Woodside Cotton Mills Co.

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Mar 2, 1940

21 N.L.R.B. 42 (N.L.R.B. 1940)

In the Matter Of WOODSIDE COTTON MILLS COMPANY and TExTII.E
WORKERS ORGANIZING COMMITTEE 1
Case No. C-1353 .-Decided March 2, 1940
Cotton Print Cloth Manufacturing Industry-Interference , Restraint, and
Coercion : separate allegations of, dismissed-Collective Bargaining : refusal to
recognize union as exclusive representative following certification by the Board
by refusal to accept Union's recognition proposal ; submitting recognition pro-
posal qualifying recognition upon continuing proof of majority ; conferences
without intention of reaching agreement ; held refusal to bargain collectively.
Mr. Alexander E. Wilson, Jr., Mr. John C. McRee, and Mr. War-
ren -Woods, for the Board.
Mr. Barry Wright, of Rome, Ga., and Messrs. Haynsworth do
Haynsworth, of Greenville, S. C., for the respondent.
Mr. Seth P. Brewer, of Charlotte, N. C., for the Union.
Miss Marcia Hertzmark, of counsel to the Board.
DECISION
AND
ORDER
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Upon charges and amended charges duly filed by Textile Workers
Organizing Committee, herein called the Union, the National Labor
Relations Board, herein called the Board, by the Regional Director
for the Tenth Region (Atlanta, Georgia), issued its complaint dated
May 24, 1939, against Woodside Cotton Mills Company, Greenville,
South Carolina, herein called the respondent, alleging that the re-
spondent had engaged in and was engaging in unfair labor practices
affecting commerce, within the meaning of Section 8 (1) and (5) and
Section 2 (6) and (7) of the National Labor Relations Act, 49 Stat.
449, herein called the Act. Copies of the complaint and accompany-
ing notice of hearing were duly served upon the respondent and the
Union.
'The name of the Union was changed to Textile Workers Union of America at a con-
vention on May 15, 1939.
21 N. L. R. B., No. 7.
42
WOODSIDE COTTON MILLS COMPANY 43
Concerning the unfair labor practices, the complaint alleged in
substance (1) that on August 16, 1938, and at all times thereafter,
the respondent refused to bargain collectively with the Union as the
exclusive representative of its employees in an appropriate unit al-
though the Union had been so certified by the Board; and (2) that
from December 1, 1937, to the date of the issuance of the complaint
the respondent urged, persuaded, and warned its employees to re-
frain from becoming or remaining members of the Union, thereby
interfering with its employees' right to self-organization.
On June 1, 1939, the respondent filed a motion to strike certain
portions of the amended charge and the complaint and a motion to
require the Union to amend its "amended charge" and to require the
Board to amend the complaint. Both motions sought to secure a speci-
fication of the unfair labor practices alleged under Section 8 (1) of
the Act, and, in the event of a denial of the motions, sought a post-
ponement of,the hearing. On June 3, 1939, the respondent filed -its
answer, admitting the allegations of the complaint as to interstate
commerce and as to the unit alleged to be appropriate for the pur-
poses of collective bargaining, but denying the commission of the
unfair labor practices alleged and setting forth facts to show that
the respondent had bargained in good faith with the Union.
Pursuant to notice, a hearing was held at Greenville, South Caro-
lina, on June 8 and 9, 1939, before William P. Webb, the Trial Ex-
aminer duly designated by the Board. The Board and the respond-
ent were represented by counsel and participated in the hearing.
A representative of the Union appeared in its behalf. Full oppor-
tunity to be heard, to examine and cross-examine witnesses, and to
introduce evidence bearing on the issues was afforded all parties. At
the commencement of the hearing and at the conclusion of the Board's
case, the respondent renewed its motions to strike and to amend,
and ruling thereon was reserved by the Trial Examiner. The Trial
Examiner granted a motion by counsel for the Board to conform
the pleadings to the proof. During the course of the hearing the
Trial Examiner made a number of other rulings on motions and on
objections to the admission of evidence. The Board has reviewed
the rulings of the Trial Examiner and finds that no prejudicial errors
were committed. The rulings are hereby affirmed. After the hear-
ing the respondent submitted a brief to the Trial Examiner.
