W. W. Cross & Co., Inc.

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Jun 17, 1948

77 N.L.R.B. 1162 (N.L.R.B. 1948)

In the Matter of W. W. CROSS & COMPANY, INC., and UNITED STEEL-
WORKERS OF AMERICA, CIO
Case No. 1-C-2676.-Decided June 17, 19.48
Mr. Robert E. Greene, for the Board.
Ropes, Gray, Best, Coolidge and Rugg, by Mr. Edward O. Proctor,
of Boston, Mass., for the Respondent.
Grant and Angoff, by Messrs. Samuel E. Angoff and Harold B.
Roitman, of Boston, Mass., for the Union.
DECISION
AND
ORDER
On January 27, 1947, Trial Examiner James R. Hemingway issued
his Intermediate Report in the above-entitled proceeding, finding that
the Respondent had engaged and was engaging in certain unfair labor
practices and recommending that it cease and desist therefrom and
take certain affirmative action, as set forth in the copy of the Inter-
mediate Report attached hereto. Thereafter, the Respondent filed
exceptions and supporting briefs.
On November 18, 1947, the Board, at Washington, D. C., heard oral
argument, in which the Respondent and the Union participated.
The Board has reviewed the rulings of the Trial Examiner made
at the hearing, and finds that no prejudicial error was committed. The
Board has considered the Intermediate Report, the exceptions and
briefs filed by the Respondent," the arguments of counsel, and the entire
record- ilr the case, and hereby adopts the findings, conclusions, and
recommendations of the Trial Examiner, insofar as such findings,
conclusions, and recommendations are consistent with the Decision and
Order which follows.
The Trial Examiner found that the Respondent: (1) would not and
will not recognize the Union's right to negotiate with it concerning
the terms of a group health and accident -insurance plan;. and (2)
' The Union filed no exceptions and no briefs.
77 N. L. R. B., No. 188:
1162
W. W. CROSS & COMPANY, INC. 1163
failed and refused, before about April 11, 1946, to negotiate on other
subjects in good faith. He concluded, upon these findings, that the
Respondent had engaged and is engaging in violations of Section
8 (5) and (1) of the Act.
The Respondent's exceptions to the Intermediate Report have placed
in issue the validity of the foregoing findings and the conclusions
reached upon them. For the reasons set forth below, we find, merit in
these exceptions insofar as they go to the question of whether the Re-
spondent unlawfully has failed and refused to bargain in good faith
on subjects other than group health and accident insurance. We agree
with the Trial Examiner, however, that the Respondent's refusal to
bargain at all about the terms of a group health and accident insurance
plan was and.is. violative of Section 8 (5) and (1) of the Act.2
1. The Respondent's failure and refusal to bargain about a group
health and accident insurance plan
The Respondent concedes that it refused and is refusing to bargain
with the Union about a group health and accident insurance program
supported financially by it and yielding monetary protection to em-
ployees against the financial hazards of illness or accidental injury;
that, following a rejection of the Union's demand, it established the
terms and conditions of such a program unilaterally; 3 and that it
solicited the employee's participation in the plan through direct
appeals to them rather than through their representative. It con-
tends, however, that the Act does not obligate collective bargaining as
to such matters and that, hence, its refusal to treat this subject as
negotiable is not an unfair labor practice, within the meaning of Sec-
tion 8 (5) and (1) of the Act.4 For the reasons stated by the Trial
I Section 8 ( 5) and ( 1) of the Act has been reenacted as Section 8 (a) (5) and 8 (a)
(1) of the amended Act.
3 A group health and accident insurance plan financed in part by the Respondent and in
part by the employees was originally established by the Respondent at a time apparently
antedating the employees ' designation of a statutory repicsentative The Union presented
its demand for a new group insurance plan (to be wholly supported by Respondent) during
the period when the negotiation of a new contract was pending The Respondent refused
the demand on the ground that it was not legally obligated to bargain on the subject.
Thereafter it unilaterally arranged for a group insurance contract and announced to the
employees directly that the plan would become effective when 75 percent of them had
agreed in writing to contribute one-half of the cost of their premiums , the other half to be
provided by Respondent All but two employees authorized the deduction of their half
of premium cost from wages, and the insurance program was thereafter placed into effect.
* The Respondent apparently contends , further , that because it had originally established
the program unilaterally , it had the legal privilege to continue to deal with the program as
it chose . This contention has no validity . Cf. N L R . B. v. J H. Allison Co , 165 F.
( 2d) 766 (C. C A 6), enforcing 70 N. L R. B. 377.
1164 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Examiner, and for those set forth in our decision in Matter of Inland
Steel Co., 77 N. L. R. B. 1, we find this contention to be without nierit.5
Accordingly, we find, as did the Trial Examiner, that where, as here,
the employees in an appropriate unit have designated an exclusive bar-
gaining representative, the employer of such employees is under a
statutory duty to bargain collectively with the accredited representa-
tive concerning the terms of a group health and accident insurance
program providing for employee protection against the financial haz-
ards of illness or accidental injury. We find, further, that the Re-
spondent violated this statutory duty by failing and refusing to bar-
gain collectively' with the Union about such a program and that it
thereby engaged in and is engaging in violations of Section 8 (5) and
(1) of the Act.
II. The alleged refusal to bargain in good faith on subjects other than
group health and accident insurance
The Trial Examiner's finding that the Respondent failed and refused
to bargain in good faith from about January 9, 1946, to April 18;
1946, on subjects other than group health and accident insurance is
based primarily on : (1) the wage increase granted the employees on
January 9, and (2) the Respondent's rejection of the Union's proposals
for a renewal of the maintenance of membership and arbitration pro-
visions of the expiring contract. We, however, do not agree with the
Trial Examiner .6
As is set forth more fully in the Intermediate Report, the wage in-
crease here complained of effected an increase of 10 percent in the
wages of all employees. It forms the subject of complaint here be-
cause the grant was accomplished unilaterally despite the fact that
The Respondent took the position that its contiibutions to such a plan are gratuitous
payments for the benefit of employees and not "wages" as the latter term is used in the Act
In support, thereof, it relied upon a meaning of "wages" as compensation foi work done.
and upon the portions of the legislative and historical background of the Act, also relied
upon by the Respondent employer in the Inland Steel case, as proof that such a meaning of
the statutory terns was intended by Congress It further grounded its position as to the
intent of Congress on the practical difficulties of bai gaining collectively about an insurance
program with a union iepiesenting one segment of employees where, as here, the program
is not limited in scope to the Respondent. but applies to several affiliated corporations
what we have said in the Inland Steel case adequately meets the various aspects of the
Respondent's position on this issue We need only point out further that, as a matter of
economic fact, the employer's contributions to such a piogram are one means of providing
paid sick leave. The economic effect of these and other forms of paid sick leave on current
rates of pay is well recognized; even by the Respondents Its officials testified that in
making a survey of the wage sates paid by competitors, it treated the latter's contributions
to such insurance funds as an inseparable part of the take-home pay given by them, to
employees , and adjusted its weekly rate of pay to meet the over-all figure of the competitors
6 Member Murdock agrees with the Trial Examiner that the Respondent refused to
bargain in good faith with the Union by granting a unilateral wage increase on January 9,
1946, and dissents from the contrary finding of his colleagues
W. W. CROSS & COMPANY, INC. 1165
a substantial group of the employees affected by it were represented by
the Union.
