Search and Seizure - Standing

Brendlin v. California, 127 S.Ct. 2400 (2007)

When the police stop a vehicle that has a driver and passenger, the passenger is also “detained” for fourth amendment purposes. Therefore, if there was no basis for the stop, the passenger may contest the admissibility of any fruits of that stop (for which he has standing), such as a statement he made, or evidence seized from his person or personal belongings. He may also challenge the fruits of his illegal detention, which may include the search of the car in which he was a passenger.

Minnesota v. Carter, 119 S.Ct. 469 (1998)

The Supreme Court held that visitors to an apartment whose sole purpose in visiting was to package drugs did not have standing to contest a warrantless search of the apartment. Three Justices dissented, and two concurring Justices (Kennedy and Souter) stated that they believed that any social visitor to a house or apartment would have standing. Thus, five Justices would confer standing on a social visitor, even if not an overnight visitor.

United States v. Padilla, 508 U.S. 77 (1993)

The Ninth Circuit held that a co-conspirator retained an expectation of privacy in a vehicle which he enlisted another person to drive across the border with contraband. This “co-conspirator” standing rule was rejected by the United States Supreme Court. Only if the defendant’s own rights were violated may he complain; the privacy rights of co-conspirators are not pertinent. “Participants in a criminal conspiracy may have such expectations or interests, but the conspiracy itself neither adds nor detracts from them.”

Minnesota v. Olson, 495 U.S. 91 (1990)

An overnight guest in a residence has a reasonable expectation of privacy in the residence.

United States v. Walton, 763 F.3d 655 (7th Cir. 2014)

The fact that the defendant had left his home jurisdiction without permission from his parole officer and that he violated the rental car agreement by driving without a valid driver’s license did not mean that he did not have standing to challenge a search of the rental car he was driving.

United States v. Noble, 762 F.3d 509 (6th Cir. 2014)

The police were watching the Interstate for a vehicle that was suspected to be involved in a methamphetamine distribution operation. When the vehicle was spotted, an officer pulled behind it. The vehicle crossed a lane line without a proper signal. The officer activated his lights. The officer determined that the tint on the window was too dark. The driver and the passenger were excessively nervous. The driver consented to a search of the vehicle, at which point the passenger was asked to exit the vehicle and he was frisked. Because there was no basis to believe that he was armed or dangerous, there was no legitimate basis to frisk the defendant and the evidence derived from this frisk should have been suppressed. The officers then obtained a search warrant to search a hotel room where a co-conspirator was located and more evidence was located. The hotel occupant contested the search on the basis that the frisk was illegal and that evidence was used to obtain the search warrant. Though the hotel occupant did not have standing to challenge the frisk of the occupant of the vehicle, because the government never raised the standing issue, the issue was waived. The Sixth Circuit reviews the law in other Circuits and holds that the failure to raise the standing issue waives the government’s right to contest that issue on appeal.

United States v. Starks, 769 F.3d 83 (1st Cir. 2014)

The driver of a rental car has standing to contest the stop of the vehicle, even if he is not on the rental agreement as an authorized driver and has no driver’s license. The driver has no less right than he would have as a passenger, and a passenger has standing to contest an unlawful stop pursuant to Brendlin v. California. In this case, the person who rented the car permitted the defendant to drive, even though the rental agreement only allowed the renter or a domestic partner to drive the car.

United States v. Edwards, 632 F.3d 633 (10th Cir. 2001)

The defendant was arrested on the sidewalk near a parking lot. The court concluded that there was probable cause to support the arrest (a belief that the defendant had participated in a bank robbery). The police then searched a rental car, which had been rented by his girlfriend which was in the parking lot. The Tenth Circuit held that the defendant did not have standing to contest the search of the car in general, because he was not on the rental agreement, but he did have standing to challenge the search of the closed suitcases which he owned that were in the trunk of the vehicle. The court also held that the search was not a valid probable cause search of the vehicle, because there was no probable cause to believe that the car contained any evidence. The search was not a valid search incident to arrest, because the defendant was over 100 feet away from the car when he was arrested and he was handcuffed in the back of the patrol car (note, this case was decided pre-Gant). This was not an inventory search, because the police conceded that they were searching for evidence and had not decided to impound the car until the evidence was found.

United States v. Washington, 573 F.3d 279 (6th Cir. 2009)

The defendant had an expectation of privacy in the apartment in which he was staying. The apartment was his uncle’s. Though the apartment was being used for illegal purposes (drug dealing) this does not deprive the defendant of the right to assert standing to challenge an illegal entry and search of the apartment. Additionally, the fact that the uncle was occasionally behind in his rent (and violated the terms of the lease by engaging in illegal conduct in the unit) did not affect the standing issue. Even if the landlord had the ability to evict the tenants, until he does so, the tenant, and his guest, have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the apartment.

