Waples-Platter Companies

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Dec 11, 1974

215 N.L.R.B. 483 (N.L.R.B. 1974)

WAPLES-PLATTER COMPANIES 483
Waples-Platter Companies ' and Chauffeurs, Team-
sters and Helpers Local Union No . 47, affiliated
with International Brotherhood of Teamsters,
Chauffeurs , Warehousemen and Helpers of
America . Case 16-CA-5494
witnesses, and after due consideration of the briefs filed on
behalf of all parties, I make the following:
FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS
1. RESPONDENT'S BUSINESS
December 11, 1974
DECISION AND ORDER
BY MEMBERS JENKINS, KENNEDY, AND PENELLO
On July 31, 1974, Administrative Law Judge Irving
M. Herman issued the attached Decision in this pro-
ceeding. Thereafter, Respondent filed exceptions and a
supporting brief, and the Charging Party filed a brief
in support of the Decision.
Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the
National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the Na-
tional Labor Relations Board has delegated its au-
thority in this proceeding to a three-member panel.
The Board has considered the record and the at-
tached Decision in light of the exceptions and briefs
and has decided to affirm the rulings, findings, and
conclusions of the Administrative Law Judge and to
adopt his recommended Order.
ORDER
Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor Re-
lations Act, as amended, the National Labor Relations
Board adopts as its Order the recommended Order of
the Administrative Law Judge and hereby orders the
Respondent, Waples-Platter Companies, Fort Worth,
Texas, its officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall
take the action set forth in the said recommended Or-
der.
I The name of Respondent appears as amended at the hearing
DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
IRVING M. HERMAN, Administrative Law Judge: This case
was tried before me on June 4 and 5, 1974, at Fort Worth,
Texas. The charge was filed by Chauffeurs, Teamsters, and
Helpers , Local Union No. 47, affiliated with International
Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and
Helpers of America, herein called the Union, on March 14,
and served on Respondent, Waples-Platter Companies,' by
registered mail the same day. Complaint issued April 30. The
primary issues is whether Respondent violated Section
8(a)(5) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended (29
U.S.C., Sec. 151 et seq.), herein called the Act, by failing to
bargain in good faith with the Union.
Upon the entire record, including my observation of the
Respondent's name was amended at the hearing by changing "Com-
pany" to "Companies "
The complaint (as amended at the hearing) alleges, the
answer (as amended at the hearing) admits, and I find that
Respondent is a Texas corporation engaged in the wholesale
distribution and sale of groceries, with its principal office and
place of business at Fort Worth; that during the year immedi-
ately preceding the complaint, Respondent received at said
facility products valued in excess of $50,000 from outside of
Texas, and sold and distributed groceries valued at over $1
million; and that Respondent is an employer engaged in com-
merce within the meaning of Section 2(2), (6), and (7) of the
Act.
II. THE LABOR ORGANIZATION INVOLVED
The complaint alleges, the answer admits, and I find that
the Union is a labor organization within the meaning of
Section 2(5) of the Act.
III. THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICE
A. The Fact'
1. The bargaining prior to March 6, 1974
Following a stipulated consent election held March 21,
1973, the Union was certified on March 29, 1973, as the
exclusive bargaining representative of Respondent's em-
ployees. The Union submitted its proposals on April 26 and
a series of 10 bargaining meetings commenced May 18, 1973.
A number of the Union's proposals were tentatively agreed
on at the first meeting. Respondent sent the Union certain
counterproposals on June 18, but failed to furnish its eco-
nomic proposals at the June 21 meeting, as promised, because
of its claimed inability to do so in view of the price freeze. The
employees struck on July 29. The parties did not meet again
until September 21, and, since the Respondent still had no
economic proposals ready, the Union's chief negotiator at
that time, Allgood, said there was no point in prolonging the
meeting and the Union would be available to meet when
Respondent was prepared to present its economic proposal.
