendant’s arbitration provision. I" I" 11 5 PLAINTIFF EDDIE PRICE’S OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO COMPEL ARBITRATION AND DISMISS OR STAY ACTION B L N Oo 0 9 O N Wn 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 bE; 24 25 26 27 28 1. Defendants’ Arbitration Provisions Is Procedurally Unconscionable An analysis of procedural unconscionability “begins with an inquiry into whether the contract is one of adhesion.” (Armendariz, 24 Cal.4th at p. 113.) An adhesive contract is standardized, generally on a preprinted form, and offered by the party with superior bargaining power “on a take-it-or-leave-it basis.” (See Id.) Typically, arbitration contracts imposed as a condition of employment are considered adhesive. (/d. at pp. 114-115.) “The pertinent question, then, is whether circumstances of the contract’s formation created such oppression or surprise that closer scrutiny of its overall fairness is required.” (OTTO, L.L.C., at p. 126 (citation omitted).) “The circumstances relevant to establishing oppression include, but are not limited to (1 the amount of time the party is given to consider the proposed contract; (2) the amount and type of pressure exerted on the party to sign the proposed contract; (3) the length of the proposed contract and the length and complexity of the challenged provision; (4) the education and experience of the party; and (5) whether the party’s review of the proposed contract was aided by an attorney.” (Id. at pp. 126-27, citing Grand Prospect Partners, L.P. v. Ross Dress for Less, Inc. (2015) 232 Cal.App.4th 1332, 1348.) In OTO v. Kho, the Court found the arbitration agreement to be procedurally] unconscionable where the arbitration provision appeared as a dense, single spaced paragraph filled with legalese, a copy was not provided to the employee, and did not explain the process of how to initiate arbitration. In so holding, the court reasoned that the plaintiff was not given adequate time to read over the terms of the agreement, or a reasonable opportunity to seek clarification or legal advice, and that the agreement - in its entirety - was a “paragon of prolixity, only slight more than a page long but written in an extremely small font.” (OTO, L.L.C., supra, at p. 122.) Indeed, the Court found the sentences to be “complex, filled with statutory references and legal jargon” and the agreement (as a whole) difficult for a layperson to comprehend. (/d. at pp. 122-23.) Here, analogous to OTO v. Kho: 1. Plaintiff was asked to sign a document titled “Employment Agreement” which included an arbitration provision, prior to starting employment with Defendants without explanation of its contents in the presence of Defendant, MANI’s office secretary, Timothy Bird. 6 PLAINTIFF EDDIE PRICE’S OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO COMPEL ARBITRATION AND DISMISS OR STAY ACTION B L N Oo 0 9 O N Wn 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 bE; 24 25 26 27 28 2. The Arbitration clause was grafted on the final page of the Employment Agreement as one dense paragraph, printed in small font, filled with complex sentences, statutory references, and legal jargon with the first sentence alone being 13 lines long. 3. Plaintiff was not given a copy of the signed agreement, nor was he given an opportunity to review or understand the fact that he was giving up his right to a jury trial. 5. The Employment Agreement does not explain how to initiate arbitration, nor does if suggest where the information can be found because it does not even identify any commercial providers or whether one even exists. 6. The Employment Agreement mandates that the arbitrator be a “retired California Superior Court Judge” but gives no indication how Plaintiff might find such a person. 7. The arbitration paragraph refers to: the National Labor Relations Act; California Workers” Compensation Act; Employment Development Department Claims; Federal Arbitration Act; California Arbitration Act; California Department of Fair Employment and Housing; U.S, Equal opportunity Commission; and four different sections of California’s Civil Code and Code of Civil Procedure. A layperson, like Plaintiff with only a high school education trying to navigate this block text, printed in tiny font, with intricate legal verbiage would not have an easy journey. Moreover, unlike the arbitration provision in O70 v. Kho, nowhere in the Employment Agreement does it state that Plaintiff is giving up his right to Jury trial by signing the agreement. It is unreasonable to conclude that Plaintiff knew he was giving up his constitutional right to a jury trial and voluntarily agreeing to arbitration instead. Therefore, this Court should find the arbitration agreement to be procedurally unconscionable. 