United States v. Hamilton, 538 F.3d 162 (2d Cir. 2008)

The defendant purchased a house and put it in his girlfriend’s name and she lived there. He came and went as he pleased. He actually went there two or three times per weeks for years. The defendant did not have keys to the house. The district court held that the defendant did not have standing to contest the search of the house. The Second Circuit reversed: “There is no authority for the proposition that one need live in the premises, or exercise control over them, in order to emjoy a privacy interst in those premises.”

United States v. Finley, 477 F.3d 250 (5th Cir. 2007)

The defendant had standing to contest the search of his cell phone, even though the phone had been provided to him by his business.

United States v. Olivares-Rangel, 458 F.3d 1104 (10th Cir. 2006)

If a defendant is illegally seized or arrested and as the result of that illegal arrest, the defendant makes a statement, the defendant’s identity is learned, and his illegal status is ascertained, the court may suppress all the evidence. The suppression of the defendant’s statement is governed by Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590 (1975). The suppression of the identity evidence (as well as the defendant’s “A-file”) is more complicated. The government argued that INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032 (1984), holds that the identity of the defendant may never be suppressed. The Tenth Circuit rejected this argument. The defendant, himself, may not be suppressed (i.e., he may be brought to court), but evidence derived from the illegal detention may be suppressed, including fingerprint evidence in certain circumstances (see Davis v. Mississippi, 394 U.S. 721 (1969); Hayes v. Florida, 470 U.S. 811 (1985)) and independently created and maintained government records. The fact that the defendant does not have an expectation of privacy in the government records is not relevant. The standing issue focuses on the defendant’s rights regarding the illegal arrest. The defendant need not have an expectation of privacy in the fruits that are the result of the unlawful arrest. In other words, the defendant is not required to prove an expectation of privacy in both the primary violation and the fruits. If his expectation of privacy was violated, the fruits of that violation may be suppressed, regardless of whether the fruits are discovered in a place for which the defendant does not have an expectation of privacy.

United States v. Mosley, 454 F.3d 249 (3rd Cir. 2006)

If the police stop a car without an articulable suspicion, the discovery of contraband in the car must be suppressed, even in a prosecution of a passenger. Though Rakas v. Illinois indicates that the passenger has no expectation of privacy in the car, the passenger’s motion to suppress is predicated on his unlawful detention and the fruit of that unlawful detention, rather than on the expectation of privacy in the automobile. The court’s opinion runs twenty pages and comprehensively reviews the law of “fruit”.

United States v. Thomas, 447 F.3d 1191 (9th Cir. 2006)

The Ninth Circuit held that an unauthorized driver of a rental car has standing to contest the search of the car if the authorized driver gave permission to the unauthorized driver to drive.

United States v. Waller, 426 F.3d 838 (6th Cir. 2005)

The defendant was evicted from one apartment where he was living with friends and asked another friend if he could store some of his belongings in his apartment. The friend agreed. Shortly thereafter, the police obtained an arrest warrant for the defendant and arrested him outside the friend’s apartment. He acknowledged coming out of that apartment. The police obtained the friend’s consent to search the apartment. The police searched throughout the apartment and found guns in what turned out to be the defendant’s suitcase. He was prosecuted for possession of the guns. The Sixth Circuit held that the evidence should have been suppressed. The defendant had standing to challenge the search of his suitcases and the apartment owner did not have actual, or apparent authority to search the suitcases. The officers did not reasonably believe that the apartment owner had authority to grant consent to search the defendant’s personal belongings that were stored there.

United States v. Thomas, 372 F.3d 1173 (10th Cir. 2004)

A social guest – even one who does not spend the night – has standing to challenge a search of an apartment.

United States v. Bautista, 362 F.3d 584 (9th Cir. 2004)

The defendant checked into a hotel room with what the hotel later learned was a stolen credit card. The management called the police and asked them to investigate, though the hotel had not yet made the decision to evict the defendant. The police went to the door, announced who they were and demanded, “Open the door” and then used a pass key to open it. Inside was the defendant’s wife, who backed up from the door (which she was opening at the same time the pass key was used to unlock it) and she said, “Come in.” They then obtained her consent to search the room and discovered counterfeit paraphernalia. The Ninth Circuit held that the evidence had to be suppressed: First, the defendant had standing, because the hotel had not yet made the determination to evict him and had not terminated his right of occupancy and the police had not yet made the decision to evict him. Both the police and the hotel were still investigating the information relating to the alleged stolen credit card. With regard to the issue of consent, the police officers’ command, “Police, open the door!” negated any suggestion of consent. “The government may not show consent to enter from the defendant’s failure to object to the entry.” Note that this decision was limited in a subsequent Ninth Circuit decision, United States v. Cunag, 386 F.3d 888 (9th Cir. 2004).

