Verizon New York, Inc.

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

May 16, 2003

339 N.L.R.B. 30 (N.L.R.B. 2003)

DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 30
Verizon New York, Inc. and Communications Work-
ers of America, Local 1103. Cases 3–CA–22987
and 3–CA–23257
May 16, 2003
DECISION AND ORDER
BY CHAIRMAN BATTISTA AND MEMBERS LIEBMAN
AND WALSH
On March 19, 2002, Administrative Law Judge Joel P.
Biblowitz issued the attached decision. The Respondent
filed exceptions and a supporting brief, the General
Counsel filed cross-exceptions and a supporting brief,
and the General Counsel and the Charging Party each
filed an answering brief to the Respondent’s exceptions.
The National Labor Relations Board has delegated its
authority in this proceeding to a three-member panel.
The Board has considered the decision and the record
in light of the exceptions and briefs and has decided, for
the reasons set forth below, to affirm the judge’s rulings,
findings, and conclusions, and to adopt the recommended
Order.1
At issue is whether the Respondent violated Section
8(a)(1) and (5) of the Act by unilaterally rescinding its
longstanding practice of allowing employees to partici-
pate in blood drives during paid worktime. We agree
with the judge that this change involved a mandatory
subject of bargaining, and therefore that the Respondent
violated Section 8(a)(1) and (5) by failing and refusing to
bargain with the Union regarding the change.
Facts
The relevant facts, as more fully set forth in the
judge’s decision, are as follows. The Respondent had
sponsored blood drives with the Union through Hudson
Valley Blood Services (Hudson Valley) at least twice a
year for over 30 years. Employees participating in these
blood drives spent an average of 4 hours of worktime for
each drive, which included a 30-minute solicitation meet-
ing, driving time for employees in the field, and time for
donating blood.
Union stewards employed by the Respondent sched-
uled and organized the blood drives, which generally
took place on the Respondent’s facilities and always oc-
curred on paid time. Employee Joseph Barca, a union
business agent, would receive a list of potential dates
from Hudson Valley, eliminate busy times for the Re-
spondent, and submit a revised list to the Respondent’s
management, which would then approve the dates.

1 We shall substitute a new notice in accordance with our recent de-
cision in Ishikawa Gasket America, Inc., 337 NLRB 175 (2001).
Consistent with this longstanding practice, a 2-day
blood drive was scheduled for February 7 and 8, 2001.2
The blood drive was postponed by Mid-State Regional
Director Tarita Miller, however, because of a pending
storm and pressing service needs.
On March 6, the Respondent notified Union Executive
Vice President Glenn Carter by phone that the Respon-
dent had decided it would no longer maintain employees
in a pay status for the time spent in their participation in
the blood drives. The Respondent said that this change
was due to customer service demands. The Respondent
would continue to support the blood donation program
by providing its communication media to advertise the
drives and its premises for the blood drives. However, in
an effort to reduce nonproductive employee time, it
would no longer permit its employees to participate in
the drives on paid time.
In response to the policy change, Michael Barth, the
Union’s chief steward at the Newburgh location, filed a
grievance on March 9, alleging that “[the Respondent]
bargained in bad faith by changing Blood Donation Pol-
icy without negotiating with the Union.” In a March 16
first-step grievance meeting, the Respondent’s represen-
tatives took the position that the policy change was a
corporate level decision. A second-step grievance meet-
ing was held on March 28, at which the Respondent was
represented by George Variano, local manager for con-
struction in Newburgh; David Dodaro, foreman at the
Newburgh garage; and Lawrence Iazetti, a senior market-
ing manager designated to participate by Charles Lapolis,
a director in the Mid-State area. At the meeting, Union
Business Agent Greg Irwin requested that the Respon-
dent negotiate the change in the blood drive policy. The
Respondent’s representatives took the position that the
change was a corporate level decision and did not need to
be negotiated because it was not a term and condition of
employment. In his April 8 letter denying the grievance,
Director Nick Mattia acknowledged the Union’s request
to negotiate and reiterated the Respondent’s position that
the policy change was not a term and condition of em-
ployment.
After the second-step grievance was denied, the Union
filed an additional grievance requesting to have the Feb-
ruary 7–8 drive rescheduled, but the grievance was de-
nied and the drive was never rescheduled.
Analysis
Section 8(d) of the Act requires employers and collec-
tive-bargaining representatives to bargain about “wages,
hours, and other terms and conditions of employment.”
Matters are subject to this mutual duty to bargain if they
2 All dates are 2001 unless otherwise indicated.
339 NLRB No. 6
VERIZON NEW YORK, INC. 31
are “plainly germane to the ‘working environment’” and
“not among those ‘managerial decisions which lie at the
core of entrepreneurial control.’”3
It is axiomatic that the payment of wages is a manda-
tory subject of bargaining. Thus, the issue of whether
employees will be paid while they engage in nonwork
activities is a mandatory subject of bargaining. Em-
ployer policies that pay employees during these nonwork
activities directly affect wages. That is, if employees are
not permitted to engage in the activities during paid
worktime, they must take personal time, and risk losing
pay, in order to perform the activities during their sched-
uled work hours.
The Board has held that employers violate Section
8(a)(5) by making unilateral changes in rules regarding
activities, besides normal job duties, that will be permit-
ted during paid worktime. Thus the Board has found
unlawful unilateral employer action restricting employee
use of telephones while on duty;4 withdrawing a long-
standing practice of giving employees an extra 15 min-
utes for their Thanksgiving lunchbreak;5 adding or elimi-
nating paid time on payday to facilitate banking;6 limit-
ing employee use of restrooms;7 eliminating a paid lunch
period;8 and canceling a 5-minute washup period for
maintenance employees.9
In this case, the Respondent unilaterally ended a 30-
year practice of allowing employees to participate in
company-sponsored blood drives during worktime. Un-
der the prior policy, employees could donate blood dur-
ing working hours with no loss of worktime or pay. Fol-
lowing the policy change, in contrast, employees who
wished to perform the same activity at the same time as

on its
representatives.

