NoticeCal. Super. - 6th Dist.January 8, 201910 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 1QCV340667 Santa Clara - Civil BROWNE GEORGE ROSS LLP Peter Obstler (State Bar N0. 171623) pobstler@bgrfirm.com 101 California Street, Suite 1225 San Francisco, California 941 11 Telephone: (415) 391-7100 Facsimile: (415) 391-7198 BROWNE GEORGE ROSS LLP Pete Wilson (State Bar No. 35742) pwilson@bgrfirm.com Eric M. George (State Bar N0. 166403) egeorge@bgrfim.com Ryan Q. Keech (State Bar No. 280306) rkeech@bgrfirm.com 2121 Avenue of the Stars, Suite 2800 Los Angeles, California 90067 Telephone: (3 10) 274-7100 Facsimile: (310) 275-5697 Attorneys for Plaintiff Prager University Electronically Filed by Superior Court of CA, County of Santa Clara, on 11/14/2019 3:16 PM Reviewed By: R. Walker Case #1 9CV340667 Envelope: 3651960 SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SANTA CLARA PRAGER UNIVERSITY, Plaintiff, VS. GOOGLE LLC, a Delaware limited liability company, YOUTUBE, LLC, a Delaware limited liability company, and DOES 1-25, Defendants. 13724651 Case N0. 19CV340667 Assigned for all purposes t0 Department 1 (Complex Civil Litigation), The Honorable Brian C. Walsh presiding NOTICE OF LODGING COPY OF REPORTER’S TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS (Demurrer) ON OCTOBER 25, 2019 Judge: Hon. Brian C. Walsh presiding Dept: 1 Action Filed: January 8, 2019 Trial Date: None Set NOTICE OF LODGING COPY OF REPORTER’S TRANSCRIPT OF HEARING ON OCTOBER 24, 2019 4; \OOONQUI 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 Plaintiff, Prager University, hereby lodges a copy of the Reporter’s Transcript of Proceedings (Demurrer) heard October 25, 2019, concerning Which matter was taken under submission pending the Court’s receipt 0f the Reporter’s Transcript. DATED: November 14, 2019 BROWNE GEORGE ROSS LLP 1372465.1 Pete Wilson Eric M. George Peter Ob stler Debi Ramos By: Debi Ramos Attorneys for Plaintiff Prager University -2- NOTICE OF LODGING COPY OF REPORTER’S TRANSCRIPT OF HEARING ON OCTOBER 24, 2019 lO ll 12 l3 l4 15 l6 l7 l8 l9 20 21 22 23 24 25 SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SANTA CLARA BEFORE JUDGE BRIAN C. WALSH DEPARTMENT l ---oOo--- PRAGER UNIVERSITY, Plaintiff, vs. No. 19CV340667 GOOGLE LLC et al., Defendants. / REPORTER'S TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS (Demurrer) October 25, 2019 Taken before Kimberley Richardson CSR No. 5915 Pages l- 48 Page l Veritext Legal Solutions 866 299-5 127 KQCD\IO\ lO ll 12 l3 l4 15 l6 l7 l8 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 APPEARANCES OF COUNSEL: For the Plaintiff Prager University: PETER OBSTLER Browne George Ross LLP 101 California Street, Suite 1225 San Francisco, California 94111 415-391-7100 pobstler@bgrfirm.com For the Defendant Google LLC: BRIAN M. WILLEN LAUREN WHITE Wilson Sonsini Goodrich & Rosati 1301 Avenue of the Americas, 40th Floor New York, New York 10019 650-493-9300 bwillen@wsgr.com Page 2 Veritext Legal Solutions 866 299-5 127 10 ll 12 l3 14 15 16 l7 18 l9 20 21 22 23 24 25 P R O C E E D I N G S Friday, October 25, 2019 - 11:00 a.m. ---oOo--- THE BAILIFF: Department l in the Superior Court is now in session. Honorable Brian C. Walsh presiding. Thank you, please be seated. JUDGE WALSH: Thank you. Good morning. Welcome to Department l. I'm Judge Brian Walsh here on the matter of Prager University versus Google. Counsel, please state your appearances. MR. OBSTLER: Good morning, your Honor. Peter Obstler, law firm of Browne George Ross for plaintiff Prager University. JUDGE WALSH: Good morning. MR. WILLEN: Good morning, your Honor. Brian Willem from Wilson Sonsini representing Google and YouTube. MS. WHITE: Good morning, your Honor. Lauren White from Wilson Sonsini also representing Google. JUDGE WALSH: Do you have other counsel with you? MR. OBSTLER: Not today, your Honor. MR. WILLEN: My colleague Dave Kramer is here and Amit Gressel as well. Page 3 Veritext Legal Solutions 866 299-5 127 10 ll 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 JUDGE WALSH: Welcome to all of you. And welcome to those of you in the audience. Before we start, I just want to say I'm a public servant doing public work in a public courtroom, so you're all welcome to be here. I'll describe what we do and how we do it, but we do have some rules. One of those rules I'm going to waive at least for today's proceeding that is our standing rule, there will be no photographs, video recordings or audio recordings taken anywhere in any courthouse facility by any device. Normally if media wants to come in and do recordings, they have to file a request five days ahead of time. We received no request. But for today's purposes, we're talking about free speech. On my own motion, I'm going to waive that rule for just a bit so that I don't get in any trouble with all my colleagues in the building, just for this case this morning. We have another rule, and that one I'm not going to waive, and that says that there can be no expressive activity in the courtroom or around the courthouse, so there will be no demonstrating, protesting, gathering, picketing, parading, distributing of literature. You don't seem like the kind of folks that Page 4 Veritext Legal Solutions 866 299-5 127 10 ll 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 would be doing that anyway, but the point of that rule is we don't want people coming down and picking their favorite side whether it is a civil case like this one or a criminal case and picketing the judge, "Judge, go our way," et cetera. The only people here who can try to tell me which way to go are these fine lawyers at counsel table. Everybody else is asked to listen politely, and hopefully you can understand what we're saying, we say it loud enough and Clear enough. And as I said, other than that, you're welcome to be here and join us in our civil discourse which we call a legal proceeding. So, the court has posted the tentative. It looks like the tentative will speak first. We'll proceed to the tentative. How much time do you think you need, Mr. Obstler? MR. OBSTLER: Your Honor, I think I need somewhere between 2O and 30 minutes, and the reason for that is most of my argument today isn't so much going to be argument. I want to get the court to clarify a few things that I at least had trouble understanding the ruling so I can understand whether or not to say to you give me leave to amend or I need to go on up. Page 5 Veritext Legal Solutions 866 299-5 127 10 ll 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 JUDGE WALSH: That's fine. Keep in mind, though, this isn't my deposition, so I don't have to answer questions, but you can state them, and I'll ponder them and take it under submission and give you an answer by revising the tentative. MR. OBSTLER: Thank you very much. JUDGE WALSH: What do you think you need? MR. WILLEN: Well -- JUDGE WALSH: Well, let me coach the witness here. There is the clock. I would love to stop at noon. If we give Mr. Obstler until about 11:30 or so, and you took 20, and he can take five to ten, and we'd be done. MR. WILLEN: That's perfectly fine. I don't think I'll be longer than lO or 15 minutes. JUDGE WALSH: That's another thing we shouldn't do is speak over each other. With that, let's begin, Mr. Obstler. MR. OBSTLER: Thank you very much, your Honor. And I really do appreciate the opportunity to argue this motion here today. I know you worked very hard on the tentative. It's very thorough, and there are some very important issues here. With that said, I just want to make sure that I understand the court's ruling regarding the scope of the Page 6 Veritext Legal Solutions 866 299-5 127 10 ll 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 CDA as it relates to the claims. And I'm referring the court to page 13. The court consequently finds in section 230 CB -- and that's important -- 230 C2B bars Prager's claims related to restricted mode and 230 Cl bars all of it's claims with the possible exception of those based on its own promises and representations. So do you see where I'm going here? I'm trying to make sure I understand the scope of the CDA ruling because I think I need to start what that because I think your Honor correctly ruled that if the CDA does apply the Pruneyard analysis is essentially irrelevant because under the supremacy clause -- right? -- it wouldn't matter; right? It would be barred under that. So do I have that? In other words, my question is I'm really arguing 230 C2B here as to the restricted mode of claims in the Pruneyard claims, and the other thing is I guess I'm arguing the issue about whether I've stated the claim irrespective of the immunity with respect to the misrepresentations and promises. Is that a fair assessment? JUDGE WALSH: Well, I think that's a fair read, but I'm not -- MR. OBSTLER: I don't want to take you all over the place, Judge. Page 7 Veritext Legal Solutions 866 299-5 127 10 ll 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 JUDGE WALSH: Take me where you want to take me. It's your argument. MR. OBSTLER: Let's start with the CDA, then. I think the court's ruling on the CDA is extraordinarily broad, and I think it suggests that Section 230 does not question the service provider's motive, I think that's what the court is saying, in deciding to remove the content from its service. And, I guess, your Honor, what I would say to that is I don't think that's what we're alleging. And I don't think we are alleging that they cannot use restricted mode. That restricted mode doesn't serve a purpose or even that the objective types of information is banned under the restricted mode or prompt. I think what we're arguing is and what I think we've alleged, and I have all the paragraphs because there is about 3O of them, is that they're not looking at the content. In other words, in order to filter and determine Whether something's objectionable, you have to look at the content. What we're arguing is that the algorithm in some of the manual review processes is only looking at the identity of the speaker or the viewpoint, and, therefore, I don't think the immunity was intended to Page 8 Veritext Legal Solutions 866 299-5 127 10 ll 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 apply if the person doing the filtering isn't really looking at the content where that is not the major motivator of whether or not something is otherwise objectionable. What they're looking at is the identity and viewpoint of my client. So Dennis Prager or in the case of the LGBTQ case that just got filed, they said in a recorded call Google has a policy we don't subject to gay people. Period, full stop. So they're looking at, again, whether the person is gay, whether the person is conservative, whether he is a liberal, whether he is white. We have some African-Americans who have contacted us, and that is what we're getting at. If we yet to discover we believe the algorithm will show that an important factor in the determination of whether or not we get restricted or whether or not they sell you advertisement or whether or not any policy that they have that is content based is not looking at the actual content. It's looking at the Viewpoint and the identity. And because they have expressly promised not just in their contracts but to Congress and to more recently that they interpret their own contracts as being viewpoint neutral -- this is their