The People, Respondent,v.Tyrone D. Manor, Appellant.

Brief

N.Y.March 31, 2016

Brief Completed: June 30, 2015 To Be Argued By: Robert J. Shoemaker Time Requested: 10 Minutes STATE OF NEW YORK COURT OF APPEALS THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK, -vs- TYRONE D. MANOR, Respondent, Defendant-Appellant. BRIEF FOR RESPONDENT APL-2015-00069 SANDRA DOORLEY District Attorney of Monroe County Attorney for Respondent By: Robert J. Shoemaker Assistant District Attorney Suite 832 Ebenezer Watts Building Rochester, New York 14614 Phone: (585) 753-4810 Fax: (585) 753-4576 TABLE OF CONTENTS Page QUESTIONS P~SENTED 1 PRELIMINARY STATEMENT 2 STATEMENT OF FACTS 4 POINT I DEFENDANT'S GUlL TY PLEA WAS KNOWINGLY, INTELLIGENTLY, AND VOLUNTARILY ENTERED 7 A. The court made a proper inquiry into defendant's request to withdraw his guilty plea. 7 B. The record belies defendant's claim that his plea was not knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily entered. 10 POINT II DEFENDANT RECEIVED EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL 15 CONCLUSION 18 TABLE OF AUTHORITIES CASES People v Alexander, 97 NY2d 482 (2002) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 People v Anderson, 63 AD 3d 1617 (4th Dept 2009), lv denied 70 AD 3d 1332 (20 1 0) . . . . . . . . 9 People v Baldi, 54 NY2d 137 (1981) .... .... ....... .... ...... .. ........ ... ....... 16 People v Baret, 11 NY3d 31 (2008) .. ......... .. ....... ... ........ .... .... ... ... 7, 8 People v Biro, 85 AD3d 1570 (4th Dept 2011) ..................................... 15 People v Brown, 14 NY3d 113 (2010) ................... . ...................... 9, 10 People v Campbell, 62 AD3d 1265 (4th Dept 2009), lv denied 13 NY3d 795 (2009) ........ 13 People v Dym, 122 AD3d 878 (2d Dept 2014) ............. . .................... ..... 9 People v Fiumefreddo, 82 NY2d 536 (1993) .. . .. . . . . . .. . . . .. . . . . . .. . . .. . . . . . . . 8, 9, 10 People v Garcia, 92 NY2d 869 ( 1998) .. . .. .. .. . . .. . . .. . . .. . . . .. . . .. . . .. . . .. . . .. .. 10 PeoplevGuzman, 70AD3d 1332(4thDept2010),/vdenied16NY3d831 (2011) .......... 9 People v Henry, 95 NY2d 563 (2000) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 People v Hernandez, 22 NY3d 972 (2013), cert denied 134 S Ct 1900 (2014) ............. 16 People v Hernandez, 207 AD2d 659 (1st Dept 1994) ................................ 11 People v Hidalgo, 91 NY2d 733 (1998) ........................................... 10 People v Lewis, 46 NY2d 825 ( 1978) . . . . . . . . . . .. .. . . .. . . . .. . . .. . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . .. . 11 People v Manor, 121 AD3d 1581 (4th Dept 2014) ................................... 2 People v Martin, 157 AD2d 674 (2d Dept 1990) .................................... 11 People v McKinney, 122 AD3d 1083 (3d Dept 2014) ................................. 9 People v McKoy, 60 AD3d 1374 (4th Dept 2009), lv denied 12 NY3d 856 (2009) .......... 13 11 People v Montero, 100 AD3d 1555 (4th Dept 2012}, lv denied21 NY3d 945 (2013} ........ 15 People v Nash, 229 AD2d 916 (4th Dept 1996}, lv denied 88 NY2d 1023 (1996) . ......... . 8 People v Nimmons, 27 AD 3d 1186 {4th Dept 2006),/v denied 6 NY3d 851 (2006} . . . . . . . . . 13 People v Nixon, 21 NY2d 338 {1967} ............................................ 7, 8 People v Oathout, 21 NY3d 127 (2013) ..... . ........ .. ....... ... ........ ... ...... 16 People v Obert, 1 AD 3d 631 {3d Dept 2003), /v denied 2 NY3d 764 {2004) . ... .... ... ... 12 People v Patino, 119 AD3d 409 {1st Dept 2014) ..................................... 9 People v Phillips, 41 AD3d 969 (3d Dept 2007) .. .. . . .. . . . .. .. .. . . .. .. .. . . . . .. . . . . . 13 People v Rivera, 71 NY2d 705 (1988} ...... . ....... ..... ......................... 15 People vSparcino, 78 AD3d 1508 (4th Dept 2010), lv denied 16 NY3d 746 (2011) .. . ...... 8 People v Tinsley, 35 NY2d 926 (1974) .... . ......... ... ........ .. ................ 7, 9 People v Wilson, 38 AD 3d 1326 (4th Dept 2007), lv denied 9 NY3d 853 {2007) . . . . . . . . . . . 10 Stricklandv Washington, 466 US 668 (1984) ........ . ............................. 16 STATUTES CPL 440 .................................................................. 2, 4 Penal Law§ 125.25 ........................................................... 