3 Ford Motor Co. v. NLRB, 441 U.S. 488, 498 (1979), quoting Fi-
breboard Corp. v. NLRB, 379 U.S. 203, 222–223 (1964) (Stewart, J.,
concurring).
4 Hedison Mfg. Co., 249 NLRB 791, 824 (1980), enfd. 643 F.2d 32
(1st Cir. 1981); Pepsi-Cola Bottling Co., 315 NLRB 882, 895 (1994),
enfd. in part and remanded mem. 96 F.3d 1439 (4th Cir. 1996), on
remand 330 NLRB 900 (2000), enfd. in relevant part mem. 24
Fed.Appx. 104 (4th Cir. 2001).
5 Rangaire Co., 309 NLRB 1043 (1992), enfd. mem. 9 F.3d 104 (5th
Cir. 1993).
6 Atlas Microfilming, 267 NLRB 682 (1983), enfd. 753 F.2d 313 (3d
Cir. 1985); AT&T Corp., 325 NLRB 150 (1997).
7 Production Plated Plastics, 247 NLRB 595 (1980), enfd. 663 F.2d
709 (6th Cir. 1981).
8 Van Dorn Plastic Machinery Co., 286 NLRB 1233 (1987), enfd.
881 F.2d 302 (6th Cir. 1989).
9 Appalachian Power Co., 250 NLRB 228 (1980), enfd. 660 F.2d
488 (4th Cir. 1981), cert. denied 454 U.S. 866 (1981). See also Pollu-
tion Control Industries of Indiana, 316 NLRB 455, 463–464 (1995)
(addition of grandparents to the list of relatives whose funerals employ-
ees could attend on paid time). We note that in Sivalls, Inc., 307 NLRB
986 (1992), cited by the judge, no exceptions were filed to the judge’s
finding that paid time off for voting was a mandatory subject of bar-
gaining.
before would be required to lose worktime and pay. The
fact that employees continued to have the opportunity to
participate in blood drives outside their working hours,
or during their working hours with loss of pay, does not
make up for that loss.
The Respondent contends that its decision to engage in
philanthropic activity by sponsoring blood drives for
Hudson Valley is not a term and condition of employ-
ment because it lies “at the core of entrepreneurial con-
trol.” However, the Respondent’s decision to sponsor
blood drives entailed establishing the practice of allow-
ing employee participation during paid worktime, which
clearly is a term and condition of employment. In these
circumstances, that aspect of the Respondent’s policy
that allows employees to participate in the activity during
paid worktime is not “at the core of entrepreneurial con-
trol” and is subject to the duty to bargain.10
We also find no merit in the Respondent’s assertion
that the Union waived its bargaining rights. We adopt
the judge’s finding that the Union explicitly requested
bargaining at the second-step grievance meeting on
March 28, 2001, and further find that this request was
timely raised following the Respondent’s March 7 notifi-
cation to the Union of the change.11
In addition, we find unavailing the Respondent’s ar-
gument that the Union should not have addressed its bar-
gaining request to the Respondent’s second-step griev-
ance officials, i.e., that those officials lacked authority to
bargain. The grievance process is an integral part of col-
lective bargaining.12 The Board has found that the duty to
bargain in good faith requires parties to give their
representatives at grievance meetings the authority to
resolve the grievance.13 In this case, the subject of the
grievance was the Respondent’s change in the blood
donation program without affording the Union an
opportunity to bargain. Thus, the Respondent was under
an obligation to see to it that its representatives had the
authority to deal with the Union’s request to bargain.
The Respondent will not be heard to assert, as a defense,
its own failure to confer sufficient authority
ORDER
The National Labor Relations Board adopts the rec-
ommended Order of the administrative law judge and
10 See Ford Motor Co., supra, 441 U.S. at 498 and fn. 10 (in-plant
food prices and services are mandatory subjects of bargaining, apart
from decision to provide such services initially).
11 Because we find that the Union made an appropriate bargaining
request, we find it unnecessary to pass on the judge’s finding that the
Respondent presented the change to the Union as a fait accompli.
12 Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574,
581 (1960).
13 Paragon Paint Corp., 317 NLRB 747, 765 (1995).

DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 32
orders that Verizon New York, Inc., New York, New
York, its officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall
take the action set forth in the Order.
APPENDIX
NOTICE TO EMPLOYEES
POSTED BY ORDER OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
An Agency of the United States Government

The National Labor Relations Board has found that we vio-
lated Federal labor law and has ordered us to post and obey
this notice.

FEDERAL LAW GIVES YOU THE RIGHT TO

Form, join, or assist any union
Choose representatives to bargain with us on
your behalf
Act together with other employees for your bene-
fit and protection
Choose not to engage in any of these protected
activities.

WE WILL NOT unilaterally eliminate our participation in
blood programs, which allowed our employees to par-
ticipate in the program on working time and to be paid
for that time, without first giving notice and an opportu-
nity to bargain to Communications Workers of America,
Locals 1103 and 1120 as the collective-bargaining repre-
sentative of certain of our employees.
WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner interfere
with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of the
rights guaranteed them by Section 7 of the Act.
WE WILL restore our participation in the blood pro-
grams as they existed prior to March 2001 by paying
employees for working time spent participating in the
blood programs, and WE WILL bargain with the Union
prior to making any change in this program.
WE WILL make whole any bargaining unit employee
who suffered a monetary loss by participating in the
blood program during his/her regular working hours and
was not paid for that time.

VERIZON NEW YORK, INC.

Robert Ellison, Esq., for the General Counsel.
Steven Martin, Esq., for the Respondent.
Ellen Dichner, Esq. (Gladstein, Reif & Meginniss, LLP), for the
Charging Party.
DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
JOEL P. BIBLOWITZ, Administrative Law Judge. This case
was heard by me on January 16 and 17, 2002, in Albany, New
York. The amended consolidated complaint herein, which is-
sued on October 17, 2001,1 and was based upon unfair labor
practice charges and an amended charge that were filed on
March 23, April 17, and September 5 by Communications
Workers of America, Local 1103 (the Union), alleges that Veri-
zon New York, Inc. (the Respondent), violated Section 8(a)(1)
and (5) of the Act, on about March 7, by unilaterally rescinding
its practice of permitting unit employees to participate, while
on company time and pay, in blood solicitation/donation pro-
grams, which is a mandatory subject of bargaining for purposes
of collective bargaining.
FINDINGS OF FACT
I. JURISDICTION
Respondent admits, and I find, that it has been an employer
engaged in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(2), (6),
and (7) of the Act.
II. LABOR ORGANIZATION STATUS
Respondent admits, and I find, that the Union has been a la-
bor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act.
III. THE FACTS
Respondent, and its predecessor, New York Telephone
Company, have been party to collective-bargaining agreements
with the Union for many years covering a large number of job
classifications. In laymen’s terms, the Union represents in-
stallers, repair persons, splicers, linemen, clerks, plant depart-
ment, and other employees. The most recent contract is effec-
tive for the period August 6, 2000, through August 3, 2003, and
is referred to herein as the Agreement. The Respondent has a
number of different work areas; as set forth in the Agreement,
“Mid-State” means the geographic locations north of New York
City and south of the Northeast area where the Respondent
conducts its operations. “Downstate” includes New York City,
Nassau, Suffolk, Westchester, Rockland, and Putnam Counties,
parts of Orange and Dutchess Counties, and Greenwich Con-
necticut. “Upstate” includes the Central area, the Western area,
and the Northeast area not included in “Downstate.” On the
other side of the table is the Union. The Respondent deals with
numerous unions depending on the area in which the employees
are employed. This case relates solely to Local 1103. However,
prior to the year 2001, there was a Local 1103 and a Local
1120. On about October 1, 2000, these locals merged and be-
came one local union, Local 1103, the Union, and during all
times relevant to the incidents that will be described herein, that
was the situation. However, on about September 30, the parties
withdrew from this merger and Local 1120 reemerged as a
distinct local union. Local 1103 generally covers employees in
Respondent’s downstate area. Local 1120 covers Respondent’s
employees from about 50 miles north of New York City to just
south of Albany, New York.
The sole issue herein relates to the legality of the Respon-
dent’s termination of a program wherein the Union and the
employees participated in a blood program on worktime. This