In finding that the Respondent's unilateral promulgation of this
increase constituted a violation of the duty to bargain, the Trial Ex-
aminer has applied the principle, frequently enunciated, that where a
statutory representative has been designated by the employees, an em-
ployer's unilateral determination of matters properly the subject of
collective bargaining constitutes a breach of the employer's obligation
to bargain under the Act.7 For the reasons hereafter set forth, we
are of the view that this principle is not here applicable.
The record here shows that after the Union had opened up the wage
clauses of the contract for negotiation by notice dated October 30,
1945, it took a series of steps, which, viewed as a whole, indicate that
by January 1946, it had created, anticipatorily, an impasse on the issue
,of its wage demands. These demands were indirectly presented to the
Respondent as early as November 1945 when the Union, acting in com-
mon with various affiliated organizations representing steelworkers
throughout the country, polled its employee membership for authori-
zation to propose an increase of $2 a day in each individual's wave
and to strike in the event the proposal was rejected. The Respondent's
employees voted the Union the authorization it requested without re-
gard to the existence of a contractual no-strike pledge. These events
acquired significance, so far as the bargaining situation was concerned,
when, with the passage of time, the Union failed to seek any confer-
ences with the Respondent on wages.5
Under these circumstances, we believe that by January 9, the Union
had effectively demonstrated to the Respondent that there was no pos-
sibility of reaching an agreement on wages through the normal process
of collective bargaining in the event that the Respondent was unwill-
ing to grant the Union's demands in full,9 and that it thereby made it
possible for the Respondent to apply in good faith its policy of grant-
ing a nominal cost of living increase.
We regard it as significant, moreover, that the Respondent did not
utilize the increase as a means of undermining the Union's prestige.
Thus, it carefully precluded the possibility that the wage revision
' See e g May Department Stores, Inc v N L R B., 326 U S 376, 383-384; N L R B.
v. Hill Stores, Inc., 140 F . ( 2d) 924 , 926 (C C A . 5) ; Matter of V-O Milling Co, 43
N. L R B 348; Matter of General Motors Corp ., 59 N L . R B 1143, 1153-1154, enf'd 150
F. (2d) 201 ( C. C A 3 ) , Matter of South Carolina Granite Co, 58 N L R . B 1448, 1461.
8 The Union 's effort to obtain a conference date occurred on or about January 11, 1946,
when the Union wrote to Respondent that it desired to negotiate on the entire contract
and served notice that a strike for enforcement of a $2 a day increase in the wages of each
employee would begin on January 21, 1946
9 Cf Matter of Times Publishing Co., 72 N L R B 676
1166 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
aright be interpreted by the employees as all act of withdrawal of rec-
ognition from the Union. It gave the Union token notice of the pro-
mulgation of the increase and of the terms thereof in advance of dis-
closure to the employees, and it stated, in announcing the increase to
,the employees, that it had "discussed" the matter with the Union,
which "represented . . . certain groups of our employees." It further
:assured the employees of its continuing relations with the Union by
,participating promptly, upon the Union's subsequent request, in nego-
=tiating conferences which resulted in a collective agreement for a
further wage increase.
In this context, we are unable to find that the wage increase of
January 9 constituted an unfair labor practice.lo
. Nor do we, believe, .in the light of the circumstances Hereafter' set
forth, that the Respondent's rejection of the Union's demands for
'maintenance of membership and for arbitration as the final step in
-the disposition of grievances evidences bad faith bargaining.
In this phase of the case, we are confronted with a situation where
-union security and arbitration guarantees were issues involved in prior
'bargaining negotiations between the parties as to which no voluntary
-agreement had been reached. As noted by the Trial Examiner, these
-obligations were contractually assumed by the Respondent in obedi-
ence to a directive of the War Labor Board, were faithfully executed,
and were in effect at the time the Union made the demand that these
obligations be carried over into the new collective contract it sought to
negotiate. In this background, there is no warrant for assuming that
the unyielding attitude admittedly adopted by the Respondent at the
outset of the negotiations for the new contract and firmly maintained
throughout the many months of conferences, was premised on any
-but an economic basis.
There is no question that the rejection of these demands, despite the
-Union's adamant insistence upon them, constituted the primary cause
of-the-impasse.. But the-statutory duty-to bargain may be satisfied even
though negotiations are abortive. There is no evidence here that the
'Respondent failed to discuss its reasons for rejecting these demands.
Nor can it otherwise be said that it was using its position on them as a
means of avoiding establishment of any contractual relation. It is
-ndisputed that the Respondent made counterproposals to the Union
during the- course of the negotiations, embodying, concessions to'the
Union in many respects and that it offered to incorporate these con-
cessions into a binding contract." Moreover, a partial agreement con-
'0Cf Matter of Exposition Cotton Mills Co., 76 N. L R. B 1289, Matter of Sain M
Jackson Co , 34 N L R B. 194.
11 The Trial Examiner apparently regarded the Respondent ' s imposition on its negotiators
of a duty to submit the agreement concluded during negotiations to a final ratification proc-
W. W. CROSS & COMPANY, INC. 1167
taming provisions for a substantial wage increase and for other bene-
#icial terms relating to the settlement of the strike was entered into
is a result of the collective bargaining during this period.12 .
Upon the foregoing facts, we are not convinced that the Respondent's
Attitude on the Union's demands for maintenance of membership and
for arbitration as the final step in the disposition of grievances, es-
tablishes that the Respondent failed and refused to bargain in good
faith.
THE REMEDY
As noted heretofore, the Respondent has rigidly maintained and is
maintaining that its group health and accident insurance plan is not
the subject of collective bargaining but is a matter about which the
Respondent is free to act unilaterally. Because, in our opinion, .the
Respondent's unilateral action with respect to any aspects of its group
health and accident insurance program substantially affects the in-
terest of the statutory representative in the establishment of stable
terms and conditions of employment applicable to the entire group, we
find it necessary, in order to effectuate the policies of the Act, to require
the Respondent to refrain from taking any action with respect to its
group health and accident insurance program which affects any of
the employees in the unit represented by the Union, without prior
consultation with the Union 13 and, in addition, to require it to bargain
collectively with the Union upon request when and if the Union meets
the conditions specified below.
