NJ rejects the state’s prior subjective inadvertence requirement of the plain view doctrine

The prior subjective inadvertence requirement of the plain view doctrine is rejected prospectively only. State v. Gonzales, 2016 N.J. LEXIS 1177 (Nov. 15, 2016) (summary by the court):

The Court now excises the inadvertence requirement from the plain-view doctrine. Because it is setting forth a new rule of law, the Court will apply the reformulated plain-view doctrine prospectively. Nevertheless, the Court holds that the trial court’s finding of inadvertence is supported by credible evidence in the record. The Court therefore reverses the judgment of the Appellate Division and reinstates the trial court’s denial of the motion to suppress.

1. The Court notes that both the New Jersey and Federal Constitutions protect against “unreasonable searches and seizures” and forbid the issuance of a warrant absent “probable cause.” N.J. Const. art. I, ¶ 7; see U.S. Const. amend. IV. Warrantless searches are prohibited unless an exception to the warrant requirement applies such as the plain-view doctrine, which authorizes an officer to seize evidence or contraband that is in plain view. (pp. 15-16)

2. The United States Supreme Court established the factual predicates necessary to satisfy the plain-view exception in Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 465-72, 91 S. Ct. 2022, 2037-41, 29 L. Ed. 2d 695, 582-87 (1984). …

3. In Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128, 110 S. Ct. 2301, 110 L. Ed. 2d 112 (1990), the United States Supreme Court interred the inadvertence requirement as a predicate for a plain-view seizure of evidence. The majority of the Court found that other aspects of search-and-seizure jurisprudence protect against the concerns that the inadvertence requirement aimed to address. The Court also rejected the inadvertence requirement because it necessitated a subjective inquiry into the officer’s state of mind. The Court thus explicitly stated that inadvertence was not a necessary predicate to a plain-view seizure, a position that a majority of states have since adopted. (pp 20-23)

4. Before Horton was decided, this Court adopted the Coolidge plurality’s formulation of plain view in Bruzzese. Even in espousing the three-prong plain-view standard, however, the Court expressed the view that the standard of objective reasonableness governs the validity of a search or seizure. This Court continued to apply the three-part test in the post-Horton era, but without occasion to assess whether a plain-view seizure would pass muster in the absence of inadvertence. (pp. 23-26)

5. The Court stresses the preference for objective standards over subjective inquiries in both federal and New Jersey search-and-seizure jurisprudence. (pp. 27-29)

6. The Court now excises the inadvertence requirement from the plain-view doctrine. The Court finds subjective inquiry into an officer’s motives to be at odds with the standard of objective reasonableness that applies to a police officer’s conduct under the New Jersey Constitution. The Court notes that the constitutional limiting principle of the plain-view doctrine is that the officer must lawfully be in the area where he observed and seized the item, and that it must be immediately apparent that the seized item is evidence of a crime. Because the Court sets forth a new rule of law, the Court will apply the reformulated plain-view doctrine prospectively. (pp 29-32)

7. Thus, the Court applies the now-defunct three-part plain-view test to the facts of this case. The Court concludes that all three parts of the test were met. The motor-vehicle violations gave the officers a reasonable and articulable suspicion to stop Gonzales’s car, and Officer Perez’s training made the nature of the spilled items “immediately apparent.” Finally, the trial court’s finding that the discovery was inadvertent was supported by sufficient credible evidence in the record, and the appellate panel should have deferred to that finding. (pp 32-35)

8. The Court observes that the appellate panel also erred in finding that the police lacked exigent circumstances to act, stressing that the officers were not required to watch helplessly as Gonzales drove away with what the authorities reasonably believed was a cache of drugs. Here, again, the plain-view observation of the spilled heroin provided the basis for the seizure of the contraband. (pp 35-36)

9. The Court provides guidance as to the limits of the plain-view exception and the continuing need to obtain a warrant when there is sufficient time to do so. (pp 36-37)