1 Unless indicated otherwise, all dates referred to herein relate to the
year 2001.

VERIZON NEW YORK, INC. 33
program had been in effect for in excess of 30 years and in-
volved union stewards and Respondent’s employees conducting
meetings to solicit employees to participate in the blood drive,
usually at one of the Respondent’s facilities. Union representa-
tives and Respondent’s employees then scheduled the blood
programs and manned the stations and gave blood, all on com-
pany worktime. The Respondent has two defenses herein: that
the blood drive was not a term and condition of employment
and that the Union never requested that the Respondent bargain
about the subject.
There was testimony from a number of witnesses regarding
the past operation of the blood drives and the amount of em-
ployee time expended on the drives. Joseph Barca, who has
been employed by the Respondent for 33 years, presently as a
field technician, and is a business agent for the Union, has been
the chairman of the blood program since 1989. He testified that,
initially, he is notified by Hudson Valley Blood Service (Hud-
son Valley), that it would like to set up dates for blood pro-
grams for Respondent’s employees. Hudson Valley then sent
proposed dates to Barca, who fine tuned them by eliminating all
Mondays and Fridays and the summer, which are Respondent’s
busy periods. He then sent the proposed list to the Respondent’s
representatives for approval, and the dates were usually ap-
proved without any changes. The blood drives are divided by
location in order to shorten the drive time of the employees
involved. The areas are northern and southern, with two drives
each per year, and central, with four drives per year. The first
stage of each drive is the solicitation, which took about 30 min-
utes. The steward meets with the unit employees at the start of
the workday (with Respondent’s consent) on the garage floor or
in a conference room and solicits the employees to sign up to
give blood. The steward then faxes the list of donors to Barca
who, together with his chief steward, sets up a schedule for the
employees that least disrupts the Respondent’s operation, and
this schedule was given to the Respondent to distribute to its
supervisors. A large percentage of these blood drives were held
on the Respondent’s premises; in fact, the Central Westchester
drive was held at the Respondent’s facility in Valhalla, West-
chester County, New York. On the day of the blood drive,
Barca and his business agents and stewards assisted the Hudson
Valley people with crowd control, food, and transportation for
the donors who have no way to get to the drive. Prior to Febru-
ary, he and the union stewards were paid by the Respondent for
their time in soliciting and assisting in the blood drive, and
employees who came to give blood were paid for their time.
Barca estimated that, on the average, including transportation
time, the amount of working time that an employee spent in
going to and from the blood drive, and giving blood was about
4 hours. This varied from 1 to 2 hours for clerical employees
employed in the building where the drives were taking place, to
5 or 6 hours for some employees in the field. This includes the
time donors spent giving a medical history prior to the blood
donation, the actual blood donation and the post donation rest
period with juice and cookies. In addition to paying its employ-
ees for their worktime assisting on the blood drive and/or actu-
ally giving blood, the Respondent paid for the food and bever-
age costs at the drive. Barca identified a chart that he testified
he received from a manager for the Respondent in about 1995.
It is entitled “Non Productive Worktime Comparison for 1995.”
It includes 6 different geographic areas, and 21 different cate-
gories, including blood bank. This document states that 4646
work hours were lost in 1995 for blood bank drives, although
this number includes employees who are members of Local
1107, which has about 300 members who are employed by the
Respondent. Respondent introduced into evidence business
records for the year 2000, which states that there was approxi-
mately 2400 hours of nonproductive worktime for blood drives
for most of the unit herein2 during that year.
Michael Korsak, who is employed by the Respondent as an
outside field technician and is a steward for the Union, testified
that the average length of time that employees spent donating
blood, including transportation to and from the blood program,
was 3 to 4 hours. Greg Irwin has been employed by the Re-
spondent for 28 years and is presently a business agent for Lo-
cal 1120 in the Newburgh, New York area. At the time in ques-
tion, he covered approximately 150 of Respondent’s employ-
ees. In his area, each business agent is responsible for the blood
program in his/her jurisdiction, and the blood drive chairperson
was responsible for coordinating the program with Hudson
Valley. The business agents had meetings with the employees,
often lasting about an hour, soliciting them to fill out cards
stating that they would donate blood. They also set up the ap-
pointments and purchased refreshments for the blood drive. The
managers of the facilities involved were notified of these activi-
ties and schedules and were told to notify the Union within a
certain time if they had a problem with any of the dates. He
testified that the average time spent by each donating employee
on the day of the drive was 3-1/2 to 4 hours. The employees
were paid for time spent at the solicitations and at the blood
drives and the Respondent paid for the refreshments at the
blood drive. Irwin was asked about the importance of the blood
drive to the employees. He testified:

Well, the people who gave blood got a couple of benefits out
of it . . . there was the good feeling of doing something for the
community. You know, being able to participate and . . . help
out. The other, I guess, more selfish reason they gave blood
was four hours off the job for most of them. And they got in
from the cold . . . they got in an air conditioned building dur-
ing the summer. And, I mean, it’s certain amount of value to
that, too, I guess to them.