Tho Union has not complied with the provisions of Section 9 (f),
(g), and (h) of the amended Act. Our remedial order will therefore
be in part conditioned upon its complying with these provisions, within
thirty (30) days from the date of the Order herein.14
ORDER
Upon the basis of the entire record in this case and pursuant to Sec-
tion 10 (c) of the Act, as amended, the National Labor Relations Board
ess as constituting an unlawful limitation on the authority of the negotiating agents We
do not agree There is no evidence that the reservation of the power to ratify on Respond-
ent's part was intended or was used to foreclose the achievement of an agreement.
Moreover so far as the record shows, this reservation was not relaxed at any time during
the negotiations ; yet the Trial Examiner did not deem it of sufficient import to warrant
attributing to the Respondent bad faith iir'the negotiations it conducted after April 11.
It is also noteworthy that the Union , too, was required to submit the agreement resulting
from negotiations to the employees for ratification The Respondent 's negotiating agents
thus had as much autlroiity to commit their principal as did the Union representatives to
commit theirs . Cf Matter of Wilson & Co , 30 N. L R. B 314 , 324, 328
12Cf Matter of Exposition Cotton Mills Co, 76 N. L. R B. 1289 , Matter of Union
Manufacturing Co, Inc, 76 N L R B 322
'3 Cf Matter of Inland Steel Company, 77 N. L R. B 1
11 Matter of Marshall and Bruce Company, 75 N L R B 90.
1168 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
hereby orders that the Respondent, W. W. Cross & Company, Inc:,
and its officers, agents, successors, and assigns shall :
1. Cease and desist from :
(a) Refusing to bargain collectively with respect to a group health
and accident insurance program, with United Steelworkers of Amer-
ica, CIO,15 if and when said labor organization shall have complied
within thirty (30) days from the date of this Order with Section 9 (f),
(g), and (h) of the Act, as amended, as the exclusive bargaining rep-
resentative of all production and maintenance employees in the
Respondent's East Jaffrey, New Hampshire, plant, excluding execu-
tives, supervisors, foremen, working foremen, tackmakers, sealers,
watchmen, and office and clerical employees;
(b) Making any unilateral changes affecting any employees in the
unit represented by the Union with respect to its, group health and
accident insurance program without prior consultation with the
Union, when and if the Union shall have complied with the filing
requirements of the Act, as amended, in the manner set forth above.
2. Take the following affirmative action, which the Board finds will
effectuate the policies of the Act :
(a) Upon request, and upon compliance by the Union with the filing
requirements of the Act, as amended, in the manner set forth above,
bargain collectively with respect to its group health and accident insur-
ance program with the Union as the exclusive representative of all
its employees in the aforesaid appropriate unit;
(b) Post in conspicuous places throughout its plant in Jaffrey
[East Jaffrey], New Hampshire, copies of the notice attached hereto,
marked "Appendix A." 16 Copies of said notice, to be furnished by the
Regional Director for the First Region, shall, after being duly signed
by the Respondent's representative, be posted by the Respondent im-
mediately upon receipt thereof and maintained by it, for thirty (30)
consecutive days thereafter and also for an additional thirty (30) con-
secutive days in the event of compliance by the Union with the filing
requirements of the Act as amended, in conspicuous places, including
all places where notices to employees are customarily posted. Reason-
able steps shall be taken by the Respondent to insure that said notices
are not altered, defaced, or covered by any other material;
(c) Notify the Regional Director for the First Region in writing,
within ten (10) days from the date of this Order, and again within
' Hereinafter refer red to as the Union.
^0 In the event that this Order is enforced by decree of a Cii cuit Court of Appeals, there
shall be inserted before the words "A DECISION AND ORDER," the words "DECREE OF
THE UNITED STATES CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS ENFORCING"
W. W. CROSS & COMPANY, INC. 1169
ten (10) days from the future date, if any, on which the Respondent
is officially notified that the Union has met. the conditions hereinabove
set forth, what steps the Respondent has taken to comply herewith.
MEMBER GRAY, dissenting in part:
For the reasons set forth in my dissenting opinion in Matter of In-
land Steel Company,17 I would leave group health and accident insur-
ance to the field of voluntary collective bargaining. I would dismiss
the complaint in its entirety.
APPENDIX: A
NOTICE TO ALL EMPLOY r S
Pursuant to a Decision and Order of the National Labor Relations
Board, and in order to effectuate the policies of the National Labor
Relations Act, we hereby notify our employees :
WE WILL NOT refuse to bargain collectively with respect to our
group health and accident insurance program with United Steel-
workers of America, (C. I. 0.), as the exclusive representative of
all of the employees in the bargaining unit described herein, pro-
vided said labor organization complies, within thirty (30) days
from the date of the aforesaid order of the Board, with Section 9
(f), (g), and (h) of the National Labor Relations Act, as,
amended.
WE WILL NOT make any unilateral changes in our group health
and accident insurance program affecting any employees in the
bargaining unit without prior consultation with the Union, pro-
vided said labor organization complies within thirty (30) days
from the date of the afore-mentioned order of the Board, with
Section 9 (f), (g), and (h) of the National Labor Relations Act,
as amended.
The bargaining unit is: all production and maintenance employees
in the R'espondent's East Jaffrey, New Hampshire, plant, excluding
executives, supervisors, foremen, working foremen, tackmakers, seal-
ers, watchmen, and office and clerical employees.
W. W. CROSS & COMPANY, INC.,
Employer.
By _/ ----------------------------------
(Representative) (Title)
Dated --------------------
This notice must remain posted for 60 days from the date hereof
and must not be altered, defaced, or covered by any other material.
27 77 N. L. R. B. 1.
1170 DECISIONS. OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
INTERMEDIATE REPORT
Dir. Robes t E. Greene, for the Board.
Messrs Ropes , Gi ay, Best, Coolidge & Rugg, by Mi Edivm d 0 Pi octo . of
Boston, Mass ., for the Respondent.