admissions, not Page 9 Veritext Legal Solutions 866 299-5 127 10 ll 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 mine -- that they are viewpoint neutral, looking at a person's identity, race, ethnicity, religion, political viewpoint, not the content, is not only a breach of that expressed representation but is not covered by this immunity. I don't think Congress intended to allow somebody to effectively go out there and say, "You know what? Dennis Prager wants to put a YouTube video up that says 'I like the New York Mets.'" Well, that's objectionable. Why? Because it's Dennis Prager, not because there's anything in the content. And an example of this, which is not in this case, but I could replead it if you would give me lead, is in the LGBTQ case where we put out -- our Clients put out a video about tea work, the LGBTQ community and what teas are really good and relaxing. That Video was restricted. They have to be looking at the identity. They have to be looking at the tag of the creator. And so my question is does the CDA in terms of this ruling, does the CDA protect somebody from filtering devices that don't look at the content. And even Kaperski in the cases that have cited to Kaperski have said that that is not the case. Page lO Veritext Legal Solutions 866 299-5 127 10 ll 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 In other words, I think the best case for that that I saw is -- yeah, is the Sherman case, Sherman versus Yahoo, 997 SF 2nd 1129, and I am quoting from 1138, accordingly, the court concludes that Good Samaritan and Apple and YouTube did not engage in any form of content analysis of the subject text to identify that this material was offensive or harmful prior to the automatic staying. It's the same issue in Kaperski because remember the issue that got waived, and your Honor correctly pointed that out in the ruling. In the ruling you quote Kaperski as saying the issue of whether or not the actual content was objective was waived. It was never decided. All we're saying is we provided a chart to you, and what we're saying if you look at those videos, there is one on the Ten Commandments. There is a Video in there that was been restricted on the Ten Commandments. Really, that's objective, offensive, lewd, lascivious? No, they're looking at the fact that Dennis Prager put it up. And I really want to emphasis two things, Judge, in saying this. I love YouTube. I think YouTube has a tremendously difficult job on its hands. I think Page 11 Veritext Legal Solutions 866 299-5 127 10 ll 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 it is a wonderful product that has done amazing things for the world, and I believe that they have an absolute right to be able to restrict content and to filter content. And even I think they actually have a right -- we could fight about if you get a First Amendment analysis whether it's protected or not, but I'm not making the argument that this is protected speech or not protected speech in the First Amendment context. In other words, I'm not making the argument that anything goes on the platform. Okay? I'm arguing that when you make the determination you can't consider the viewpoint where the identity of the person, absent some sort of the equivalent of a vexatious litigant standpoint, I mean, an Alex Jones who is consistently bugging YouTube with bad stuff, then maybe they can do that. But that's not my client. That is not this case. That is not a class action. Those videos are clean. They are quality content. And to call them a lewd, lascivious or whatever is absurd. And if the immunity stretches that far, if the court thinks that the immunity stretches that far, then so be it. We have to go up on that issue. But I don't read this as being a filtering Page 12 Veritext Legal Solutions 866 299-5 127 10 ll 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 immunity to provide for viewpoint or identity censorship. It has to be based on the actual content of the video. We may disagree if that's the case about whether or not it's objectionable and they're going to argue -- I argue that it is good faith standard. They are going to argue, no, they're not. It is a subjective term, your Honor, I think there is a good faith standard. Okay, this issue I'm raising is a predicate to that. Which is even if there is no good faith standard, do you get to do it on viewpoint and do you get to do it on identity? So that's point one. Point two is it appears to me that the issue of whether it's a C-l immunity or a C-2 immunity, and your Honor, to be fair, I have struggled with this. Courts have struggled With this. Sometimes courts apply C-l to everything -- JUDGE WALSH: You feel my pain. MR. OBSTLER: Yes, totally. And believe me, I'm sure you saw it in my briefing, too, and their briefing. We're all trying to struggle to figure out where this goes. But I do think there is a predicate rule, and I take your Honor's point that in Roommates there was Page l3 Veritext Legal Solutions 866 299-5 127 10 ll 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 actually a person viewing -- the person putting the content on was breaking the rule, and here we're arguing that they're filtering. Your Honor makes that distinction. But remember, your Honor, they're content producers here, too. They've got a lot of their own content on it, and they do not -- our allegations are they do not subject their content to the same restrictions and the same rules and the same scrutiny that they subject my client's content to, and that's a breach of a concept that the rules apply "equally to all." And what I'm contending here is that we are going to allow content-based regulation to become a substitution for anticompetitive conduct. We all know that after 2016 what generally happened was the platforms under pressure admittedly began to move away from a hosting model to an actual content-producing model. So they do both now. Facebook in particular more than Google, but we've seen this, but Google has -- and they have a right to do this -- a lot of preferred content. They've got YouTube TV. They've got all sorts of things out there that you have to go through the fundamental core YouTube the interface to access. Page 14 Veritext Legal Solutions 866 299-5 127 10 ll 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 And so what could happen and what we've alleged has happened, and I think I can get to some discovery on this, is if they're using that content-based criteria to apply not equally to all but for them to pick winners and losers so that they could profit, that's an anticompetitive use of viewpoint filter, and that is what we've alleged. And if -- I know I'm big on the algorithm, but we have other evidence of this. But I think discovery will allow me to show that that's happening, and, your Honor, and I think Mr. Willem would agree with me on this, if I find that that is clean, I will dismiss my lawsuit immediately. But I don't take their word for it when they tell you they're viewpoint neutral, and I have the evidence to prove it because I showed you the chart of the videos that are in restricted mode from my client and the same videos or Videos that are far worse that are not in restricted mode including people like Bill Maher who I adore. He's one of my favorite people, but YouTube has an exclusive deal with him. Only l percent of his stuff is in there, and you've heard his language. My clients are doing videos on the Ten Commandments. And having Alan Dershowitz in a tie and a Page 15 Veritext Legal Solutions 866 299-5 127 10 ll 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 jacket talking about the Baker case that went before the Supreme Court, that video got restricted. So my only point is if the scope of the immunity is broad enough to immunize them from viewpoint and identity-based restrictions, I concede I lose this case. But if it's not, I think I get discovery, or your Honor should tell me what I'm missing in the pleadings because I will put it in there, especially after my further investigation with the LGBTQ case and some of the investigations we're not doing with the African-American community. So that's my piece on the CDA. I'm going to go to Pruneyard next, your Honor, and there I do -- oh, yeah, I'm going to go to Pruneyard next. And, again, we don't decide Pruneyard if the CDA bars it. However, I know your Honor disagrees With me on this, but this is a really important issue in talking to a lot of legal scholars about it. If the CDA gets applied in the manner that they're urging in this case, I do think there is a issue about prior restrained speech because I think that the statute -- and we know that already provisions of the CDA have been struck for being a prior restrainer of speech in the criminal Page l6 Veritext Legal Solutions 866 299-5 127 10 ll 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 context, and that would be Reno versus ACLU. And that was the case with the criminal divisions of the CDA were struck out of course because they were state action there because it's a criminal statute. But, the right to petition to protect injury to otherwise protected speech is a First Amendment issue, and I think I've got state action if you're using a Congressional statute here. And I admit this is an extremely complicated issue, and we're going to flesh out more in another lawsuit, that has not been fleshed out as well as I would like to with your Honor. JUDGE WALSH: And you'll get some help from the 9th Circuit. MR. OBSTLER: Absolutely, and that's where I'm going next. We're going to be getting some help from the 9th Circuit on the issue of state action on the federal claim. And, your Honor -- JUDGE WALSH: Any sense of the timing on that? MR. OBSTLER: No. But I'm going to be candid with you, your Honor. I will be shocked if I win that. I really think I'm going to lose. JUDGE WALSH: I won't tell. MR. OBSTLER: Don't tell. Page 17 Veritext Legal Solutions 866 299-5 127 10 ll 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 But, what they did say and what they are concerned about is they clearly thought their algorithm swept too broadly. You can watch the argument on YouTube. It was restricted, but they unrestricted the argument. I greatly appreciate that. JUDGE WALSH: It was on YouTube? MR. OBSTLER: It was on YouTube. But they took the restriction off. The first week it was restricted, and then they took the restriction off. I'm glad. Maybe they made a mistake. I don't know, maybe the 9th Circuit thought it was inappropriate. But my point being on that state action issue is that state action is different than the issue of what is and is not protected speech. And this is something that I have been speaking about and arguing With a lot of people for because I think it's a really crucial point here. The issue of whether something is protected or not protected under the First Amendment may be very different on the Internet than it is in the town park, but that is a different issue of whether a speech would otherwise be protected than whether the person doing the restricting is a state actor. Here where the harm and the injury, whether it Page l8 Veritext Legal Solutions 866 299-5 127 10 ll 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 be UCL or whatever, is to speech, I believe that an order that restrains us on terms like otherwise objectionable, offensive, et cetera, that language in the