On August 31, 1939, the Trial Examiner filed his Intermediate
Report, copies of which,were duly served upon all the parties, finding
that the respondent had engaged in unfair labor practices within the
meaning of Section 8 (1) and (5) of the Act. Inasmuch as no evi-
dence had been introduced to sustain the allegations of the complaint
that the respondent, by urging, persuading, and warning its em-
44 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
ployees to refrain from becoming or remaining members of the
Union, had engaged in unfair labor practices, within the meaning
of Section 8 (1) of the Act, the Trial Examiner recommended the
dismissal of the complaint in that respect. In view of this recom-
mendation the Trial Examiner denied the motions of the respondent
to strike and to amend. We concur in the Trial Examiner's recom-
mendation and affirm his ruling on the respondent's motions to strike
and amend. The respondent thereafter filed exceptions to the In-
termediate Report and requested permission to argue orally and to
file a brief. Upon permission granted by the Board, the respondent
filed a brief in support of its contentions.
Pursuant to notice, a hearing was held before the Board in Wash-
ington, D. C. on January 18, 1940, for the purpose of oral argument.
The respondent was represented by counsel. The Union did not
appear. The Board has considered the respondent's exceptions to
the Intermediate Report, and its brief and oral argument in sup-
port thereof, and, in so far as the exceptions are inconsistent with
the findings, conclusions, and order set forth below, finds no merit in
them.
Upon the entire record in the case, the Board makes the following :
FINDINGS OF FACT
1. THE BUSINESS OF THE RESPONDENT
The Woodside Cotton Mills Company, a South Carolina corpora-
tion, is engaged in the manufacture of cotton print cloths. It op-
erates three plants, one at Greenville, one at Simpsonville, and one
at Fountain Inn, all in Greenville County, South Carolina. The
Greenville plant is the only one involved in this proceeding.
In 1938 the respondent purchased, for use at its Greenville plant,
$745,899.62 worth of cotton, 82 per cent of which had its origin
within the State of South Carolina and 18 per cent of which came
from outside the State. Practically all of the respondent's supplies
come from States other than South Carolina although they are pur-
chased by the respondent from local dealers. The respondent's total
sales of products manufactured at its Greenville plant in 1938
amounted to $1,235,519.32. All sales are made through a commis-
sion house in New York City, Iselin-Jefferson Company. Approxi-
mately all of the respondent's finished product ultimately goes out
of the State of South Carolina after having been delivered to the
warehouse of William Iselin & Co. in Greenville for redelivery to
various points.
During the years 1937 and 1938 the respondent employed an aver.
age of 998 persons in its Greenville plant.
WOODSIDE COTTON MILLS COMPANY 45
II. THE ORGANIZATION INVOLVED
Textile Workers Organizing Committee, now known as Textile
Workers Union of America, is a labor organization affiliated with
the Congress of Industrial Organizations, admitting to membership
production and maintenance employees in the textile industry.
III. THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
A. Allegations concerning interference, restraint, and coercion
The complaint alleged that the respondent urged, persuaded, and
warned its employees to refrain from becoming or remaining mem-
bers of the Union. No evidence was introduced to sustain the
allegations, and the Trial Examiner recommended the dismissal of
the complaint in that respect. No exceptions were filed by the Union.
We shall order that the complaint be dismissed in so far as it alleges
that the respondent has urged, persuaded, and warned its employees
to refrain from becoming or remaining members of the Union.
B. The refusal to bargain
1. The appropriate unit
On June 16, 1938, we found that the production and maintenance
employees of the respondent's Greenville plant, excluding clerical
and supervisory employees and watchmen, constituted a unit appro-
priate for the purposes of collective bargaining, within the meaning
of Section 9 (b) of the Act 2 The unit so found is not contested here.
We find that the production and maintenance employees of the
respondent at its Greenville plant, exclusive of clerical and super-
visory employees and watchmen, constitute a unit appropriate for
the purposes of collective bargaining with respect to rates of pay,
wages, hours of employment, and other conditions of employment,
and that said unit insures to employees of the respondent the full
benefit of their right to self-organization and to collective bargaining
and otherwise effectuates the policies of the Act.
2. Representation by the Union of the majority in the
appropriate unit
In our previous Decision we directed that an election be held by
secret ballot to ascertain whether or not the employees in the afore-
said appropriate unit desired to be represented for the purposes of
collective bargaining by the Union. Pursuant to the Direction of
2 Matter of Wood8ide Cotton Mills Company and Textile Workers Organizing Committee,
7 N. L. R . B. 960.
46 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Election, balloting was conducted on June 27, 1938, which resulted in
a majority vote being cast for the Union. On July 26, 1938, we
certified the Union as the sole collective bargaining agent in the
aforesaid unit.3
We find that on July 26, 1938, and at all times thereafter, the
Union was the duly designated representative of a majority of the
respondent's employees in the appropriate unit, and that by virtue
of Section 9 (a) of the Act it was the exclusive representative of all
the employees in said unit for the purposes of collective bargaining
with the respondent in respect to rates of pay, wages, hours of em-
ployment, and other conditions of employment.