Michael Barth, who is employed by the Respondent as a field
technician and is the chief steward for the Union at the Respon-
dent’s facility in Newburgh, New York, testified that prior to
becoming steward, his sole participation in the blood drives
was as a donor. After becoming steward, he was active in so-
licitations for the blood drives; in his area, participation was
about 60 to 70 percent of the membership.
Tarita Miller, who is currently employed by the Respondent
as director of operations, testified that when she was employed
by the Respondent as a technician, the blood program solicita-
tions by the business agents usually lasted from 15 to 30 min-

2 This did not include the CX&M employees (the construction em-
ployees) for the first half of the year and engineering, switch employees
and, some other employees for the entire period.

DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 34
utes. She filled out a card, was given an appointment, and when
the time came, she went to the designated location, was
checked and gave blood. George Variano, a local manager of
the Respondent for construction in Newburgh, had a similar
experience; a union representative, either a steward or business
agent, came to a facility, met with some employees and solic-
ited them to sign cards to donate blood. This usually took about
30 minutes and, sometime thereafter, the employees would be
notified of when they were scheduled to donate blood.
Respondent discontinued this policy of paying employees
and union representatives for time spent on blood drives some-
time in February and March, this policy had been discontinued
by the Respondent in other regions years earlier. Miller, who
transferred from a location in Queens, New York, to Mid-State
in February 2000, learned that the blood program was still in
existence in the Mid-State area. She testified that the Respon-
dent has obligations to the Public Service Commission (the
Commission) that requires the Respondent to comply with cer-
tain time targets set by the Commission. Failure to comply with
these time targets could result in penalties to the Respondent,
and “at that time,” the Respondent was paying millions of dol-
lars in penalties. One of the problems that the Respondent had
in complying with the Commission’s rules was:

If the techs are doing something other than working on cus-
tomer troubles, they’re not available to provide the service so
when we had blood drives . . . the people that were at the
blood drives weren’t available to provide the service to the
customers.

In about the end of January or beginning of February, she
and Santo Cali and Nicholas Mattia, both directors for the Re-
spondent, decided to discontinue the Respondent’s participation
in the blood program to the extent of paying employees for
their time spent participating in the program. She testified that
she notified Barca of the change on about February 5. She
called him on about that day because “I understood . . . it was
his baby so I didn’t want his first piece of correspondence to be
a letter.” In this call she told Barca that the decision was made
that the Respondent would no longer pay employees for time at
the blood bank:

Basically, just I wanted to let him know ahead of time before
it was official . . . before we sent the policy out, that I was
planning on making a change . . . with respect to the way I as-
signed people for the blood drive and . . . he asked me why
and I explained to him the customer service issues that I was
facing . . . and, basically, that was it.

She testified that Barca’s only response was to ask why, and
she told him that it was because of customer service; he never
requested bargaining over the issue. Barca testified on rebuttal
that he never had any such conversation with Miller on about
February 5. Although Miller had a conversation with him a few
days later about the need to reschedule the February 7 and 8
blood drive, which will be discussed below, she testified that
the next occasion when she discussed the termination of the
blood program was at a meeting that she had with Barca on
about February 25, when they were discussing other issues. She
testified that at this meeting, he asked her if she had changed
her mind on the issue, and she said that she hadn’t. Barca testi-
fied that he does not recall such a meeting. He testified that the
first he learned that the Respondent was discontinuing its pay-
ments to employees for participating in the blood program was
Miller’s March 29 letter to McCracken. By letter dated March
29, Miller, Cali, and Mattia wrote to Robert McCracken the
union president:

We wholeheartedly support the efforts of Hudson Val-
ley Blood Services, the New York Blood Center and CWA
Local 1103 regarding the New York Blood Drive. We
know how important your work is and how difficult it can
be for you to recruit candidates to donate blood, particu-
larly in the New York Metropolitan Area.
First at NYNEX, then Bell Atlantic and now at Veri-
zon we take our corporate citizenship responsibilities very
seriously and we value the long relationship we have had
with both Hudson Valley Blood Services and the New
York Blood Center. That is why we will continue to open
our facilities, publicize your recruiting drives and do all
we can to encourage our employees to donate blood.
However, while we are 100 percent behind your ef-
forts, we must balance our community involvement efforts
and our commitment to our customers. So all we ask is the
Blood Drive take place on our employees’ own time. We
will continue to make our facilities available to you so you
can hold the Blood Drives on our premises after work or
on weekends when our employees are off. We will con-
tinue to use our internal communications networks—e-
mail system, web site and company publications—to let
our employees know where they can go to donate blood.
We look forward to continuing the strong partnership
that Verizon has with Hudson Valley Blood Services, the
New York Blood Center and CWA Local 1103 regarding
the New York Blood Drive. We value your relationship
and will continue to do our part to help make your Blood
Drives successful.

By letter dated April 4, McCracken responded to Miller,
Cali, and Mattia’s letter of March 29. Initially he inquired
whether it was a “bogus” letter, since it was unsigned. (Miller
faxed the letter to McCracken with the names typed on the
bottom, but without signatures, so that she would not have to
send the letter to the others in order to get their signatures.)
McCracken also wrote:

If you have ever donated blood, you know that we receive
much more participation when your employees, my Mem-
bers, are allowed to donate during company time. As you
know, there have been times in the past, when during a Blood
Drive, our commitments to the customer would not have been
met if your employees, my Members, took the time out to do-
nate, and we postponed donations from those employees who
were necessary to meet our customer commitments.

In about the first week in April, Miller was visited by Phyllis
Cole-Hollis and Kevin Shields, employees of Respondent and
union stewards. Cole-Hollis told her of the history of the pro-
gram, how the Union operated it and why it was so important to
her. Miller told them that her decision was based upon the