Messrs. Grant & Angoff, by DIi. Samuel E . Asgoff and Mr. Harold B Rothman,
of Boston;'Mfss, for,the Union.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Upon a charge duly filed on January 16, 1046, by United Steelworkers of
America, C I. 0, herein called the Union, the National Labor Relations Board,
herein called the Board, by its Regional Director for the First Region (Boston,
Massachusetts), issued its complaint dated October 14, 1946, against W «'_
Cross & Company, Inc, herein called the Respondent, alleging that the Re-
spondent had engaged in and was engaging in unfair labor practices within
the meaning of Section 8 (1) and (5) and Section 2 (6) and (7) of the National
Labor Relations Act, 49 Sat 440, herein called the Act Copies of the complaint
together with notice of hearing thereon were duly served upon the Respondent
and the Union
With respect to the unfair labor practices, the complaint alleged in substance
that since January 9, 1946, the Respondent had failed and refused to bargaut
in good faith with the Union, although the Union was the representative of a
majority of the Respondent's employees in an appropriate unit; that the Re-
spondent, while purportedly bargaining with the Union, granted and announced
to the employees in said appropriate unit a general wage increase without consul-
tation with the Union; that since January 9, 1946, the Respondent had attempted
to circumvent the representatives of the Union by disregarding them and dealing
directly with its own employees, the officers and committeemen of the Local of
the Union; that on June 11, 1946, the Respondent threatened to sell its plant or
move it unless the Union accepted the proposals of the Respondent respecting
terms of a collective bargaining agreement ; and that on September-4, 1946, the
Respondent, while purportedly bargaining with the Union as to rates of pay,
wages, hours of employment or other conditions of employment, granted and
announced to the employees certain insurance benefits without consultation with
he Union.
The Respondent's answer and amendment thereto admitted having granted
a wage increase to its employees but averred that the increase was granted on
the basis of the increase in the cost of living and that the Respondent "made it
clear to the Union" that the increase was not to be regarded as a settlement of
its wage demands and that the Respondent intended to continue negotiations
with the Union on its wage demands; admitted that the Respondent informed
Union representatives that the Respondent had, during the course of a strike
at the plant, "been approached by certain people who wanted to buy the plant,"
but denied that the statement was accompanied by or used as a threat or for the
purpose of coercion; admitted that it had put into effect an insurance plan with-
out consulting the Union, but averred that there existed at the plant a benefit
association whose bylaws provided for certain insurance benefits, to which asso-
ciation the Respondent contributed an amount equivalent to 50 percent of the
clues and assessments ; that the benefits paid were small and inadequate and
that therefore the Respondent, through the foremen, submitted to all hourly.
-W. W. CROSS & CODIPANY, INC. 1171
paid employees a plan which had been arranged through a mutual insurance
company for accidental death, dismemberment, and loss of sight benefits, and
accident and sickness weekly benefits, under which plan the Respondent was
to pay half of the cost; that such plan was conditional on enrollment of 75
percent of the hourly paid employees; that when all but two of such employees
signed applications therefore the plan was put into operation, and that on
September 30, 1946, the said association voted to discontinue. The Respondent's
answer denied that it had failed or refused to bargain in good faith and denied
that it had attempted to circumvent the representatives of the Union, averring
that the Respondent regarded the Local as the real party in interest and that,
while it had no objections to the International Representative's presence at
negotiations, it had reserved to itself the right to notify the elected representa--
tives of the Local of its communications with the International Representative
and to insist on the presence of the local representatives at all conferences;
and in general denied the commission of all the alleged unfair labor practices.
Pursuant to notice a hearing was held at Jaffrey,' New Hampshire, from Novem-
her 13 to 15, inclusive, 1946, before the undersigned Trial Examiner, duly desig-
nated by the Chief Trial Examiner. The Board, Respondent, and Union were,
each represented by counsel, and all participated in the hearing Full oppor-
tunity to be heard, to examine and cross-examine witnesses, and to introduce
evidence hearing on the issues was afforded all parties.
At the conclusion of the testimony the parties argued orally, and thereafter
Board's counsel moved to amend the complaint to conform to the proof as to
non-substantive matters The motion was granted Briefs were filed with the
Trial Examiner by Respondent's and Board's counsel.
Upon the entire record in the case and fioni his observation of the witnesses,
the undersigned makes the following:
FINDINGS of FACT
I THE BUSINESS OF THE RESPONDENT
The Respondent is a Maine corporation , having its plant at Jaffrey ( popularly
called East Jaffrey ), New Hampshire , where it is engaged in the manufacture,
sale, and distribution of cut tacks and cut nails It is a wholly owned subsidiary
of United Shoe Machinery Corporation of Boston , Massachusetts The principal
raw materials used by the Respondent are sheet steel , sheet copper , sheet brass,
and steel wire . During the year preceding March 19, 1 946, the Respondent used
such raw materials in the value of approximately $ 700,000 , of which substantially
all was purchased from points outside the State of New Hampshire. During the
same per iod the Respondent shipped approximately 90 percent of its finished prod-
ucts , of it value of approximately $2,000 ,000, to points outside the State of New
Hampshire . The Respondent employs approximately 355 persons , of whom ap-
pioxnuately 257 are within the scope of the alleged appropriate bargaining unit.
II. THE ORGANIZATION INVOLVED
United Steelworkers of America, affiliated with the Congress of Industrial
Organizations, is a labor organization admitting to membership employees of the
Respondent
1 Jaffrey (popularly called East Jaffrey) became the official name early in 1946 by action
of the selectmen of the town
1172 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
III. THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
A. The refusal to bargain in good faith
1 The approprigte_unit
The complaint alleges and the answer admits that all production and mainte-
nance employees at the Respondent's East Jaffrey [Jaffrey, New Hampshire
plant, excluding executives, foremen, working foremen, tackinakers, sealers,
watchmen, office and clerical employees, and all supervisory employees with au-
thority to hire, promote, discharge, discipline, or otherwise effect changes in the
status of employees or effectively recommend such action, constitute a unit appro-
priate for the purposes of collective bargaining within the meaning of Section 9
(b) of the Act. The undersigned so finds.
2. Representation by the Union of a majority in the appropriate unit
In a consent election held on February 12, 1945, a majority of the employees
in the appropriate unit above described designated the Union as their representa-
tive for the purposes of collective bargaining with the Respondent, and the Union
was certified on February 17, 1945, in a consent determination by the Regional
Director for the Board. The Respondent's answer admits that the Union has
been the majority representative of such employees at all times since February
12, 1945. Accordingly the undersigned finds that on February 12, 1945, and at
all times thereafter the Union was and now is the duly designated representa-
tive of a majority of the employees in the aforesaid appropriate unit, and that,
by virtue of Section 9 (a) of the Act, the Union at all times was, and now is, the
representative of all the Respondent's employees in such unit for the purposes
of collective bargaining in respect to rates of pay, wages, hours of employment or
other conditions of employment.
3. The refusal to bargain in good faith
Pursuant to negotiations, the Respondent and the Union entered into a contract
for one year from February 12, 1945, with a provision for automatic renewal from
year to year unless notice by either party of a desire to amend or terminate it
were given at least 30 days prior to the termination date. The contract also
contained a provision that either party might reopen the contract on the issue of
wages on 30 days' notice.2 Until early in 1946 the Union enjoyed very cordial
relations with the Respondent through Manager Paul Somers.