3. The refusal to bargain
(a) The course of negotiations
On August 16, 1938, following the certification of the Union by
the Board, representatives of the respondent and the Union met for
the purposes of collective bargaining. At the meeting, which was
held in the respondent's offices, the Union was represented by Eliza-
beth Hawes, State Director of the Union, J. R. Coope, its local rep-
resentative, Ralph Simmerson, a representative of the Columbia,
South Carolina, Branch of the Union, and four members employed
by the respondent; and the respondent by S. M. Beattie, its president,
W. H. Beattie, its treasurer, and M. O. Alexander, its general super-
intendent. The union representatives presented to the respondent's
officers a proposed contract providing for recognition of the Union
as the exclusive bargaining agent for "all" of the respondent's em-
ployees except executives, office ^ employees, and certain :supervisory
employees; seniority in lay-offs and reemployment provided the
worker involved was competent; a 40-hour week; an increase in
wages which would restore a 121/2-per cent wage cut effected during
the preceding summer ; and for a closed shop and check-off system
of collecting dues. It also set forth a method for handling griev-
ances and for arbitration of disputes and bound the parties to forego
strikes, lock-outs, slow-downs, speed-ups or "any other controversy"
which would interfere with production.
The respondent's officers had not previously seen the proposed con-
tract and there was little discussion concerning its provisions except
that S. M. Beattie, the respondent's president and principal spokes-
man, objected to the section providing for an increase in wages. He
pointed out that the respondent was losing money and that economic
conditions would not permit restoration of wages to the level re-
3 Matter of Woodside Cotton Mills Company and Textile Workers Organizing Committee,
8 N. L. R. B. 619.
WOODSIDE COTTON MILLS COMPANY 47
quested by the Union. Hawes asked Beattie if he would "sign an
agreement if and when a mutual agreement was arrived at." Beattie
replied that "he would not promise, not knowing what the circum-
stances would be at that time." Hawes then asked Beattie to submit
a counterproposal and the meeting was adjourned.
The next conference was held a week later, on August 23, with
practically the same persons present. Again the discussion began
with the section concerning wages and Beattie requested that Hawes
resubmit that section to the Union. She replied that this was im-
possible since no request of the Union had been granted. Beattie
informed her that the Company would probably have to shut down
if forced to raise wages. The provision for a 40-hour week was
discussed and Beattie refused to agree thereto. He also stated that
he would be reluctant to sign a contract containing a closed-shop
provision.
On September 15 a third conference was held. Henry I. Adams,
North Carolina State Director of the Union, was present in addition
to those who had attended previous conferences. In answer to the
respondent's objection to the wage-increase clause the Union agreed
to reconsider the question. The respondent contended at this meet-
ing that there was no need to include in the contract the section as to
recognition; also that the 40-hour provision was superfluous because
of State legislation providing for a 40-hour maximum week and
because of the Wage and Hour Law which would permit a 44-hour
week. Beattie requested time to consider the clause dealing with
seniority and other provisions which were explained to him at this
meeting. He again expressed his reluctance to sign a contract con-
taining,a closed-shop clause. Adams agreed to rewrite the sections
dealing with recognition, seniority, and wages to "come more in line
with the discussion that we carried on with regard to them."
On about October 1 the Union, by Adams, sent to the respondent
another proposed contract in which the recognition clause was
changed to include the words "subject to provisions of the National
Labor Relations Act," and in which the wage section called for use
of the wage scale in effect during an undetermined week in 1938 as
the prevailing rate. Added to the wage section was a provision that
either party might request a reopening of the question of wages and
that, in the event no understanding was reached in 10' days, the agree-
ment as to wages should terminate and either party might take any
action that it desired, including strike by the Union or change in
wages or shut-down by the respondent. No change was made in the
section dealing with seniority.
This second proposal of the Union was considered at a conference
on October 4, at which time there was a lengthy discussion of the
48 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
changes it contained. Beattie once more expressed opposition to the
closed-shop clause but did not definitely state that he would not agree
to it. He stated that the condition added to the wage clause was not
acceptable and that he objected to the seniority provision in that
competence alone was made the basis for application of the principle.
