The important issues of ascertainability and choice of law led a federal court to deny class certification in litigation relating to the dietary supplement VPX Meltdown Fat Incinerator. See Karhu v. Vital Pharm., Inc., No. 13-60768 (S.D. Fla., 3/3/14).
Plaintiff filed a class complaint against Vital Pharmaceuticals Inc. to recover damages based upon VPX's alleged false advertisements, and to enjoin any further alleged misrepresentations. He sought to bring the suit on behalf of all persons in the United States who have purchased Meltdown for purposes other than resale since April 4, 2008. The claims included: (1) breach of express warranty under the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act ("MMWA"), 15 U.S.C. § 2301, et seq.; (2) breach of
express warranty; (3) unjust enrichment; and (4) violation of the Florida Deceptive and Unfair Trade Practices Act ("FDUTPA"), Fla. Stat. § 501.201, et seq.
The court concluded that the case would be unmanageable as a class action. First, the court saw no practical method of verifying membership in the proposed Class of Meltdown purchasers. No central record of Meltdown customers existed, and it was unlikely that each Meltdown purchaser since 2008 has retained a proof of purchase. Second, the claims of the Nationwide Class would implicate the laws of multiple states. The varied requirements of the states' laws would require different proof on each claim depending on the locations of the class members. These legal permutations would render an eventual trial unwieldy, and would overshadow the common factual questions that otherwise allegedly united the class members' claims.
Regarding ascertainability, a plaintiff seeking class certification must first craft a class definition clear enough to allow the court to understand whether a particular individual is a member of the class, and that membership is ascertainable. A class is ascertainable only if the court can determine whether a given person is a class member through administratively feasible methods. See In re Checking Account Overdraft Litig., 286 F.R.D. 645, 650–51 & n.7 (S.D. Fla. 2012). Here, plaintiff failed to propose a realistic method of identifying the individuals who purchased Meltdown. The courts have come to recognize that purchasers are less likely to retain receipts or other records of minor purchases, and thus cannot rely on those proofs to ascertain the identities of class members. See Red v. Kraft Foods, Inc., 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 186948, at *14–19 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 12, 2012).
Nor could the court trust individuals to identify themselves as class members through the submission of affidavits. Accepting affidavits of Meltdown purchases without verification would deprive VPX of its due process rights to challenge the claims of each putative class member. On the other hand, having VPX contest each affidavit would require a series of mini-trials and defeat the purpose of class-action treatment. Using affidavits to determine class membership would also invite fraudulent submissions and could dilute the recovery of genuine class members, said the court.
Regarding predominance, the court noted that the MMWA does not define a stand-alone federal cause of action for breach of express written warranty, but instead borrows state law causes of action for breach of both written and implied warranties. Under choice of law analysis, the law governing each class member's warranty claim is the law of the state where he or she purchased the Meltdown. The court noted that state law varied on issues such as privity and reliance. In short, varied state laws would govern the MMWA claims of class members across the country, imposing different legal requirements and overshadowing the allegedly common factual bases of the claims. Moreover, some of these laws would require individualized proof inappropriate for class treatment. In light of the differences among applicable laws and the potential need for individualized proof, the court found that individualized legal and factual issues predominate over the common aspects of the proposed class MMWA claims, rendering class certification inappropriate under Rule 23(b)(3).
Class certification denied.