CDA as applied in this case, particularly if it's applied, particularly if it's applied would ban a person based on their viewpoint or their identity rather than their speech is going to run into problems with the First Amendment, and I'm certainly going to continue to make that argument. I understand your Honor's point here, I think, wait a minute, if there is no state action how can it be a prior restrainer of speech? Well, because there is state action when you're using an immunity statute to do that, and there was a series of Supreme Court cases, and we're getting to reelect, Moose Lodge and some other cases that looked at immunity statutes that suggest that where the immunity statute is immunized and otherwise constitutional violations, that in of itself can make -- invoke the immunity of state act. I need to look at those more carefully. They are going to be pled carefully in the LGBTQ case, and I realize that I don't have that before your Honor, and so that's -- I do that at my peril here, but I really believe this prior restraining issue is important. Page l9 Veritext Legal Solutions 866 299-5 127 10 ll 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 And I think Senator Cruz, and this is really important, if you saw the video of the testimony that Juniper Downes gave to the senate committee on this issue of neutrality, CDA and First Amendment, three things were said. First of all, under oath they admitted that YouTube was a public forum. Okay. Judge Koh said, well, she didn't understand the legal terms or something like that. I'm not -- I don't know. But I think that's a factual dispute about what that admission under oath means. But the second thing she said, which was really important, was that they were viewpoint neutral, and they knew that they needed to be viewpoint neutral in order to get the protections of the CDA, and that is implicit and actually said by Judge Kozinski with emphasis that the tools need to be neutral. Nobody is saying they don't have a right if they're using neutral tools that are fair and even to make a subjective aspect of that, but, again, I come back to my point. You don't look at the content, or you're at least including issues of identity and viewpoint in making that decision. That taints the immunity, and it taints the right to be able to do that Page 20 Veritext Legal Solutions 866 299-5 127 10 ll 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 because it has nothing to do with your purpose of protecting people from speech. You simply are discriminating against people. Now, as to the Pruneyard case, we argued in Marsh in the federal case -- that it was Marsh. They are cutting back Marsh. Obviously after I briefed the issue and when I argued, in between that the Supreme Court came out with Halleck, and Halleck clearly narrowed Marsh substantially. And I'm getting -- I'm going to get to the California state action which I know is different. And what's funny because Judge Bidey's reaction to that was, "Well, come on, Mr. Obstler, why do you need to do a state action claim here? You have a slam dunk breach of contract point. They contracted to abide by the First Amendment," et cetera, and then I said to them, "Well, you know, I'm going into State Court, and they're going to argue that they're immune from that," and that's when the discussion in the court got to be -- and I asked Mr. Willem this, "You're telling us there's a wrong here, but there's not a remedy." Now, your Honor may have a different view whether there is a wrong here, but that's what Judge Bidey and Judge McKeown was concerned about was where's Page 21 Veritext Legal Solutions 866 299-5 127 10 ll 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 the remedy here if you did sweep too broad? And with Pruneyard, and I raised Pruneyard with them. They said, "No, that's California law." We agree that Pruneyard did not eliminate the state action requirement. It simply has a different state action requirement, has a broader state action requirement. And we all agree, I think, that Pruneyard doesn't necessarily even mean that the First Amendment is broader. It just means the people that can be sued on the First Amendment may be larger than people that can be sued under the federal First Amendment, liberty of speech. With that said, I read your Honor's ruling on Pruneyard as not saying that the core platform is not a public forum but that what we've alleged is that restricted mode is not a public forum, and that is a platform. That is not our allegation. Restricted mode is a filtering tool. The platform where they remove things from the core platform is -- is restricted mode. It is a filtering tool. They admit it. That's what they say in their briefs. That's what we've said. I don't think there is a whole lot of dispute. Page 22 Veritext Legal Solutions 866 299-5 127 10 ll 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 So your Honor says in your ruling on Pruneyard that somehow restricted mode is a selective platform at page 7. That seems to be the basis. Restricted mode and YouTube's advertising are new inherently selected platform that do not resemble a traditional public forum. I agree with you. But my point is that's because there are filtering restrictions on a public forum that is not consistent with the public forum, so it is no different than if there is a park out there, and I say everybody with such and such has got to go stand in that corner. That's a restriction. That's -- and it may be a legitimate restriction. It may be a legitimate time, manner and place restriction. It may be a legitimate content-based restriction, but it's not a platform. It's a restriction. And then the question is is the restriction compliant With the rules that govern regulation of speech in a public forum. So if your Honor believes -- and I think your Honor is saying -- this is the question I have -- that the court order in the public forum under Pruneyard I think I definitely pled enough because your Honor is making a factual finding that the restricted mode is, in Page 23 Veritext Legal Solutions 866 299-5 127 10 ll 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 fact, a platform. We didn't allege it was a platform. We allege it was a filtering tool. They say it's a filtering tool. That's a factual finding. We could come back to your Honor in three months, and you can say, "You know, I looked at this discovery, Mr. Obstler, and I was right from the get-go," but at least I get to do the discovery. I mean, I have yet to get an ounce of discovery in this case, and it's a really important case to find out what's going on, what they do consider this to be, and this brings me back to their terms of service because your Honor said very correctly "Well, they reserve the right to do everything basically; right? It's just one of those things." But, Judge, I lost, and I may have been before you but I know I was before Judge Koh five cases defending the banks on that exact claim that there was -- you can get a mortgage. You can get a mortgage in a rate, and we came in and we said, "Yeah, but the contract says we're able to do anything we want at any time," and this was the classic unfettered discretion provision that conflicts with the other provisions. So your Honor may be asking me, "Well, Mr. Obstler, what other provisions are there?" Page 24 Veritext Legal Solutions 866 299-5 127 10 ll 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 Well, the most important provision is that they incorporate by reference expressly into their terms of service all of their community guidelines and all of their statements, so that's in the terms of service. So merely having a statement we reserve to do anything we want, you have to resolve that ambiguity with the other promises they've made and whether they are exercising that discretion fairly. And if I'm missing something there, your Honor, I'm happy to plead it. I mean, when I talk to Judge Koh, she made the decision that there was nothing that I could do based on her two rules. It can't be state action as a matter of law no matter what you plead, number one. I don't care what you plead. And, number two, that it was puffery, the statements they were making in the mission statement were puffery as a pure matter of law. So I don't have anything else, okay, but I'll tell you the 9th Circuit was very, very interested in whether she made that ruling. They didn't see that, and I said, yes, they did make that ruling as a matter of law because they thought I had waived by not agreeing to amend my complaints. I said, "How can I amend my complaint on Lanner, your Honor, when, you know, everything I say is Page 25 Veritext Legal Solutions 866 299-5 127 10 ll 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 as a matter of law puffery," and Judge McKeown actually asked me "Where did she say that?" And we pointed that out in the statement. But my point on Pruneyard is -- is that they're not selected platforms. They're not selected platforms. They are filtering tools. So if your Honor finds that under Pruneyard -- let's me get to discovery -- that under Pruneyard under the four factors the core platform is, in fact, the public forum, and this is a restricting tool. However we can fight about whether it complies or it doesn't comply or whether it's voluntary or it's not voluntary, but clearly it has to comply with strict scrutiny because it's a content-based regulation. And even if it didn't comply with strict scrutiny, I don't -- even if it were rational basis scrutiny, even if it was non public forum or a limited public forum, for example, you still can't discriminate based on viewpoint of identity. You have to prove to the court that you're looking at the content, and you have some compelling interest for taking that content down. You can't just say "Dennis Prager, get out of here." That's what's going on here on a massive level. Page 26 Veritext Legal Solutions 866 299-5 127 10 ll 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 And because of the narrative which is a fair narrative about of the attack of the Russian bots and all the people interviewed and all the hate speech that appears on my client that they don't regulate. In the LGBTQ complaint, my clients have to turn their comment sections off because they are getting so much hate speech that they are not regulated. And why are they not regulated? I think it's because they monetize it. So putting that aside, they defended Mr. Prowler when he went after somebody and said he had a First Amendment right. Well, if there Prowler has a First Amendment right to troll people and go after people on YouTube, how come my client's videos are being taken down for talking about the Ten Commandments? Lastly, I do have an issue with the finding on the UCL claim because I think there is an issue of fact here that is driving the UCL decision, and I may be wrong, but your Honor has concluded that there is no causation, and this would be on page l4. You acknowledge that lost income reduced viewership and damaged the brand, reputation and goodwill would certainly satisfy the requirements if there were "A causal connection between Prager's alleged Page 27 Veritext Legal Solutions 866 299-5 127 10 ll 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 reliance on defendant's statement in participating in the YouTube service and these harms. "However, these injuries could