Upon the request of Adams, Beattie agreed to submit a counterpro-
posal to the Union's requests. On October 11 Beattie sent to the
Union a counterproposal covering recognition, reading as follows:
The Company hereby recognizes the Union as the exclusive
bargaining agent, subject to the provisions of the National Labor
Relations Act, for its production and maintenance employees at
its Greenville plant. It is understood that this applies to all em-
ployees of the Company at the Greenville plant, with the excep-
tion of executives and office employees, and with the exceptions
of overseers, second hands and foremen who have. authority to
hire and discharge. It is agreed that if at any time the active
membership in good standing of the local Union includes less
than a majority of the employees of the Company's said plant,
as above defined, this contract shall be null and void, and the
Union will cease to be the collective bargaining agent for all
employees. If the Company shall determine at any time that
the Union is no longer entitled to represent as the bargaining
agency all of its employees as above defined, the Company shall
so notify the Union by registered mail, and if within five days
thereafter the Union shall question such conclusions, it shall
notify the Company by registered letter addressed to the Pres-
ident of the Company at the latter's Greenville, S. C. office.
If no objection be made by the Union within said five days, this
shall be conclusive of the fact that the Union no longer repre-
sents the employees as their exclusive bargaining agent; but if
within said period of five days, it claims that it still represents
a majority of the employees as above defined, then the matter
shall be determined by vote of such eligible employees as above
defined, after ten days' notice by registered mail to the Union,
and after posting in the mill building for a similar length of
time. Such notice shall state the time, place and purpose of the
ballotting. , Such ballotting shall be secret. Both parties agree
that there shall be no intimidation nor coercion at or about the
ballotting place, and both parties agree to abide by the outcome
of the ballot. Such vote shall be properly supervised by four
supervisors, two each selected by the Company and two by the
Union. Such vote shall be with ballots furnished at the ballot-
ting place, and containing merely "Do you wish to be represented
by T. W. O. C.? Yes. No."
WOODSIDE- COTTON MILLS. COMPANY 49
No such ballot shall be called for nor held within ninety days
from the date of this contract, and if such ballotting be favorable
to the Union, no further ballot shall be called for nor held within
ninety days thereafter.
On October 13 a conference was held to consider the respondent's
counterproposal. Beattie pointed out that the respondent did not
want the Union to represent the employees unless a majority were
members of the Union at all times. The Union took the position
that only the Board could hold an election to determine representa-
tion and refused to agree to the proposal, although Beattie urged
upon the .Unions representatives the, fairness of his suggested para-
graph on the ground that there were some employees who had voted
against the Union in the election conducted by the Board. The
Union insisted that whether or not the Union, after certification by
the Board, continued to represent a majority of the employees in
the appropriate unit did not concern the respondent. No question
was raised as to whether the Union represented a majority of the
employees at the time.
A conference set for October 25 was postponed until October 27
and held on that date. The proposed contracts were discussed clause
by clause but no agreement was reached on any section.
On November 3 Adams and Beattie conferred alone in the hope
that they might be able to accomplish more without the other con-
ferees present. The meeting was no more successful than previous
conferences, it being described by Adams as "simply another discus-
sion of world economics." There was some discussion of the proposal
covering recognition previously submitted by Beattie, but Adams
again refused to accept it for the Union and no progress was made.
At this meeting Adams told Beattie that the Union had filed charges
against the respondent with the Board, alleging a refusal to bargain.
Negotiations thereafter ceased for a period of over four months.
Prior to their resumption the Regional Director wrote to Beattie
stating that lie was informed that the respondent had refused to
bargain with the Union. The Regional Director also wrote to Seth
P. Brewer, administrator of the Union for North Carolina and South
Carolina, and urged him to make a further effort to arrive at an
agreement with the respondent. On March 17, 1939, Brewer pre-
sented a third proposal to the respondent in which the Union receded
materially from the position taken in its former proposals, provisions
for a closed shop and check-off of dues having been eliminated.
Brewer told Beattie that he had been informed by Commissioner
Heafner of the United States Department of Labor that Beattie had
agreed that in the future all matters pertaining to work assign-
ments, conditions of employment, wages, etc., were to be considered
50 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
matters for collective bargaining to be taken up with the Union's
representatives before any changes were put into effect by the re-
spondent. A clause embodying this procedure had been incorpo-
rated in the Union's third proposal and Brewer contended that all
such matters should be construed as bargaining issues. Beattie, how-
ever, denied having agreed to such a provision and explained that he
had apparently misunderstood the Commissioner. Each section of
the new proposal was discussed and, although the respondent's officers
asked a number of questions, they failed to indicate a willingness to
subscribe to any particular clause and offered no counterproposals.
