Guilty Pleas - Miscellaneous

United States v. Paladino, 769 F.3d 197 (3rd Cir. 2014)

Even if there is a stipulated sentence in a plea agreement, the defendant must be given the opportunity to allocute. The judge retains the authority to sentence the defendant below the stipulated sentence.

United States v. Adame-Hernandez, 763 F.3d 818 (7th Cir. 2014)

When a judge accepts a guilty plea that is part of a binding, 11(c)(1)(C) plea, but defers accepting the agreement, if the court later decides to reject the agreement, all that the court may do is offer the defendant the opportunity to withdraw the plea. The district court is not authorizecd to withdraw or otherwise negate the plea. Here, after rejecting he plea agreement, the court withdrew the plea itself.

United States v. Arqueta-Ramos, 730 F.3d 1133 (9th Cir. 2013)

Mass guilty plea proceedings violate the requirement in Rule 11 that the court “address the defendant personally in open court.” While the court may advise more than one defendant at a time about the rights that are being waived by entering a guilty plea, each defendant must individually be questioned about his or her understanding of the rights and the voluntariness of any waiver of the rights that occurs upon the entry of a guilty plea.

United States v. Lewis, 633 F.3d 262 (4th Cir. 2011)

The plea agreement in this case contained language that indicated that it was a “binding” plea agreement (Rule 11(c)(1)(C)), because it said that the sentence “shall run concurrent” with a state sentence currently being served, rather than “the government would recommend that the sentence run concurrent” with the state sentence. Other parts of the plea agreement stated that the government “would recommend” certain Guideline decisions. The court’s colloquy with the defendant at the plea was also ambiguous. The Fourth Circuit holds that the judge should have treated this portion of the plea as binding and given the defendant the right to withdraw the plea.

United States v. Frownfelter, 626 F.3d 549 (10th Cir. 2010)

The defendant entered a guilty plea to a charge that was, as a matter of law, a misdemeanor. The judge, the prosecutor and the defendant, however, believed it was a felony. After the plea was entered and the defendant was sentenced, the government acknowledged that it was actually a misdemeanor and urged the court to simply vacate the plea under the contractual theories of “mutual mistake” or “frustration of purpose.” The Tenth Circuit rejected the government’s theory and ordered the district court to vacate the sentence and re-sentence the defendant to a misdemeanor sentence consistent with the charge to which he pled guilty.

United States v. Mancinas-Flores, 588 F.3d 677 (9th Cir. 2009)

During the plea colloquy, the judge asked the defendant if was guilty. The defendant’s response was that there were no fingerprints connecting him to the crime. The judge asked again if the defendant was pleading guilty because he was guilty, to which the defendant responded, “Well, I’m really not guilty.” The judge promptly ordered that a jury be brought upstairs and commenced the trial. On appeal, the defendant claimed that rejecting his plea agreement was an abuse of discretion. The Ninth Circuit agreed, holding that the judge failed to set forth the factual reason for rejecting the plea. In addition, the judge never explained the charges to the defendant, so his protestation of innocence may have reflected his lack of understanding of the charges. A remand to permit the defendant to enter a guilty plea pursuant to the plea agreement was ordered.

United States v. Self, 596 F.3d 245 (5th Cir. 2010)

If the district court does not intend to adhere to the terms of a binding plea agreement that was entered pursuant to Rule 11(c)(1)(C), the court must clearly state that the court rejects the plea agreement in toto. In this case, the trial court advised the defendant that the court would accept the plea except as to the sentence on one of the counts. The court may not accept a binding plea in part. This should have been more accurately explained to the defendant so that he could have made a decision whether to withdraw his plea.

United States v. Roblero-Solis, 588 F.3d 692 (9th Cir. 2009)

The practice of advising 40 or 50 defendants at a time of the Rule 11 rights and procedures is not permissible, even if the actual entry of the guilty plea and factual basis is handled on an individual basis. There is no practical way that even the most conscientious judge can be assured that 40 or more defendants (some of whom do not speak English) are fully understanding the rights that are being waived when a plea is entered.

United States v. McIntosh, 580 F.3d 1222 (11th Cir. 2009)

The defendant entered a guilty plea to certain charges and the court unconditionally accepted the plea. Prior to sentencing, the government moved to dismiss the indictment because of an error in a date and presented a second indictment which corrected the error. The defendant objected, claiming that jeopardy had attached. The defendant then conditionally entered a plea to the second indictment. The Eleventh Circuit held that jeopardy had attached and the defendant could not be prosecuted under the second indictment for the same offense.

