M.D.Fla.: The automobile exception is based on inherent mobility, and the fact the defendant is handcuffed and the police have the keys is “inconsequential”

The automobile exception is based on inherent mobility, and the fact the defendant is handcuffed and the police have the keys is “inconsequential.” United States v. Collins, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 101003 (M.D.Fla. May 31, 2016), adopted, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 101001 (M.D.Fla. Aug. 2, 2016):

Defendant argues, however, that the automobile exception does not apply here because the Infiniti was incapable of mobility since Defendant had been subdued and handcuffed by the deputies before the search occurred. Docs. 21 at 11-13; 42 at 4-7. This argument is without merit. The automobile exception is premised on the inherent mobility “in all automobiles that reasonably appear to be capable of functioning.” United States v. Nixon, 918 F. 2d 895, 903 (1990). In other words, “[a]ll that is necessary to satisfy this element is that the automobile is operational.” United States v. Watts, 329 F. 3d 1282, 1286 (11th Cir. 2003). The Eleventh Circuit rejected a similar argument that the automobile exception does not apply, for example, “because [the defendant] was already in custody and police officers had possession of his car keys at the time of the search.” States v. Birdsong, 982 F.2d 481, 483 (11th Cir. 1993). Thus, whether Defendant was under arrest and incapable of driving the vehicle away is inconsequential.

Defendant cites United States v. Navas, 597 F.3d 492 (2d Cir. 2010), in support of his argument that the ready and inherent mobility of an automobile is a precondition. Doc. 21 at 12. While the general proposition is true, the Navas court rejected the precise argument that Defendant raises here, that the vehicle was incapable of mobility because Defendant already was detained. In Navas, the Second Circuit decided whether a warrantless search of a trailer that was unhitched from its cab was permissible under the automobile exception. 597 F.3d at 497. In holding that it was, the court held that the inherent mobility of the vehicle, “not the probability that it might actually be set in motion” or “the potential for the vehicle to be moved from the jurisdiction” is the foundation of the mobility rationale. Id. at 498. Thus, the fact that the defendants were under arrest and incapable of driving the vehicle away was insignificant, for “[a]lthough the arrestees were detained and the warehouse was secured by the agents, these facts had no bearing on the inherent mobility of the trailer itself.” Id. at 500. Although not controlling on this Court, the Navas decision and its rationale are consistent with Eleventh Circuit precedent that “[a]ll that is necessary … is that the automobile is operational.” Watts, 329 F.3d at 1286. Its decision, therefore, is persuasive authority and provides further support for the Court’s conclusion.