2 Ill QUESTIONS PRESENTED Question: Was defendant's guilty plea knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily entered? Answer of the Trial Court: Yes. Answer of the Appellate Division: Yes. Question: Was the defendant afforded effective assistance of counsel? Answer of the Trial Court: Answer of the Appellate Division: Not addressed. Yes. PRELIMINARY STATEMENT This is an appeal from a judgment of Monroe County Court (John J. Connell, J.) entered April30, 2010, convicting Defendant-Appellant Tyrone D. Manor, following his guilty plea, of murder in the second degree (Penal Law § 125.25 [1]). Defendant was sentenced, pursuant to plea agreement, to 18 years to life in prison (Record [R] 8). There has not been a stay of the sentence and defendant is currently incarcerated. On direct appeal, the Appellate Division, Fourth Department, held that County Court did not abuse its discretion in denying defendant's motion to withdraw his guilty plea: "defendant's claims that he was coerced by family members into pleading guilty, that he was intoxicated during the plea proceeding, and that he did not understand the nature of the plea or its consequences are belied by the record of the plea proceeding" (People v Manor, 121 AD3d 1581, 1582 [4th Dept 2014]). The Appellate Division further held that defendant was afforded a reasonable opportunity to present his contentions, that County Court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion without a hearing, and that defendant did not negate an element of the crime (id.). Finally, the Appellate Division found that defendant's claim that he did not have ample time to discuss his offers was belied by the record~ defendant's claims that he did not receive adequate advice were based on matters outside the record and should have been raised by way of a CPL article 440 motion (id. at 1583; seeR 5-6). Although it appears defendant has filed at least two unsuccessful CPL 440 motions in county court, for neither was he 2 given permission to appeal. A judge of this Court granted leave to appeal (25 NY 3d 951 [20 15]). 3 STATEMENT OF FACTS Defendant was arraigned on Monroe County Indictment 0143 of 2009 on March 6, 2009 (R 11-12). The sole count of the indictment was murder in the second degree, based on an incident occurring on October 16, 2008. Mter several adjournments, a Wade/Huntley hearing was held on August 14th (R 31). As revealed at the hearing, defendant had spontaneously told investigators that he caused the death of the victim (R 85-86). Defendant waived a jury trial on November 30, 2009, the morning the trial was set to begin (R 89, 93-94). On December I, 2009, when the non-jury trial was scheduled to commence, defendant admitted that he threw garden shears at Desiree Curry, intending to cause her death (R 99-100). Defendant had been given two alternative dispositions: he could plead guilty to the sole charge in the indictment and receive a sentence between 15 years to life and 20 years to life (R 96). Alternatively, he could plead to manslaughter in the frrst degree with a sentence of 25 years with 5 years of post-release supervision, and a waiver of appeal (R 97). Prior to defendant's guilty plea, the court explained to the defendant the constitutional rights he would be waiving by entering such plea (R 97-99). In response to the questions posed by the court during the extensive colloquy preceding his plea, the defendant described what occurred on the date of the crime and explained his role in the murder (id.). 4 Specifically, the court questioned the defendant as follows: THE COURT: All right. Mr. Manor, the indictment charges you with Murder in the Second Degree involving an October 16th, 2008 incident in the City of Rochester involving the death of Desiree Curry, C-U-R-R-Y. Would you tell me where this took place and what you did? You have to keep your voice up so I can hear you. MR. MANOR: I was at MR. WALDORF: Correction. Your honor, it would be MR. MANOR: . We got into a discussion. She shot some shears at me. I wasn't thinking. I shot them back and they went in her back. THE COURT: When you say shears, do you mean garden shears? MR. MANOR: Yes. THE COURT: Did that cause her death? MR. MANOR: Yes. THE COURT: Did you intend to cause her death? MR. MANOR: No. THE COURT: Well, the plea of guilty that you are entering is a plea to Murder in the Second Degree. I'm not trying to put words in your mouth but in order for me to accept the plea of guilty I have to be satisfied that you have committed a crime, and the crime is with intent to cause the death of Ms. Curry you caused her death. MR. MANOR: Yes. THE COURT: Well. Mr. Manor, I'm not putting words in your mouth. You either intended to cause her death or you didn't. MR. MANOR: I intended. THE COURT: Pardon me. MR. MANOR: I intended. THE COURT: You intended to cause her death? MR. MANOR: Yes. THE COURT: Is that the truth? MR. MANOR: Yes (R 99-100). Almost three