2. The Arbitration Clause Is Substantively Unconscionable Because It Is Overly Harsh and One-Sided Substantive unconscionability examines the fairness of a contract’s terms; that they arg unreasonably favorable to the more powerful party. (See OTO, L.L.C., supra, 8 Cal. 5th 111 at p| 125.) A contract may be substantively unconscionable where the terms are overly harsh, one- sided, unduly oppressive, or the agreement was not within the reasonable expectations of the party. (Armendariz, supra, 24 Cal.4th at p. 114; Stirlen v. Supercuts, Inc. (1997) 51 Cal.App.4th 1519, 7 PLAINTIFF EDDIE PRICE’S OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO COMPEL ARBITRATION AND DISMISS OR STAY ACTION B L N Oo 0 9 O N Wn 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 bE; 24 25 26 27 28 1532; Perdue v. Crocker National Bank (1985) 38 Cal.3d 913, 925). In assessing substantive unconscionability, the “paramount consideration” is mutuality of the obligation to arbitrate, (Nyulassy v. Lockheed Martin Corp. (2004) 120 Cal.App.4th 1267, 1287.) California courts have held arbitration agreements to be illusory where only one partyj retains the unilateral right to modify or terminate the agreement. (Peleg v. Neiman Marcus Group, Inc. (2012) 204 Cal.App.4th 1425, 1449 (holding that “most courts that have considered the issu} have held that, if a party retains the unilateral, unrestricted right to terminate the arbitration agreement, it is illusory™).) Here, three aspects of Defendants arbitration provision are substantively unconscionable, First, the Employment Agreement includes terms that are overly harsh and one-sided as the agreement confers exclusive rights to Defendant, ER, but not to Plaintiff. For example, the arbitration clause provides that “Revisions to the Agreement are not valid unless prepared and agreed to in writing by Employers Resource”, meaning regardless of Plaintiff’s agreement to revisions, as long as Employers Resource prepares and agrees to any revisions, it will be valid. The Employment Agreement does not confer upon Plaintiff the same right to modify or terminate the agreement. With a provision granting Defendant the unilateral and unrestricted right to modify or terminate any part of the agreement, the agreement is not only illusory, but also substantively unconscionable and cannot be enforced. To enforce such an agreement would allow Defendants the superior bargaining power to elect binding arbitration when it is advantageous for Defendant to do so, and to decline from binding arbitration when it is disadvantageous to do so. Therefore, the arbitration agreement is invalid, illusory, substantively unconscionable and cannot be enforced to bind Plaintiff to arbitration. Second, the burden imposed on Plaintiff to pay the arbitration fees and costs render the provision substantively unconscionable. Defendants assert in its moving papers that when an arbitration agreement is silent on whether an employee must incur any additional costs in connection with mandatory arbitration, the agreement implicitly provides that an employee need pay such costs. However, contrary to Defendants assertion, although the allocation of arbitration 8 PLAINTIFF EDDIE PRICE’S OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO COMPEL ARBITRATION AND DISMISS OR STAY ACTION B L N Oo 0 9 O N Wn 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 bE; 24 25 26 27 28 costs is not addressed explicitly, the agreement refers to Code of Civil Procedure section1284.2. Code of Civil Procedure section 1284.2 states a default rule that, unless the agreement specifies otherwise (which in this case it does not), parties to an arbitration will bear their own expenses which goes directly against the exception created in Armendariz, where the court held that “a mandatory arbitration agreement that contains within its scope the arbitration of FEHA claims impliedly obliges the employer to pay all types of costs that are unique to arbitration. (See Armendariz, supra, 24 Cal.4th at p. 113.) In other words, “the employer must bear the arbitration forum costs.” (/d.) Third, the agreement is one sided as it requires Plaintiff to arbitrate all claims against the worksite employer, MANI, but any claims MANI would have against Plaintiff does not necessitate to be arbitrated. It is significant to note part of the first sentence