Under date of October 24, 1945, the Union wrote to the Respondent giving notice
or reopening of the contract on the matter of wages.' Between that date and
January 1946, Staff Representative Michael Ryan talked with Somers, who on
one occasion said he was trying to work out a wage agreement with his superiors
and thought he could work out something if he could stay away from the attorneys
and upper bracket officials. Later, however, Somers said the matter was out of
his hands.
On January 9, 1946, Ryan and the bargaining committee of the Union met about
11: 30 a. m in the conference room at the plant. Somers came in with a paper in
2 Several issues were submitted to the war Labor Board which granted the Union two of
its demands-maintenance of membei ship and cmnpnlsomy arbitration
3 A strike vote, based on the issue of a $2 per day wage increase demand, was taken in
the latter gait of November 1945.
W. W. CROSS & COMPANY, INC. 1173
his hand, showed it to Ryan and the committee, and announced, "This is what we
are going to do." The paper announced a 10-percent increase effective January
7, 1946, for all salary-paid, hourly paid, and piece-work employees, and concluded
with a statement that the Union represented certain groups of employees for
collective bargaining and that the increase had been discussed with the Union
representatives. Ryan called attention to the fact that the increase had not
been discussed with the Union and requested negotiations thereon. Somers re-
plied that he had to post the notice that day. Ryan told Somers he thought it
would be a violation of the Act to post the notice. Somers excused himself and
left the room. Returning shortly, Somers told Ryan that he had his orders
and had to post the notice. Ryan telephoned the Union's attorneys in Boston
and again requested Somers not to post the notice. Somers repeated that he had
his orders and had to post it. Somers left the meeting and posted the notice.'
After lunch Somers returned to find the committee and Ryan still meeting.
They told Somers that the 10-percent increase was not enough. Somers said
it was the best the Respondent could do until it was seen how the strike would
come out.'
On January 11, Ryan wrote to the Respondent that the Union wished to meet
for the purpose of discussing changes, additions, and amendments to the contract
for the year following the February 12 expiration date. On January 17 ° Somers
replied, suggesting that, before meeting, the Union should submit its proposals in
writing. On February 4, 1946, Ryan sent a proposed contract with a letter re-
questing a conference.' Meanwhile, about the end of January, Charles Howard
had replaced Somers as manager.' Howard did not reply to Ryan's letter, but
at the request of the head of the grievance committee, arranged to meet with
the committee on February 8 to discuss a contract On the latter date Ryan,
through a field examiner for the Board, telephoned Howard and arranged to have
the meeting postponed to February 12 so that he would be able to attend At
the meeting of February 12, attended by Ryan and the committee for the Union
and by Howard and some 10 other supervisors of the Respondent, Howard looked
over the provisions of the Union's proposed contract. The meeting broke up
with the understanding that Howard was to take up the proposed contract with
his superiors and let the Union know the result, and that the Respondent would
present counterproposals. Later, learning from the local president of the Union
that Howard had arranged a meeting with the local's committee, Ryan, again
through the field examiner, arranged with Howard for a meeting on February 20,
at which time the Respondent presented its counterproposals. Among the pro-
posals of the Union were those for wage increase, maintenance of membership,
compulsory ai bitration, and an insurance plan by which the Respondent would
provide, through a large insurance company, certain health and accident benefits
at its own expense. The Respondent omitted all of these from its counterpro-
posals. Proposals and counterproposals were discussed but Howard stated that
the Respondent regarded insurance as a matter that was not negotiable. The
Respondent at that time had in existence, and contributed 50 percent of the dues
4 Two of the officials of the parent corporation-Wilson Palmer, vice president and E. E.
Yake-were waiting for Somers in' his 'office while Somers was with Ryan and the
committee
s The Union filed its charge on January 16, 1946
° Somers was away ill and did not receive Ryan's letter until January 17.
T On January 21, 1946, the employees went out on a. strike.
s Howard was acting manager from about January 28 to May 8, when he became manager.
788886-49-vol. 77-75
1174 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
and assessment of, a mutual benefit association which the employees felt was
inadequate . After a discussion of other proposals , Howard again said he would
take the matter up with his superiors . No progress was made on disputed issues
at a meeting on February 26, which had been arranged by a Federal conciliator.
Howard testified that Wilson Palmer, since January 1, 1946, vice president
of the United Shoe Machinery Company,' told him that his power as plant
manager to negotiate a contract would be subject to review by the officers of
the parent company, that maintenance of membership and compulsory arbitration
were contrary to the Respondent's fixed policy and should not be in the new con-
tract, and that the Respondent was working on a new insurance plan and if and
when it was ready it would be announced but that it was not to be negotiated.
At a meeting on March 21, 1946, arranged through another Federal conciliatoi,
Howard informed the Union that the Respondent was working on an insurance
plan. The Respondent made no offer on the Union's wage increase demand, and
no agreement was reached Ryan asked Howard to get someone from top man-
agement in to negotiate , as Howard did not appear to have authority
Under date of April 4, 1946, Howard wrote a letter to the local of the Union
stating that the Respondent had tried to make the fairest possible proposal to
settle the strike. The letter set forth its proposals and then said that it had
intended to use these proposals as the basis for a joint meeting between the
Respondent and the Union's officers, but that it had learned from the conciliator
who had been assisting in negotiations that Ryan had stated the proposals to
be unacceptable for discussion at a joint meeting. The letter concluded by
saying that a copy of this letter was being sent to each employee, to the Board
of Selectmen of the Town of Jaffrey, and to the Commissioner of Labor of the
State of New Hampshire 10 No copy was sent to Ryan and neither the Respond-
ent nor the conciliator had made to him the proposals stated in the letter.
Through the efforts of the Selectmen of the town, the Union and the Re-
spondent were brought together in meetings on April 11 and April 18 at .Jaffrey,
and the Respondent was represented, in addition to the local management, by
E. E. Yake, who described himself as liaison between general management of
United Shoe Machinery Company and many of its subsidiaries. At the latter
meeting , the parties reached a settlement on wages and agreed to postpone
consideration of other disputed terms temporarily until after the employees had
returned to work. As part of the settlement agreement, the original contract
was extended for 60 days or until a new one was negotiated, whichever was
sooner. The employees returned to work on April 22, 1946.
On May 28, 1946, Ryan wrote the Respondent requesting a meeting for re-
sumption of negotiations. Howard failed to answer this letter but arranged
a meeting through one of the union committeemen for June 11." At this meet-
9 The Respondent is a wholly onned subsidiary of this company. The parent company
and the Respondent have the same president.