Beattie,' agreed, however, to let Brewer know in a week or 10 days
whether he would then discuss the Union's proposal again or offer
a counterproposal.
On April 11, 1939, the respondent forwarded to the Union a pro-
posed contract covering 11 typewritten pages. Upon request of the
Union a conference was held on May 3 between Coope, a local repre-
sentative of the Union, and a committee of the respondent's em-
ployees, representing the Union, and Attorneys Barry Wright and
C. J. Haynsworth, and S. M. Beattie, W. H. Beattie, E. M. Johnston,
Tom Bray, superintendent of the Woodside plant, and others, repre-
senting the respondent. The proposed contract was not discussed in
detail but the Union's representatives objected to a number of its
provisions,. including Section 3 which reads as follows :
It is understood and agreed that should the Union at any time
cease to represent a majority of such employees of the Company
by the voluntary and continued assent of such employees, the
Company shall have the right to rescind this contract, and to
withdraw the recognition of the Union above granted. If at
any time the officers of the Company shall be of the opinion that
the Union no longer represents a majority of such employees by
their free, voluntary and continued assent, the Company may
give notice to the Union of its election to rescind this Agreement.
Five days after the date of such notice this Agreement shall be-
come null and void unless within such time notice shall be given
to the Company by the Union that in its opinion it continues to
represent the majority of such employees, whereupon the question
of representation shall be submitted to arbitration as hereinafter
provided.
The pertinent part of the arbitration section referred to above reads :
Where the question submitted relates to the representation by
the Union of the employees of, the Company, as •provvided in
Section 3, the Board of Arbitrators shall have authority to con-
duct by secret ballot an election among the employees of the
WOODSIDE COTTON MILLS COMPANY 51
Company, which election shall be governed by all applicable
rules, regulations and practices then in effect and applicable to
elections conducted by the National Labor Relations Board.
Other objections by the Union to the respondent's proposal centered
around a provision giving the respondent the right to determine and
apply work standards, assignments, and loads without consulting
the Union in advance; a section permitting the respondent to balance
operations by laying off or discharging employees without consult-
ing the Union; and a clause providing that working hours should be
fixed by "any valid law applicable." Coope rejected the counter-
proposal and no agreement was reached. However, Coope agr`ee'd- to
submit to Brewer the results of the conference. A copy of the re-
spondent's proposal had already been forwarded to Brewer at that
time and the latter had advised Coope to tell Beattie that the proposal
was objectionable and that the Union could not agree to it. No
further conferences were requested or held thereafter.
(b) Conclusions as to the refusal to bargain
(1) Recognition
The first issue presented by the foregoing facts is whether or
not the respondent's action in' refusing to accept the Union's-pro-
posal of recognition, and in insisting upon the recognition clauses
submitted by it, constituted an unfair labor practice. The obliga-
tion of an employer to bargain collectively under Section 8 (5) of
the Act entails, as an essential element thereof, the duty to recog-
nize the representative chosen by a majority of the employees as
exclusive bargaining agency.' In the case before us the respondent
insisted upon a qualified recognition, that is, it made recognition
contingent upon a continuing proof of majority, first at ninety-day
intervals and then as often as the respondent should demand. In
our opinion the respondent has not fulfilled its obligation to bargain
collectively under the Act.
The Act confers upon the Board the duty and the power, when-
ever a question concerning representation arises, to certify to the
parties the representatives designated by a majority of the employees.
Obviously the Act does not contemplate that such certification of
the Board shall remain effective only for a period of ninety days
and that thereafter, upon mere challenge by the employer, the
question concerning representation must again be resolved. A fortiori
4N L. R. B. v. The Griswold Manufacturing Co, 106 P. ( 2d) 713 (C C A. 3 ),'enf'g
Matter of The Griswold Manufacturing Company and Amalgamated Association of bon,
Steel and Tin Workers of North America, Lodge No 1197, 6 N . L R. B 298; Matter of
McNeely & Price Company and National Leather Workers Association Local No 30, of the
C 1. 0., 6 N. L. R. B. 800 , enf'd as mod, N. L. R. B. v. McNeely & Price Co ., 106 P. (2d)
878 (C. C. A. 3).
52 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
the Act does not contemplate that the Board's certification may
be challenged at any* time after issuance upon the whim of the
employer. On the contrary the whole spirit and purpose of the
Act demands that a Board certification stand as proof of majority,
at least in the absence of a marked change of circumstances which
would clearly rebut the presumption of a continuing majority, for
t reasonable period of time. Unless the Board's certification be
given this effectiveness Section 9 (c) of the Act becomes adminis-
tratively unworkable and Section 8 (5) fails to achieve that stability
of bargaining relations which it is a prime objective of the Act to
secure.
