Defendant’S Appearance At Trial - Shackling

Deck v. Missouri, 125 S. Ct. 2007 (2005)

Shackling the defendant, even during the sentencing phase of a death penalty trial, violates due process. A defendant may not be forced to appear in shackles unless the trial court has found that such restraint is warranted by an essential state interest specific to the particular defendant.

United States v. Haynes, 729 F.3d 178 (2d Cir. 2013)

The trial court improperly ordered that the defendant be shackled during trial, despite the absence of any findings on the record regarding the need to shackle the defendant. The government indicated during oral argument that shackling the defendant is a routine practice in the NDNY and that the Marshal’s office communicates directly with the judge in each case about the need to shackle detained defendants. The Second Circuit condemned this practice (shackling is appropriate only when there is an on-the-record finding that shackling is necessary as a last resort to satisfy a compelling reason, such as the preservation of safety in the courtroom) and held that, along with various other errors at trial, necessitated reversing the conviction.

United States v. Banegas, 600 F.3d 342 (5th Cir. 2010)

The defendant was shackled at trial because, according to the judge, she always shackled pro se defendants. Though the evidence was unclear whether the jury could see the shackles, the burden was on the government to prove that the jury did not see the shackles; the burden was not on the defendant to show that the jury did see the shackles. The conviction was reversed.

United States v. Miller, 531 F.3d 340 (6th Cir. 2008)

The defendant’s attorney expressed fear about sitting at counsel table with the defendant and said that the defendant had threated her. The court declined to allow her to withdraw from representing the defendant, but required the defendant to wear a stun belt during trial. The Sixth Circuit held that the trial court failed to make an adequate inquiry prior to using the stun belt. There was no hearing and no evidence, other than the attorney’s statement. The defendant, however, never complained. The Sixth Circuit held that use of the belt was not plain error.

Gray v. Moore, 520 F.3d 616 (6th Cir. 2008)

Before a defendant may be removed from the courtroom because of his misbehavior, the trial court must warn the defendant of the consequences of his actions. Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337 (1970). Because the state trial court promptly removed the defendant from the courtroom when he yelled at a witness, “You’re lying” without warning the defendant of the consequences of his outburst, a writ of habeas corpus was granted.

Lakin v. Stine, 431 F.3d 959 (6th Cir. 2005)

It was error, but harmless, for the state court to shackle the defendant without having made a case-by-case determination of the necessity, and simply deferring to the request of the corrections officer’s request.

Ruimveld v. Birkett, 404 F.3d 1006 (6th Cir. 2005)

The defendant, an inmate in a state prison, was charged with poisoning a guard (putting cleaning fluid in the guard’s coffee). During trial, which occurred in a courtroom in the prison, the defendant was shackled. The Sixth Circuit granted a writ. Even in this situation – a known prisoner, in a prison courtroom – the defendant should not be shackled absent proof of the need for this procedure.

United States v. Durham, 287 F.3d 1297 (11th Cir. 2002)

The Eleventh Circuit holds that the district court made insufficient findings regarding the use of a stun belt during trial. Though the belt was apparently not seen by jurors, the defendant claimed that his fear that the belt would be activated by the marshals deterred him from talking to his counsel during trial, or making any movements at defense table. He became preoccupied during trial that he would be stunned and could not concentrate on the evidence.

Gonzalez v. Pliler, 341 F.3d 897 (9th Cir. 2003)

Based on the Eleventh Circuit decision in Durham, the Ninth Circuit held that the state court’s use of a stun belt was not supported by any findings of the trial court. The case was remanded to the lower court for a hearing on the question of prejudice.

Rhoden v. Rowland, 172 F.3d 633 (9th Cir. 1998)

Shackling the defendant during trial in a manner that was visible to the jury is inherently prejudicial. Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337 (1970); Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S. 501 (1976); Holbrook v. Flynn, 475 U.S. 560 (1986). When the shackling was unnecessary, it is reversible error.