Sometime between then and November 15, Respondent
proposed the maintenance of existing economic conditions
which Union Attorney Hicks accepted in a telephone call to
Respondent's attorney and chief negotiator, Sears, on
November 15. Hicks confirmed this by letter to Sears the
following day, adding his "certain[ty]" that such acceptance
would remove "the last stumbling block to securing a final
contract" and urging that the parties meet the following week
"to finalize this matter." Further meetings were held on
November 28 and December 3. Meanwhile, tentative agree-
ments were reached on additional noneconomic provisions.
2 There is no testimonial conflict between the opposing witnesses, con-
cerning the period prior to March 6, 1974
215 NLRB No. 80
484 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Hicks, who by that time had started to attend the negotia-
tions and had become cospokesman with Allgood, began the
December 17 meeting by stating that the parties were reason-
ably close to an agreement and proposed that they run
through the various items. This proved burdensome, and it
was decided that the Union would send to Sears a draft of the
noneconomic items tentatively agreed to thus far. Hicks
farmed the job out to Allgood but Allgood understood that
he had been assigned only so much of this task as related to
matters covered in the Union's original proposal. There was
substantial discussion of some, if not all, of the five items still
open. Allgood thought these were settled "in principle," and
that, in view of the other agreements reached, the parties
virtually had a contract. Hicks testified that while he would
not describe the situation in respect to the open items as
"agreement in principle," he felt that at least "we were down
to the final cut before we had an agreement . . we were
darned close."
Hicks sent the following wire to Sears on December 17,
after the conclusion of the meeting, listing the items still open,
and notifying him of the unconditional offer of the strikers to
return to work:
THIS MESSAGE WILL CONFIRM THE PRESENT STATUS OF THE
REFERENCED MATTER ALL CONTRACT LANGUAGE HAS BEEN
AGREED UPON EXCEPT THE FOLLOWING THE WAIVER CLAUSE AS
SET OUT IN YOUR WRITTEN PROPOSAL WAS NOT AGREED UPON
YOU WERE TO DETERMINE WHETHER, AS A MATTER OF LAW, THE
LANGUAGE WOULD REQUIRE BARGAINING ABOUT SUBSEQUENT
UNFORESEEN MATTERS HOWEVER, WE HAVE RECIEVED NOTH-
ING TO DATE THE PICKET LINE CLAUSE (SECTION 2-6 OF THE
COMPANIES NO STRIKE-NO PICKETING-NO LOCK-OUT CLAUSE)
HAS NOT BEEN AGREED UPON ALTHOUGH SO PROPOSED BY THE
COMPANY
NO AGREEMENT HAS BEEN REACHED REGARDING THE TERM OF
THE CONTRACT THE UNION HEREBY PROPOSES THAT THE CON-
TRACT BE EFFECTED FOR ONE YEAR PLFASE BE PREPARED TO
AGREE OUR COUNTER PROPOSE AT OUR NEXT MEETING
THE PARTIES HAVE AGREED THAT EXISTING ECONOMIC BENEFITS
WILL CONTINUE IN EFFECT, HOWEVER, DESPITE AGREEMENT TO
DO SO, YOU HAD NOT REDUCED THESE TO WRITING FOR OUR
MEETING OF DECEMBER 17, 1973 YOU AGREED TO HAVE SUCH
PREPARED FOR OUR NEXT MEETING A PREGNANCY LEAVE
CLAUSE HAS NOT RECEIVED AGREEMENT PLEASE BE PREPARED
TO COUNTER PROPOSE OR AGREE TO OUR NEXT MEETING DUR-
ING THE WEEK OF DECEMBER 10, 1973 YOU INFORMED ME FOR
THE FIRST TIME THAT THE COMPANY WISHED TO HAVE LAN-
GUAGE IN THE CONTRACT TO PROTECT AGAINST POST STRIKE
DISRUPTION BY FORMER STRIKERS
YOU LEFT THE MEETING OF DECEMBER 17, 1973 TO PREPARE THE
COMPANIES PROPOSAL IN LATER CONVERSATION YOU IN-
FORMED ME THAT SUCH A PROPOSAL WOULD BE READY BY OUR
NEXT MEETING
REGARDING ALL THE ABOVE, WE AGREED THAT YOU WOULD
CALL ME ON DECEMBER 19 1973 TO SET UP A SESSION FOR LATER
THAT WEEK IN ADDITION, ACCEPT THIS MESSAGE AS THE UN-
ION'S UNCONDITIONAL OFFER TO RETURN TO WORK ALL STRIK-
ERS PLEASE ADVISE ME IMMEDIATELY HOW SUCH CAN MOST EX-