1 0 Set forth in full as "Appendix A "
Ryan, in a letter to Howard dated July 2, 1946, protested that "when this office has
communicated with you, you have gone over the heads of the International Representatives
and ignored them, and talked with Local Union Representatives " Howard replied, ' We
had no intention of ignoring 3 ou or any of your associates We appreciate quite clearly that
you will undoubtedly desire to be present at any negotiations or discussions and, if the
Local is nhllmg, we certainly have no objections We are, however, definitely of the
opinion that the Local is the real party in interest on behalf of the Union as the bargaining
agent and we must reserve to ourselves the right to notify the elected representatives of the
Local of our communications with you and to insist that they be present at all conferences '
This reply, the fist ever directed by Howard to Ryan, was composed by Yake and N B.
Todd , the Respondent 's general counsel in Boston
W. W. CROSS & COMPANY, INC. 1175
ing, attended by Ryan, Samuel Angoff, the Union's attorney, and the committee
for the Union, and by Yake, Howard, and a few other members of local man-
,gement, for the Respondent, Yake made an introductory statement in which
lie told the committee it might be interested in knowing that during the latter
part of the strike the Respondent had had an opportunity to sell the plant, that
more than half of the employees owned their own homes, that they wore local
people, that Howard was-a local man, that their problems were local which
could best be worked out together, and that the employees would be better off
to accept the Respondent's proposals.'
Meetings were held on July 15, August 6 and 21. and October 17, with no
agreement being reached, but with inteiiin 60-day extensions of the old con-
tiact On the latter date, however, the Respondent refused any further exten,
sions of the contract but agreed to continue deducting dues
Meanwhile, on about September 4, the Respondent announced to its employ-
ees by a letter accompanying their pay checks the inauguration of an insurance
plan. The Union apparently did not find the plan unsatisfactory but felt that
it was a matter on which the Respondent should have baigained, and so indi-
cated to the Respondent at the October 17 meeting
4 Conclusions
From all the evidence, the undersigned infers and finds that the Respondent is
not fully aware of its obligations in the collective bargaining process While the
Respondent correctly argues that it is not required to yield to the Union on all its
demands, that is not the equivalent of saying that the obligations of the Respond-
ent under the Act are fulfilled by detailing the duty of negotiating to an emissary
who has piactically no freedom of decision, as was the situation with Howard.13
Even Yake's authority was limited on principal issues, such as 1,.tid holidays,
insurance, maintenance of membership, and compulsory arbitration. Whatever
the initial prejudices toward certain proposals and whatever the ultimate decision
thereon may be, it is incumbent on the parties to enter bargaining conferences with
;in open mind, " otherwise the purpose of such conferences-to exchange factual
knowledge, ideas, and theories with a view to breaking down the'barriers erected
by incomplete or inaccurate knowledge or thought-would be thwarted at the
outset. The Respondent did not exhibit an open-minded attitude Nor does it
appear that the Respondent could enter the bargaining conferences with an open
mind when none of its policy-making officials attend such conferences and where
the representatives of the Respondent who do attend are denied authority even to
consider certain propositions"
The Respondent defended its action in granting the wage increase on January 9,
1946, without negotiating it with the Union on the ground that it was a "fixed
policy" of the parent company to correlate wage increases to the increase in the
cost of liv ing,34 that the Bureau of Labor Statistics in December 1945 had indi-
12 Board's counsel contended that this statement constituted a threat The effect of the
statement will he considered hereinafter
13 Matter of Ho sch Mercantile Co., 45 N. L. R. B 377.
14 Aluminum Ore Co v N L R B , 131 F (2d) 485, N L R B v. Montgomery Ward t6
Co , 133 F (2d) 676 at p 684, Globe Cotton Mills v N L. R B., 103 F (2d) 91 ; Rap.d
Roller Co v N. L R B, 126 F (2d) 452, Singer Mfg. Co. v. N L R B, 119 F (2d) 131.15 Matter of V-0 Milling Co., 43 N. L. R B 348
16 See Matter of V-0 Milling Co., 43 N L R B. 348.
,1176 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
cated a 5-percent increase because of decline of quality, that, because the Union's
$2 wage demand was national , it was apparent that a wage settlement would be
long delayed, and that the wage increase granted was not intended to interfere
with further negotiations ." It is quite apparent from the summary manner in
which the wage increase was announced 18 and from Somers' statement that the
Respondent would not grant any more until it was seen how the strike would
come out that the increase was not regarded as a down payment with negotiations
continuing as to the balance. It is also apparent that Somers had no authority
to deviate from his instructions to explain the predetermined increase and to post
the notice . He was not authorized to engage in any negotiations thereon. By
granting such increase while the Union was attempting to negotiate thereon, the
Respondent foreclosed all negotiations and, in effect , refused to bargain with
reference to a wage increase.17
In the same manner the Respondent refused to negotiate concerning the
Union's request for a new insurance plan. Any emoluments or benefits which
can be measured in money's worth which the employees are entitled to receive
as a result of their employment relation are in the category of wages and like
wages may be the subject of collective bargaining. Plans for group insurance
benefits for sickness , disability , old age, and death have increasingly become a
subject of collective bargaining .20 The Board has "repeatedly held it to be a
refusal to bargain collectively where an employer unilaterally acts with respect
to matters which normally are the subject matters of collective bargaining, after
his employees have requested an opportunity to bargain collectively with regard
to such matters ." 21 Neither the fact that the Respondent had unilaterally
set up its original insurance plan nor the fact that the parent company wished
to include the number of subsidiaries under the same insurance plan is sufficient
reason for the Respondent to refuse to recognize insurance as a negotiable
subject.
From the beginning of 1946 and especially from the time Howard replaced
Somers it was evident that the Respondent was turning a cool shoulder to the
Union's international representatives and was exhibiting a purpose to deal with
the Union merely as a local . Howard's discourteous failure to reply to Ryan's
letters until called to task therefor, Howard's reply, prepared by officials of the
parent company, 21 Yake's remarks at the June 11 and July 18 ineetings,' among
17 Yake testified that the 10 -percent increase was not regarded as a negotiable matter,
that it was a down payment.
is Somers testified that he had received instructions from Yake to post the notice after
,explaining the Respondent 's reasons for it
10 Matter of V-0 Milling Co , 43 N L. R. B. 348 . Most of the cases cited in Respondent's
brief are cases of increases which were made at a time when negotiations were not in
progress or where the Union did not protest the increase
20 Collective Bargaining Negotiations and Contracts ( Bureau of National Affairs , Inc.) 15 :
101 (June 6, 1946).