not have resulted from Prager's decision to use YouTube. They could only have been caused by YouTube's later decisions to restrict and demonetize Prager content." So if you sign up with me for a wine club, and I sell you Napa wine, and the first four shipments are Napa wine, and then after that the shipments start coming in with wine from Paso Robles. I think you've got a Claim. I think you have a claim. There is causation here. It is not about us being -- we don't even have to show reliance. It is not about us reliance. The reliance is you said you were viewpoint neutral. You said you didn't look at identity, and you're taking us down and causing us harm as a result of that. We can have a fight in discovery about this. This may be a legitimate defense after we get through discovery, but I think I'm entitled to prove causation. I mean, I can't believe I'm getting taken out as a matter of law in causation. So with that, your Honor, I'll accede the rest of my time. I see my time is also up. I really appreciate the opportunity to be heard. Thank you. Page 28 Veritext Legal Solutions 866 299-5 127 10 ll 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 JUDGE WALSH: Thank you, Mr. Obstler. Why don't we take a pause and go off the record. Mr. Obstler really worked the court reporter hard. (Discussion held off the record.) MR. WILLEN: Thank you, your Honor. I will try not to exhaust the court reporter nearly so much. So it probably won't surprise you to hear that we think the court got pretty much every issue spot on in the tentative ruling. And I think the tentative shows the degree of thoughtfulness and care in grappling with the issues here that we are hard-pressed to improve on. Let me just walk through the main issues here and try to respond as I go to some of the things that Mr. Obstler said. So let me start with Section 230. He seems to ask that the court recognize that this is a straightforward case under the long line of decisions, many of which cited by the court in the tentative from both the California state courts and the federal courts applying section 230 C-l to claims that are essentially identical to the claims here. So the court referenced the Seeks For Justice case, the King versus Facebook case, the Britain versus Twitter case. Page 29 Veritext Legal Solutions 866 299-5 127 10 ll 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 In addition, there are two recent decisions which we discussed in our papers both from the state courts, from the San Francisco Superior Court, the Taylor versus Twitter case and the Murphy versus Twitter case, both of which involved essentially identical claims, actually, in some ways stronger claims where Twitter terminated users' accounts, again, the accounts of conservative speakers, and Twitter was accused of engaging in similar forms of anti-conservative bias in terminating those accounts, and the courts in both of those cases concluded with the straightforward that 230 C-l analysis that the statute bars all the claims including claims for breach of contract, claims for promissory estoppel, claims under the California Constitution, claims under the Unfair Competition Law, et cetera. So I think as the court recognized, those decisions are sound. Those decisions reflect the correct interpretation of the statute and legally no basis for treating this case any different. It follows directly from the way that the California Supreme Court has articulated section 230 C-l in Hassell versus Bird to say that the statute bars claims that seek to hold a service provider liable for the exercise of traditional publisher editorial actions Page 3O Veritext Legal Solutions 866 299-5 127 10 ll 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 including the decision to withdraw content. So that's Section 230 Cl. As the court recognized, there is not any sort of good faith limitation in that provision, and that again is consistent with lots of case law. With respect to the neutrality argument, I think the argument that we heard rests on just a misreading of Judge Kozinski's decision in Roommates. It's true that neutral tools are protected. The use of neutral tools doesn't make you a content developer. That's what Roommates says. It doesn't follow from that and Roommates doesn't say that that means you have to be a neutral public forum or you have to be viewpoint neutral or anything else in order to get the benefits of Section 230 protection. And, of course, all the cases go the other way. You have many cases including Seeks For Justice which allege discrimination claims, claims of unfair treatment in one form or another, and the courts have been consistent in saying that Section 230 bars those claims. So there is not any sort of viewpoint neutrality requirement that's built into the immunity as it's been developed and applied in other cases. So that's on Section 230 C-l. With respect to Section 230 C-2 B, we think Page 31 Veritext Legal Solutions 866 299-5 127 10 ll 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 this is a case that, again, as recognized in the tentative falls within the heartland of what congress was trying to protect when it enacted Section 230 C-2 B. The whole purpose of that provision was to create room for platforms to help their users protect themselves against content that might be considered objectionable. The idea of that statute was to provide a protection for the kinds of filtering and content moderation tools that could be given to users or activated by users that would allow platforms and users to set their own standards for what's appropriate and what's not appropriate, what they want to see and what they don't want to see. And as the court recognized, that provision, too, deliberately does not have a good faith limitation. So I think we are really squarely within the heart of what congress intended to protect. With respect to the claim that somehow the decisions here were not based on content, I know primarily we're here on a demurrer. There is also, of course, a preliminary injunction, and there is a record on the preliminary injunction. You can look at paragraph -- I believe it's paragraph 44 of the declaration that we submitted that says very clearly Page 32 Veritext Legal Solutions 866 299-5 127 10 ll 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 that all the decisions here were based on the content of the videos. There is no basis for disputing that. So the idea that if we got into discovery somehow we would be faced with a case where decisions were being made simply on the basis of the viewpoint and our identity of the speaker is not -- just flatly contradicted by the record that actually is in front of the court. And, frankly, based on just the allegations in the complaint, what is undisputed is that fewer than the 25 percent of the Prager videos actually he's even been excluded from the restricted mode. So the idea that somehow this was based on Mr. Prager's identity or the viewpoint that he's expressing has nothing to do with the specific contents of the videos is directly contrary to the facts and completely inconsistent with what I think is undisputed which is that only a small percentage of even Prager reviewed videos were excluded from restricted mode. JUDGE WALSH: This is a demurrer, so I don't want to get too much into the facts. I thought the mass was more like 80 out of 250. MR. OBSTLER: I don't mean to interrupt, but I think the court found it was about the equivalent of what their overall thing about 75 million views a day or Page 33 Veritext Legal Solutions 866 299-5 127 10 ll 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 something like that or -- MR. WILLEN: Yeah, just to cite the actual statistics from the declaration, it's 142 out of 619 which is 22.9 percent. JUDGE WALSH: Okay. MR. WILLEN: But the point is even the allegations in the complaint make it Clear that it's nothing like all or half. It's a minority of the Prager reviewed videos that were even made unavailable in restricted mode. And so I think that's just obviously inconsistent with any notion that this is being done based on identity or viewpoint and having nothing to do with the actual content of the videos. Now, I don't think as the court recognized in its interpretation of the statute that matters for purposes of applying Section 230 C-l or Section 230 C-2 B, but I don't want to let that allegation go without some clarification. So with respect to the question of whether somehow Section 230 is a prior restrained or unconstitutional, and again, the court I think correctly rejected that argument. And with respect to the reference to the Reno decision, yes, there were provisions of the Page 34 Veritext Legal Solutions 866 299-5 127 10 ll 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 Communications Decency Act that did violate the First Amendment and were struck down. Those were provisions in which the government was directly regulating and criminalizing speech on the Internet. The whole purpose of Section 230 was to adopt a completely different approach to get the government out of the business of directly regulating or requiring the removal of speech. Section 230 is a protection for private activity. It is designed to reinforce and protect that the private -- actually First Amendment protected editorial judgments that online platforms make, so the whole purpose of the provision was to create space for self-regulation that wouldn't implicate the First Amendment in the way that the government coming in and directly requiring the removal of speech would. So the idea that that somehow operates as a prior restraint is -- just I think misses the point of the statute. It's also inconsistent with law. We cited the Third Circuit's decision in Green versus AOL which expressly rejected the same argument that we've heard here and said that Section 230 doesn't require the removal of content. It simply allows private parties to set their own standards of decency. Page 35 Veritext Legal Solutions 866 299-5 127 10 ll 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 So I don't think there's a serious argument that applying the statute is -- either creates state action or creates a basis for invalidating YouTube decisions on First Amendment grounds, and, of course, there is not even a First Amendment claim in this case. So I think that's sufficient to deal with the immunities. I do want to talk a little bit about the claims because Mr. Obstler did as well. So I think in terms of the liberty of speech clause argument, again, I think the court got it right, and I'm not sure that -- I may have misunderstood Mr. Obstler's interpretation of the court's ruling, but as I understood what the court said, and I agree with this, it is not the question of whether restricted mode is a -- quote, unquote -- platform or a tool that matters. The point is that restricted mode is not a public forum. Restricted mode is not a portion of YouTube service in which it is meant to be open and nonexclusive. The court recognized correctly that the whole point of restricted mode is to create a limited, sheltered, protected portion of the service where people that wanted to opt in to a limited experience wanted to be able to protect themselves or their children or their family members from content that may be overly mature or Page 36 Veritext Legal Solutions 866 299-5 127 10 ll 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 