PEDITIOUSLY BE COMPLETED
Sears replied by wire on the 18th as follows:
YOUR TELEGRAM OF DECEMBER 17 1973 RECEIVED BY ME DECEM-
BER 18 1973 I DO NOT AGREE THAT ALL CONTRACT LANGUAGE
HAS BEEN AGREED UPON EXCEPT THE DETAILS SET OUT IN YOUR
TELEGRAM ALL PROPOSALS HERETOFORE MADE BY BOTH OF US
IN THE HOPE THAT THE STRIKE COULD BE AVOIDED OR SHORT-
ENED WERE CONTINGENT UPON ARRIVING AT A COMPLETE CON-
TRACT, WHICH WE HAVE NOT ACCOMPLISHED AS OF THIS TIME I
BELIEVE THAT THE BEST WAY TO PROCEED IS FOR YOU TO PRE-
PARE AND MAIL TO ME A COMPLETE CONTRACT AS YOU UNDER-
STAND THE PRESENT SITUATION THIS WOULD BE IN LINE WITH
YOUR PREVIOUS STATEMENT THAT SUCH A PROPOSAL WOULD BE
READY FOR OUR LAST MEETING WE WILL THEN REVIEW TO DE-
TERMINE WHETHER DISCUSSION IS NECESSARY AND MEET YOU
AS SOON AS POSSIBLE STRIKERS WHO WISH TO RETURN TO WORK
MAY REPORT IN PERSON TO THE EMPLOYMENT OFFICE AT THE
WAREHOUSE BETWEEN THE HOURS OF 8AM AND 5PM ON
WEEKDAYS
On the 19th, Allgood , under the mistaken impression, as
indicated above, that he was not to cover any items, even
those agreed upon , which had been proposed by Respondent,
sent Sears a draft of the items in the Union 's proposal on
which tentative agreement had been reached . On January 3,
1974, Hicks sent Sears a draft of proposals concerning the
open items listed in his wire of December 17. On January 31,
apparently in response to the request in Hicks' telegram of
December 17, Sears sent him materials embracing the eco-
nomic benefits that the Union had agreed to accept. There
were delays, apparently on both sides, in scheduling the next
meeting, and in the interim , on February 18, Respondent
wrote Hicks of its unilateral revision of its pay scale upwards
on the basis of the completion of construction of a warehouse
addition enabling it to consolidate its operations into a single
facility making for greater efficiency and productivity. Its
announcement stated the action was "without prejudice to
collective bargaining" and offered to "negotiate any details
which you want to discuss " Neither the delay nor the wage
raise was regarded by the Union as other than bona fide.' A
meeting was finally arranged for March 6
2. The March 6 meeting
Allgood had been transferred to Washington in February,
so Hicks was the chief spokesman for the Union at the March
6 meeting . Respondent was again represented , as at all the
sessions, by Sears, Dexter (its vice president and secretary),
and Nickell (personnel director). However, Dexter opened
the meeting by announcing that he had succeeded Sears as
chief negotiator and immediately went on to say that all
tentative agreements were set aside, and that while Respond-
ent might not want to change all of them it was going to
reexamine them.' Hicks asked why, and Dexter said that
3 Hicks felt "at that point that we had relinquished control over wages
during whatever term the contract would be "
Although Dexter testified that he had mentioned only those agreements
covered in Allgood's communication of December 19, he admitted on cross-
examination to having "announced that all tentative agreements were off "
I have found Hicks a more credible witness in any event, and he emphati-
WAPLES-PLATTER COMPANIES 485
circumstances had changed. Pressed for specifics, he and
Sears mentioned economic controls, the energy crisis, a sig-
nificant increase in business, enlargement of the warehouse,
more employees, more customers, and the passage of time;
plus the fact that concessions had been made to avert a strike
and then to settle it, and now the strike was no longer hanging
over their heads. Hicks said this sounded like "utter bad
faith" and that since they had been so close to a contract
Respondent owed an explanation in greater particularity as