VERIZON NEW YORK, INC. 35
problem that she was having with service in the area and that
was why the Respondent decided not to participate any more.
Neither Cole-Hollis or Shields requested that she bargain with
the Union about the subject.
By letter dated May 4, Barca wrote to Mattia that he was
“amazed” that the March 29 letter about the blood program was
asking the Union to “kill it by moving it to off-work hours.” He
further stated that off-work hour blood drives in the past had
not been successful and that the Respondent had approved the
blood drive schedule for 2001 in the fall of 2000, and that the
Union “strongly insist that we hold all of the remaining 2001
drives according to the commitment made by [Respondent’s
agent].” He further stated: “If the changing of Verizon’s com-
munity commitment was necessary, it would have been more
appropriate if it was done when the 2001 schedule was first
presented and not now in mid-year of the program.” Mattia
responded to Barca’s letter by letter dated May 21. Where rele-
vant, Mattia stated that he was “somewhat puzzled and disap-
pointed” by Barca’s assertion that Respondent’s employees
would only participate in a blood drive if it took place on com-
pany time, stating that this “takes a very cynical and demeaning
view toward our employees.” Mattia stated further that the
Respondent would continue to publicize the blood drives and
make its facilities available for the program before and after
work, but “in today’s ultracompetitive environment, we must
balance our community involvement efforts, and our commit-
ments to our customers to deliver top-notch service. So we ask
that our employees donate blood on their own time.” Miller
testified that no representative of the Union ever requested that
she bargain about the Respondent’s change in the operation of
the blood program.
Glenn Carter, who was employed by the Respondent for 31
years, is the president of CWA, Local 1120 and, during the
time in question, was executive vice president of the Union. On
about March 6 or 7, he received a telephone call from Cali, who
told him that the Respondent was no longer going to participate
in the blood program.3 Carter asked if that was statewide, and
Cali said that it was and Carter said that he didn’t think the
Company could do that. Carter then wrote a note dated March 7
to all the business agents in the area: “Company pulled out of
Blood Bank.” Vincent Auletta, an area manager for the Re-
spondent, testified that on March 6 he received a call from Cali
saying that from then on, the Respondent would no longer par-
ticipate in the blood program on company time, but would offer
its facilities, after hours, to the program. Cali asked him to no-
tify the Union of the change. On the same day, Auletta called
Carter and told him exactly what Cali had said. Carter asked
him, “When are you going to learn to stop screwing our mem-
bers?” Auletta said that he was just relaying a message; if he
wanted to discuss it further, he should call Cali. Carter did not
request that the Respondent bargain with the Union about the
change in the blood program. A few days later, Carter called
Irwin; they discussed the change in the blood program and both

3 The unfair labor practice charge filed by the Union on March 23 al-
leges that on about March 7 Cali advised representatives of the Union
that the Respondent would no longer support the blood programs in the
area.
felt that the Respondent should not have made the change with-
out first discussing it with the Union. They agreed that Irwin
would request that the Respondent bargain about the subject.
Shortly thereafter, Carter spoke to McCracken and told him of
the Respondent’s change in the operation of the blood program
and “that we were going to look into requesting negotiations
with the company, and that I had Greg Irwin working on it.”
Irwin testified that on about March 7, he had a telephone con-
versation with Carter, who told him that Cali told him that the
Respondent was pulling out of the blood program; about a day
or two later, he received the memo that Carter had written
about this conversation with Cali. Irwin then instructed Barth,
his chief steward, to file a grievance about the Respondent’s
withdrawal from the blood program and in the grievance to ask
the Company to negotiate about it. Barth filed the grievance on
March 9 alleging: “Company bargained in bad faith by chang-
ing Blood Donation Policy without negotiating with the Un-
ion.” Under “What Settlement is Expected,” Barth wrote: “Ne-
gotiate all policy changes with Union.”4 At the first- and sec-
ond-step grievances, the Respondent’s positions were that it
was a corporate level decision and it was not a term and condi-
tion of employment.
Barth testified that at the first-step meeting on about March
16, he told Variano and David Dodaro, at the time a foreman at
the Newburgh garage, that he would like the Respondent to sit
down and negotiate the changes in the blood program because
it was a term of his employment. They said that it wasn’t a term
of employment, that the decision came from above, and they
could not do anything about it. At the second-step meeting with
Irwin present, they told the Respondent’s representatives that
“we should negotiate if there was a change.” Irwin was not
present at the first-step meeting, but attended the second-step of
this grievance on March 28. He testified that he was there with
Barth and another steward; representing the Respondent were
Larry Iazzetti, senior marketing manager, Variano, and Dodaro.
Irwin testified that a number of grievances were discussed that
day. When they got to the blood program grievance, they asked
Respondent’s representatives why they pulled out of the pro-
gram.5 Iazzetti said it was corporate policy, that it was done
throughout the Company. “And then I offered him a chance to
negotiate.”

At that point, I had a blood bank scheduled for that Spring.
And I said, I told him . . . that I had one scheduled for the
Spring, and that we could still resolve this problem before that
date occurred. And I asked him if he could negotiate it, and he
told me no, he wasn’t responsible for corporate policy.
4 This copy of the grievance was introduced into evidence by the
General Counsel. Respondent introduced the first page of this grievance
in evidence as well, but it did not have “Negotiate all policy changes
with Union” written in. This can be explained by Barth’s testimony that
he only fills out the top of the form when he hands it to the Respon-
dent’s representative; the writing on the lower half of the form is filled
out on the day of the grievance.
5 In an affidavit given to the Board on April 11, Irwin stated that he
had no conversation with Cali or any representative of the Respondent
on the issue since the Respondent ended its participation in the blood
program. Irwin testified that this statement in his affidavit was incor-
rect.

DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 36

Variano testified that the first time he heard of the Respon-
dent’s change in the blood program was in early March, when
he received the grievance from Barth. He testified that at the
first-step meeting with Barth and another steward, they re-
quested to have the blood program reinstated. Since it was a
corporate decision and there wasn’t much he could do about it,
“I was just going to deny and we were going to move it along
the process.” There was no request by the Union to bargain.
Irwin, along with Barth, was present at the second step; Iazzetti,
Variano, and Dodaro were present for the Respondent. He testi-
fied that Irwin opened with a long statement that the Respon-
dent could not discontinue the blood program because it was a
term and condition of employment, and they wanted the pro-
gram restored. Iazzetti, who was a manager from another area,
said that he thought that the blood program had been ended
earlier, and that it was not a term and condition of employment.
On direct examination, Variano testified that nobody from the
Union requested that the Respondent bargain with them about
the change. On cross-examination he was asked:

Q. Okay. Do you recall anybody from the Union mak-
ing a statement to the effect that the Company needed to
negotiate with the Union regarding the Blood Program?
A. That very well may have been stated. Could you re-
peat that again?
Q. Yes, do you recall any reference made by the Union
at that meeting, concerning the Company’s need to negoti-
ate with the Union over the program?
A. Yes, a statement may have been made.
Q. Okay . . . does that refresh your recollection any
better as in terms of what actual statement along those
lines was made?
A. A statement may have been made that if the Com-
pany chooses to change the blood bank policy, they must
first negotiate the policy change.
Q. Okay
A. . . . something along those lines.

