Confession - Miranda – In Custody Requirement

J.D.B. v. North Carolina, 131 S. Ct. 2394 (2011)

The suspect’s age is a factor that the court must consider in deciding whether the defendant would reasonably believe that he was “in custody” and thus whether Miranda warnings were required.

Howes v. Fields, 131 S. Ct. 1047 (2012)

The prisoner in this case was not “in custody” when he was asked by sheriff’s deputies to answer questions about another investigation. The defendant was brought to a conference room in another building in the prison, but was not restrained and and was specifically told that he was free to leave.

Maryland v. Shatzer, 130 S. Ct. 1213 (2010)

In Edwards v. Arizona, the Court held that once the defendant invokes the right to counsel during custodial interrogation, the police must cease interrogation and can never re-initiate interrogation. The question in this case is whether the “never can re-initiate questioning” rule applies even if the defendant is released from custody? The Court holds that once the defendant is released from custody (and that includes being returned to general population in prison, which is not “in custody” for Miranda purposes), the police may re-initiate questioning after fourteen days. In other words, if the defendant invokes his right to counsel and is later released from custody, the police must wait at least fourteen days prior to contacting the defendant and interrogating him.

Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652, 124 S.Ct. 2140 (2004)

In this habeas case, the Supreme Court held that the state court did not unreasonably apply controlling Supreme Court doctrine when it held that a suspect’s age is not factor to be considered in deciding whether he is “in custody” for Miranda purposes. The Court did not definitively hold that age is not a factor, but simply held that in the context of a habeas petition, the state court did not err in holding that age is not a factor. The Court indicated, however, that whether a suspect is “in custody” should be decided under a strict objective standard – not a subjective evaluation of whether the suspect in this case believed he was in custody. The suspect’s age, lack of experience with the criminal justice system, or other psychological factors, are not relevant considerations, because the police cannot be expected to know all of these characteristics of the suspect and would not know, consequently, when Miranda warnings are necessary. Note, again, that this is a habeas case and the Court did not definitively decide this question; rather, it simply held that lower federal courts should have deferred to the state court habeas decision.

Stansbury v. California, 511 U.S. 318 (1994)

In a per curiam opinion, the Supreme Court reiterates that the question whether a person is in custody for Miranda purposes focuses on the objective circumstances, not the subjective intent of the police officer. While an officer’s knowledge or beliefs may bear upon the custody issue if they are conveyed by word or deed to the individual being questioned, the officer’s personal view of whether he was going to let the suspect go, or not, is irrelevant, in and of itself. The officer may be asked about his intent, insofar as this may be relevant in testing his or her credibility of what happened during an interrogation.

Illinois v. Perkins, 496 U.S. 292 (1990)

The defendant was in jail on charges unrelated to a murder which the police were investigating. The police put an undercover agent in the jail cell block who elicited a confession from the defendant about the murder. The confession was admissible. His right to remain silent and his right to counsel were not violated. Because the essential ingredients of a “police dominated atmosphere” were missing, there was no need for the undercover agent to advise the defendant of his Miranda rights. The atmosphere in the prison was not coercive, at least not with respect to the undercover agents’ conversation with the defendant. The Sixth Amendment was not implicated, because no murder charges had been filed against the defendant at the time of the “interrogation.” Thus, the decisions in Massiah and United Statesv. Henry and Maine v. Moulton are all distinguishable. In those cases, the undercover agent questioned the defendant about the charges which had already been filed against the defendant, and for which his Sixth Amendment rights had attached.

United States v. Borostowski, 775 F.3d 851 (7th Cir. 2014)

When the police executed a search warrant at the defendant’s house, he was handcuffed and confined to a small room for three hours. This satisfied the “in custody” requirement of Miranda. While the agents’ statement to the defendant “You are not under arrest” is relevant, it did not counterbalance the other factors that would lead a reasonable person to believe that he was not free to leave.

United States v. IMM, 747 F.3d 754 (9th Cir. 2014)

For purposes of Miranda, the juvenile defendant was in custody when he was questioned. He was in a police interrogation room. As far as the juvenile could determine, the room was locked (he was told that if he needed to go to bathroom, he should knock on the door and obtain a detective’s permission. The police station was located 30 – 40 minutes from his home. He was alone in the room. Though his mother had been told that the juvenile was not in custody, the question must be addressed from the defendant’s point of view, not his mother’s.