United States v. Gomez, 276 F.3d 694 (5th Cir. 2001)

The police went to a house that had been identified by a tip as a stash house. The police talked to the defendant, who answered the front door. He declined to give consent to search the house but said that the agent could search the garage. The police then searched a truck in the driveway that the defendant had said belonged to his cousin. The question is whether the defendant had standing to contest the legality of the search of the truck. The Fifth Circuit concluded that a homeowner has a reasonable expectation of privacy in a vehicle owned an operated by a third party but parked on the homeowner’s driveway. The court stressed that his expectation of privacy was based, in part, on the fact that the truck was part of the unlawful enterprise (storing drugs) in which he took part. The court canvassed the law regarding a homeowner’s standing to contest “containers” owned by visitors, even if the homeowner did not know the contents. Many of the decisions uphold a homeowner’s expectation of privacy in that situation.

United States v. Best, 135 F.3d 1223 (8th Cir. 1998)

A driver who is not on the rental agreement, but who has the permission of the person who rented the car to drive the vehicle, has standing to contest a search of the vehicle.

United States v. Cooper, 133 F.3d 1394 (11th Cir. 1998)

The driver of a rental car which is overdue has standing to contest a search of the vehicle.

United States v. Blaze, 143 F.3d 585 (10th Cir. 1998)

The defendant was the only person listed on the rental car agreement permitted to drive the car. When the police stopped the car, however, the defendant was not in the car and another person was driving it. He had no standing to contest the search of the car. However, in the car was located a briefcase which belonged to him. The briefcase was locked and was in the locked trunk. Having entrusted the locked briefcase to his associates, the defendant did not abandon his expectation of privacy and he had standing to contest the warrantless search. (Having won the standing issue, the defendant then lost the issue of whether the evidence would inevitably have been discovered).

United States v. Baker, 221 F.3d 438 (3rd Cir. 2000)

A passenger in a car that he neither owns nor leases typically does not have standing to challenge a search of the car. A person who steals a car has no standing to challenge a search of the car. However, a person who borrows a car has a reasonable expectation of privacy and may challenge a search of the car. Moreover, any discrepancy between the defendant’s statement about who owns the car and the title is not enough to deprive him of an expectation of privacy in the vehicle, assuming it is not shown that the vehicle is stolen.

United States v. Vega, 221 F.3d 789 (5th Cir. 2000)

The police entered a house that was leased to the defendant after it was placed under surveillance. The government argued that the defendant lacked standing to contest the warrantless entry because one of defendant’s colleagues fled, leaving the side door open and, later, when the defendant was questioned, he denied living at the house. The court rejected both these theories. The fact that a door is left open does not defeat the defendant’s reasonable expectation of privacy in the premises. And the defendant’s denial that he lived there, in the face of interrogation, did not deprive him of standing to contest the warrantless entry into the house. Finally, the fact that the defendant used the premises for illegal purposes did not forfeit his right to contest the search.

United States v. Kimball, 25 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 1994)

When a police officer effects a stop of a vehicle, all of the occupants have had their freedom of movement restrained, and thus all of the occupants have been seized. The passengers, as well as the driver, may feel that they are not free to leave once they have been stopped by the police. Therefore, if the stop is illegal, fruits of that stop, including evidence found in the car, must be suppressed in a trial involving the passengers of the car. In this case, the stop was lawful.

United States v. Cardona-Sandoval, 6 F.3d 15 (1st Cir. 1993)

The crewmembers of a ship laden with drugs had standing to contest a search of the internal structure of the boat. The contraband was secreted in a hollowed-out part of a structural beam. The court found standing based on the cramped nature of the boat, the right of crewmembers to exclude non-crew members from the vessel, and the crewmembers’ duty to maintain the security of the boat.

United States v. Fields, 113 F.3d 313 (2d Cir. 1997)

The police searched an apartment and discovered cocaine. The two defendants who were arrested challenged the legality of the search. One defendant paid the tenant for the privilege of using the apartment and had a key. He had standing. The other defendant was a visitor who had stayed overnight on occasion, but was not shown to be an overnight visitor on this occasion. Nevertheless, he had standing, as well. The decision in Minnesota v. Olson, 495 U.S. 91 (1990), is not limited to overnight guests.