The Respondent’s position at the second step was that it was
not a term and condition of employment.
Dodaro testified that the first he knew of the change in the
blood program was when Barth told him about it on about
March 7; he received the grievance 2 days later. At the first-
step meeting, Barth said that the Union wanted the blood pro-
gram restored; Dodaro and Variano replied that it was a corpo-
rate decision and they did not have the authority to change it
and that it was not a term of employment. At the second-step
meeting Iazzetti and Irwin joined them. Irwin repeated that the
Union objected to the change and wanted the program restored.
Iazzetti said that he was surprised that it was still in effect, that
it had previously been canceled in his area. Regardless, it was a
corporate decision and they weren’t going to change it. Neither
Irwin nor the other union representatives requested that the
Respondent bargain with the Union about the change.
Iazzetti testified that, at the time in question, he was em-
ployed by the Respondent as a senior marketing manager in
retail markets in New York City. As far as he knew, the prac-
tice of assigning and paying employees to participate in the
blood program was discontinued in about 1990. In March, he
was asked to cover grievances in the Mid-State area. This sec-
ond-step meeting took place on March 28. Barth and Irwin
were present for the Union; he, Dodaro, and Variano were there
for the Respondent. When they got to the blood program griev-
ance, Irwin said that the blood bank was a term and condition
of employment and “in order to remove the Blood Bank, it
needed to be negotiated.” Iazzetti replied that he thought that
the blood bank had been eliminated years ago, but that it was
not a term and condition of employment, and did not need to be
negotiated to be removed. Other than Irwin’s statement as set
forth above, nobody asked him to negotiate about the change.
By letter to McCracken dated April 8, Mattia denied the
grievance on the basis that the blood program was not a term
and condition of employment. In addition, he wrote, inter alia:
“This is in response to the above grievance, which was heard at
second step of the grievance procedure on March 28, 2001. As
discussed in the meeting, the Union believes that the Blood
Bank is a term and condition of employment and any change to
the program must be negotiated.”
There was some testimony about a blood drive that had been
approved in 2000 and was scheduled to take place at the Re-
spondent’s principal facility in Valhalla, Westchester County,
New York, on February 7 and 8. Barca testified that, about a
half hour before the blood drive was scheduled to begin, he
received a call from Miller saying that “due to the weather, she
would have to cancel or postpone the outside technicians from
participating in those two days of blood drives.” Barca was
upset, because it is very difficult to postpone a drive at such a
late time. However, Miller said, “We’re under the gun, very
busy. Plus, we have this very bad weather. I promise to re-
schedule it in the next two or three weeks.” The drive did con-
tinue that day, but only for employees employed in the build-
ing. Barca’s testimony on this subject is not very clear, but it
appears that this drive was never rescheduled, and became in-
volved with the overall cancellation of blood drives as dis-
cussed above. Korsak testified that some of the employees in
his garage were supposed to go to the Respondent’s facility in
Valhalla to donate blood and assist in the program on February
7. However, he received a telephone call from one of the Re-
spondent’s managers saying that because of the bad weather,
they were not going to send anybody to the blood program that
day.
Miller testified that she did have a conversation with Barca
on about February 7 regarding the blood drive scheduled in
Valhalla for that day, but that conversation was a “different
issue” from her conversation 2 days earlier (denied by Barca)
where she informed him of the overall cancellation of the pro-
gram:

basically, the conversation was because of the pending storm
and of the issues with service and having people on the load. I
initiated the call because I didn’t want to just cancel the calls,
especially in light of the fact that we had just recently had a
conversation pertaining to the blood drive and the original
conversation had nothing to do with the February Seventh and
Eighth so I didn’t want to even make it assumed that I was
canceling these two blood drives as a result of that, so basi-
cally, it was just to let him know that it was a service issue

VERIZON NEW YORK, INC. 37
and I wasn’t canceling these two, I was postponing them to
another day. Actually, I think the term that was used was, “re-
scheduled.”

Miller testified that even though she told Barca that the blood
drive for February 7 and 8 was to be rescheduled, some em-
ployees, including outside technicians and clerical employees
did participate on those days and she paid for 110 hours of
nonproductive hours for those days. Miller testified further that
she thought that the postponed blood drive would be resched-
uled, but since a grievance was filed on the refusal to resched-
ule the February 7 and 8 blood drives, “I would guess that one
area didn’t follow and reschedule.” She could not testify with
any certainty if that blood drive or subsequent blood drives
took place because she was out sick from April until August.
However, she testified that it was her intent that all blood drives
after her March 29 letter would be canceled. On March 29,
Korsak filed a grievance over the Respondent’s failure to re-
schedule the February 7 and 8 blood program; this grievance
was denied.
Barca and Irwin testified about the different levels of blood
donations before and after the change in March. Barca testified
that prior to the change about 25 percent of the employees,
about 1000 employees, donated blood. After the Respondent
instituted the change in the blood program, the Union attempted
to hold a drive for employees to donate blood after working
hours, but Hudson Valley told him that only two or three mem-
bers donated and “it fell on its face.” Irwin testified that he has
about 150 of Respondent’s bargaining unit employees in his
area. Prior to March, the usual blood drive received about 60
blood donors. When the Union attempted to have a blood drive
after March, they received 12 pints of blood from employees.
IV. ANALYSIS
Admittedly, the Respondent unilaterally changed its partici-
pation in the blood program in the areas involved herein by
discontinuing paying its employees for the working time spent
soliciting for the program and donating, or attempting to do-
nate, to the program. The Respondent’s defenses are that the
employees’ participation in the blood program was not a term
and condition of employment and that it could therefore unilat-
erally make changes in the program, and that, even if it were a
term and condition of their employment, the change did not
violate the Act because the Union never requested bargaining.
There are some credibility issues herein. Miller testified that
she first notified the Union (through Barca) that the Respondent
would no longer pay employees for their participation in the
blood program on February 5 and again on February 25; Barca
denies having received any notification of this change until
seeing the March 29 letter. Although Barca and Miller appeared
to be equally credible, I credit Barca based upon the facts of
this case and common sense. Barca is clearly an active union
representative and has been chairman of the blood program
since 1989; Miller testified that the blood program “was his
baby.” After observing Barca as a witness, I find it highly
unlikely that if Miller had told him on February 5 that the Re-
spondent was discontinuing its participation in the program, he
would simply have asked why, and done nothing about it. Fur-
ther, if there were such a conversation on February 5, I find it
likely that Barca would have asked Miller about the status of
the February 7 and 8 blood drive. It is possible that Miller con-
fused that conversation with her discussion with Barca about
rescheduling the February 7 and 8 blood drive. The other credi-
bility issue involves what was said at the second-step grievance
meeting on March 28. Recognizing the difficulty of recon-
structing a conversation that occurred almost a year earlier,
when the blood program was only one of a number of griev-
ances that were discussed at that meeting, I find that during this
meeting, Irwin asked the Respondent’s representatives to nego-
tiate about the change. Because Irwin and Barth knew that the
Iazzetti, Dodaro, and Variano were not authorized to overturn
Miller’s decision, it was probably a brief, pro forma request
that they knew would have no effect, but was made to protect
their rights.
In NLRB v. Katz, 369 U.S. 736, 747 (1962), the Supreme
Court stated:

Unilateral action by an employer without prior discussion
with the Union does amount to a refusal to negotiate about the
affected conditions of employment under negotiation, and
must of necessity obstruct bargaining contrary to the congres-
sional policy. It will often disclose an unwillingness to agree
with the union. It will rarely be justified by any reason of sub-
stance. It follows that the Board may hold such unilateral ac-
tion to be violation of Section 8(a)(5), without also finding the
employer guilty of over-all subjective bad faith.