consisting of 13 lines: “Employee agrees that any claims, dispute, and/or controversy . . . that either Employee or Employers Resource . . . may have against the other, or which Employee would have against the Worksite Employer . . . which would otherwise require or allow resort to any court or other governmental dispute resolution forum arising from, related to, or having any contract, statutory, or equitable law, or otherwise, shall be submitted to and determined exclusively by binding arbitration/[.]” The arbitration provision is mutual as to Plaintiff and Employers Resource as the first ling] suggest, however, the mutuality is lacking as to the worksite employer, MANI, and Plaintiff. C. The Arbitration Agreement Is So Permeated With Unconscionability That It Is Unenforceable. Plaintiff submits that the agreement is so permeated with unconscionability that it would be inappropriate to modify it. The Armendariz Court held that the presence of more than one unlawful provision indicates “a systematic effort to impose arbitration on an employee not simply 9 PLAINTIFF EDDIE PRICE’S OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO COMPEL ARBITRATION AND DISMISS OR STAY ACTION B L N Oo 0 9 O N Wn 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 bE; 24 25 26 27 28 as an alternative to litigation, but as an inferior forum that works to the employer's advantage,” and that modification of such an agreement is not appropriate. (Armendariz, supra, 24 Cal.4th at pp. 121-27.) Arbitration agreements that are “permeated” with unconscionability are unenforceable. (Id. at p. 122.) Such agreements may not be cured through reformation. (/d.) Various Court of Appeal decisions, including Armendariz, have held that arbitration agreements containing more than one unlawful provision of importance were permeated by an unlawful purpose and have refused to enforce the agreements. (Adrmendariz, supra, 24 Cal.4th at pp. 125- 27; Ontiveros v. DHL Exp. (USA) Inc. (2008) 164 Cal.App.4th 494, 515.) In the present case, substantive rights of Plaintiff are not at all preserved and, under these agreements, would likely be lost. The number of unconscionable provisions permeating Defendants’ arbitration provision, coupled with the high degree of established procedural and substantive unconscionability, clearly illustrates systematic effort by Defendants to gain an advantage over Plaintiff through an arbitration provision. Accordingly, the arbitration provision is irreparably tainted, cannot be reformed by severing the numerous unconscionable provisions, and is therefore unenforceable. V. CONCLUSION Based on the foregoing, Plaintiff requests that this Court deny Defendants’ Motion to Compel Arbitration and allow this matter to proceed in a Court of law. Dated: July 22, 2020 THE AGADZHANYAN FIRM, P.C. By: iL SEROP AGADZHANYAN, ESQ., Attorney for Plaintiff, EDDIE PRICE 10 PLAINTIFF EDDIE PRICE’S OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO COMPEL ARBITRATION AND DISMISS OR STAY ACTION PROOF OF SERVICE Eddie Price v. Million Air North Inc, et al. CASE NO.: 19STCV44360 I am employed in the County of Los Angeles, State of California. I am over the age of 18 and not a party to the within action. My business address is: 450 North Brand Blvd., 6" Floor, Glendale, California 91203 On DATE: 07/22/2020 I served the forgoing documents described as: PLAINTIFF EDDIE PRICE’S OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO COMPEL ARBITRATION AND DISMISS OR STAY ACTION On the following parties: SENT VIA U.S. FIRST-CLASS MAIL: Attorneys for the Defendant, Million Air North, Inc. Raul E. Zermeno Cristina Medina Fisher & Phillips, LLP 444 South Flower Street, Suite 1500 Los Angeles CA 90071 Tel. 213-330-4500 Fax: 213-330-4501 Emails: rzermeno@fisherphillips.com, cmedina@fisherphillips.com, ebustillos@fisherphillips.com, tle@fisherphillips.com [XXXX] BY MAIL I deposited such envelope in the mail at Glendale, California. The envelope was mailed with postage thereon fully prepaid. [| BY ELECTRONIC MAIL Instead of placing a copy of the document in a sealed envelope, I sent a copy of the above-described document(s) via Electronic mail to each of the individuals set forth above. [I BY FACSIMILE Instead of placing a copy of the document in a sealed envelope, I sent a copy of the above-described document(s) via Facsimile to each of the individuals set forth above, [x] (STATE) I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California that the above is true and correct. DATE: July 22, 2020 Signature: § alm Paulina Contreras Aguirre