months after the guilty plea, defense counsel filed a motion with the court moving to withdraw his guilty plea based on alleged family pressure to enter such plea and a subsequent examination of defendant more than a month after entering his guilty plea (R 158, 160-161, 177). Attached to the motion were affidavits from both of defendant's attorneys and from a forensic psychiatrist; 5 notably, defendant himself provided no affidavit (R 158-180). The People opposed the motion, arguing that there was no record evidence to support defendant's clctims (R 184-185) and that family pressure was insufficient to support a motion to withdraw a guilty plea (R 185, paragraph 17). On the date of sentencing, the court indicated that the motions were reviewed, and gave both sides an opportunity to be heard further. Neither side placed anything additional on the record (R 112). The court found as follows: THE COURT: I really don't see an issue for a factual hearing and I'm satisfied that the plea that was entered was a knowing, voluntary and intelligent waiver of his rights to a trial on the day of trial. So I'll deny the application the withdraw the plea (R 112). Defendant was sentenced as promised, to 18 years to life in the New York State Department of Corrections (R 117). This appeal ensued. 6 POINT I DEFENDANT'S GUILTY PLEA WAS KNOWINGLY, INTELLIGENTLY, AND VOLUNTARILY ENTERED On appeal, defendant contends that his plea was not entered knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily. Therefore, he argues, County Court abused its discretion in denying his request to withdraw his guilty plea. Defendant claims that at the time of his guilty plea, he was under extreme duress imposed by relatives immediately before his plea and that he possessed an impaired decisional capacity due to anxiety and intoxication. Such claims should be rejected. A. The court made a proper inquiry into defendant's request to withdraw his guilty plea. It is well settled that "trial judges are vested with discretion in deciding plea withdrawal motions because they are best able to determine whether a plea is entered voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently. It follows that a motion to withdraw a guilty plea will not be granted merely for the asking . . .. " (People v Alexander, 97 NY2d 482, 485 [2002]; see also People v Tinsley, 35 NY2d 926, 927 [1974]). When a defendant makes a motion to withdraw a guilty plea, a court is required to afford a reasonable opportunity to advance his claims so that the court can make an informed decision (People v Nixon, 21 NY2d 338, 355 [1967]; People v Tinsley, 35 NY2d at 927). It is the rare situation where a defendant would be entitled to a hearing on such motion, and typically, a limited questioning by the court is a sufficient prerequisite to a decision being rendered (People v Baret, 11 7 NY3d 31,33 [2008]; People v Fiumefreddo, 82 NY2d 536,544 [1993] [" .. .the nature and extent of the fact-finding procedure on such motions rest largely in the discretion of the court .... "]). Prior to sentencing, defendant filed a motion with the court asking to withdraw his guilty plea (R 158). On the date of sentencing, the court gave each side the opportunity to orally argue the motion. Both sides rested on the filed papers. After reviewing defendant's motion and the People's response, reviewing the plea minutes, and relying on defendant's statements made at the time his guilty plea was entered, the court, in exercising its discretion, made an informed decision and denied defendant's motion to withdraw his plea without a hearing (R 112). This was more than reasonable and provided the court with a clear understanding of defendant's arguments (People v Nixon, 21 NY2d at 355). No further inquiry was needed where "[ d]efendant had ample opportunity to advise the court of the grounds upon which he sought to withdraw the plea." (People v Nash, 229 AD2d 916 [4th Dept 1996], lv denied 88 NY2d 1023 [1996]; see also People v Sparcino, 78 AD3d 1508, 1509 [4th Dept 2010], lv denied 16 NY3d 746 [2011]). Clearly, in light of the thorough plea colloquy, defendant's "showing of involuntariness was too flimsy to warrant further inquiry" (People v Baret, 11 NY 3d 31, 34 [2008]). Moreover, County Court had the opportunity to see the defendant at the time of the plea and note the presence or absence of any indicia of intoxication, had defendant indeed been acting as strangely as later alleged. 