The initial issue herein is whether the Respondent’s partici-
pation in the blood program, by paying its employees for work-
ing time spent soliciting for, and otherwise participating in the
program, was a mandatory subject of bargaining. Although I
was unable to find a case right on point, there are numerous
cases that can be analogized to the instant matter. In NLRB v.
Central Illinois Public Service Co., 324 F.2d 916, 917 (7th Cir.
1963), the employer was a public utility providing gas and elec-
tricity to its customers. For 36 years, the employer had been
giving its employees a 33-percent discount on the price of gas.
Fewer than half of its employees took advantage of this dis-
count, which was worth about $48 in 1960. The court found
that this was a term and condition of employment as it was an
“emolument of value which accrued to employees out of their
employment relationship.” In Sivalls, Inc., 307 NLRB 986,
1007 (1992), the Board found that the employer violated Sec-
tion 8(a)(1) and (5) of the Act by unilaterally changing a prac-
tice of giving the employees 1 hour of paid leave in order to
vote. The Board has also found jury duty rights to be manda-
tory subjects of bargaining and terms and conditions of em-
ployment under Section 8(d) of the Act. Newspaper Printing
Corp., 232 NLRB 291 (1977); Merrill & Ring, Inc., 262 NLRB
392 (1982). In Ohio Power Co., 317 NLRB 135 (1995), it was
found that an employer’s practice of allowing union workmen’s
compensation officers to take worktime off, without pay, to
assist employees at workmen’s compensation hearings was a
mandatory subject of bargaining, when the employer unilater-
ally discontinued this practice. In AT&T Corp., 325 NLRB 150
(1997), the employer had been providing check cashing ser-
vices to its employees or, in lieu thereof, 15 minutes of paid
time to cash their paychecks. After the employer unilaterally

DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 38
discontinued this privilege, the administrative law judge and the
Board found that this was a material, substantial and significant
change, and a term and condition of employment, and the
change violated Section 8(a)(5) of the Act.
In Pontiac Osteopathic Hospital, 336 NLRB 1021 (2001),
the employees had a “bank” of hours that depended upon the
employees’ length of service with the employer and the number
of hours that they worked. The employees used the time accu-
mulated in this bank for vacations, sick, and personal days. This
was found to be a mandatory subject of bargaining when the
employer unilaterally changed this system to make it identical
to a system it employed for a different unit of employees. In
Mackie Automotive Systems, 336 NLRB 347 (2001), the em-
ployer employed approximately 16 employees at its facility,
which is dedicated to supplying parts to General Motors, its
only customer. In addition to the employer’s 16 employees,
there were approximately 200 General Motors employees at the
facility who are supervised by the employer. Because of its
dependence on General Motors, the employer’s operational
practice mirrored that of General Motors. So when General
Motors shut down its operation, for whatever reason, the em-
ployer did the same. In the past, the General Motors’ employ-
ees had worked a 9-1/2-hour workday, with no lunchbreaks and
the employer did the same, paying its employees time and a
half for the 30 minutes each day that they worked during what
would otherwise have been their lunchbreak. When General
Motors notified the employer that, effective immediately, they
were changing their practice and their employees would receive
a 30-minute lunchbreak, during which they would not be paid,
the employer, without prior notice to the union, changed its
practice to mirror the General Motors’ change. The employer
defended that it had to make the change because the work
schedule of its employees was always subject to change based
upon the General Motors’ schedule of operations. The Board
found a violation of Section 8(a)(5) of the Act: lunchbreaks are
mandatory subjects of bargaining, adherence to past practice
(mirroring the General Motors’ practice) is no defense, and it
does not come within the limited Board exception which, at
times, allows unilateral action when prompt action is compelled
by economic exigencies or business emergencies.
On the basis of the above, I find that the Respondent’s par-
ticipation in the blood programs was a mandatory subject of
bargaining. Like in Central Illinois, supra, this practice had
been in effect for over 30 years and provided a number of sub-
stantial and material benefits to those employees participating.
As testified to by Irwin, the employees derived satisfaction
from doing something for the community, giving blood, and
more selfishly, coming in from the cold or heat and getting paid
for the time. The amount of pay that the employees received for
this time spent, up to 8 hours for two contributions a year, is not
insubstantial. Counsel for the Respondent in his brief argues
that the blood programs were a benefit to Hudson Valley, rather
than Respondent’s employees, and that the cases cited by coun-
sel for the General Counsel in his brief to establish that the
blood programs are a term and condition of employment are not
applicable because the items listed, such as jury duty, “is a
direct benefit to the individual” which he differentiates from the
instant matter. I do not agree. Jury duty and voting are more of
a civic duty, such as giving blood; although they do not result
in any extra remuneration to the employees participating, they
are a term and condition of their employment.
Having found that participation in the blood program is a
term and condition of employment for the Respondent’s em-
ployees, the ultimate issue is whether the elimination of this
program by the Respondent violated Section 8(a)(5) of the Act.
The Respondent defends that it did not because the Union did
not request bargaining. I have found that the first time that the
Union requested bargaining was at the second-step grievance
on March 28, about 3 weeks after it was first notified of the
elimination of the program.6 Although the Union was clearly
less than vigilant in requesting bargaining, I find it unnecessary
to decide whether this constitutes a failure to request bargaining
because the change would still have violated the Act as it was
announced to the Union on March 7 and 29 as a fait accompli.
In Ciba-Geigy Pharmaceuticals Division, 264 NLRB 1013,
1017 (1979), Administrative Law Judge Julius Cohn, as af-
firmed by the Board, stated:

The other aspect of the waiver issue arises from Respondent’s
contention that the Union waived its right to bargain over the
changes simply because it failed to request bargaining. The
Board has long recognized that, where a union receives timely
notice that the employer intends to change a condition of em-
ployment, it must promptly request that the employer bargain
over the matter. To be timely, the notice must be given suffi-
ciently in advance of actual implementation of the change to
allow a reasonable opportunity to bargain. However, if the no-
tice is too short a time before implementation or because the
employer has no intention of changing its mind, then the no-
tice is nothing more than informing the union of a fait accom-
pli. [Footnotes omitted.]