In Matter of Whittier Mills Company, where the Board upheld
the effectiveness of a certification challenged by an employer 7 months
after issuance , we said :
To hold that, 7 months following certification by the Board
of a collective bargaining representative, the employer can
question with impunity the status of the certified representa-
tive as a representative of a majority of the employees in the
appropriate unit, in the manner the respondents here attempt
to do, would be to render such a certification nugatory. The
Congress, cannot have intended by Section 9 (c) of the Act to
authorize the Board to do a futile and meaningless thing. .. .
To prevent employers from thus flouting the Act, to give mean-
ing to the Board's authority to certify representatives desig-
nated by employees in appropriate units, to effectuate the
policies of the Act, the presumption of the continuing effective-
ness of such a certification by the Board must be held not to be
rebuttable, under the circumstances here presented, by evidence
such as that here introduced by the respondents.'
It follows that the respondent may not, after certification of rep-
resentatives by the Board, require as a condition to recognition of
G See Matter of Whittier Mills Company and Silier Lake Company et al and Textile
Workers Organizing Committee, 15 N L R. B. 457 In Matter of Clark Shoe Company
and United Shoe Workers of America, 17 N L R B 1070, we said
The fruition of collective bargaining in an agreement often requires negotiations
lasting several months . It is therefore essential to the effectuation of the policies
of the Act that the representative status , once established , be vested with a degree
of stability . Thus, in a recent case , we held that a refusal to bargain with iepre-
sentatives 7 months after their certification by the Board can not be justified by
challenging their authority to deal for a majority No reason appears why a dif-
ferent rule should be applied in the instant case . The authority of the U S W
as sole bargaining agent was established in a consent election under the aegis of
the Board The fairness of the election is not questioned Promptly after the
election the U. S. W opened negotiations for a contract To permit the respondent
with impunity to interiupt the bargaining process and evade agreement by challeng-
ing the authority of the U S W. only 4 months after its designation in the election
would be to lender meaningless the respondent 's duty and its employees ' coirelative
right to bargain collectively
WOODSIDE COTTON MILLS COMPANY 53
such representatives the right to raise at intervals of ninety days,
or at will, the issue of majority designation.
Our conclusion in this matter is confirmed by the fact, evident
from the record in this case , that the respondent 's real objective in
seeking such frequent determinations of the majority issue was sim-
ply to harass the Union and undermine its morale . By putting the
Union to a test of its strength at such times as it thought strategic
the respondent hoped to deny the Union the prestige accorded to a
recognized bargaining agent and , in the end , to avoid collective bar-
gaining altogether.
Moreover , it is apparent that the respondent, even if it desired to
exercise its power to force the Union to an election only when it
honestly believed that the Union no longer represented a majority
of the employees , would perforce be required to interest itself con-
tinually in the membership of the Union , a question with which it
should not ordinarily be concerned once the union has been certified.
The respondent argues in its brief that "while the recognition
clauses in the Union proposals were basically perfectly proper, they
needed correction and were in several respects subject to negotiation
and alteration before agreement ." The chief fault found with the
recognition clauses submitted by the Union is that they failed to limit
recognition to the one plant for which the Union had been certified
by the Board. In oral argument counsel for the respondent stated
that it was understood that the Union did not actually claim to rep-
resent the employees at the other two plants and that in such respect
the proposed contracts apparently were merely forms sent from the
main office of the Union without having been changed to fit the
specific occasion . Counsel further admitted that the error in form
had not been brought to the attention of the Union 's representatives
and that there was no discussion of the recognition clauses other than
the respondent 's refusal to agree thereto . Under such circumstances
the respondent 's objection to the recognition clauses proposed by the
Union is without merit.
The respondent ; also urges in its brief that the recognition clause
submitted by the Union constituted merely one part of 'a proposed
contract and that, therefore , the respondent was under no duty to
agree to it alone. The Board had certified the Union as the ex-
clusive bargaining agency for the employees of the respondent.
While the respondent was not required to suggest that the recognition
clause be signed as a separate contract , the obligation to recognize
the Union as such representative followed immediately upon such
certification , whether or not other requests of the Union were met.
We accordingly find that the respondent , by refusing to recognize
the Union as exclusive bargaining representative, has refused to
bargain collectively within the meaning of Section 8 (5) of the Act.