21 Matter of Singer Mfg Co, 24 N L R B 444 at 470 (aff'd 119 F. (2d) 131) Yake
testified that the Respondent regarded insurance as a matter of good will rather than a
subject for collective bargaining . The Board rejected the same argument in the Singer
case with respect to paid holidays, vacations, and bonuses
22 See footnote 11, supra.
2' At the latter, Yake, according to his own testimony, opened the meeting by saying that
the Respondent recognized that the original contract was made with the International Union,
but that the bulk of constructive work would naturally have to be done by the management
and the local committee , although the latter could exercise its prerogative under the law, if
they cared to, to have a representative of their own choice present.
W. W. CROSS & COMPANY, INC. 1177
other things are illustrative of this attitude ." This attitude of the Respondent,
which evidences bad faith in its recognition of and dealings with the Union
certified as the representative of the employees in the appropriate unit, is not
improved by the fact that, although the Respondent expected the local committee
to represent the Union , the parent company in Boston was dictating most of the
contractual terms to which the Respondent would agree . Since the Respondent
did not refuse to meet with Ryan or the Union's attorneys , however, the under-
signed does not find that the Respondent actually failed or refused to bargain
by such attitude.
Yake's remark at the June 11 meeting that the Respondent had had an oppor-
tunity to sell the plant during the strike was apparently, from the testimony of
Ryan and certain committee members, interpreted as a veiled threat that the
Respondent might resort to such measure if the Union failed to see the Respond-
ent's point of view. The undersigned is not satisfied that any of the witnesses
accurately repeated Yake 's remarks in their entirety . While the original state-
ment may have justified the inference drawn by the union representatives, the
undersigned finds that , on the evidence as presented , Yake did not make a threat
that the Respondent would sell its plant if the Union did not accept its proposals.
During the ninny bargaining conferences the Respondent and the Union made
no progress in the settlement of their differences . The only instances of agree-
ment appear to be in cases where both parties accepted certain clauses of the
original contract without change and where the Respondent in its counter-
proposals of February 20 accepted a few minor changes proposed by the Union.
A comparison of the overtime clause of the original contract with the Respond-
ent's proposals thereon indicate that the Respondent at first wished to eliminate
the alternative of overtime pay for work in excess of 8 hours per day, which
was provided for in the original contract, leaving only overtime pay for work
in excess of 40 hours per week. At the June 11 meeting the Respondent offered
a modification of its proposal, recognizing the alternative of daily or weekly
overtime but providing that in no event would time and one half be paid for
both daily and weekly hours. The original contract had provided that time
and one half should be paid for all hours worked in excess of 8 hours in any
day or 40 hours in any week, whichever was greater. The Respondent's new
provision even as modified omitted the final phrase, leaving it in doubt as to
whether the alternative choice would rest with the Respondent or the employee.
During all the conferences the Respondent failed to deviate in any other
respect from its original proposals. At the final meeting, October 17, the Re-
spondent offered a substitute for one paragraph of its original proposals, but,
the substitute paragraph appears to state the same thing in different form.
While it is difficult to see how reasonably minded men could engage in as
many conferences as did the Union and the Respondent and not make greater-
progress in the adjustment of their differences, no record was kept of the con-
ferences (except those arranged by the Selectmen on April 11 and 18 when the
strike was settled) by which it might be seen how earnestly the parties were
seeking a solution to their difficulties. Apparently neither side smoothed the
path of negotiations by offering a compromise on any of the principal disputed
ii The original contract was with the Union on behalf of the Local. The Union's 1946
proposals were in the same form The proposed contract submitted by the Respondent
named the Local as the contracting party, and in the article dealing with settlement of
grievances it changed the third step by substituting "(c) Between the [Local ] Union and
the Management of the Company" for "(c) Between the iepresentative of the National
Organization and the Genera ] Manager of the Company or his representative "
1178 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
points. In view of the Respondent's unilateral action with respect to the Janu-
ary 9 increases, and the new insurance plan, its predetermination not to con-
sider certain issues as negotiable and its design to ease the international repre-
sentative out of its dealings with the Local, the Respondent's sincerity of purpose
in the conferences following the settlement of the strike may be open to doubt.
However, for want of more substantial evidence concerning this lack of sincerity
in the conferences following the settlement of the strike, the undersigned makes
.no such finding.
By failing and refusing to bargain in good faith as hereinbefore found, the
Respondent has interfered with, and is interfering with, its employees in the
exercise of the rights guaranteed in Section 7 of the Act.
IV. THE EFFECT OF THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES UPON COMMERCE
The activities of the Respondent set forth in Section III, above, occurring in
connection with the operations of the Respondent described in Section, I, above,
have a close, intimate, and-substantial relation to trade, traffic, and commerce
among the several States and, insofar as they constitute unfair labor practices,
tend to lead to labor disputes burdening and obstructing commerce and the free
flow of commerce.
V THE REMEDY
Since it has been found that the Respondent has failed and refused to bargain
with the Union as the representative of all its employees in an appropriate unit,
it will be recommended that it cease and desist therefrom and that, upon request,
the Respondent bargain collectively with the Union with respect to wages, hours,
and working conditions.
Upon the basis of the above findings of fact and upon the entire record in
the case, the undersigned makes the following :
CONCLUSIONS OF LAw
1 All production and maintenance employees at the Respondent's East Jaffrey,
New Hampshire, plant, excluding executives, foremen, working foremen, tack-
makers, sealers, watchmen, office and clerical employees, and all supervisory em-
ployees with authority to hire, promote, discharge, discipline, or otherwise effect
changes in the status of employees or effectively recommend such action, consti-
tute a unit appropriate for the purposes of collective bargaining within the
meaning of Section 9 (b) of the Act.
2. United Steelworkers of America, affiliated with the Congress of Industrial
Organizations, was on February 12, 1945, and at all times thereafter has been
the exclusive representative of all the employees in the aforesaid appropriate
unit for the purposes of collective bargaining within the meaning of Section 9 (a)
of the Act.
3. By failing and refusing on and after January 9, 1946, to bargain in good
faith with United Steelworkers of America, C. I. 0., as the exclusive repre-
sentative of, its employees in the appropriate unit, the Respondent has engaged
in and is engaging in unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section
S (5) of the Act.
4. By such unfair labor practices, the Respondent has interfered with, re-
strained, and coerced its employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in
W. W. CROSS & COMPANY, IN C. 1179
Section 7 of the Act, thereby engaging in unfair labor practices within the
meaning of Section 8 (1) of the Act.
. 5. The aforesaid unfair labor practices are unfair labor practices affecting
commerce within the meaning of Section 2 ( 6) and (7) of the Act.
6 The Respondent did not threaten to sell or move its East Jaffrey plant as
alleged in paragraph 10 of the complaint.