to how each tentative agreement had been affected by these
various factors. Respondent refused so to particularize. Hicks
testified that he then asked what proposals Respondent had
to make, and Respondent offered a grievance procedure that
would have sharply reduced coverage from any complaint
alleging failure to comply with the contract to discharges for
reasons other than destruction of company property or sabot-
age The Union rejected this proposal out-of-hand, and Hicks
asked what other proposals Respondent had after repudiating
almost a year of bargaining achievements. Respondent re-
plied, according to Hicks, that it did not have any other
proposals ready but would have a full written proposal at the
next meeting.5 Dexter's testimony was that he was ready to
discuss other proposals but that he wished to discuss the
changes, while "Mr. Hicks refused to go through and discuss
the changes that we wanted to make. He only wanted to
discuss the reasons for the changes."
Dexter first testified that Respondent's decision to reexam-
ine the tentative agreements was made in January or Febru-
ary. He testified later, however, that the decision, made by
President Sweeney, was communicated to him at the time
when they discussed the wording of the telegram Sears sent
to Hicks on December 18. Dexter also testified that prior to
March 6 Respondent had not considered each agreement
"individually" in light of the changed circumstances it men-
tioned to the Union, but his later testimony was that he
"knew which ones [he] wanted to change" by that date.
3. Subsequent events
The Union filed the instant charge on March 14. Although
a meeting had been set for the 19th, Hicks did not attend
because he felt that further negotiations should await the
outcome of the charge. The Union's new business agent,
Birks, who had also attended the prior bargaining sessions,
spoke for the Union on March 19 He requested the proposal
that had been promised on March 6, but Dexter who had
started to prepare the proposal, had dropped it upon the filing
of the charge because he and Sears agreed that the charge
indicated the Union would not rehash the previously tenta-
tively agreed items without a detailed explanation by Re-
spondent which the latter did not intend to provide. Birks did
refuse to renegotiate any of those items, saying he did not see
"any reason" to do so in the absence of further explanation
by Respondent, and the Union did not want to appear to be
mooting its charge.
cally testified that Dexter's announcement referred to "all" the tentative
agreements
5 Dexter said that supplying written proposals in advance of discussion
was not the way the parties had been operating This position did not
comport with the submission of the initial proposals of the parties.
Respondent offered to extend recognition for 60 days
beyond March 29, the anniversary of the certification, and
Birks said that Hicks, who had previously expressed concern
over the approaching end of the certification year, would
communicate with Sears concerning his proposal. Hicks tele-
phoned Sears on April 8 to inquire about a resumption of
negotiations with the understanding that the parties would
not "rehash" the tentative agreements pending the investiga-
tion of the charge. Sears, after talking to Dexter and Sweeney,
rejected this condition by letter of April 10 in which he
"restate[d] . . . that many of the concessions made in the
initial negotiations were done so for the purpose of avoiding
and averting a strike," which, "coupled with other reasons,"
required "re-examination of those articles which were tena-
tively agreed to between the parties."
B. Analysis
The Act "impose[s] a mutual duty upon the parties to
confer in good faith with a desire to reach agreement."