In re Gallaher, 548 F.3d 713 (9th Cir. 2008)

The defendant, with the consent of the government tendered a conditional plea that would have enabled him to appeal a certain pretrial ruling. Rule 11(a)(2). The district court judge deferred ruling on whether he would agree to accept the conditional plea until after he reviewed the PSR. He reviewed the PSR, but then rejected the conditional plea. Because a PSR may only be reviewed by a judge after a plea has been accepted (unless the defendant consents otherwise), Rule 32(e)(1), the case would have to be re-assigned to a different district court judge.

In re Morgan, 506 F.3d 705 (9th Cir. 2007)

A district court judge may not summarily reject all plea agreements that contain a recommendation by the prosecution as a matter of policy. The district court must make an individualized decision regarding any plea agreement and whether to accept or reject the agreement and cannot establish his own policy of rejecting all government recommendations that are contained in a plea agreement.

United States v. Rea-Beltran, 457 F.3d 695 (7th Cir. 2006)

The trial court repeatedly rejected the defendant’s attempt to enter a guilty plea, based on the defendant’s apparent lack of understanding of the proceedings, his statement that he did not want to forego certain pretrial motions and his statement that he did not know that he entered the country illegally. The defendant did, however, repeatedly attempt to plead guilty. The Seventh Circuit held that the trial court erroneously refused to accept the tendered plea. With regard to the defendant’s statement that he did not know that he was committing a crime, this did not amount to a protestation of innocence, because the defendant’s knowledge of the prohibition was not an element of the offense.

Ferrara v. United States, 456 F.3d 278 (1st Cir. 2006)

Twelve years ago, the defendant entered a guilty plea to a RICO case that charged various predicate offenses, including murder. A key witness for the government provided a statement implicating the defendant in one of the charged murders. Later, however, he recanted and told the AUSA and the case agents that the defendant was not involved in the murder. The AUSA and agents met once again with the witness and he recanted his recantation. The witness’s recantation was never provided to the defense, despite Brady obligations that were ongoing pursuant to the Constitution and Local Rules. The defendant entered a guilty plea, though during the plea colloquy, he never admitted participation in the murder. Years later, the witness’s recantation was revealed. The District Court granted § 2255 relief. The First Circuit affirmed, concluding that the government’s conduct amounted to a violation of Brady and amounted to gross governmental misconduct.

In re: Vasquez-Ramirez, 443 F.3d 692 (9th Cir. 2006)

A trial court does not have the authority to reject the entry of a guilty plea. The court can reject the plea agreement, but not a plea of guilty. An unconditional guilty plea must be accepted. Rule 11(a)(1), Fed.R.Crim.P.

United States v. Hodge, 412 F.3d 479 (3rd Cir. 2005)

In a case involving a package deal, the parties must reveal this to the district court judge. Thus, where one defendant’s plea is accepted by the government under the condition that other defendants enter pleas, as well, the trial court must take “special care” in determining the voluntariness of the pleas of all defendants. See generally Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357 (1977).

United States v. Howard, 381 F.3d 873 (9th Cir. 2004)

The defendant offered proof in his § 2255 petition that he was under the influence of a powerful narcotic drug (painkiller) at the time he entered his guilty plea and that his attorney was aware of this. The district court erred in not conducting an evidentiary hearing to inquire into the factual support for this claim.

United States v. Bennett, 332 F.3d 1094 (7th Cir. 2003)

Where a plea agreement is part of a package deal involving other defendants, or third parties, the trial court should be apprised of the existence of this “package” and should ensure that the plea has been entered into voluntarily by the defendant.

United States v. Gibson, 356 F.3d 761 (7th Cir. 2004)

Shortly after the trial began, the defendant entered into a binding plea agreement that provided for a 262-month sentence. Unfortunately, the attorneys for the government and the defense agreed that this would be achieved by pleading to one count – a § 371 count – that only carried a five year maximum sentence. The appellate court held that the plea would be vacated and the case remanded for further proceedings.

United States v. Stubbs, 279 F.3d 402 (6th Cir. 2002)

Defendant was charged with conspiring to possess firearms in connection with a drug offense (18 U.S.C. §924(o)) but entered a guilty plea to possessing a firearm in connection with a drug offense (§ 924(c)). This tainted the guilty plea and as a matter of law it could not have been a knowing and voluntary plea. Not only do these statutes have different elements (one is a conspiracy, the other is a substantive offense), but they also have different sentence provisions. Finally, the court held that an appeal waiver did not apply. Here, the plea agreement itself was invalid; not just the sentence.