In NLRB v. Crystal Springs Shirt Corp., 637 F.2d 399, 402 (5th
Cir. 1981), the court stated: “a union cannot be held to have
waived bargaining over a change that is presented to it as a fait
accompli” and the court, in NLRB v. Citizens Hotel Co., 326
F.2d 501, 505 (5th Cir. 1964), stated: “an employer must at
least inform the union of its proposed actions under circum-
stances which afford a reasonable opportunity for counter ar-
guments or proposals.” In Pontiac, supra, the Board stated:
“The issues of ‘fait accompli’, ‘request to bargain’, and
‘waiver’ are related in the sense that a finding of fait accompli
will prevent a finding that a failure to request bargaining is a
waiver.” In Hadden Craftsmen, 300 NLRB 789 at fn. 8 (1990),
the Board stated: “Board law requires an employer, after reach-
ing a decision concerning a mandatory subject, to delay imple-
mentation of the decision until after it has consulted with the
bargaining representative, but does not require that the em-
ployer delay the decision-making process itself.”
On March 6 or 7, Carter, who I found to be a totally credible
and believable witness, was told that the Respondent was no

6 A further defense of the Respondent is that, even this request was
not a proper request to bargain because it was made to individuals who
lacked to authority to negotiate. I disagree. At the time, Iazzetti was
senior marketing manager for the Respondent. However, because of my
finding that the change was a fait accompli, I find it unnecessary to
decide this issue.

VERIZON NEW YORK, INC. 39
longer going to participate in the blood program. Miller’s
March 29 letter to McCracken, while not as direct, had a similar
message. Neither one asked the Union for a response or gave
the Union an opportunity to bargain. Rather, this was a classic
fait accompli situation where the Respondent was telling the
Union that it decided that it was ending its participation in the
blood program; at that point, there was nothing to negotiate
about. I therefore find that by unilaterally rescinding its practice
of paying its employees for worktime spent participating in the
blood program, the Respondent violated Section 8(a)(1) and (5)
of the Act.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. The Respondent has been an employer engaged in com-
merce within the meaning of Section 2(2), (6), and (7) of the
Act.
2. The Union has been a labor organization within the mean-
ing of Section 2(5) of the Act.
3. By unilaterally rescinding its practice of permitting its
employees to participate in blood programs while on company
time and pay, on about March 7 and 29, 2001, the Respondent
violated Section 8(a)(1) and (5) of the Act.
THE REMEDY
Having found that the Respondent engaged in unfair labor
practices in violation of Section 8(a)(1) and (5) of the Act, I
shall recommend that it be ordered to cease and desist there-
from and that it take certain affirmative action to effectuate the
policies of the Act. Respondent has unlawfully unilaterally
discontinued its long tradition of paying employees for work-
time spent participating in the blood programs. I shall recom-
mend that the Respondent be ordered to rescind and withdraw
this change, and reinstate the policy that was in effect prior to
February 2001, and to bargain with the Union about this sub-
ject, prior to implementing such a change. If any employee
donated blood during worktime during this period, and was not
paid for this time, that employee would be entitled to be reim-
bursed by the Respondent for the time lost. I will leave it to the
compliance proceeding herein to determine whether this situa-
tion exists and, if so, the amounts owed.
On these findings of fact and conclusions of law and the en-
tire record, and pursuant to Section 10(c) of the Act, I issue the
following recommended 7
ORDER
The Respondent, Verizon New York, Inc., New York, New
York, its officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall
1. Cease and desist from
(a) Unilaterally eliminating its participation in blood pro-
grams, which allowed its employees to participate in the pro-

7 If no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec. 102.46 of the Board’s
Rules and Regulations, the findings, conclusions, and recommended
Order shall, as provided in Sec. 102.48 of the Rules, be adopted by the
Board and all objections to them shall be deemed waived for all pur-
poses.
gram on working time and to be paid for that time without first
giving notice and an opportunity to bargain to the Communica-
tions Workers of America, Locals 1103 and 1120 as the collec-
tive-bargaining representative of certain of its employees.
(b) In any like or related manner interfering with, restraining,
or coercing employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed
them by Section 7 of the Act.
2. Take the following affirmative action necessary to effec-
tuate the policies of the Act.
(a) Restore its participation in the blood programs as they ex-
isted prior to March 2001, i.e., paying employees for working
time spent participating in the blood programs, and bargain
with the Union prior to making any change in this program.
(b) Make whole any employee who gave blood during work-
ing time, in accordance with the remedy section of this deci-
sion.
(c) Preserve and, within 14 days of a request, or such addi-
tional time as the Regional Director may allow for good cause
shown, provide at a reasonable place designated by the Board
or its agents, all payroll records, social security payment re-
cords, timecards, personnel records and reports, and all other
records, including an electronic copy of such records if stored
in electronic form, necessary to analyze the amount of backpay
due under the terms of this Order.
(d) Within 14 days after service by the Regional Director for
Region 3 of the Board, post at each of its facilities in the Mid-
state, Upstate, and Downstate areas copies of the attached no-
tice marked “Appendix.”8 Copies of the notice, on forms pro-
vided by the Regional Director for Region 3, after being signed
by the Respondent’s authorized representative, shall be posted
by the Respondent and maintained for 60 consecutive days in
conspicuous places, including all places where notices to em-
ployees are customarily posted. Reasonable steps shall be taken
to ensure that the notices are not altered, defaced, or covered by
any other material. In the event that during the pendency of
these proceedings the Respondent has gone out of business or
closed any of the facilities involved in this proceeding, the Re-
spondent shall duplicate and mail, at its own expense, a copy of
the notice to all employees in the facility involved who were
employed by the Respondent at any time since March 1, 2001.
(e) Within 21 days after service by the Region, file with the
Regional Director a sworn certification of a responsible official
on a form provided by the Region, attesting to the steps the
Respondent has taken to comply.

8 If this Order is enforced by a judgment of a United States court of
appeals, the words in the notice reading “Posted by Order of the Na-
tional Labor Relations Board” shall read “Posted Pursuant to a Judg-
ment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of the
National Labor Relations Board.”