8 Since there was no legitimate question as to whether or not defendant's guilty plea was voluntary (People v Brown, 14 NY3d 113, 116 [2010]), the court properly exercised its discretion in denying defendant's motion (see People v Guzman, 70 AD3d 1332 [4th Dept 2010], lv denied 16 NY3d 831 [2011]; People v Anderson, 63 AD3d 1617, 1618 [4th Dept 2009], lv denied 10 AD3d 1332 [2010]). Incidentally, the standard enunciated below by the Appellate Division, Fourth Department, is the same standard that is followed in the other three departments (see People v Patino, 119 AD3d 409 [1st Dept 2014]; People v Dym, 122 AD3d 878 [2d Dept 2014]; People v McKinney, 122 AD3d 1083 [3d Dept 2014]; People v Tinsley, 35 NY2d 926 [1974] ["Only in the rare instance will a defendant be entitled to an evidentiary hearing ... "]). In People v Brown, defendant had been promised a furlough if he were to plead guilty. Importantly, in that case the issue was whether the plea was being entered into voluntarily, a question the court never actually asked of defendant (14 NY3d at 115 [''The court never inquired whether defendant was pleading guilty voluntarily"]). Here, where an issue is whether defendant was threatened or forced into pleading guilty, he was specifically asked that very question, and answered in the negative (R 98). Additionally, it appears from the briefs filed in Brown that defendant in that case actually wrote or signed an affidavit. That is not the case here, and it appears that defendant in Fiumefreddo, supra, either did not sign an affidavit or did not include pertinent arguments on the motion to withdraw her plea. As the Brown 9 Court put it: "on the motion to withdraw the plea, the defendant [in Fiumefreddo] provided no information detailing her claim of coercion," whereas Brown himself "provided detailed allegations explaining the duress that he experienced ... " (People v Brown, supra, 14 NY3d at 117). B. The record belies defendant's claim that his plea was not knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily entered. Defendant's claim regarding the voluntariness of his plea is also belied by the record. "Whether a plea was knowing, intelligent and voluntary is dependent upon a number of factors, 'including the nature and terms of the agreement, the reasonableness ofthe bargain, and the age and experience of the accused" (People v Garcia, 92 NY2d 869, 870 [1998], quoting People v Hidalgo, 91 NY2d 733,736 [ 1998]). Additionally, the court will consider whether the consequences of the plea were carefully reviewed with the defendant and whether defendant indicated his understanding of such consequences (see People v Wilson, 38 AD3d 1326, 1327 [4th Dept 2007], lv denied 9 NY3d 853 [2007]). When this Court assesses these factors, it is clear that the defendant received an eminently fair bargain, which spared him exposure to a longer prison sentence. During the thorough plea colloquy, defendant admitted that he intentionally caused the death of Desiree Curry by throwing garden shears at her back (R 99). The record indicates that the court was careful in making sure the defendant understood all of the constitutional rights he was waiving by pleading guilty, that it was clear what, in fact, he was pleading guilty to and what his agreed-upon sentence range would be (R 96-98). 10 Defendant claims that his guilty plea was made under the duress of pressure from relatives who demanded that he accept the plea deal. However, the only record support for the current claim regarding aggressive behavior by the family members of the defendant and how distressed defendant became (Brief for Appellant at 4-5) is from the motion filed by counsel after the guilty plea was entered, and a report made by a doctor, weeks after the guilty plea was entered and after only a one hour interview of the defendant. Such facts cannot simply be accepted as true for purposes of this appeal and in any event, were considered and properly rejected by the trial court. Noticeably absent from defendant's motion to withdraw his guilty plea is an affidavit from defendant himself explaining what, if any, impact his family had on his decision to plead guilty. Since this current claim by the defendant concerns matters outside the record, defendant should bring such claim by way of a motion pursuant to CPL article 440, a vehicle he has apparently utilized at least twice before (although such motions and decisions are admittedly no part of this record). In any event, the Court of Appeals has "never recognized 'coercion' by family members as a reason for withdrawing a guilty plea" (People v Lewis, 46 NY2d 825, 826 [ 1978]). Even if defendant were pressured to plead guilty, when considering the thorough questioning by the court, that fact does not render the guilty plea involuntary or made under duress (People v Hernandez, 207 AD2d 659 [1st Dept 1994], People v Martin, 157 AD2d 674 [2d Dept 1990]). ll As defendant stated: THE COURT: Have you had enough time to talk to your attorney about all of this? MR. MANOR: Yes. THE COURT: Has anyone threatened or forced you to get you to plead guilty? MR. MANOR: No (R 98). Defendant's family was apparently agitated and upset on the day of defendant's guilty plea. Such was clearly to be expected due to the severity of the crime and the potential sentence defendant was facing. However, this does not equate to coercion or duress rendering defendant's guilty plea involuntary. The same is true for defendant's assertion that his plea was not voluntary due to the alleged use of alcohol and drugs at the time of his plea. This claim is also belied by the record due to defendant's response to the court's direct question on this subject: THE COURT: Have you taken any medication or alcohol today that would affect your ability to decide to plead guilty today? MR. MANOR: No (R 98-99). The only support for this claim in the record is a hearsay comment in the report of Dr. Weisman that the defendant allegedly told the doctor when they met for one hour. Defendant did not include this fact in any affirmation of his own with the motion to withdraw the guilty plea, nor did he include an explanation as to why he answered the question posed by the court in the negative (see People v Obert, I AD3d 631 [3d Dept 2003], lv denied 2 NY3d 764 [2004]). It was eminently reasonable for County Court to find that a doctor's long-retroactive diagnosis of 12 intoxication to be simply not credible and deserving of no further inquiry. Finally, defendant claims that his plea was not knowingly and voluntarily entered because he was not sufficiently advised as to the nature and consequences of the altemati ve plea offers. This claim is also belied by the record. At the time of defendant's guilty plea, counsel placed the following on the record: MR. LEPORE: The various options presented to Mr. Manor, Mr. Manor at this time is prepared to go forward and enter a plea of guilty to the first count of the indictment which is the murder charge, Murder Second I believe (R 96). And, as set forth above, the Court proceeded to ask questions of the defendant to confirm that he knew what the plea and sentence offers and agreements were (R 96-97). Further, accepting as true what is contained in the report of Dr. Weisman (R 178), defendant stated to the doctor that he was told of the plea bargain offer and discussed the case with his attorneys two days prior to November 30, 2009. Given the totality of all of these facts and defendant's statements during the plea colloquy, his claim that his guilty plea was not knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily entered is refuted by the record (People v Campbell, 62 AD3d 1265, 1266 [4th Dept 2009], lv denied 13 NY3d 795 [2009], People v McKoy, 60 AD3d 1374 [4th Dept 2009], lv denied 12 NY3d 856 [2009], People v Nimmons, 27 AD3d 1186, 1186-1187 [4th Dept 2006], lv denied 6 NY3d 851 [2006], People v Phillips, 41 AD3d 969 [3d Dept 2007]). 13 In this case, defendant received a sentence within the range for which he bargained. On the record before this Court, there is no basis to conclude that defendant's guilty plea was not knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily entered. It was also clearly within the court's discretion to deny defendant's motion to withdraw his guilty plea. The conviction should be affmned. 14 POINTD DEFENDANT RECEIVED EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL Defendant argues that his counsel was ineffective in not requesting an adjournment to be able to meet privately with him to ensure he understood the nature and consequences of the plea offer. He claims that counsel did not ensure that his decision to plead guilty was not the result of coercion and undue pressure. However, this claim is contradicted by the colloquy held at the time of defendant's guilty plea. Further, according to the doctor's affidavit attached to defendant's motion to withdraw his plea, defendant did have time to discuss the case with his attorneys two days prior to the scheduled trial date (R 178). On appeal, it is the defendant's burden "to demonstrate the absence of strategic or other legitimate explanations for counsel's failure to request a particular hearing" or for other allegedly deficient conduct (People v Rivera, 71 NY2d 705, 709 [1988]; see People v Biro, 85 AD3d 1570 [4th Dept 2011]). In New York it "is well settled that a defendant received effective assistance of counsel so long as the evidence, the