United States v. Hashime, 734 F.3d 278 (4th Cir. 2013)

Though he was told that he was not under arrest, the defendant was awaken by numerous armed agents who were executing a search warrant in his house. He was taken at gunpoint to a storage room where he was questioned for several hours and told that during the execution of the search warrant, he must remain under guard. The defendant was in custody and the failure to Mirandize him required that the confession be set suppressed.

United States v. Cowan, 674 F.3d 947 (8th Cir. 2012)

The defendant was in custody when he was handcuffed, patted down, and questioned. The encounter occurred in an apartment that was being searched pursuant to a search warrant. The defendant was a visitor in the apartment. When the search started, he was handcuffed and ordered to produce identification. He was then asked questions about where he had come from and why he had car keys in his possession if he had taken the bus there. The defendant’s statements were not preceded by Miranda warnings and his statements should have been suppressed.

United States v. Cavazos, 668 F.3d 190 (5th Cir. 2012)

Fourteen law enforcement officers executed a search warrant at the defendant’s house. He was handcuffed and led into the kitchen and separated from his family. Thereafter, the handcuffs were removed and he was brought to a bedroom where he sat the bed and two officers sat across from him and questioned him. He was told that he was not in custody. The Fifth Circuit held that the number of agents involved, the movement of the defendant around the house while he was continuously monitored, the fact that he was initially handcuffed, all led the conclusion that he was in custody for Miranda purposes.

United States v. Rogers, 659 F.3d 74 (1st Cir. 2011)

The defendant, a soldier, was ordered to return to his home by his commanding officer. There, he was questioned by police, but expressly told that he was not under arrest. In an opinion by retired Justice David Souter, the First Circuit held that the defendant was “in custody” for Miranda purposes because of the compulsion resulting from his military status and orders from his superiors.

United States v. Villa-Gonzalez, 623 F.3d 526 (8th Cir. 2010)

The defendants were in custody when they were confronted and questioned on the porch outside their trailer. Several law enforcement officers questioned the brothers. They were accused of being drug dealers. Their identification papers were taken from them. This amounted to a seizure of Fourth Amendment purposes and for Miranda purposes.

United States v. Slaight, 620 F.3d 816 (7th Cir. 2010)

A Judge Posner opinion on the definition of “in custody” for Miranda purposes concludes that the defendant was in custody, even though the police told him he was “free to leave.” The police used a battering ram to gain entry into the defendant’s house with a search warrant. After the dust settled, the police “invited” him to come to the police station to be interviewed about child pornography on his computer. He agreed and was placed in a small interview room in the police station. The room was approximately eight by eight and had no window. The defendant knew the police had already discovered the child porn on his computer. The defendant eventually confessed. The court also notes that some police manuals advise the police to tell the suspect that he is not in custody in order to avoid having to Mirandize the suspect, and after the defendant confesses the defendant should be Mirandized. The Seventh Circuit reverses, holding that the failure to advise the defendant of his Miranda warnings was error.

United States v. Chavira, 614 F.3d 127 (5th Cir. 2010)

At the initial border checkpoint, the defendant was not in custody during routine questioning. But when she was brought to a secondary processing, the situation changed dramatically. She was handcuffed to a chair; the officers already knew that she had made a false statement and acknowledged that she was not free to leave; the officers stated that they intentionally did not Mirandize her, because they wanted her to confess first; the questioning was clearly not limited to routine immigration questions; her identification papers had been confiscated and were in possession of the agents.

Simpson v. Jackson, 615 F.3d 421 (6th Cir. 2010)

The defendant was in custody in the prison when investigators came to interview him about a murder case. The Surpeme Court vacated and remanded for further consideration in light of Howes v. Fields.

United States v. Brobst, 558 F.3d 982 (9th Cir. 2009)

When the defendant arrived home, agents were executing a search warrant at his house. He was directed to “come with me” by one of the agents and was confronted with the fact that the agents had located child pornography in the house. The Ninth Circuit concluded that the defendant was “in custody” for Miranda questioning and he should have been advised of his rights.

United States v. Craighead, 539 F.3d 1073 (9th Cir. 2008)

The police questioned the defendant in his home without Mirandizing him. The government argued that the defendant was not in custody – he was in his own home and was told that he was not in custody. The Ninth Circuit holds that the defendant was in custody and that he should have been Mirandized. Interrogations in the home, particularly where, as here, the police are executing a search warrant and therefore are not in the home with the defendant’s consent, may be more “custodial” than interrogations elsewhere. Moreover, telling the defendant that he is free to leave is a rather unusual suggestion, because the defendant is in his own home and it is not a sign of “freedom” that he has been invited by the police to leave his own home. The court rhetorically asked, “Where will he go? The library? The police station? He is already in the most constitutionally protected place on earth: [his own home].”