shocking or violate their sensibility in some way could do that and feel comforted and safe being able to turn on that portion of YouTube. So it's completely opt in, and it's completely optional, and I think it's exactly right. We actually don't need to get into the question of whether the main broader YouTube service is a public forum under Pruneyard. We think it's not. But this case doesn't involve the removal of content from YouTube. It involves the exclusion of videos from this narrowed and sheltered portion of the service. So that's the California Constitution. Let me just say briefly with respect to the implied covenant claim, because that was raised as well, that this case I think is very much on all fours with the Sweet versus Google case in which essentially the same theory that by that case demonetizing Videos violated the implied covenant. That case rightly recognizes that YouTube, Google have clear expressed contractual rights to take the action that they did. And unless the application of those provisions renders the contract illusory and unenforceable the implied covenant just doesn't apply, and as the court recognized that's exactly what we have Page 37 Veritext Legal Solutions 866 299-5 127 10 ll 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 here. We have a fully enforceable contract notwithstanding the provisions that are at issue. So I can stop there unless the court has any particular questions or things that you would like me to address that Mr. Obstler said. JUDGE WALSH: I'll leave Mr. Obstler some more time, so I don't want to take it up for him. Why don't you proceed. MR. OBSTLER: Thank you, your Honor. So just to be clear, as I understand Mr. Willem, he's saying it doesn't matter -- he's saying it does not matter whether or not they're doing the censorship based on viewpoint and identity. Regardless of what the facts show on that, it wouldn't matter. That's point one. I will submit to this court this will be the first court in the country to ever hold that the CDA protects this type of discrimination. All the cases that they cite are cases where the actionable content there was no claim that the content wasn't being looked at. Here we are alleging that even if they are looking at the content, what drives the decision is the viewpoint and identity. That's number one. And it doesn't matter under the First Amendment Page 38 Veritext Legal Solutions 866 299-5 127 10 ll 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 for any of these claims whether it's one video or 25 million videos, a hundred percent or 25 percent because they are doing what Mr. Willem says they're not, and this is a factual dispute. They are removing the video from the platform for everybody who has that mode. They don't even know the video exists. And he says they're protecting people. I'm telling that there are more videos that are not in that mode that those people are going to get who have that mode that are far more dangerous to those people than that of my Client. So they are not doing what he says they're doing. They're not doing this to protect people. If they were doing this to protect people you wouldn't see how to punch a Nazi in unrestricted mode. You have to look at the videos, Judge. We put a chart. He said there is no evidence. There is a chart of over 6O videos comparing that to other things. That is evidence. That is disparate evidence, disparate impact evidence of why it is they are taking that video down, and I'm alleging, and we have evidence including engineers who have spoken to us, that it's because of the viewpoint and the identity. I don't think that that is protected by the CDA regardless of good faith or all of these other technical Page 39 Veritext Legal Solutions 866 299-5 127 10 ll 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 issues. That's the allegation. And I don't think it matters whether it is 25 percent of the videos. The mere fact that it is only 25 percent of Dennis Prager's videos, it's only 1 percent of Bill Maher. No percent of other things. And as I told you, the LGBTQ community put a video out about tea that is restricted. How are you protecting people with that when you're letting all of this other junk not be restricted. I mean, if they are overly broad in restricted mode, I would say, "Well, okay, maybe you're right." Look at all the junk that's out there that isn't restricted. My clients are getting hate speech 24/7, and their CEO says they have a First Amendment right to do it, and that's on tape by the way. Lastly, on the Pruneyard doctrine, a filtering tool can't be a forum. We've alleged what the forum is. If they want to dispute that that's not the forum, they can dispute that that's not the forum. But we are alleging that that -- that restricted mode is not a forum at all. It is a filtering mode that somebody can turn on. And what we're also alleging is the people that turn that mode on don't know. They don't know that Page 4O Veritext Legal Solutions 866 299-5 127 10 ll 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 they're making their decisions made on viewpoint identity, and they don't even know that my client's videos exist. They don't even know they exist, so I don't know how they would whitewash them if they don't even know they exist. It's not like this video has been restricted, and if you want to get it off, you can do this. It doesn't exist to those people. They don't know that it's out there. I really think there were some really serious factual issues here. Mr. Willem and I disagree on them. Mr. Willem may be right, and I may be right. But until we see that algorithm, until we see what's really going on, and, Judge, if there is any doubt, and I'm not saying this is in the record right now, but if there is any doubt, I would be happy to amend this complaint. If you think there are issues that would change this result that I could plead, I promise you I would look at them in good faith and tell you whether I can do it. And there is an advantage to that because the LGBTQ is going to be heard soon by a Federal Court, and that is going to push the limit on the CDA, and that is a federal question of law. So no matter what your Honor rules here, if that court rules differently in that case, we're going Page 41 Veritext Legal Solutions 866 299-5 127 10 ll 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 to be back here. So if you can give me the opportunity to amend the complaint if you think there are factual issues that are missing here, I would like that opportunity. I will not take -- I will not advantage of it. I think I've pled these things, but to the extent that there is any doubt, I will put them in neon and make them blink. But, if we're going to hold as a matter of law that it doesn't matter, then I submit I cannot win this case, and we need to go up on appeal to deal with the issue of whether the CDA actually immunizes them from viewpoint and identity. I can't beat that. But I do think I've got a lot of factual issues. And one of the beauties of -- the last thing I want to say about Pruneyard, and I've got to say people think Pruneyard is expansive. I think Pruneyard would solve the problem With the Internet if the federal courts adopted it because there are very clear rules about what is and is not protected, and it would allow people to look at protected speech in the context of the Internet which is what we're going to have to do anyway because if congress does try to pass laws to regulate that speech, then it will be a private state. Then we'll have all sorts of litigation about regulations of Congress regulating speech because they are the only Page 42 Veritext Legal Solutions 866 299-5 127 10 ll 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 industry in the world whose sole business model is to monetize free speech. And I think it's a great thing, but it creates all sorts of interesting intersections with the First Amendment in this country. We don't have this problem in Europe. Why? Because in Europe they actually have hate speech laws. They don't have a First Amendment. But, again, the facts of this case are the 20 or 30 videos you have before your Honor, and I would just ask you take a peek at them and say "Really? This is restricted mode?" Because that's how I came along. And with that, your Honor, I'm prepared to submit. MR. WILLEN: Can I just respond very quickly to one of the things that Mr. Obstler said? JUDGE WALSH: Quickly but slowly. MR. WILLEN: Sure. I just wanted to point the court to Exhibit E of the Trevary declaration which is the declaration that the plaintiffs submitted in this case, and this is the evidence that comes from them. To the point that somehow users don't know the videos have been restricted and are not told that if they want to see them they can disable restricted mode, this is the screenshot that they put in that shows what Page 43 Veritext Legal Solutions 866 299-5 127 10 ll 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 happens when you navigate while you're in restricted mode to a video that's been restricted, and what I said is this video is unavailable with restricted mode enabled. To view this video, you will need to disable restricted mode. So YouTube does exactly the thing that Mr. Obstler said it does not do. Again, I don't think it matters for the purposes of this decision, but I don't want to let the record go uncorrected. MR. OBSTLER: Your Honor, that's a good point but we have evidence that some of the restricted mode videos that we confirmed were restricted mode were actually blank. JUDGE WALSH: Disappeared? MR. OBSTLER: Yes, just didn't show up. We can fight about that, but at the end of the day let's assume that that's even correct. Let's assume that that's correct. The point is people that turn on restricted mode are turning it on exactly for what Mr. Willem says because they don't want all the trash that's potentially out there; right? What I'm saying is even if -- even if -- and I totally agree with that, all we're saying don't make that decision which the person isn't making. The person Page 44 Veritext Legal Solutions 866 299-5 127 10 ll 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 in restricted mode is not making that -- it would be different if the thing said when the video came up "This video,‘ the name of this video comes up, "This video contains stuff. If you don't want to watch it." Then the person is doing it himself. I know a company that is actually coming out with an algorithm that is going to let you do your own user filter. But they are making the decision -- and they admitted in articles to this court and to everybody that they have swept it so broadly in the August 17th -- 2017 admissions of Susan Waniki about wiping out with restricted mode so much of the LGBTQ content that that had to change. They thought they changed it. They didn't change it. I told you about the tea video. So we can argue about the level of harm and whether it does, but I'm in a First Amendment world here where even if it is not First Amendment claim the courts have said that even restrain on speech even for 30 second in the most minimal way is an irreparable injury and an irreparable harm. So if all we're fighting about is how bad this is, I'm happy to work with them to make it better. But if we're arguing about we have an absolute right to do this to people, then