A suit over an allegedly defective truck is the stage for the latest entry in the debate whether the claim pleading standards clarified in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007), and Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937 (2009), apply to affirmative defenses as well.
In Hayne v. Green Ford Sales Inc., 2009 WL 5171779 (D. Kan. 12/22/09), defendants plead standard affirmative defenses to the breach of warranty claim, including statute of limitations, contributory fault, failure to mitigate damages, assumption of risk, superseding/intervening act, waiver, failure to use product in manner designed or intended, and estoppel. Plaintiffs moved to strike the defenses under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(f).
The court, sua sponte, noted that the motion to strike raised the issue as to what pleading standard applies to affirmative defenses. Recognizing that the courts have split on the issue so far, the district court found that the Twombly/Iqbal standard for pleading a claim also applies to defenses.
Courts that have applied the heightened pleading standard to affirmative defenses: CTF Dev., Inc. v. Penta Hospitality, LLC, 2009 WL 3517617, at *7-8 (N.D.Cal. Oct. 26, 2009) Tracy ex rel. v. NVR, Inc., 2009 WL 3153150, at *7-8 (W.D.N.Y. Sept. 30, 2009); FDIC v. Bristol Home Mortg. Lending, LLC, 2009 WL 2488302, at *2-4 (S.D.Fla. Aug. 13, 2009); Teirstein v. AGA Medical Corp., 2009 WL 704138, at *6 (E.D.Tex. Mar. 16, 2009); Greenheck Fan Corp. v. Loren Cook Co., 2008 WL 4443805, at *1-2 (W.D.Wis. Sept. 25, 2008); Stoffels ex rel. SBC Tel. Concession Plan v. SBC Commc'ns, Inc., 2008 WL 4391396, at *1 (W.D.Tex. Sept. 22, 2008); Safeco Ins. Co. of Am. v. O'Hara Corp., 2008 WL 2558015, at *1 (E.D. Mich. June 25, 2008); Holtzman v. B/E Aerospace, Inc., 2008 WL 2225668, at *2, (S.D.Fla. May 28, 2008); United States v. Quadrini, 2007 WL 4303213, at *3-4 (E.D.Mich. Dec. 06, 2007).
The court observed that "parties do not always know all the facts relevant to their claims or defenses until discovery has occurred." But to equate the plaintiff's knowledge, or lack of knowledge, after months or perhaps years of possible preparation and investigation, and having full access to plaintiff, the product, and key fact witnesses in most cases, to the defendant's ability in a few short days after being served to know all the relevant facts, is a completely unfair comparison. While the court said it did not mean to "suggest that heightened pleading requires the assertion of evidentiary facts. A minimal statement of only ultimate facts should suffice," the better reasoned decisions are cases like First Nat'l Ins. Co. of Am. v. Camps Servs., Ltd, 2009 WL 22861, at *2 (E.D.Mich. Jan. 5, 2009) (finding Twombly's analysis of the “short and plain statement” requirement inapplicable to affirmative defenses); and Romantine v. CH2M Hill Eng'rs, Inc., 2009 WL 3417469, at *1 (W.D.Pa. Oct. 23, 2009) (declining to apply Twombly to affirmative defenses).
The Supreme Court addressed in Twombly the requirements for a well-pled complaint under Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)'s “short and plain statement” requirement. No such language, however, appears within Rule 8(c), the applicable rule for affirmative defenses. As such, Twombly 's analysis of the “short and plain statement” requirement of Rule 8(a) is inapplicable to a motion under Rule 8(c).
As posted about before, the plaintiffs' bar is seeking to get these Supreme Court cases overturned in Congress. The possible application of the rule to affirmative defenses shouldn't make any defendants re-think opposition to the legislation. But the handful of courts that have applied the standard to defenses raise a yellow flag for defendants.