United States v. Colonna¸ 511 F.3d 431 (4th Cir. 2007)

The defendant was in custody, for Miranda purposes, when twenty-three officers went to his house, kicked open his bedroom door and at gunpoint, ordered him to get dressed and come downstairs. Despite the fact that one officer told the defendant that he was not under arrest, his circumstances amounted to being in custody and he should have been Mirandized before being interrogated.

United States v. Mittel-Carey, 493 F.3d 36 (1st Cir. 2007)

Agents were executing a search warrant at the defendant’s house. The agents went into his bedroom, where he was asleep, ordered him to get up and get dressed. He was escorted downstairs. He was questioned for a period of time. He was allowed to go to the bathroom and to speak with his girlfriend when she left to go to work. The agents left without arresting him. The First Circuit held that the defendant was “in custody” for Miranda purposes and the statements he made were properly excluded by the trial court.

United States v. Martinez, 462 F.3d 903 (8th Cir. 2006)

The police spotted the defendant, who generally matched the description of a man who recently robbed a bank. The police approached him and told him about the robbery. He responded that he had a lot of money in his pocket. He was frisked and when the police found the money, they handcuffed him. He then was further questioned and made incriminating statements. The Eighth Circuit held that when the defendant was handcuffed, he was in custody for Miranda purposes and his subsequent statements were inadmissible. The court rejected the notion that a Terry stop (as opposed to an arrest) does not trigger the necessity for Miranda warnings. A detention that does not rise to the level of an arrest may still be sufficiently “custodial” to necessitate warnings before interrogation. See generally Berkemer v.McCarty, 468 U.S. 420 (1984); Thompson v. Keohane, 516 U.S. 99 (1995).

United States v. Ollie, 442 F.3d 1135 (8th Cir. 2006)

The defendant’s parole officer instructed him to go to the police station and talk with the chief about a pending investigation. The defendant did so, but was not Mirandized by the police when he arrived at the station. The Eighth Circuit holds that the defendant was in custody during this questioning and his statement should have been suppressed. Though Minnesotav. Murphy, 465 U.S. 420 (1984), had held that an interview with a probation officer need not be preceded by Miranda warnings, in this case, the defendant was “ordered” by the parole officer to speak with the police chief, thus creating a reasonable expectation that failure to speak would result in consequences.

United States v. Jacobs, 431 F.3d 99 (3rd Cir. 2005)

The defendant, a confidential informant for the police, was in-custody when she was asked to come to the police station and then confronted with evidence of her criminal activity. Among the factors considered by the Third Circuit was the confrontational and intimidating nature of the questioning, the location of the questioning, and the officer’s belief, which he conveyed to the defendant, that she was guilty. In addition, the defendant believed that she was still an active informant for the FBI and was required to continue cooperating with the agency.

Reinert v. Larkins, 379 F.3d 76 (3rd Cir. 2004)

The defendant was in custody when he made a statement to the police while in an ambulance. Harmless error.

A.M. v. Butler, 360 F.3d 787 (7th Cir. 2004)

The state court determined that the defendant was not “in custody” when he was being interrogated. The state trial court’s failure to take into account the fact that the defendant was an 11-year old at the time he was being interrogated amounted to an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law. (This decision was reached while Yarborough v.Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652, 124 S.Ct. 2140 (2004) was pending in the Supreme Court; the Seventh Circuit cited the lower court’s decision in Yarborough that held that age is a relevant factor in deciding the question of custodial status).

United States v. Newton, 369 F.3d 659 (2d Cir. 2004)

In deciding whether a person is “in custody” for Miranda purposes, one factor is whether the defendant is “free to leave” at the time the questioning occurs. But this factor is not outcome determinative, because a motorist stopped for a motor vehicle offense is not “free to leave” but is not entitled to Miranda warnings prior to being questioned. Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420 (1984). Rather, the “free to leave” factor is just one of the factors; other factors include whether the questioning occurs in a coercive atmosphere, whether the defendant was handcuffed, the length of time involved in the detention, the public versus private setting, the number of officers involved in the stop, and presence of firearms being brandished by the police. The ultimate question is whether the defendant was subject to “formal arrest or restraint on freedom of movement of the degree associated with a formal arrest.” California v.Beheler, 463 U.S. 1121, 1125 (1983). In this case, the defendant was “in custody.” The fact that he was expressly told that he was not under arrest did not establish that he was not, in fact, in custody for Miranda purposes. The court went on to hold, however, that the “public safety” exception exempted the police from issuing a Miranda warning.