283032-41-vol 21-5
54 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
(2) Conclusions as to the respondent's refusal to negotiate with the
purpose of reaching an agreement
The second issue raised by the facts heretofore recited is whether
or not the respondent, aside from the recognition issue, has bargained
with the Union in good faith in an honest endeavor to reach an
agreement. A review of the negotiations convinces us that at no
time did the respondent make any genuine effort to come to an agree-
ment with the Union.
The Union submitted an original proposal and two subsequent pro-
posals. In the second and third proposed contracts the Union made
serious attempts to meet the respondent's objections to the preceding
ones. In both the second and third proposals the Union receded
substantially from its original position. Yet the respondent made
no move to come to terms with the Union. At the hearing Beattie,
the respondent's president, was asked, "Was there anything in the
contract that you were willing to agree to?" He replied, "Yes, sir,
but why bring that up? I didn't feel it advisable or a good trading
proposition for me to pick out certain sections of the contract that
I would agree to or that were not objectionable. I felt that the best
procedure or the procedure calculated to get the best results was to
pick out the features that were objectionable and try to get those
modified.,' This statement by Beattie indicates his=attitude through.
out the negotiations. He listened attentively to explanations of all
the sections and gave his reasons for objecting to some of them. But
he would agree to nothing, although admittedly there were some
provisions to which he had no objection. Moreover, at the outset,
he refused to agree that he would sign a contract "if and when a
mutual agreement was arrived at." 6
After the Union had made two proposals the respondent submitted
a counterproposal covering recognition upon which it rested through
out three conferences. The respondent's first full counterproposal
was not forthcoming until April 12, 1939, after negotiations had been
carried on since August 16, 1938. This proposed contract was pat-
ently less desirable to the Union than the position which the respond-
ent had adopted during the course of negotiations up to that time.
It merely crystallized and restated the policies of the respondent in
force at the time of the negotiations ; and it withdrew from the sphere
of collective bargaining in the future a number of matters ordinarily
considered proper subjects for bargaining. Among other things, it
9 Cf. Matter of Wilson and Company and United Packinghouse Workers L. I. U.-&1
P t1' 0 C of C I 0., 19 N L R B. 990; Matter of Highland Park Manufacturing
Co and Textile Workers Organizing Committee , 12 N. L R. B. 1238; Matter of H J
Heinz Company and Canning and Pickle Workers, Local Union No 325, dfliltiated with
Amalgamated Meat Cutters and Butcher Workmen of North America, American Federa-
tion of Labor, 10 N L. R B 903.
WOODSIDE COTTON MILLS COMPANY 55
provided that the respondent might determine work standards, as-
signments, and loads without consulting the Union; it empowered
the respondent to establish new shifts, increase, diminish, or abolish
shifts, without reference to the desires of the Union ; it reserved to
the respondent absolute discretion to control production or shut down
the plant and made the decision of the respondent conclusive as to
the need therefor; it provided that, discharge might be for inefficiency,
incompetency, neglect of duty, carelessness, insubordination, violation
of rules, conviction of crime or misdemeanor, drunkenness, bad char-
acter, assignment of pay, or garnishment; it gave the respondent
unchecked discretion as to lay-offs to balance operations; it stated
that the respondent need consider seniority in laying off employees
only if they have equality in knowledge, training, ability, skill,
efficiency, physical fitness, family status, industry, and initiative,
hours of work were to be determined by any valid law applicable;
the existing wage scale was to remain in effect unless changed by law
or unless either party gave notice of a desire to negotiate the ques-
tion; and it set forth a complicated arbitration procedure for griev-
ances except work standards and assignments and wages.
The respondent admits that its proposed 'contract, submitted 8
months after negotiations had commenced, was intended to serve only
as a basis for discussion. To indulge in such tactics is to invite
interminable delays before any result can be attained from the process
of collective bargaining The respondent could scarcely have been
surprised when the Union, confronted after months of negotiations
with such a proposal, rejected it and decided that it was futile to
seek further conferences We think it clear that the respondent,
while attempting to give the appearance of bargaining in good faith.
was merely sparring with the Union until it should have caused the
Union to recede to the wall. Thereupon it delivered the final blow
in the form of a proposed contract having the effect of nullifying all
previous efforts on the part of the Union. Bargaining connotes an
effort in good faith to reach an agreement and we cannot find such
an effort in this case.
We find that on August 16, 1938, and at all times thereafter, the
respondent has refused to bargain collectively with the Union as the
exclusive representative of its employees within an appropriate unit,
and that the respondent has thereby interfered with, restrained, and
coerced its employees in the exercise of rights guaranteed by Section
7 of the Act.