it's a legal issue, and then, you Page 45 Veritext Legal Solutions 866 299-5 127 10 ll 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 know, we've got to get it resolved. JUDGE WALSH: Okay. Is the matter submitted? MR. OBSTLER: Thank you, your Honor. MR. WILLEN: Thank, your Honor. JUDGE WALSH: Thank you both. Excellent argument. I have trouble with excellent arguments. They cause me to think about and work harder, but I'm happy to do that. The court will take the matter under submission and will request -- Counsel, I assume you're going to order a transcript? MR. OBSTLER: Yes. MR. WILLEN: Yes. JUDGE WALSH: You will provide the court with one. MR. WILLEN: Of course. JUDGE WALSH: And we had a case management conference set for today. We'll just continue that. If the court sticks With the tentative, we won't need one. If the court grants leave or something else, then we can put in the order what our plans are with that. All right? Let me say tell the audience thank you so much for being here. Thank you for interest in our justice system, and thank you for supporting my optimism about Page 46 Veritext Legal Solutions 866 299-5 127 10 ll 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 how civil civil people can be. But you're about to leave, so don't forget those rules are going to come back on you once you are out the door on this case today no recording, photograph in the courthouse without permission, and no expression or demonstration even out in the plaza or in the courthouse area. Okay? It's been great to have you here. You're been perfectly appropriate. I appreciate that. The court will be in recess. Have a great weekend. (Whereupon, the hearing was concluded at 11:58 a.m.) Page 47 Veritext Legal Solutions 866 299-5 127 10 ll 12 13 14 15 l6 l7 l8 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 REPORTER'S CERTIFICATE I, KIMBERLEY RICHARDSON, a Shorthand Reporter, State of California, do hereby certify: That said hearing was taken before me at said time and place, and was taken down in shorthand by me, a Certified Shorthand Reporter of the State of California, and was thereafter transcribed into typewriting, and that the foregoing transcript constitutes a full, true and correct report of said proceedings that took place; IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunder subscribed in my hand this 30th day of October 2019. KIMBERLEY RICHARDSON, CSR NO. 5915 State of California Page 48 Veritext Legal Solutions 866 299-5 127 [& - answer] & 250 33:22 & 2:10 2nd 11:3 1 3 1 124,25 324,9 30 5:208:1743:10 13:15,17 15:21 45319 29221301222 30th 48313 31:24 34:17 40:4 4 10 6:15 40th 2:10 10019 2:11 415-391-7100 2:5 101 2:4 44 32:24 1129 11:3 4s 1:25 1138 11:4 5 11:00 3:2 11:30 6:11 5915 12148.18 1225 2:4 6 13 7:2 60 39:18 1301 2:10 619 34:3 14 27:21 650-493-9300 2:11 142 34:3 7 1459 48:17 7 23:3 15 6‘15 75 33:25 17th 45:11 19cv340667 1:8 8 2 80 33:22 2 13:1531:2532:3 9 34:17 94111 2:4 20 5:206:1243:9 997 11:3 2016 14:16 2017 45:11 2019 1:18 3:2 48:13 22.9 34:4 230 7:3,4,5,16 8:5 29:16,21 30:11,22 31:2,15,20,24,25 32:3 34:17,17,21 35:5,9,23 24/7 40:14 25 121832233211 39:1,2 40:2,3 9th 17:14,17 18:11 25:19 a a.m. 3:247:12 abide 21:16 able 12:3 20:25 24:21 36:24 37:2 absent 12:13 absolute 12:2 45:24 absolutely 17:15 absurd 12:21 accede 28:23 access 14:25 accounts 30:7,7,10 accused 30:8 acknowledge 27:22 aclu 17:1 act 19:2035zl action 12:19 17:3 17:7,17 18:13,14 19:11,13 21:12,15 22:5,6,6 25:13 36:3 37:22 actionable 38:19 actions 30:25 activated 32:11 activity 4:21 35:10 actor 18:24 actual 9:2011213 13:2 14:18 34:2 34:14 addition 30:1 address 38:5 admission 20:12 admissions 9:25 45:12 admit 17:9 22:23 admitted 20:6 45:10 admittedly 14:17 adopt 35:5 adopted 42:18 adore 15:20 advantage 41:20 42:5 advertisement 9:18 advertising 23:4 african 9:13 16:12 agree 15:1222:4,8 23:7 36:13 44:24 agreeing 25:22 ahead 4:12 a1 1:9 alan 15:25 alex 12:15 algorithm 8:22 9:15 15:8 18:2 41:13 45:7 allegation 22:19 34:18 40:1 allegations 14:7 33:9 34:7 allege 2422,231218 alleged 8:16 15:1,7 22:16 27:25 40:18 alleging 8:10,11 38:22 39:21 40:21 40:24 allow 10:6 14:14 15:10 32:11 42:19 allows 35:24 amazing 12:1 ambiguity 25:6 amend 5:25 25:23 25:24 41:16 42:2 amendment 12:6 12:9 17:6 18:20 19:8 20:4 21:17 22:9,11,12 27:12 27:13 35:2,11,15 36:4,5 38:25 40:15 43:5,8 45:17,18 american 16:12 americans 9:13 americas 2:10 amit 3:25 analysis 7:12 11:6 12:7 30:12 answer 623,5 Veritext Legal Solutions 866 299-5 127 Page 1 [anti - cda] anti 30:9 anticompetitive 14:15 15:6 anyway 5:1 42:21 aol 35:21 appeal 42:10 appearances 2:1 3:11 appears 13:14 27:3 apple 11:5 application 37:22 applied 16:21 19:4 19:5,531223 apply 7:129:1 13:17 14:11 15:4 37:24 applying 29:21 34:17 36:2 appreciate 6:20 18:6 28:25 47:9 approach 35:6 appropriate 32:12 32:13 47:9 area 47:7 argue 6:2013:6,6 13272121945216 argued 21:4,8 arguing 7216,18 8215,22 12:11 14:2 18:17 45:24 argument 521,22 asked 5:821:21 26:2 asking 24:24 aspect 20:21 assessment 7:21 assume 44:17,18 46:10 attack 27:2 audience 4:2 46:23 audio 4:9 august 45:11 automatic 11:8 avenue 2:10 b b 31:25 32:3 34:18 back 20:2221z6 2425,12 42:1 47:3 bad 12:1645:22 bailiff 3:4 baker 16:1 ban 19:5 banks 24:18 banned 8:14 barred 7:14 bars 7:4,5 16:17 30:12,23 31:20 based 7:6 9:19 13:2 14:14 15:3 16:5 19:6 23:16 25:12 26:14,19 28:21 32:24 believes 23:21 benefits 31:15 best 11:1 better 45:23 bgrfirm.c0m 2:5 bias 30:9 bidey 21:25 bidey's 21:13 big 15:8 bill 15:1940:5 bird 30:23 bit 42163627 blank 44:14 blink 42:7 bots 27:2 brand 27:23 breach 10:3 14:11 21:1630213 breaking 14:2 brian 1:3 2:93:5,9 3:16 briefed 21:7 briefing 13:21,22 briefly 37:14 briefs 22:24 brings 24:12 britain 29:24 broad 8:5 16:4 22:140:10 broader 22:6,10 37:7 C c 1:3 321,5 13:15 13:15,17 29:21 30:12,22 3124,25 32:3 34:17,17 c1 7:5 31:2 c2b 724,16 california 1:1 2:4 2:4 21:12 22:3 29:20 30:14,22 37:13 48:5,8,18 call 5:13 9:8 12:20 candid 17:21 care 25:14 29:10 carefully 1921,22 case 4:18 5:3,4 9:6 9:7 10:14,15,25 11:1,2 12:19 13:4 16:1,6,10,21 17:2 1924,22 21:4,5 24:10,10 29:18,24 2924,25 30:4,5,20 31:5 32:1 33:4 36:5 37:9,15,17,18 37:20 41:25 42:10 4329,21 46:17 47:4 cases 10:24 19:15 19:16 24:17 30:11 31:16,17,23 38:18 38:19 : : l 2 :2 8:212:8,1018:4,5 32,2033,1’9’13 broadly 18:3 causa. 7 5. 34.13 38.13 causatlon 27.21 19:9 31:6,7 34:23 . _ 45:11 , 35.22 36.1 10 baslcally 24.14 b 2.3 3.13 28.12,20,22 46:6 " basis 23:3 26:16 brOWT‘e 1'21-6 cause 46:7 ' t 466 30;2033;2,536;3 bugfing 4h caused 28:5argumen s ' beat 42:12 “E mg ' causing 28:17 artlcles 45:10 . , bullt 31:22 , t, 1t d 30.22 beautles 42.14 b , 35743.1 cb 7.3 ”111°“ 37"“10 ' began 14:18 busifsszolé ° cda 7:1,9,118:3,4 as‘ e ' believe 9:1512;2 W1 e“ - 10:21,2216;13,16 13:20 19:1,25 1620,24 17:2 PageZ Veritext Legal Solutions 866 299-5 127 [cda - course] 19:420:4,16 38:17 39:24 41:22 42:11 censorship 13:2 38:13 ceo 40:15 certainly 19:8 27:24 certificate 48:1 certified 48:8 certify 48:5 cetera 5251923 21:17 30:16 change 41:17 45:14,15 changed 45:14 chart 11:15 15:16 39:17,18 children 36:24 circuit 17:14,17 18:1225319 Circuit's 35:21 cite 34:2 38:19 cited 10:2429219 35:20 civil 5:3,1247:1,1 claim 7:19 17:18 21:1524:1827:18 28:11,11 32:19 36:5 37:15 38:20 45:18 claims 7:1,4,6,17 7:17 2921,22 30:6,6,12,13,13,14 30:15,2431:18,18 31:20 36:8 39:1 Clara 1:2 clarification 34:19 clarify 5:22 class 12:19 classic 24:22 clause 7:13 36:10 clean 12:20 15:13 clear 5:10 34:7 37:21 38:10 42:18 clearly 18:221:9 26:13 32:25 client 9:6 12:18 15:17 27:4 39:11 client's 14:10 27:15 41:2 clients 10:15 15:23 27:5 40:14 clock 6:10 club 28:7 coach 6:9 colleague 3:24 colleagues 4:17 come 4:11 20:21 21:14 24:5 27:15 47:3 comes 43:21 45:3 comforted 37:2 coming 5:2 28:10 35:15 45:6 commandments 11:17,18 15:24 27:16 comment 27:6 committee 20:3 communications 35:1 community 10:16 16:12 25:3 40:6 company 45:6 comparing 39:18 compelling 26:21 competition 30:15 complaint 25:24 27:5 33:10 34:7 41:16 42:3 complaints 25:23 completely 33:16 35:6 37:4,4 compliant 23:19 complicated 17:9 complies 26:11 comply 26:12,13 26:15 concede 16:5 concept 14:11 concerned 18:2 21:25 concluded 27:20 30:11 47:11 concludes 11:4 conduct 14:15 conference 46:18 confirmed 44:13 conflicts 24:23 congress 9:23 10:6 32:2,18 4222,25 congressional 17:8 connection 27:25 consequently 7:3 conservative 9:11 30:8,9 consider 12:12 24:11 considered 32:6 consistent 23:9 31:5,20 consistently 12:15 constitutes 48:10 constitution 30:15 37:13 constitutional 19:18 contacted 9:13 contains 45:4 contending 14:13 content 8:8,18,21 9:2,19,20 1023,12 10:23 1126,13 12:3,4,20 13:2 14:2,5,7,8,10,14 14:19,23 15:3 20:22 23:16 26:14 2620,21 28:6 3121,10 32:6,9,20 33:1 34:14 35:24 36:25 37:10 38:19 3820,23 45:13 contents 33:15 context 12:9 17:1 42:20 continue 19:8 46:18 contract 21:16 24:21 30:13 37:23 38:1 contracted 21:16 contracts 9223,24 contractual 37:21 contradicted 33:7 contrary 33:15 core 14:25 22:15 22:21 26:9 corner 23:12 correct 30:19 44:18,19 48:11 correctly 7:11 11:11 24:13 34:22 36:20 counsel 2:1 3:11 3:21 5:7 46:10 country 38:17 43:5 county 1:2 course 17:3 31:16 32:22 36:4 46:16 Veritext Legal Solutions 866 299-5 127 Page 3 [court - equally] court 1:1 3:5 5:14 5:22 722,3 8:7 11:4 12:23 16:2 19:15 2128,1820 23:23 26:20 29:3 29:6,8,17,19,23 3023,1122 31:2 32:14 3328,24 3415,22 36:10,13 36:20 37:25 38:3 38:16,17 41:21,25 43:19 45:10 46:9 46:14,19,20 47:10 court's 6:25 8:4 36:12 courthouse 4:10 4:22 47:5,7 courtroom 424,21 courts 13:16,17 2920,20 3023,10 31:1942:18 45:18 covenant 37:14,19 37:24 covered 10:4 create 32:5 35:13 36:21 creates 36:2,3 43:3 creator 10:20 criminal 5:4 16:25 17:2,4 criminalizing 35:4 criteria 15:3 crucial 18:18 cruz 20:1 csr 1:21 48:18 cutting 21:6 d d 3:1 damaged 27:23 dangerous 39:10 dave 3:24 day 33:25 44:17 48:13 days 4:12 deal 15:21 36:6 42:10 decency 3521,25 decide 16:16 decided 11:14 deciding 8:7 decision 20:24 25:11 27:19 28:4 31:1,8 34:25 35:21 38:23 44:9 44:25 45:9 decisions 28:5 29:1830:1,18,18 32:20 33:1,4 36:4 41:1 declaration 32:25 34:3 43:19,20 defendant 2:8 defendant's 28:1 defendants 1:10 defended 27:10 defending 24:18 defense 28:19 definitely 23:24 degree 29:10 deliberately 32:15 demonetize 28:6 demonetizing 37:18 demonstrating 4:22 demonstration 47:6 demurrer 1:16 32:21 33:20 dennis 9:6 1018,11 11:21 26:23 40:4 department 1:4 3:4,9 deposition 6:2 dershowitz 15:25 describe 4:5 designed 35:10 determination 9:16 12:12 determine 8:20 developed 3 1 :23 developer 3 1 :1 1 device 4:11 devices 10:23 different 18:14,21 18:22 21:12,23 22:5 23:10 30:20 35:6 45:2 differently 41 :25 difficult 11:25 directly 30:21 33:15 35:3,7,16 disable 43:24 44:4 disagree 13:4 41 :1 1 disagrees 16:18 disappeared 44:15 discourse 5:12 discover 9:15 discovery 15:2,10 16:7 24:7,8,9 26:8 28:18,20 33:3 discretion 24:22 25:8 discriminate 26:18 discriminating 21 :3 discrimination 3 1 : 1 8 38: 1 8 discussed 30:2 discussion 21:20 29:4 dismiss 15:13 disparate 39:19,19 dispute 20:11 22:25 39:4 40:19 40:20 disputing 33:2 distinction 14:4 distributing 4:23 divisions 17:2 doctrine 40:17 doing 4:4 5:1 9:1 15:23 16:11 18:23 38:12 39:3,12,13 39:13,1445:5 door 47:4 doubt 41:14,16 42:7 downes 20:3 drives 38:23 driving 27:19 dunk 21:16 e e 321,1 43:19 editorial 30:25 35:12 effectively 10:7 either 36:2 eliminate 22:4 emphasis 11:23 20:18 enabled 44:4 enacted 32:3 enforceable 38:1 engage 11:5 engaging 30:9 engineers 39:22 entitled 28:20 equally 14:11 15:4 Veritext Legal Solutions 866 299-5 127 Page 4 [equivalent - going] equivalent 12:14 33:24 especially 16:9 essentially 7:12 29:21 30:5 37:17 estoppel 30:14 et 129525 19:3 21:17 30:16 ethnicity 10:2 europe 43:6,7 everybody 5:8 23:11 39:5 45:10 evidence 15:9,16 39:17,19,19,20,21 43:21 44:12 exact 24:18 exactly 37:5,25 44:6,20 example 10:13 26:18 excellent 46:5,6 exception 7:6 excluded 33:12,18 exclusion 37:10 exclusive 15:21 exercise 30:25 exercising 25:8 exhaust 29:6 exhibit 43:19 exist 41:3,3,5,8 exists 39:6 expansive 42:16 experience 36:23 expressed 10:4 37:21 expressing 33:14 expression 47:5 expressive 4:21 expressly 9:22 extent 42:6 extraordinarily 8:4 extremely 17:9 f facebook 14:20 29:24 faced 33:4 facility 4:10 fact 11:21 24:1 26:9 27:18 40:3 factor 9:16 factors 26:9 facts 33:16,21 38:1443z9 factual 20:11 23:25 24:4 39:4 41:11 4223,13 fair 721,22 13:16 20:20 27:1 fairly 25:8 faith 13:6,8,11 31:3 32:16 39:25 41:19 falls 32:2 family 36:25 far 1222,23 15:18 39:10 favorite 5:3 15:20 federal 17118215 222122922041221 41:23 42:17 feel 13219372 fewer 33:10 fight 12:626:11 2821844217 fighting 45:22 figure 13:22 filter 8:19 12:3 15:6 45:8 filtering 9:1 10:23 12:25 14:3 22:20 22:22 23:8 24:3,3 26:6 32:9 40:17 40:23 find 15:12 24:10 finding 23:25 24:4 27:17 finds 7:3 26:7 fine 5:7 6:1,14 firm 3:13 first 5:15 12:6,9 17:6 18:9,20 19:8 20:4,6 21:17 22:9 22:11,12 27:12,13 28:8 35:1,11,14 36:4,5 38:17,25 40:15 43:4,8 45:17,18 five 4:12 6:12 24:17 flatly 33:6 flesh 17:10 fleshed 17:11 floor 2:10 folks 4:25 follow 31:12 follows 30:21 foregoing 48:10 forget 47:2 form 11:6 31:19 forms 30:9 forum 20:7 22:16 22:17 23:6,9,9,20 23:23 26:10,17,18 31:13 36:17 37:7 40:18,18,19,20,22 four 26:928z8 fours 37:16 francisco 2:4 30:3 frankly 33:9 free 4:15 43:2 friday 3:2 front 33:7 full 9:948:10 fully 38:1 fundamental 14:25 funny 21:13 further 16:10 g g 3:1 gathering 4:23 gay 9:9,11 generally 14:16 george 2:3 3:13 getting 9:14 17:16 19:15 21:11 27:6 28:21 40:14 give 5:25 6:4,11 10:14 42:2 given 32:10 glad 18:10 g0 524,7,25 10:7 12:24 14:24 16:14 16:15 23:11 24:8 27:14 2922,14 31:16 34:18 42:10 44:10 goes 12:11 13:23 going 4:7,15,20 5:21 7:8 13:5,7 14:14 16:14,15 17:10,16,16,21,23 19:7,8,22 21:11,18 file 4:12 21:1924:11 26:25 25'2 35'22 filed 9:7 found 3324 39:9 41:13,21,22 41:25 42:8,21 Page 5 Veritext Legal Solutions 866 299-5 127 [going - issue] 45:7 46:10 47:3 good 3:8,12,15,16 3:19 10:17 11:4 13:6,8,11 31:3 32:15 39:25 41:19 44:11 goodrich 2:10 goodwill 27:24 google 1:9 2:8 3:10 3217,20 9:8 14:21 14:21 37:17,21 govern 23:19 government 35:3 35:6,15 grants 46:20 grappling 29:10 great 43:3 4728,10 greatly 18:6 green 35:21 gressel 3:25 grounds 36:4 guess 7:18 8:9 guidelines 25:3 h half 34:8 halleck 21:9,9 hand 48:13 hands 11:25 happen 15:1 happened 14:17 15:2 happening 15:11 happens 44:1 happy 2521041216 45:23 46:8 hard 6:21 2933,11 harder 46:7 harm 18:2528:17 45:16,21 harmful 11:7 harms 28:2 hassell 30:23 hate 27:3,7 40:14 43:7 hear 29:7 heard 15:22 28:25 31:7 35:22 41:21 hearing 47:11 48:6 heart 32:18 heartland 32:2 held 29:4 help 17:13,16 32:5 hereunder 48:12 hold 30:24 38:17 42:8 honor 3:12,16,19 3:23 5:19 6:19 7:11 8:9 11:10 13:8,16 14:3,5 15:11 16:8,14,18 17:12,19,22 19:23 21:23 23:1,21,22 23:24 24:5,13,24 2519,25 26:7 27:20 28:23 29:5 38:9 41:24 43:10 43:13 44:11 46:3 46:4 honor's 13:25 19:10 22:14 honorable 3:5 hopefully 5:9 hosting 14:18 hundred 39:2 i idea 32:8 33:3,12 35:17 identical 30:5 29:22 identify 11:6 identity 8:24 9:5 9:21 10:2,19 12:13 1321,13 16:5 19:6 20:23 26:19 28:16 33:6 33:13 34:13 38:13 38:24 39:23 41:2 42:12 illusory 37:23 immediately 15:13 immune 21:19 immunities 36:7 immunity 7:19 8:25 10:5 12:22 12:23 13:1,15,15 16:4 19:14,17,17 19:20 20:25 31:22 immunize 16:4 immunized 19:18 immunizes 42:11 impact 39:20 implicate 35:14 implicit 20:17 implied 37:14,18 37:24 important 6:23 7:4 9:16 16:19 19:25 2022,14 24:10 25:1 improve 29:11 inappropriate 18:12 including 15:19 20:23 30:13 31:1 31:17 39:21 income 27:22 inconsistent 33:16 34:12 35:20 incorporate 25:2 industry 43:1 information 8:13 inherently 23:4 injunction 32:22 32:23 injuries 28:3 injury 17:5 18:25 45:20 intended 8:25 10:6 32:18 interest 26:21 46:24 interested 25:19 interesting 43:4 interface 14:25 internet 18:21 35:4 42:17,21 interpret 9:24 interpretation 30:19 34:16 36:12 interrupt 33:23 intersections 43:4 interviewed 27:3 invalidating 36:3 investigation 16:10 investigations 16:1 1 invoke 19:19 involve 37:9 involved 30:5 involves 37:10 irrelevant 7:12 irreparable 45:20 45:21 irrespective 7:19 issue 7:18 1129,10 11:12 12:24 13:10 13:14 16:19,22 17:6,10,17 18:13 18:14,19,22 19:25 Veritext Legal Solutions 866 299-5 127 Page 6 [issue - mind] 20:4 21:7 27:17 27:18 29:8 38:2 42:11 45:25 issues 6:23 20:23 29:11,13 40:1 41:11,17 4233,14 j jacket 16:1 job 11:25 join 5:12 jones 12:15 judge 1:3 328,9,15 3:21 4:1 524,4 6:1 6:7,9,16 7:22,25 8:1 11:24 13:19 17:13,20,24 18:7 2028,17 21:13,24 21:25 24:16,17 25:10 26:1 29:1 31:8 33:20 34:5 38:6 39:16 41:14 43:17 44:15 46:2 46:5,14,17 judgments 35:12 juniper 20:3 16:23 18:11 20:10 21:12,18 24:6,17 25:25 32:20 39:6 4025,25 41:2,3,4 41:5,8 43:22 45:6 46:1 koh 20:8 24:17 25:11 kozinski 20:17 kozinski's 31:8 kramer 3:24 l language 15:22 19:3 lanner 25:25 larger 22:11 lascivious 11:20 12:21 lastly 27:17 40:17 lauren 2:9 3:19 law 3:13 22:3 25:13,17,22 26:1 28:22 30:15 31:5 35:20 41:23 42:8 laws 42:22 43:7 40:6 41:21 45:13 liable 30:24 liberal 9:12 liberty 22:12 36:9 limit 41:22 limitation 31:4 32:16 limited 26:17 3621,23 line 29:18 listen 5:8 literature 4:24 litigant 12:14 litigation 42:24 little 36:7 llc 1:9 2:8 llp 2:3 lodge 19:16 long 29:18 longer 6:15 look 8:21 10:23 11:16 19:21 20:22 28:16 32:23 39:16 40:124121842220 looked 19:1624:6 m 2:9 maher 15220405 main 29:13 37:6 major 9:2 making 1228,10 20:24 23:25 25:16 41:1 44:25 45:1,9 management 46:17 manner 16:21 23:15 manual 8:23 marsh 21:5,5,6,9 mass 33:21 massive 26:25 material 11:7 matter 3:10 7:14 25:13,13,17,21 26:1 28:22 38:11 38:12,14,25 41:24 42:8,9 46:2,9 matters 34:16 36:15 40:2 44:8 mature 36:25 junk 40:9,12 lawsuit 15:13 38‘,” mckeown 21:25 . . . . looklng 8:17,23 , Justlce 29.23 17.11 9.2 5 10 19 20 26.1 3121746224 lawyers 5:7 10’1 ’19’20’1121 mean 12:1522:9 k lead 10:14 26:22) 58.23 ° 24:9 2521028221 ka erski 10.24 24 leave 5:25 38:6 l k' 5'1'5 33:23 40:10 p ‘ ’ 46:20 47:2 °° S - means 20:12 22:10 keep 631 ega ' ' losers 15°5 ' . 202945225 ' meant 36:18 kimberley 1:20 _ lost 24:1627:22 . , _ legally 30.19 medla 4.11 kind 4:25 egltlmate . 18.172225 42.13 mem ers . . _ 23:14,15 28:19 ' ' ' mere 40:3 kmds 32.9 , lots 31;5 . . lettlng 40:8 merely 25:5 king 29-24 loud 5:10 , knew 20,15 level 26:25 45:16 love 61011.24 mets 10.9 ' lewd 11:19 12:21 ° ° million 33:25 39:2 know 6:21 10:7 , 14,16 15,8 16,18 lgbtq 9:7 10:15,16 mlnd 6:1 ' ' ' 16:10 19:22 27:5 Page7 Veritext Legal Solutions 866 299-5 127 [mine - peril] mine 10:1 minimal 45:20 minority 34:8 minute 19:11 minutes 5:20 6:15 misreading 31:8 misrepresentatio... 7:20 misses 35:18 missing 16:8 25:9 42:4 mission 25:16 mistake 18:11 misunderstood 36:11 mode 7:5,17 8:12 8212,14 15:17,19 22:17,19,21 23:2,3 23:25 33:12,19 34:10 36:14,16,17 36:21 39:5,9,10,15 40: 1 1,22,23,25 43: 12,24 44:2,3,5 44:12,13,20 45:1 45:13 model 14:18,19 43:1 murphy 30:4 Il n 3:1 name 45:3 napa 28:8,9 narrative 27:1,1 narrowed 21:9 37:11 navigate 44:1 nazi 39:15 nearly 29:6 necessarily 22:9 need 5:17,19,25 6:7 7:10 19:21 20:1821:15 37:6 42:10 44:4 46:19 needed 20:15 neon 42:7 neutral 9:25 10:1 15:1520:14,15,18 20:20 28:15 31:9 31:10,13,14 neutrality 20:4 31:6,22 never 11:14 new 2:11,11 10:9 oath 20:6,12 objectionable 8:20 9:4 10:10 13:5 19:3 32:7 objective 8:13 11:13,19 obstler 2:3 3:12,13 3:23 5:18,19 6:6 6:11,18,19 7:24 8:3 13:20 17:15 1721,25 18:8 21:14 2427,25 29:1,3,15 33:23 36:8 38:5,6,9 43:16 44:7,11,16 46:3,12 obstler's 36:12 obviously 21:7 34:11 october 1:18 3:2 48:13 offensive 1127,19 19:3 0h 16:15 okay 12:11 13:10 20:8 25:18 34:5 40:11 46:2 47:8 ounce 24:9 overall 33:25 overly 36:25 40:10 P p 3:1 page 7:2 23:3 27:21 pages 1:25 pain 13:19 papers 30:2 parading 4:23 paragraph 32:24 32:24 paragraphs 8:16 park 18:21 23:10 participating 28:1 particular 14:20 38:4 particularly 19:4 19:5 parties 35:24 paso 28:10 pass 42:22 pause 29:2 peek 43:11 people 5:2,6 9:9 moderation 32:10 23:4 , once 47:3 15319’20 .1817 , non 26.17 , 21.2,3 22.10,11 monetlze 27:9 . onllne 35:12 _ _nonexcluswe 27.3,14,14 36.22 43:2 _ 000 1:5 3:3 o36.19 39.7,9,10,13,14 months 24:6 , open 36:18 , , 1916 noon 6.11 t 35.17 40.8,24 41.8 “10°“? ' normally 4:11 Opera es, ° 4215,20 44:19 mornlng 3:8,12,15 . , opportunlty 6:20 o onotlon 34.12 45.25 47.1 3216,19 4:18 . . 28:25 42:2,4 _n0tw1thstand1ng percent 15.21 mortgage 24:19 382 opt 36:23 37:4 33.11 34.4 39.2 2 24:19 ' o optimism 46:25 I ' ' ’ , number 2514,15 , 40.3,4,4,5 motlon 4:15 6:21 , optlonal 37:5 . , 38.24 percentage 33.18 motlvator 9:3 order 8:19 19:2 erfecfl 6,14 motive 8:6 0 202162322331214 p47_9 y ' - 3:1 - ° move 14.18 0 46,11,21 peril 19:24 Page 8 Veritext Legal Solutions 866 299-5 127 [period - r] period 9:9 permission 47:5 person 9:1,11,11 12:13 14:1,1 18:23 19:5 44:25 44:25 45:5 person's 10:2 peter 2:3 3:12 petition 17:5 photograph 47:4 photographs 4:9 pick 15:4 picketing 4:23 5:4 picking 5:2 piece 16:13 place 7:25 23:15 4827,11 plaintiff 1:7 2:2 3:13 plaintiffs 43:20 plans 46:21 platform 12:11 22:15,18,20,21 23:2,5,16 24:1,2 26:9 36:15 39:5 platforms 14:17 26:5,5 3225,11 35:12 plaza 47:6 plead 25:10,13,14 41:18 pleadings 16:9 please 3:7,11 pled 19:22 23:24 42:6 pobstler 2:5 point 5:1 13:13,14 13:25 16:3 18:13 18:18 19:10 20:22 21:16 23:7 26:4 34:6 35:18 36:16 36:21 38:15 43:18 43:22 44:11,19 pointed 11:11 26:2 policy 928,18 politely 5:8 political 10:2 ponder 6:4 portion 36:17,22 37:3,11 possible 7:6 posted 5:14 potentially 44:21 prager 1:6222 3:10,14 9:6 10:8 10:11 11:22 26:23 28:6 33:11,18 34:8 prager's 7:4 27:25 28:4 33:13 40:4 predicate 13:10,24 preferred 14:22 preliminary 32:22 32:23 prepared 43:13 presiding 3:6 pressed 29:11 pressure 14:17 pretty 29:8 primarily 32:21 prior 11:7 16:22 16:25 19:12,25 34:21 35:18 private 35:9,11,24 42:23 probably 29:7 problem 42:17 43:6 problems 19:7 proceed 5:1638:8 proceeding 4:8 5:13 proceedings 1:15 48:11 processes 8:23 producers 14:6 producing 14:19 product 12:1 profit 15:5 promise 41:18 promised 9:22 promises 727,20 25:7 promissory 30:14 prompt 8:14 protect 10:22 17:5 32:3,5,18 35:10 36:24 39:13,14 protected 12:7,8,9 17:6 18:15,19,20 18223312935211 36:22 39:24 42:19 42:20 protecting 21:2 39:7 40:8 protection 31:15 32:9 35:9 protections 20:16 protects 38:18 protesting 4:23 prove 1521626219 28:20 provide 13:1 32:8 46:14 provided 11:15 provider 30:24 provider's 8:6 provision 24:23 25:1 31:4 3224,15 35:13 provisions 16:24 2423,25 34:25 35:2 37:23 38:2 prowler 27:11,13 pruneyard 7:12 7:17 16:14,15,16 21:4 22:2,2,4,8,15 23:1,23 26:4,7,8 37:8 40:17 42:15 42:16,16 public 424,4,4 20:7 22:16,17 23:5,8,9 2320,23 26:10,17 26:18 31:13 36:17 37:7 publisher 30:25 puffery 25:15,17 26:1 punch 39:15 pure 25:17 purpose 8:13 21:1 32:4 3525,13 purposes 4:14 34:17 44:9 push 41:22 put 10:8,15,15 11:22 16:9 39:16 40:6 42:7 43:25 46:21 putting 14:1 27:10 q quality 12:20 question 7:15 8:6 10:21 23:18,22 34:20 36:14 37:6 41:23 questions 6:3 38:4 quickly 43:15,17 quote 11:12 36:15 quoting 11:3 1‘ r 3:1 Veritext Legal Solutions 866 299-5 127 Page 9 [race - russian] race 10:2 raised 22:2 37:15 raising 13:10 rate 24:20 rational 26:16 reaction 21:13 read 722212225 22:14 realize 19:23 really 6:20 