law, and the circumstances of a particular case, viewed in totality and as of the time of the representation, reveal that the attorney provided meaningful representation. Isolated errors in counsel's representation generally will not rise to the level of ineffectiveness, unless the error is so serious that defendant did not receive a fair trial" (People v Montero, 100 AD3d 1555, 1555 [4th Dept 2012] [citations omitted], lv denied 21 NY3d 945 15 [2013], citing People v Baldi, 54 NY2d 137, 147 [1981] and People v Henry, 95 NY2d 563, 565-566 [2000]). "Counsel's performance must be evaluated to determine whether the tactics and strategies were consistent with those of a reasonably competent attorney. The test is reasonable competence, not perfect representation" (People v Oathout, 21 NY3d 127, 128 [2013]). According to the federal standard, "defense counsel is ineffective when his or her performance falls below an objective standard of reasonableness under prevailing professional norms." However, under this standard "the defendant's conviction will not be reversed unless there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different" (People v Hernandez, 22 NY3d 972, 974-975 [2013], cert denied 134 S Ct 1900 [2014], quoting Strickland v Washington, 466 US 668, 687-688 [1984]). Under either standard, there is nothing before this Court to indicate that defendant did not receive effective assistance of counsel. Here, defense counsel brought pertinent motions, conducted a hearing, and negotiated a favorable sentence agreement on behalf of the defendant. This is especially true considering that defendant stated on the record that he was satisfied with the representation he had received. The defendant knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily made a choice to plead guilty, which was his right. After the guilty plea was entered, when both counsel had time to discuss the defendant and meet with him further, they did apparently have concerns regarding the voluntariness of defendant's guilty plea. 16 Thus, as advocates, a motion to withdraw the guilty plea was filed, and counsel went so far as to have a psychiatric evaluation conducted. The fact that the motion was denied by the court is not dispositive. Looking in hindsight to information defense counsel placed in the motion to withdraw the guilty plea cannot negate the totality of the representation that defendant received. The record herein establishes that defendant received meaningful, competent, and zealous representation. The conviction should be affmned. 17 CONCLUSION Defendant's allegations that family pressure induced his plea were not legally sufficient to support his motion, and are belied by the record. Defendant's allegations that he was intoxicated at the time of the plea were readily confirmable by County Court, and are belied by the record. Defendant's allegations of ineffective assistance of counsel are belied by the record. The judgment of conviction should be affirmed. Dated: June 30, 2015 18 Respectfully submitted, SANDRA DOORLEY Monroe County District Attorney ~~ BY: ROBERT J. SHOEMAKER Assistant District Attorney Ebenezer Watts Building Suite 832 Rochester, NY 14614 STATE OF NEW YORK COURT OF APPEALS THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK, Respondent, -vs- TYRONE D. MANOR, Defendant-Appellant. STATE OF NEW YORK) COUNTY OF MONROE) SS: CITY OF ROCHESTER) AFFIDAVIT OF SERVICE BY MAIL Laurie Mastrocola, being duly sworn, deposes and says that deponent is not a party to this action, is over the age of eighteen ( 18) years and resides at Rochester, New York. That on the 1st day of July, 2015, deponent served three (3) copies ofBrieffor Respondent upon Kimberly Duguay, Esq., Assistant Public Defender, attorney for appellant in this action at 10 N. Fitzhugh Street, Rochester, New York 14614, by depositing a true copy of the same, enclosed in a postpaid properly addressed wrapper, in an official depository under the exclusive care and custody of the United States Postal Service within the State ofNew ~ork. _ . & db. J ALl .. 1 , fr1ur:JJ;,c · LAURIE MASTROCOLA Sworn to before me this 1st day of July, 2015. JEANNE T. HEllER 'OTARY PUBliC, State of N:~rO< 'Commission Expies Cd- *'~ STATE OF NEW YORK COURT OF APPEALS PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK, Respondent, -vs- PDF CERTIFICATION TYRONE D. MANOR, Defendant-Appellant. I, ROBERT J. SHOEMAKER, ESQ., certify that I am an attorney admitted to practice in the State of New York, and that I compared the PDF brief and it is identical to the filed original printed materials. DATED: July 1, 2015 ~~ ROBERTJ.SHOEMAKER,ESQ.