Parsad v. Greiner, 337 F.3d 175 (2d Cir. 2003)

The state court’s determination that the defendant was not in custody for Miranda purposes was an unreasonable determination of the facts, but the error in admitting the defendant’s statement was harmless. Police officers told the defendant that they were going to take him to the police station to talk to him (he was homeless). Once at the station, the defendant removed his pants, which further inhibited his ability to leave.

United States v. Clemons, 201 F.Supp.2d 142 (D.D.C. 2002)

The stop of the defendant’s vehicle was justified, because the defendant was driving on two flat tires. The court determined that this was a Terry stop and not a full-scale arrest. Nevertheless, for Miranda purposes, the defendant was “in custody” and therefore should have been read his rights when the police started questioning him about the ownership of guns that were found in the car. See also United States v. Perdue, 8 F.3d 1455 (10th Cir. 1993).

United States v. Chamberlain, 163 F.3d 499 (8th Cir. 1998)

The defendant was a state prisoner who worked in a prison office that had computers. The police suspected he was involved in obtaining child pornography. He was interviewed in the office of the prison. The Eighth Circuit concluded that he was “in custody” for Miranda purposes during this interview. Though all interrogations of suspects who are already incarcerated is not necessarily “custodial,” in this case, the defendant was escorted to the room where he was interviewed; the room was in a secure area; he was never told that the questioning was voluntary, or that he could leave.

Tankleff v. Senkowski, 135 F.3d 235 (2d Cir. 1998)

The defendant was in custody, and should have been Mirandized, when the police questioned him for several hours, and told him (untruthfully) that the victim had come out of a coma and accused the defendant of the assault. At that point in the questioning, when he was accused of the crime, he would not have felt free to leave. Nevertheless, the defendant's subsequent Mirandized statement was admissible.

United States v. Byram, 145 F.3d 405 (1st Cir. 1998)

The defendant was in custody on a parole violation warrant. While in the courthouse lock-up awaiting a hearing on this charge, the police questioned him about a murder case involving a friend (and, ultimately, the defendant). The defendant was taken to another room in the courthouse by the police before he was questioned. The defendant was “in custody” and should have been Mirandized.

United States v. Madoch, 149 F.3d 596 (7th Cir. 1998)

Law enforcement agents entered the defendant’s house and arrested her husband. She was escorted into the kitchen and questioned for several hours. During the course of the questioning, she was permitted to go to the bathroom to pump her breast milk, but only with a female agent watching. The totality of the circumstances demonstrated that she was not free to leave and she should have been advised of her Miranda rights.

United States v. Doe, 878 F.2d 1546 (1st Cir. 1989)

The Coast Guard seized a vessel on the high seas and questioned the defendants about their citizenship. In light of the circumstances, Miranda warnings should have been issued.

United States v. Ali, 68 F.3d 1468 (2d Cir. 1995)

Miranda warnings are required whenever a person is in custody. This includes a detention short of an arrest. Thus, if a suspect is interrogated in the context of a Terry stop, Miranda warnings are still necessary. In this case, the defendant was asked to step away from the boarding area, his travel documents were removed and he was surrounded by seven officers with visible handguns. This amounted to being in custody – the defendant would not have felt free to leave – and statements he made without being Mirandized should have been suppressed. The Second Circuit reached this decision on the basis of the trial record after deciding that a remand was not necessary because the question is a legal question. See 86 F.3d 275 (2d Cir. 1996).

United States v. Johnson, 846 F.2d 279 (5th Cir. 1988)

Although postal inspectors advised the suspect that he was not under arrest, their inquiries took the form of demands and their hostile reactions to the suspect’s explanations altered the nature of the contact into an arrest.