IV. THE EFFECT OF THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES UPON COMMERCE
The activities of the respondent set forth in Section III above,
occurring in connection with the operations of the respondent de-
scribed in Section I above. have a close, intimate. and substantial
56 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
relation to trade, traffic, and commerce among the several States, and
tend to lead to labor disputes burdening and obstructing commerce
and the free flow of commerce.
V. THE REMEDY
Having found that the respondent has engaged in unfair labor
practices, we shall order it to cease and desist therefrom and to take
such affirmative action as will remedy the effects thereof.
We have found that on August 16, 1938, and at all times there-
after, the respondent refused to bargain collectively with the Union
as the exclusive representative of its employees in the appropriate
unit. Accordingly, in order to effectuate the purposes of the Act, we
shall order the respondent to cease and desist from its unfair labor
practices, and upon request to bargain collectively with the Union.
Upon the basis of the above findings of fact and upon the entire
record in the case, the Board makes the following :
'CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. Textile Workers Organizing Committee was, and its successor,
Textile Workers Union of America, is, a labor organization, within
the meaning of Section 2 (5) of the Act.
2. The production and maintenance employees of the respondent
at its Greenville plant, exclusive of clerical and supervisory employees
and watchmen, constitute a unit appropriate for the purposes of
collective bargaining, within the meaning of Section 9 (b) of the Act.
3. Textile Workers Organizing Committee, or its successor, Tex-
tile Workers Union of America, was on August 16, 1938, and at all
times since has been, the exclusive representative of all employees of
the respondent in the above unit for the purposes of collective
bargaining, within the meaning of Section 9 (a) of the Act.
4. The respondent, by refusing on August 16, 1938, and at all
times thereafter, to bargain collectively with Textile Workers Or-
ganizing Committee, or its successor, Textile Workers Union of
America, as the exclusive representative of all its employees in the
appropriate unit, has engaged in and is engaging in unfair labor
practices, within the meaning of Section 8 (5) of the Act.
5. The respondent, by interfering with, restraining, and coercing
its employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in Section 7
of the Act, has engaged in and is engaging in unfair labor practices,
within the meaning of Section 8 (1) of the Act.
6. The aforesaid unfair labor practices are unfair labor practices
affecting commerce, within the meaning of Section 2 (6) and (7) of
the Act.
WOODSIDE COTTON MILLS COMPANY 57
7. The respondent has not engaged in unfair hibor practices, within
the meaning of Section 8 (1) of the Act, by urging, persuading, and
warning its employees to refrain from becoming or remaining mem-
bers of the Union, as alleged in the complaint.
ORDER
Upon the basis of the above findings of fact and conclusions of
law, and pursuant to Section 10 (c) of the National Labor Relations
Act, the National Labor Relations Board hereby orders that the
respondent, Woodside Cotton Mills Company, Greenville, South
Carolina, and its officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall:
1. Cease and desist from :
(a) Refusing to bargain collectively with Texile Workers Union
of America as the exclusive representative of its production and
maintenance employees at its plant in Greenville, South Carolina,
exclusive of clerical and supervisory employees and watchmen;-
(b) In any other manner interfering with, restraining, or coercing
its employees in the exercise of the right to self-organization, to form,
join, or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively through
representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in concerted
activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual
aid or protection, as guaranteed in Section 7 of the National Labor
Relations Act.
2. Take the following affirmative action, which the Board finds
will effectuate the policies of the Act :
(a) Upon request, bargain collectively with Textile Workers Union
of America as the exclusive representative of its production and
maintenance employees, exclusive of clerical and supervisory em-
ployees and watchmen, employed at its plant in Greenville, South
Carolina, with respect to rates of pay, wages, hours of employment,
and other conditions of employment;
(b) Immediately post notices to its employees in conspicuous places
throughout its plant and maintain such notices for a period of at
least sixty (60) consecutive days from the date of posting, stating
that the respondent will cease and desist in the manner set forth in
paragraphs 1 (a) and (b) of this Order, and that it will take the
affirmative action set forth in paragraph 2 (a) of this Order;
(c) Notify the Regional Director for the Tenth Region in writing
within ten (10) days from the date of this Order' what steps it has
taken to comply therewith.
AND IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the complaint, and it hereby is,
dismissed in so far as it alleges that the respondent has urged, per-
suaded and warned its employees to refrain from becoming or
remaining members of the Union.