N.L.R.B. v. Insurance Agents' International Union
[Prudential Ins. Co.] 361 U.S. 477, 488 (1960). "While Con-
gress did not compel agreement . . . it did require
[good-faith] collective bargaining in the hope that agreements
would result." N.L.R.B. v. Truitt Mfg. Co., 351 U.S. 149, 152
(1956). It is therefore of particular importance, when the
parties have made substantial progress toward agreement,
that that momentum not be dissipated lightly. To this end,
the Board views with concern a party's withdrawal of conces-
sions made in the negotiations, albeit tentatively , and regards
as evidence of bad faith the failure to reasonable explain such
withdrawal. San Antonio Machine & Supply Corp., 147
NLRB 1112, 1116-17 (1964), enfd 363 F.2d 633, 635-637
(C.A.5, 1966); Nassau Glass Corporation, 199 NLRB 476
(1972); McCann Steel Company, 190 NLRB 12, 17 (1971);
Orion Tool, Die and Machine Co., 195 NLRB 1080,
1087-88 (1972); Inter-Polymer Industries, Inc., 196 NLRB
729, 761(1972); Shovel Supply Company, 162 NLRB 460, 473
(1966).
Recognizing the force of the foregoing, Respondent relies
on the explanation it advanced at the meeting of March 6. Its
statement of this issue, however, both at the hearing and in
its bnef,6 shows that its position falls short of the Act's re-
quirements. It is not enough to claim a change in conditions,
just as it was not enough for the employer in Truitt, supra,
to claim an inability to pay higher wages. "Good-faith bar-
gaining necessarily requires that claims made by either bar-
gainer should be honest claims . . . . If [the claim] is impor-
tant enough to present in the give and take of bargaining, it
is important enough to require some sort of proof of its ac-
curacy." Truitt, supra at 152-153. It was precisely that ab-
sence of such proof here that prevented the testing of Respon-
dent's claim and hence precluded meaningful bargaining. By
failing to particularize the effects of the "change in condi-
tions" Respondent did not even reach the stage to which the
employer in Truitt had advanced The latter at least had
relied on a claim which could be proved or disproved by the
financial records sought by the Union. The Union here,
6 "is a company permitted to re-examine those articles tentatively agreed
to when there is a material change in conditions9"
486 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
however, was not even in a position to request proofs because
Respondent had not yet indicated-indeed it refused to
indicate-why, in its own view, any of the alleged changes in
conditions (other than the termination of the strike) war-
ranted review of the various provisions tentatively agreed on.
I find incredible Dexter's testimony that Hicks was unwill-
ing to discuss the changes desired by Respondent and insisted
on confining the discussion to the reasons for the changes. In
the first place , I am unable to comprehend how the reasons
could be discussed in a vacuum free from consideration of the
changes themselves. Secondly, Dexter's repeated testimony of
his readiness and willingness to discuss the changes (but not
the reasons) on March 6 is impossible to reconcile with his
admission that he had not yet considered each particular
agreement in light of the changed circumstances, because in
the absence of such consideration he could not have decided
by that time of the withdrawn agreements he wanted to
change. He contradicted himself later in his testimony, more-
over, by asserting that as of March 6 he "knew which ones
[he] wanted to change." And if he did know that, his tes-
timony offers no explanation for his withdrawal of those
provisions which he did not intend to change, including some
indeed, like the Union' s recognition , whose substantive effect
could not lawfully be changed.
Nor does it explain why the Union was not afforded some
notice of so serious a development in advance of a meeting
which, as it turned out, was almost 3 months in coming and
only 3 weeks before the expiration date of the certification
year when it did come. Respondent's position that the Union
was put on notice by Sears' telegram of December 18 is hardly
tenable in view of the invitation in the telegram of "a com-
plete contract as you understand the present situation. This
would be in line with ' your previous statement that such a
proposal would be ready for our last meeting. We will then
review to determine whether discussion is necessary." Not
only was such an invitation inconsistent with any notion that
Respondent might be withdrawing from previous agree-
ments, but the last sentence quoted even suggests that the
draft to be submitted might well disclose the absence of any
differences so as to obviate further discussion.'