United States v. Griffin, 922 F.2d 1343 (8th Cir. 1990)

An “interview” of a bank robbery suspect in his home amounted to an arrest and should have been preceded by Miranda warnings. The defendant was never told that he was under arrest and was not physically restrained; nevertheless, he was not told that he could leave and when he walked around the house to get cigarettes, an agent would accompany him. Among the factors to be considered in determining whether the defendant was in custody are: (1) whether he was told that he was free to leave; (2) whether he had unrestrained freedom during the course of the interview; (3) whether the suspect contacted the agents, or the agents approached the suspect at the beginning of the interview; (4) whether strong-arm or deceptive practices were utilized by the agents; (5) whether the atmosphere of the interview was “police dominated”; (6) whether the suspect was formally arrested at the conclusion of the interview.

United States v. Carter, 884 F.2d 368 (8th Cir. 1989)

A bank employee was brought to the bank president’s office and questioned by postal inspectors. No Miranda warnings were given. The mere fact that the questioning occurred at the accused’s place of employment does not detract from the fact that the questioning was clearly custodial in nature. The improper interrogation spoils not only the confession given in the room but a subsequent written confession as well.

United States v. Longbehn, 850 F.2d 450 (8th Cir. 1988)

A police officer was suspected of criminal conduct. Although he was not placed under formal arrest, his forced removal from the work place to his home represented a de facto arrest. Under the totality of the circumstances, the suspect’s freedom of action was curtailed to a degree associated with formal arrest. The failure to give Miranda warnings tainted the subsequent statements.

United States v. Ricardo, D., 912 F.2d 337 (9th Cir. 1990)

The Ninth Circuit concludes that the detention of the juvenile during field questioning amounted to a de facto arrest. The juvenile was patted down, gripped by the arm, told he was not to run, and directed to the back of one of two patrol cars present at the scene. This conduct transformed the investigatory stop into an arrest.

United States v. Perdue, 8 F.3d 1455 (10th Cir. 1993)

Defendant was properly stopped based on an articulable suspicion, pursuant to Terry v. Ohio, when he approached property in a rural location that was being searched. He was ordered out of the car at gunpoint, handcuffed and ordered to lie down on the ground, as was his pregnant fiancée. He was asked what he was doing there and responded that he was there to check out his marijuana. Though this was a Terry stop, and not a full-scale arrest, Miranda warnings were required. Miranda warnings are not necessary for every Terry stop (Berkemer v.McCarty, 468 U.S. 420 (1984)), but where, as here, the Terry stop involves a degree of force and a show of authority which represents a significant curtailment of the defendant’s freedom, the warnings are required. See also United States v. Smith, 3 F.3d 1088 (7th Cir. 1993). A subsequent interrogation, which followed this initial questioning and which was preceded by Miranda warnings was tainted by the improper use of force and was thus involuntary, despite Miranda warnings. Helicopters were flying overhead; the defendant was told that his pregnant fiancée could go free if he confessed; the questioning occurred in an isolated rural area; fifteen to twenty law enforcement officers surrounded the defendant.

United States v. Griffin, 7 F.3d 1512 (10th Cir. 1993)

The defendant and her friend were approached by agents at the airport. Currency was seized from them and they were brought to the police office where they stood in a conference room while the money was counted. The defendant was then asked to come into a small room with a police officer who began to question her. The only way out of the room was past the officer; she was never advised of her right to refuse to answer questions, or to leave; she was separated from her friend; questioning continued even after the defendant made incriminating statements. Given these facts, the defendant was “in custody” and should have been given full Miranda warnings.

United States v. Adams, 1 F.3d 1566 (11th Cir. 1993)

The government agents tracked a plane leaving U.S. airspace heading south. When the plane returned to U.S. airspace several hours later, the agents followed the plane to the landing site, ordered the pilot to lie down on the tarmac, emptied the pilot’s suitcase, ordered him to remain where he was, and held him at gun point. The pilot was “in custody” and his un-Mirandized statements should not have been admitted. Harmless error.

Jacobs v. Singletary, 952 F.2d 1282 (11th Cir. 1992)

After running a roadblock and having had her car shot at by police, the defendant crashed her car. When she emerged from the car, she was confronted by several officers with guns drawn. One officer asked her if she liked shooting at troopers. Her response (“We had to.”) was inadmissible. The defendant was in custody at the time she exited the car and because the police did not Mirandize her, this was improper interrogation. The state’s claim that the question was merely rhetorical and thus, not “interrogation,” was not persuasive. “Assuming arguendo the question was rhetorical, if the accused is in custody, the police do not read the accused her rights and a question is asked and answered, then the statement must be suppressed.”