United States v. Osoria, 949 F.2d 38 (2d Cir. 1991)

Defendant was an overnight guest in the apartment of an acquaintance. Though he had not originally intended to stay overnight, when the acquaintance failed to return home (having been arrested), the defendant went to sleep in a spare bed. The police engaged in a warrantless search of the apartment. The defendant had standing to contest this search. See Minnesota v. Olson, 495 U.S. 91 (1990).

United States v. Jenkins, 92 F.3d 430 (6th Cir. 1996)

The owner of a tractor-trailer has standing to contest a search of the trailer, even if he is not in possession of the trailer at the time of the search.

United States v. Sangineto-Miranda, 859 F.2d 1501 (6th Cir. 1988)

Although a casual visitor at an apartment did not have standing to challenge the warrantless search of the apartment, a person who had been afforded unrestricted access to the apartment, “just as any member of the lessee’s family,” does have standing.

United States v. Blanco, 844 F.2d 344 (6th Cir. 1988)

A bailee may have an expectation of privacy in portions of a rented automobile for purposes of standing to object to the search of the car.

United States v. Dumas, 94 F.3d 286 (7th Cir. 1996)

The defendant was in a van that was stopped by a trooper. He argued that the search of his person was a violation of the Fourth Amendment. The government and the lower court held that he did not have standing, because he did not own the vehicle that was stopped. This misses the point. The defendant had standing to contest the search of himself, as well as his seizure when the vehicle was stopped.

United States v. Garcia, 897 F.2d 1413 (7th Cir. 1990)

The defendant was stopped in a car for speeding. The driver said he had borrowed a car from a friend named McClavio. The police ultimately searched in the doors of the vehicle and found marijuana. The next day, McClavio reported the truck stolen. The Seventh Circuit holds that the driver had standing to contest the search of the vehicle. Because the car was not reported stolen until the next day, and may very well have been reported stolen in order to distance McClavio from the occupants of the car, the government failed to sustain its burden of disproving standing by a preponderance of the evidence. In short, the government failed to prove the vehicle was, in fact, stolen.

United States v. Barry, 853 F.2d 1479 (8th Cir. 1988)

A defendant checked a suitcase full of stolen property at a public baggage claim counter in the name of a proposed buyer. He intended to deliver the claim check to the buyer. He had standing to object to the warrantless entry into the suitcase. Because the defendant had not turned over possession of the goods to the buyer, he still had an expectation of privacy in the suitcase.

United States v. Echegoyen, 799 F.2d 1271 (9th Cir. 1986)

An invited overnight guest had an expectation of privacy in the residence and thus had standing to contest the search of the home. He had permission to be in the residence at the time of the searches and had an interest in the items seized due to his involvement in the cocaine processing operation located there.

United States v. Shareef, 100 F.3d 1491 (10th Cir. 1996)

While an occupant of a car does not have standing to challenge a search of the vehicle, if the passenger is detained unlawfully and the search of the vehicle is the fruit of this unlawful detention, the evidence may be suppressed.

United States v. Mena, 863 F.2d 1522 (11th Cir. 1989)

The defendant’s ship was boarded by law enforcement agents. Pursuant to 46 U.S.C. App. §1903(d) the government argued that only the flag nation of the ship has standing to challenge a search of a vessel. The trial court agreed and barred the defendants from filing a suppression motion. The Eleventh Circuit disagreed: Although there is ambiguity in the statute, the Court held that Congress would have specifically barred defendants from challenging the government’s non-compliance with the terms of §1903(a) if that were the congressional intent.

United States v. Morales, 847 F.2d 671 (11th Cir. 1988)

Defendants were convicted of possession of cocaine while on board a vessel of United States registry. The trial court held that crewmembers did not have standing to seek suppression of evidence seized from the boat. The Court of Appeals reverses: While neither captain nor crew has a legitimate expectation of privacy in an area which is subject to the common access of those legitimately aboard the vessel, crew men do have standing to challenge the search of specific areas such as sleeping quarters and private spaces such as foot lockers and duffel bags. Here, the police officers had to destroy part of the area in which the defendant did have standing in order to get access to the area of the boat where the drugs were found. The Court holds that this gives them standing to challenge the search.

United States v. Miller, 821 F.2d 546 (11th Cir. 1987)

The driver of a car borrowed from a friend has standing to challenge the search of the car.