As indicated in footnote 4, supra I found Hicks a more
reliable witness, and credit his testimony that Dexter's with-
drawal on March 6 was from allthe tentative agreements, not
just those covered by Allgood's communication of December
19.8 This of course included even matters which had been
the subject of company demands. ". . . [I]f the Board is not
to be blinded by empty talk and by the mere surface motions
of collective bargaining, it must take some cognizance of the
reasonableness of the positions taken by an employer in the
course of bargaining negotiations." N.L.R.B. v. Reed &
Prince Mfg. Co., 205 F.2d 131, 134 (C.A. 1), cert. denied 346
U.S. 887. While tentative agreements , by definition, are not
final, an employer may not use his right to change position
' Even if Sears' wire could somehow be deemed to imply an intent to
withdraw, surely something more explicit was required by good faith in the
face of such further communications as Allgood's letter of December 19,
1973, Hicks' letter of January 3, 1974, Hicks' subsequent phone call to
Sears, and Sears' letter of January 31 in response to that call
8 Additional support for this finding appears in Sears' "restate[ment]," in
his April 10 letter, of Dexter's position-without limitation-for "re-exami-
nation of those articles which were tentatively agreed to between the par-
ties "
"as a cloak" because, as the Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit recently said in Sweeney & Co. v. N.L.R.B.., 437 F.2d
1127, 1134 (1971), in reaffirming language it had used in
N.L.R.B. v. Herman Sausage Co., 275 F.2d 229, 232 (1960):
... bad faith is prohibited though done with sophi stica-
tion and finesse. Consequently, to sit at a bargaining
table, or to sit almost forever, or to make concessions
here and there, could be the very means by which to
conceal a purposeful strategy to make bargaining futile
or fail. Hence, we have said in more colorful language
it takes more than mere "surface bargaining," or
"shadow boxing to a draw," or "giving the Union a
runaround while purporting to be meeting with the Un-
ion for purpose of collective bargaining" [footnotes
omitted].
As has been noted above, the only reason given by Re-
spondent for its change in position that required no further
explanation was that flowing from the termination of the
strike. However, I find this reason also to have been advanced
in bad faith since whatever validity it might have had in
respect to concessions, it could have had no possible applica-
tion to those matters on which tentative agreement had been
reached at the insistence of Respondent. I have grave dif-
ficulty, moreover, with Respondent's position that to the ex-
tent that a strike forces concessions from an employer, the
Union can call off the strike short of the actual conclusion of
an agreement only at the risk of the employer's repudiation
of those very concessions which induced the return to work.
If at that point the employees retain sufficient stamina to
endure and subject their families to further privation by
renewing the strike, the employer is free, contends Respond-
ent, to start again from scratch. Should the employees lack
that fortitude, as is likely after a long strike, what has been
a successful strike is lost. It may be that with this
heads-tails combination Respondent has discovered an elixir
destined to earn the everlasting and universal gratitude of the
employing fraternity. However, I cannot help but doubt that
this quite squares with the purposes of the Act. Cf. Caroline
Farms Division of Textron, Inc., 163 NLRB 854 (1967), where
an employer's insistence on renegotiating all subjects not
specifically covered by a strike settlement agreement was
held, together with other conduct indicative of bad faith, to
violate the Act even though such repudiation was sought to
be justified by the earlier rejection of the tentative agreement
by the membership and the ensuing strike.
I find that Respondent's conduct, viewed in its entirety,
shows a determination to give the appearance of good-faith
bargaining accompanied by an equal determination not to
reach agreement.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. Respondent is an employer engaged in commerce within
the meaning of Section 2(2), (6), and (7) of the Act.
2. The Union is a labor organization within the meaning
of Section 2(5) of the Act.
3. Respondent has violated Section 8(a)(5) of the Act by
refusing to bargain with the Union in good faith.
4. The aforesaid unfair labor practice affects commerce
within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
WAPLES- PLATTER COMPANIES 487
REMEDY
In order to remedy the unfair labor practice found herein
my recommended Order will require Respondent to cease
and desist therefrom and from any like or related conduct.