7:16 9:1 10:17 11:19 11:23 16:19 17:23 18:18 19:24 20:1 20:13 24:10 28:24 29:3 32:17 41:10 41:10,13 43:11 reason 5:20 received 4:13 recess 47:10 recognize 29:17 recognized 30:17 31:3 3221,14 34:15 36:20 37:25 recognizes 37:20 record 29:2,4 32:22 33:741:15 44:10 recorded 9:8 recording 47:4 recordings 429,10 4:12 reduced 27:22 reelect 19:16 reference 25:2 34:24 referenced 29:23 referring 7:1 reflect 30:18 regarding 6:25 regardless 38:13 39:25 regulate 27:4 42:22 regulated 27:7,8 regulating 35:3,7 42:25 regulation 14:14 23:1926zl435zl4 regulations 42:24 reinforce 35:10 rejected 34:23 35:22 related 7:5 relates 7:1 relaxing 10:17 reliance 2811,14 28:14,15 religion 10:2 remedy 21:22 22:1 remember 11:10 14:5 removal 3528,16 35:24 37:9 remove 8:7 22:20 removing 39:4 renders 37:23 reno 17:1 34:24 replead 10:14 report 48:11 reporter 29:3,6 48:4,8 reporter's 1:15 48:1 representation 10:4 representations 7:7 representing 3:17 3:20 reputation 27:23 request 4:12,13 46:10 require 35:23 requirement 22:5 22:6,7 31:22 requirements 27:24 requiring 35:7,16 resemble 23:5 reserve 24:14 25:5 resolve 25:6 resolved 46:1 respect 7:203126 31:25 32:19 34:20 34:24 37:14 respond 29:14 43:15 rest 28:23 restrain 45:19 restrained 16:22 34:21 restrainer 16:25 19:12 restraining 19:25 restrains 19:2 restraint 35:18 restrict 12:3 28:6 restricted 7:5,16 8:12,12,14 9:17 10:18 11:18 15:17 15:19 16:2 18:5,9 22:17,19,21 23:2,3 23:25 33:12,19 34:10 36:14,16,17 36:21 40:7,9,10,13 40:22 41:6 43:12 4323,24 44:1,2,3 44:5,12,13,19 45:1 45:13 restricting 18:24 26:10 restriction 18:9,10 23:13,14,15,16,17 23:18 restrictions 14:9 16:5 23:8 rests 31:7 result 28:1741217 resulted 28:4 review 8:23 reviewed 33:18 34:9 revising 6:5 richardson 1:20 4824,18 right 7:13,14 12:3 12:5 14:22 17:5 20:19,25 2427,14 24:14 27:12,14 36:10 37:5 40:11 40:15 41:12,12,15 44:22 45:24 46:22 rightly 37:20 rights 37:21 robles 28:10 room 32:5 roommates 13:25 31:8,11,12 rosati 2:10 ross 2:3 3:13 rule 4:8,16,19 5:1 13:24 14:2 ruled 7:11 rules 4:6,7 1429,11 23:19 25:12 41:24 41:25 42:18 47:3 ruling 5:24 6:25 7:9 8:4 10:22 11:11,11 22:14 23:1 2520,21 29:9 36:12 run 19:7 russian 27:2 Veritext Legal Solutions 866 299-5 127 Page 10 [s - submitted] S s 3:1 safe 37:2 samaritan 11:5 san 2:4 30:3 santa 1:2 satisfy 27:24 saw 11:2 13:21 20:2 saying 5:9 8:7 11:12,15,16,24 20:19 22:15 23:22 31:20 38:11,11 41:15 4423,24 says 4:20 10:9 23:1 24:21 31:11 32:25 39:3,7,12 4021544220 scholars 16:20 scope 6:25 7:9 16:3 screenshot 43:25 scrutiny 14:9 26:13,16,17 seated 3:7 second 20:13 45:20 section 7:3 8:5 29:16,21 30:22 31:2,15,20,24,25 32:3 34:17,17,21 35:5,9,23 sections 27:6 see 7:8 25:20 28:24 32:13,14 39:1441:13,13 43:24 seek 30:24 seeks 29:2331:17 seen 14:21 selected 23:4 26:5 26:5 selective 23:2 self 35:14 sell 9:1828:8 senate 20:3 senator 20:1 sense 17:20 sensibility 37:1 series 19:15 serious 36:141210 servant 4:4 serve 8:12 service 8:6,8 24:12 25:3,4 28:2 30:24 36:18,22 3727,12 session 3:5 set 32:12 35:25 46:18 sf 11:3 sheltered 36:22 37:11 Sherman 11:2,2 shipments 28:8,9 shocked 17:22 shocking 37:1 shorthand 48:4,7 48:8 show 9:16 15:10 28:14 3811444116 showed 15:16 shows 2921043225 side 5:3 sign 28:7 signature 48:17 similar 30:9 simply 21:2 22:5 33:5 35:24 slam 21:15 slowly 43:17 small 33:17 sole 43:1 solve 42:17 somebody 1027,22 27:1140223 something's 8:20 sonsini 2:103:17 3:20 soon 41:21 sort 12:1431:3,21 sorts 14:23 42:24 43:4 sound 30:18 space 35:13 speak 5:15 6:17 speaker 8:24 33:6 speakers 30:8 speaking 18:16 specific 33:15 speech 4:15 12:8,9 1623,25 17:6 18:15,22 19:1,7,12 21:222zl3 23:20 27:3,7 35:4,8,16 36:9 40:14 42:20 4223,25 43:2,7 45:19 spoken 39:22 spot 29:8 squarely 32:17 stand 23:12 standard 13:6,9 13:11 standards 32:12 35:25 standing 4:8 standpoint 12:15 start 4:3 7:10 8:3 28:9 29:16 state 3:116z3 17:3 17:7,17 18:13,14 18:24 19:11,13,20 21:12,15,18 22:5,6 22:6 25:12 29:20 30:2 36:2 42:23 48:5,8,18 stated 7:19 statement 2525,16 26:3 28:1 statements 25:4 25:16 statistics 34:3 statute 16:23 17:4 17:8 19:14,18 30:12,19,23 32:8 34:16 35:19 36:2 statutes 19:17 staying 11:8 sticks 46:19 stop 6:10 9:9 38:3 straightforward 29:18 30:11 street 2:4 stretches 1222,23 strict 26:13,15 stronger 30:6 struck 16:24 17:3 35:2 struggle 13:22 struggled 13:16,17 stuff 12:16 15:22 45:4 subject 9:8 11:6 1428,10 subjective 13:7 20:21 submission 6:4 46:9 submit 38:1642:9 43:14 submitted 32:25 43:20 46:2 Veritext Legal Solutions 866 299-5 127 Page 11 [subscribed - unenforceable] subscribed 48:12 substantially 21:10 substitution 14:15 sued 22:10,12 sufficient 36:6 suggest 19:17 suggests 8:5 suite 2:4 superior 1:1 3:4 30:3 supporting 46:25 supremacy 7:13 supreme 16:2 19:15 21:8 30:22 sure 6:24 7:9 13:21 36:11 43:18 surprise 29:7 susan 45:12 sweep 22:1 sweet 37:16 swept 18:3 45:11 system 46:25 t table 5:7 tag 10:20 taints 2024,25 take 624,12 7:24 8:1,1 13:25 15:14 29:2 37:21 38:7 42:5 43:11 46:9 taken 1:20 4:10 27:15 28:21 48:6 48:7 talk 25:10 36:7 talking 4:14 16:1 16:19 27:16 tape 40:16 taylor 30:4 tea 102164027 45:15 teas 10:17 technical 39:25 tell 5:6 15:15 16:8 1724,25 25:19 41:19 46:23 telling 21:21 39:8 ten 6:12 11:17,18 15:23 27:16 tentative 5:14,15 5:16 615,22 29:9,9 29:19 32:2 46:19 term 13:8 terminated 30:7 terminating 30:10 terms 10:21 19:2 20:9 24:12 25:2,4 36:9 testimony 20:2 text 11:6 thank 3:7,8 616,19 28:25 29:1,5 38:9 46:3,4,5,23,24,25 theory 37:17 thing 6:16 7:18 20:13 33:25 42:14 43:3 44:6 45:2 things 5:23 11:23 12:1 14:24 20:5 22:20 24:15 29:14 38:4 39:18 40:5 42:6 43:16 think 5:17,19 6:7 6:15 7210,11,22 8:4,5,6,10,11,15 8:15,25 10:6 11:1 1124,25 12:5 13:8,24 15:2,10,11 16:7,22,23 1727,23 18:18 19:10 20:1 20:11 2218,24 2321,24 27:8,18 28:10,11,20 29:8,9 30:17 3127,25 32:17 33:17,24 34:11,15,22 35:18 36:1,6,9,10 37:5,8 37:16 39:24 40:2 41:10,17 42:3,5,13 42:16,16 43:3 44:8 46:7 thinks 12:23 third 35:21 thorough 6:22 thought 18:2,12 25:22 33:21 45:14 thoughtfulness 29:10 three 20:4 24:5 tie 15:25 time 4:13 5:17 23:14 24:22 28:24 28:24 38:7 48:7 timing 17:20 today 3:23 5:21 6:21 46:18 47:4 today's 428,14 told 40:6 43:23 45:15 tool 2220,22 24:3 24:4 26:10 36:15 40:18 tools 20:18,20 26:6 3129,10 32:10 totally 13:20 44:24 town 18:21 traditional 30:25 transcribed 48:9 transcript 1:15 46:11 48:10 trash 44:21 23:5 treating 30:20 treatment 31:18 tremendously 11:25 trevary 43:19 troll 27:14 trouble 4:16 5:23 46:6 true 312948210 try 5:629:5,14 42:22 trying 7:8 13:22 32:3 turn 27:5 37:2 4023,25 44:19 turning 44:20 tV 14:23 twitter 29:25 30:4 30:4,7,8 two 11:23 13:14 25:12,15 30:1 type 38:18 types 8:13 typewriting 48:9 ll ucl 19:1 27:18,19 unavailable 34:9 44:3 unconstitutional 34:22 uncorrected 44:10 understand 529,24 6:25 7:9 19:10 20:9 38: 10 understanding 5:23 understood 36:13 undisputed 33:10 33:17 unenforceable 37:24 Veritext Legal Solutions 866 299-5 127 Page 12 [unfair - youtube's] unfair 30:1531318 unfettered 24:22 university 1:6 2:2 3210,14 unquote 36:15 unrestricted 18:5 39:15 urging 16:21 use 8:11 15:6 28:4 31:10 user 45:8 users 30:7 3225,10 32:11,11 43:22 33:5,14 34:13 38:13,24 39:23 412142212 Views 33:25 Violate 35:1 37:1 violated 37:18 Violations 19:19 voluntary 26:12 26:12 vs 1:8 W V versus 3:10 11:3 17:1 2924,24 30:4,4,23 35:21 37:16 vexatious 12:14 video 4:9 1028,16 10:17 11:17 13:3 16:2 20:2 39:1,4,6 39:20 40:7 41:6 44:2,3,4 45:2,3,3,3 45:15 videos 11:16 12:19 15:17,18,18,23 27:15 33:2,11,15 33:18 3439,14 37:11,18 39:2,8,16 39:18 40:3,4 41:3 43:10,23 44:13 view 21:23 44:4 viewership 27:23 Viewing 14:1 Viewpoint 8:24 9:6 9220,25 10:1,3 12:13 1321,12 15:6,15 16:4 19:6 20:14,15,24 26:19 28:15 31:14,21 wait 19:11 waive 4:7,15,20 waived 11:10,13 25:22 walk 29:13 walsh 1:3 325,8,9 3:15,21 4:1 621,7 6:9,16 7:22 8:1 13:19 17:13,20,24 18:7 29:1 33:20 34:5 38:6 43:17 44:15 46:2,5,14,17 waniki 45:12 want 4:3 5:2,22 6:24 7:24 8:1 11:23 24:21 25:6 32:13,14 33:21 34:18 36:7 38:7 40:19 41:7 42:15 43:24 4429,21 45:4 wanted 3623,23 43:18 wants 4:11 10:8 watch 18:4 45:4 way 5:5,7 30:21 31:16 35:15 37:1 40:16 45:20 ways 30:6 we've 8:16 14:21 15:1,7 22:16,24 35:22 40:18 46:1 week 18:9 weekend 47:10 welcome 3:9 4:1,2 4:5 5:11 went 16:127:11 whereof 48:12 White 2:9 3:19,20 9:12 whitewash 41:4 willen 2:9 3216,17 3:24 6:8,14 15:12 21:21 29:5 34:2,6 38:11 39:3 41:11 41:12 43:15,18 44:20 46:4,13,16 Wilson 2:103:17 3:20 win 17:22 42:9 wine 28:7,8,9,10 winners 15:4 Wiping 45:12 Withdraw 31:1 witness 6:9 48:12 wonderful 12:1 word 15:14 words 7:15 8:19 11:1 12:10 work 4:4 10:16 45:23 46:7 worked 6:21 29:3 world 12:2 43:1 45:17 worse 15:18 wrong 2122,24 27:20 wsgr.com 2:12 y yahoo 11:3 yeah 11:2 16:15 24:20 34:2 york 2:11,11 10:9 youtube 3:18 10:8 11:5,24,24 12:16 1423,25 15:21 18:4,7,8 20:7 27:14 28:2,4 36:3 36:18 37:3,7,10,20 44:6 youtube's 23:4 28:5 Veritext Legal Solutions 866 299-5 127 Page 13 4; \OOONQUI 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 PROOF OF SERVICE STATE OF CALIFORNIA, COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES At the time 0f service, Iwas over 18 years 0f age and not a party to this action. Iam employed in the County of Los Angeles, State 0f California. My business address is 801 S. Figueroa Street, Suite 2000, Los Angeles, CA 90017. On November 14, 2019, I served true copies of the following document(s) described as NOTICE OF LODGING COPY OF REPORTER’S TRANSCRIPT OF HEARING ON OCTOBER 25, 2019 on the interested parties in this action as follows: SEE ATTACHED SERVICE LIST BY MAIL: I enclosed the document(s) in a sealed envelope 0r package addressed to the persons at the addresses listed in the Service List and placed the envelope for collection and mailing, following our ordinary business practices. I am readily familiar With the practice 0f Browne George Ross LLP for collecting and processing correspondence for mailing. On the same day that correspondence is placed for collection and mailing, it is deposited in the ordinary course 0f business With the United States Postal Service, in a sealed envelope with postage fully prepaid. I am a resident or employed in the county where the mailing occurred. The envelope was placed in the mail at Los Angeles, California. I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws 0f the State of California that the foregoing is true and correct. Executed on November 14, 2019, at Los Angeles, California. h#WQFM Kathleen McCormick 13724651 _3_ NOTICE OF LODGING COPY OF REPORTER’S TRANSCRIPT OF HEARING ON OCTOBER 24, 2019 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 SERVICE LIST Prager University v. Google LLC and YouTube, LLC Santa Clara Superior Court Case N0. 19CV340667 Attorneysfor Defendants GOOGLE LLC and YOUTUBE, LLC Brian M. Willen, admittedpro hac vice WILSON SONSINI GOODRICH & ROSATI 1301 Avenue of the Americas, 40th Floor New York, NY 10019 Telephone: (212) 999-5800 Facsimile: (212) 999-5899 bwillen@wsgr.com 13724651 Attorneysfor Defendants GOOGLE LLC and YOUTUBE, LLC David H. Kramer, SBN 168452 Maura L. Rees, SBN 191698 Lauren Gallo White, SBN 309075 WILSON SONSINI GOODRICH & ROSATI 650 Page Mill Road Palo Alto, CA 94304-1050 Telephone: (650) 493-9300 Facsimile: (650) 565-5100 Email: dkramer@wsgr.com mrees@wsgr.com lwhite@wsgr.com Lauren Gallo White, SBN 309075 Amit Q. Gressel, SBN 307663 WILSON SONSINI GOODRICH & ROSATI One Market Street Spear Tower, Suite 3300 San Francisco, CA 94105 Telephone: (415) 947-2000 Facsimile: (415) 947-2099 1white@wsgr.com agressel@wsgr.com -4- NOTICE OF LODGING COPY OF REPORTER’S TRANSCRIPT OF HEARING ON OCTOBER 24, 2019