RECOMMENDATIONS
Upon the basis of the above findings of fact and conclusions of law and upon
the entire record in the case , the undersigned recommends that the Respondent,
W. W. Cross & Company , Inc., Jaffrey [ East Jaffrey], New Hampshire, its
officers , agents, successors , and assigns shall :
1. Cease and desist from :
(a) Refusing to bargain collectively in good faith with United Steelworkers
of America , affiliated with the Congress of Industrial Organizations, as the
exclusive •representative 'of all • itsemployees in 'the unit hereinabove found to be
appropriate;
(b) In any manner interfering with the efforts of United Steelworkers of
America, C. I. 0., to bargain collectively with it.
2. Take the following affirmative action, which the undersigned finds will
effectuate the policies of the Act:
(a) Upon request , bargain collectively with United Steelworkers of America,
C. I. 0, as the exclusive representative of all its employees in the unit herein-
above found to be appropriate in respect to rates of pay, wages , hours of
employment , and other conditions of employment , and, if an understanding is
reached, embody such understanding in a signed agreement ;
(b) Post at its plant in Jaffrey [East Jaffrey], New Hampshire , copies of
the notice attached hereto marked "Appendix B." Copies of said notice, to be
furnished by the Regional Director for the First Region ( Boston, Massachusetts),
shall , after being duly signed by the Respondent ' s representative , be posted by
the Respondent immediately upon receipt thereof, and maintained by it for sixty
(60) consecutive days thereafter , in conspicuous places, including all places
where notices to employees are customarily posted. Reasonable steps shall be
taken by the Respondent to insure that said notices are not altered , defaced,
or covered by any other material ;
(c) Notify the Regional Director for the First Region ( Boston, Massachu-
setts), in writing , within ten ( 10) days from the receipt of this Intermediate
Report, what steps the Respondent has taken to comply herewith.
It is further recommended that unless on or before ten (10 ) days from the date
of the receipt of this Intermediate Report the Respondent notifies the said Re-
gional Director in writing that it will comply with the foregoing recommenda-
tions, the National Labor Relations Board issue an order requiring the Respond-
ent to take the action aforesaid.
It is further recommended that the complaint be dismissed with respect to the
allegation that the Respondent engaged in unfair labor practices by threatening
to sell or move its plant.
As provided in Section 203 39 of the Rules and Regulations of the National
Labor Relations Board, Series 4, effective September 11, 1946, any party or
counsel for the Board may, within fifteen (15 ) days from the date of service
of the order transferring the case to the Board , pursuant to Section 203.38 of
1180 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
said Rules and Regulations, file with the Board, Rochambeau Building, Wash-
ington 25, D. C., an original and four copies of a statement in writing setting
forth such exceptions to the Intermediate Report or to any other part of the
record or proceeding (including rulings upon all motions or objections) as he
relies upon, together with the original and four copies of a brief in support
thereof, and any party or counsel for the Board may, within the same period,
file an original and four copies of a brief in support of the Intermediate Report.
Immediately upon the filing of such statement of exceptions and/or briefs, the
party or counsel for the Board filing the same shall serve a copy thereof upon
each of the other parties and shall file a copy with the Regional Director. Proof
of service on the other parties of all papers filed with the Board shall be
promptly made as required by Section 203.65. As further provided in said
Section 203.39, should any 'party desire permission to argue orally before the
Board, request therefor must be made in writing to the Board within ten (10)
days from the date of service of the order transferring the case to the Board.
JAMES R HEMENCWAY,
Trial Examiner.
Dated January 27, 1947.
APPENDIX A
W. W. CROSS & COMPANY, INC.,
TACKMAKERS,
East Jaffrey, N. IT., April 4, 1946.
UNITED STEEL WORKERS OF AMERICA, C. I. O.
LOCAL No. 3605,
East Jaffrey, New Hampshire.
GENTLEMEN : As a result of discussions with Mr James F. Mahoney of the
United States Conciliation Service, who has been assisting in negotiations
between the Union and the Company, the Company has tried to make the fairest
possible proposal to settle the present strike, as follows :
1. Wages-it is proposed that through the technical staff of the United States
Conciliation Service a determination be made as to what increases, if any, should
be made in the wage level or classifications thereof at the factory. This deter-
mination would be based on :
a. Whether or not gross inequities exist between wage rates in related in-
dustries, related plants in the same industry or locality, or related job classi-
fications at the factory.
b Cost of living increases since January, 1941, which the President in his
executive order has deemed to be 33%.
Following the determination by the technical staff of the United States Con-
ciliation Service a joint application by the Company and the Union will be made
to the Wage Stabilization Board for approval of any wage increases indicated
by such determination.
2. That the contract, which was broken due to the strike action and later ter-
minated by the Union notice requesting changes, be re-Instated for the period
of one year in order that a contractual relation might be obtained quickly.
It was intended to use these proposals as the basis for a joint meeting be-
tween the Company and the Union officers. We regret to learn from Mr. Mahoney,
however, that Mr. Michael Ryan, International Representative of the Union,
states that these proposals are not acceptable for discussion at a joint meeting
to be called by the Conciliation Service.
W. W. CROSS & COMPANY, INC. 1181
We wish to inform the employees of Cross Company of our desire to settle
matters as fairly as possible in accordance with recognized procedure as pro-
vided by the United States Government. Accordingly, we are sending a copy of
this letter to each employee. We are also sending a copy to the Board of Select-
men of the Town of Jaffrey and to the Commissioner of Labor of the State of
New Hampshire.
Very truly yours,
W. W. CROSS & COMPANY, INC,
(s.) C. H. Howard.
C. H. HOWARD.
CHH-h
APPENDIX B
NOTICE TO ALL EMPLOYEES
Pursuant to the recommendations of a Trial Examiner of the National Labor
Relations Board, and in order to effectuate the policies of the National Labor
Relations Act, we hereby notify our employees that :
WE WILL NOT in any manner interfere with the efforts of UNITED STEEL-
WORKERS OF AMERICA, C. I. 0., to bargain collectively with us.
WE WILL BARGAIN collectively upon request with the above-named union
as the exclusive representative of all employees in the bargaining unit de-
scribed herein with respect to rates of pay, hours of employment or other
conditions of employment, and if an understanding is reached, embody
such understanding in a signed agreement. The bargaining unit is:
All production and maintenance employees at the Jaffrey [East Jaffrey],
N. H., plant, excluding executives, foremen, working foremen, tackmakers,
sealers, watchmen, office and clerical- employees, and all supervisory em-
ployees with authority to hire, promote, discharge, discipline, or otherwise
effect changes in the status of employees or effectively recommend such
action.
Dated--------------------
W. W. CROSS & COMPANY, INC.,
Employer.
By ----------------------------------
(Representative) (Title)
This notice must remain posted for 60 days from the date hereof, and must not
be altered, defaced, or covered by any other material.