Moreover, in order to effectuate the policies of the Act the
recommended Order will require that Respondent bargain in
good faith with the Union and, if an understanding is
reached, embody it in a signed contract; in this connection,
and since Respondent has given no indication of how far back
it intends to go in the negotiations, I shall recommend that
the Union's certification extend 1 year from the commence-
ment of negotiations hereunder. I shall not recommend the
additional remedies sought by the Union9 because the
Board's decisions indicate that the instant circumstances do
not warrant a departure from its conventional remedial provi-
sions. Cf. Shovel Supply Co., 162 NLRB 460, 461,
474- 475 (1966); Orion Tool, Die and Machine Co., 195
NLRB 1080, 1089, 1091 (1972); Rauland Div. of Zenith, 187
NLRB 785 (1971); Longhorn Machine Works, Inc., 205
NLRB 685, fn 2 (1973).
Upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law,
and the entire record herein, and pursuant to Section 10(c)
of the Act, I hereby recommend the following:
ORDER10
Respondent, Waples- Platter Companies, its officers,
agents, successors, and assigns, shall:
1. Cease and desist from
(a) Refusing to bargain collectively with Chauffeurs,
Teamsters and Helpers, Local Union No. 47, affiliated with
International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Ware-
housemen and Helpers of America (herein called the Union),
as the exclusive bargaining representative of the employees in
the following approriate unit:
All order pullers, forklift operators, shipping and re-
ceiving clerks, frozen food packers, maintenance and
mechanics, loaders and local and over- the- road truck-
drivers at the employer's place of business located at
7301 Waples Road, Fort Worth, Texas, excluding office
clerical, professional employees, supervisors, guards and
9 Requiring Respondent "not to withdraw from tentative agreements
except where superseded by subsequent mutual agreements," to pay the
Union's costs, to give the Union the use of Respondent's bulletin boards, and
to permit Board personnel to read the order to the employees
10 In the event no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec 102 46 of the
Rules and Regulations of the National Labor Relations Board, the findings,
conclusions, recommendations, and recommended Order herein shall, as
provided in Sec 102 48 of the Rules and Regulations, be adopted by the
Board and become its findings, conclusions, and Order, and all objections
therto shall be deemed waived for all purposes
watchmen as defined in the National Labor Relations
Act, as amended.
(b) In any like or related manner interfering with, restrain-
ing, or coercing its employees in the exercise of their rights
guaranteed by Section 7 of the Act.
2. Take the following affirmative action necessary to effec-
tuate the policies of the Act-
(a) Upon request, bargain collectively and in good faith
with the Union for the unit described herein with respect to
rates of pay, wages, hours of work, and other conditions of
employment, and, if an understanding is reached, embody
such understanding in a signed agreement. The certification
year shall extend 1 year from the date such new bargaining
negotiations begin
(b) Post at its place of business in Fort Worth, Texas,
copies of the attached notice marked "Appendix."" Copies
of said notice, on forms provided by the Regional Director for
Region 16, after being duly signed by an authorized represen-
tative of Respondent, shall be posted by Respondent immedi-
ately upon receipt thereof, and be maintained by it for 60
consecutive days thereafter, in conspicuous places, including
all places where notices to employees are customarily posted.
Reasonable steps shall be taken by Respondent to ensure that
such notices are not altered, defaced, or covered by any other
material.
(c) Notify the Regional Director for Region 16, in writing,
within 20 days from the date of the Order, what steps Re-
spondent has taken to comply herewith.
11 In the event that the Board's Order is enforced by a Judgment of a
United States Court of Appeals, the words in the Notice reading "Posted
by Order of the National Labor Relations Board" shall read "Posted Pursu-
ant to a Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order
of the National Labor Relations Board "
APPENDIX
NOTICE To EMPLOYEES
POSTED BY ORDER OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
An Agency of the United States Government
WE WILL bargain collectively and in good faith with
Local 47 of the Teamsters in the unit certified by the
National Labor Relations Board on March 29 , 1973, and
the Union 's certification shall extend 1 year from the
date new bargaining negotiations begin.
WE WILL NOT refuse so to bargain in good faith, nor
will we interfere in any similar way with the rights gua-
ranteed to our employees by the National Labor Rela-
tions Act.
WAPLES- PLATTER COMPANIES